The Mimāmsā concept of *sāṃskāra

and the *sāṃskāra in the process of cognizing a word-meaning

—pūrva-varṇa-janita-sāṃskāra—*

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I. Introduction

In the Mimāmsā system of Vedic exegesis, speech (*ṣabda) is not word (*pada) but phoneme (*varṇa, aksara). So even the so-called word (*pada) is regarded as being in reality phonemes (*varṇas). This frame limits the Mimāmsakas’ options for explaining the process of cognizing a word-meaning (*padārtha-pratyaya, -pratipatti), because it is more natural to say that a word-meaning is cognized directly through a word, rather than through phonemes. For example, cowness (*gotva) is ordinarily considered to be cognized through the word “cow” (“gauḥ”), not through the phonemes /k//a//u// (/g//au//h/), as is clearly shown in our usage “word-meaning”.

To escape this dilemma between the theory of *varṇaṣabdavāda and the observed fact of *padārthapratyaya, the Vṛttikāra, whose explanation of Jaiminisūtra 1.1.3-5 is introduced in the Śābarabhāṣya, adopts the theory of *antyavarṇakaranavāda. According to this, a word-meaning is cognized through the last phoneme accompanied by a *sāṃskāra which is born from the preceding phonemes.

*pūrvavarṇajanitasaṃskārasahito 'ntyo varṇah pratyāyahakah. F 38.13*

The last phoneme accompanied by a *sāṃskāra which is born out of the preceding phonemes makes [one] cognize [the object of a word].

In this definition of *śabdārtha-pratyāyaka (or *padārtha-pratyayahetu), the Vṛttikāra maintains the position that the final phoneme (*varṇa) is the main cause in the action of cognizing a word-meaning (*padārtha-pratyaya) by allotting all responsibility to it and centralizing in it all other functions which originally belonged to the preceding phonemes. In this centralization, i.e. in uniting the momentary cognitions of each phoneme into one, he introduces the device of *sāṃskāra, which functions as a chain of momentary cognitions of each phoneme, /g//au//h/, and makes it possible to explain the fact of *padārtha-pratyaya without relying on the existence of a whole *pada, “gauḥ”. (cf. [Iyer 1966: 6 (introduction)])

This *sāṃskāra has been interpreted by modern scholars as a mental impression or trace (*sāṃskāra, bhāvanā, vāsanā), which is a cause of recollection (*smṛtiḥetu), as is described in, for example, the Vaiśeṣikasūtra, *Daśapadārthī and Praśastapādabhāṣya. Furthermore, Kumārila, historically the most important commentator on the Śābarabhāṣya, clearly states that this *sāṃskāra
is a mental trace (vāsanā). The Śābarabhāṣya, however, which is the earliest text among extant literature to state this view of *antyavarnakaranavāda, not only does not contain any evidence which may support this interpretation, but even suggests the opposite. What, then, is this sanskāra in the discussion of padārthapratyaya?

The present author tries to show the unsuitability of the old interpretation through internal textual evidence and by demonstrating that *smṛtihetusamskāra by its own definition cannot be this sanskāra. Furthermore, he suggests that this sanskāra is rather the unseen (adrṣṭa) effect of a preparation-act (saṃskāra-karman), which is a familiar notion in the Mīmāṃsā analysis of ritual. To this end, this paper first elucidates the Mīmāṃsā concept of saṃskāra-karman, which appears in various portions of the Śābarabhāṣya, and then investigates the relevant textual portion on padārthapratyaya. This internal evidence is again supported by a parallel discussion by Bhartṛhari on śabdābhivyakti. Finally, the present author tries to clarify Kumārila’s intention in accepting *smṛtihetusamskāra and shows that Kumārila’s commentary actually supports the conclusion presented here.

II. Descriptions of saṃskārakarman in the Śābarabhāṣya

1. Two types of acts: pradhānakarman and guṇakarman (=saṃskārakarman)
Mīmāṃsā analyses rituals into dravya (substance, material), guṇa (quality), karman (action, act) etc., in accordance with the Vaiṣeṣika view. Like the grammarians, however, the Mīmāṃsakas regard the act (karman, kriyā) as the core uniting these elements. This act is again divided into two types, viz. pradhānakarman (primary acts), such as yāga, homa and dāna, and guṇakarman (subordinate acts), such as dohana, avahanana and vilāpana.

Jaiminisūtra 2.1.6: tāni dvaidhaṁ, guṇapradhānahūtāni.
Those [acts] are of two types: primary [acts] and subsidiary [acts].

The former comprise the main part of a ritual, while the latter contribute to the whole indirectly, i.e. through a certain material (dravya): milking assists the offering through preparing milk, threshing serves the sacrifice through producing ground rice, and melting serves the offering through preparing butter for the offering.

2. The definition of saṃskārakarman (=guṇakarman) by contrast with pradhānakarman
Jaiminisūtra 2.1.6 divides acts (karman) into two, and Jaiminisūtra 2.1.8 gives a definition of guṇakarman (=saṃskārakarman) as dravyapradhāna or “having a material [not the act itself] as its primary element” according to Śabarāsvāmin’s interpretation.
Jaiminisūtra 2.1.8: yais tu dravyaṃ cikīrṣyate, guṇas tatra pratiyeta, tasya dravyapradhānatvāt.

On the other hand, when a material is intended to be made by those [verbs such as “grind”], one should understand [the act] as subsidiary in the case [of those verbs]. For that [act] has the material as its primary element. (This interpretation follows Śabarāsvāmin’s.)

By contrast pradhānakarman is defined in Jaiminisūtra 2.1.7 as that which has the accomplishment of the act itself (karmanirvṛtti) as its aim (ipsitama).⁹)

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{pradhānakarman} & : \text{dravya} \rightarrow \text{karman} \\
\text{guṇakarman (=}\text{samskāra}) & : \text{karman} \rightarrow \text{dravya}
\end{align*}
\]

3. The definition of samskārakarman as a śeṣa

Śabarabhāṣya ad 3.1.3 defines samskāra as a śeṣa or an element subservient to pradhānakarman. Samskāra produces in an element (padārtha), i.e. material (dravya), a capacity (sāmarthya) or suitability (yogyatā) for a certain purpose (prayojana, artha).

Śabarabhāṣya ad 3.1.3: samskāro nāma sa bhavati yasmiḥ jāte padārtho bhavati yogyāḥ kasyacid arthasya. tenāpi kriyāyāṃ kartavyāyāṃ prayojanam iti so ’pi parārthaḥ. A 660.9-11.

The samskāra is that, by the arising of which an element becomes suitable for a certain purpose. It also has a purpose regarding the action to be made. Therefore it also exists for the other [and fulfills the definition of śeṣa].

Śabarabhāṣya ad 3.7.6: yat tasya samskāravyasya prayojanam tatra sāmarthyam janayantīt. A 1078.4-5.

[Samskāra is said to be “that which arranges (samskaroti)”.] For it produces a capacity for the purpose of that which is to be arranged (samskāravya).

In this way, samskāra, like other elements, such as dravya and guṇa, assists pradhānakarman and thus fulfills the śeṣa’s definition of “parārthaṭva” or “being for the other”. Thus samskārakarman could be labelled *arthayogatāpādaka (that which brings about a suitability for a certain purpose) or *prayojanasāmarthyajanaka (that which produces capacity).

sāmarthya
4. “Purpose” (prayojana, artha) of the samskāra

Śābarabhāṣya ad 3.6.11-13 discusses the relationship of gunapradhānabhāva, šeṣašeṣibhāva between a ritual fire (agnī) and pavamāneṣṭis (sacrifices for the pavamāna[-agnī]), which are performed after setting up three or five fires (agnyādheyā, agnyādhiṇā). The opponent holds that a ritual fire, which is already set up before the pavamāneṣṭis, serves the pavamāneṣṭis in accordance with the maxim bhūtaṃ bhavyāyopadiśyate (The produced is prescribed for the sake of what should be produced). So the produced (bhūta) fire is regarded as subservient to the pavamāneṣṭis which should be produced (bhāvyavitavya). Opposing this view, the Siddhāntin answers that the pavamāneṣṭis should be regarded as subservient to the ritual fire (pavamāneṣṭayo hy agnyarthāḥ), because if the pavamāneṣṭis, as the opponent holds, were served by a ritual fire, they would be useless and so would the setting up of fire (agnyādheya), which serves the pavamāneṣṭis through a ritual fire. For the pavamāneṣṭis do not have any fruit (nisphalās tv ışṭayah). But if the ritual fire is primary, though it is a produced element (bhūta), after being purified by the future pavamāneṣṭis, it will serve other rituals, such as the agnihotra, ārthapūrṇamāsa, etc., and thereby become useful (prayojanavattvāc cāgniṇām).

5. The unseen effect (adrṣṭa) of the samskāra

Śābarabhāṣya ad 3.1.22, dealing with the same topic, expands further on the nature of “purpose” (prayojana, phala). The opponent, who holds that the pavamāneṣṭis are pradhānakarman as before, apparently suggests relying on the viśvajinnyāya, viz. that one can assume a fruit of the pavamāneṣṭis (kalpyam phalam) if they do not have any fruit taught in the scripture. The Siddhāntin, who holds that pavamāneṣṭis are samskārakarman and their fruit is the purification of the fire (agniṣamskāra), rejects the opponent’s view, appealing to the principle of

pūrvapakṣa : agni → pavamāneṣṭi → ? (nisprajojana)
siddhānta : pavamāneṣṭi → agni → prayojana

Here the opponent takes the pavamāneṣṭis as pradhānakarman. The Siddhāntin, however, concludes that they are guṇakarman (=samskārakarman) because of their contribution to other rituals through ritual fires. If we apply the above-mentioned definitions of samskāra, i.e. “dravyapradhāna” and “*prajojanasāmarthyajanaka” or “*arthayogayatapādaka”, the Siddhāntin’s intention becomes clearer: the subordinate samskārakarmans, i.e. pavamāneṣṭis, give to the primary element (pradhāna), i.e. ritual fires, a suitability (yogatā) for a certain purpose (artha, prayojana), such as to assist agnihotra etc.
“adrṣṭakalpanālpyaśi nyāyā” or “the least assumption of the unseen entities is right”. Following the opponent’s view, one has to assume two unseen effects, i.e. that of svarga as a result of homa and that of unseen purification (adrṣṭā sanskāra) of the pavamāneśṭi through the āhavanīya. In contrast, the Siddhāntin assumes only one, i.e. unseen purificatory effect upon the āhavanīya through the pavamāneśṭi.

To summarize, the procedure described here runs as follows: first each element such as sanskārakarman, dravya and prayojana, is posited according to the definition of pradhānakarman and sanskārakarman. The opponent holds that āhavanīya is for the sake of the pavamāneśṭis and the pavamāneśṭis are for the sake of svarga, which is assumed lest they should become purposeless. The Siddhāntin, considering pavamāneśṭis to be a sanskārakarman, holds that pavamāneśṭis are for the sake of āhavanīya, and āhavanīya is for the sake of other rituals such as the agnihoṭra etc. Up to this stage one cannot decide which view is preferable, because both processes have purpose enough. Then the number of unseen effects is counted, so that the “light hypothesis” or simple model may be adopted in accordance with the maxim adṛṣṭakalpanālpyaśi nyāyā.

\[
\text{sanskāra (adrṣṭa)} \\
\text{pūrvapakṣa : agni } \rightarrow \text{ pavamāneśṭi } \rightarrow \text{ svarga (adrṣṭa)} \\
\text{sanskāra (adrṣṭa)} \\
\text{siddhānta : pavamāneśṭi } \rightarrow \text{ agni } \rightarrow \text{prayojana (drṣṭa)}
\]

6. The seen effect (drṣṭa) of the sanskārakarman
Śābarabhāṣya ad 11.1.27 deals with sanskārakarman, such as threshing (avahanana) and grinding (peṣaṇa), which have seen effects. Here the question is whether they should be performed until some seen effects are accomplished or not. The Siddhāntin concludes that they should, in accordance with the maxim drṣṭe saty (or sambhavaty) adṛṣṭakalpanānyāyā (If the seen is possible, assumption of the unseen is not right). Here the act of threshing or grinding has a visible (pratyakṣa, drṣṭa) fruit, such as tanḍula (threshed rice) or piṣṭa (ground rice). If we gave up the performance in the middle, we would be forced to rely on the assumption of an unseen effect, which is not acceptable when the seen effect is possible. Here the purpose (artha, phala) is divided into two: the seen and the unseen, out of which the former is preferred.

III. The characteristic features of sanskārakarman
1. sanskārakarman has a material as its primary element (dravyapradhāna).
2. sanskārakarman gives to the material a capacity (sāmarthya) or suitability (yogyatā) for a particular purpose (artha, prayojana).
3. sanskārakarman is a subservient element (ṣeṣa, parārtha) that, through a material (dravya),
serves pradhānakarman (a primary act), which is also qualified as a purpose (arthā, prayojana).

4. The fruit (phala, artha) given by samskārakarman in a material (dravya) is either seen (drṣṭa, pratyakṣa) or unseen (adṛṣṭa, kalpya). The latter is also called samskāra. This assumed unseen entity (adṛṣṭa, kalpyam phalam) should be avoided or reduced if possible.

IV. An examination of the samskāra in the discussion of *padārthapratyaya

The following examines the notion of samskāra which appears in the discussion of the process of cognizing a word-meaning (padārthapratyaya), in order to show that the samskāra here is not the *smṛtihetusamskāra, as it is usually interpreted, but the unseen purificatory effect of samskārakarman. The synopsis of the so-called sphoṭavāda in the Śābarabhāṣya (strictly speaking, in the explanation by the Vṛttikāra), which deals with the process of cognizing the object of a word (padārthapratyaya), is as follows:

0. Presupposition: a meaning (arthā) is cognized through speech (śabda).17)
1. Speech (śabda) is nothing but phonemes (varṇa).18) (⇒Fact: artha is cognized through varṇas.) F 38. 3-5
2. The direct connection between varṇas and padārthapratyaya is denied, leading to anupapatti.19) F 38. 6
   a. Denial of two possibilities20) F 38. 6-9
   b. Explanation by *sphoṭa21) F 38. 9-10
   c. Denial of smarana-process22) F 38.11-12
3. Adṛṣṭakalpanā: artha is cognized from varṇas through the unseen medium of samskāra.23) F 38. 13
   a. laukikavacana, which seems to conflict with the siddhānta24) F 38.14-20
   b. sāstravacana, which seems to conflict with the siddhānta25) F 38.20-24
   c. Solution of the laukikavacana26) F 40. 1-7
   d. Solution of the sāstravacana27) F 40. 7-10
4. Denial of *sphoṭavāda by the number of unseen effects (adṛṣṭa).28) F 40.11-12

In composing this section, the Vṛttikāra most probably presupposes the process of arthāpatti (cf. [Kataoka 1998]), which is also shown explicitly in the two ślokas quoted in the Śābarabhāṣya ad 2.2.1.29) First the seen fact (drṣṭa) of padārthapratyaya is shown. Second, it is shown that there exists inexplicability (anupapatti) in this fact, padārthapratyaya, so long as we confine ourselves to the seen world. To keep this condition of anupapatti (or anyathānupapatti), which is the main cause for arthāpatti to function, all possible doctrines which explain the fact only with the seen are denied.
Thirdly, the unseen (adṛṣṭa) is assumed and sanāskāra is posited as a medium between varṇas and padārthapratyaya so as to solve the anupapatti. This is the stage where the doctrine of *antyavārṇakaraṇavādā is given. Fourthly, due to the smaller number of adṛṣṭas, the Mimāṃsaka’s position is preferred to that of the Vaiyākaraṇas, who hold the *sphoṭavāda which involves two unseen effects: one is *sphoṭa itself and the other is sanāskāra for *sphoṭapratyaya, which corresponds to that for padārthapratyaya in the Mimāṃsā view.

Problems in the previous interpretation If one follows the previous interpretation that the sanāskāra in the Vṛttikāra’s definition is nothing but a mental trace, which functions as a cause of recollection (smyrthetu), the following problems arise: First, besides his own position, the Vṛttikāra (in 2c above), speaking through the Sphoṭavādins, mentions one model to be denied, according to which the phenomenon of cognizing a word-meaning is to be explained as a recollection process.

antarhite ’pi śabde smaranaṇād arthapratyaya iti cen na. F 38.11
[Question:] Although the speech has disappeared, one cognizes the object by recollection. [Answer:] No.

If we accept that the sanāskāra is the cause of recollection, and so regard the process as including recollection, the Vṛttikāra’s negative statement would be inappropriate. Secondly, the context of the relevant portion, which apparently follows the procedure of arthāpatti, shows that the Vṛttikāra intends the recollection model as that which can explain the phenomenon of the padārthapratyaya within our familiar “seen (drṣṭa)” domain, without relying on any unseen effects (adṛṣṭa). It follows consequentially that the mental trace, which is always entailed by the recollection, is to be included for the Vṛttikāra in the “seen” domain. The sanāskāra in the siddhānta, on the other hand, is explicitly stated as an unseen effect (adṛṣṭa) which should be postulated. If we took the sanāskāra to be the cause of recollection (*smyrthetusanāskāra), we would encounter the dilemma that the sanāskāra is regarded by the same author as “seen” as well as “unseen”. Thirdly, *smyrthetusanāskāra, which belongs to the āman, does not fit by its definition with the sanāskāra mentioned here, which accompanies the last phoneme.

Suitability of the new interpretation The sanāskāra mentioned here is equipped with those features suitable to the unseen effect (adṛṣṭa) of sanāskārakarman. As pointed out before, the sanāskārakarman is regarded as dravyapradhāna, which has a material as its primary elements, in which it gives a capacity for a certain purpose. Likewise here the process (suggested rather weakly by the expression of “jānita”) is a sanāskārakarman, which has the last phoneme (antyo varṇa) as its primary element, in which it gives a capacity for padārthapratyaya. Here the produced capacity is
labelled as “samskāra” (a purificatory effect) and is qualified as “unseen” (adrṣṭa), as is seen in Śābarabhāṣya ad 3.1.22, where particular fruits are labeled as “samskāra” and “adrṣṭaḥ samskāra”.

samskāra (adrṣṭa)
pūrvavāṇa (*sāṃskāraka) → samskārakarman → antyavāṇa → padārthapratyaya

As is shown before in the case of the samskārakarman, it is a common procedure in the Śābarabhāṣya (and to all Mimāṃsakas) to examine the nature of acts’ fruit and count the number of the adṛṣṭas in order to show the superiority of the Siddhāntin’s view. The similarity in the procedure of both discussions, i.e. one on the unseen purificatory effect of samskārakarman and the other on the process of padārthapratyaya, leads one to think that both samskāras are of the same nature.

V. A parallel discussion by Bhartṛhari

The following points out the fact that Bhartṛhari uses the terminology of “sāṃskāra” to denote the samskārakarman and regards it as a device to explain the process of *śabdābhivyakti or the manifestation of speech. This fact implies that the concept of sāṃskāra current in linguistic debate around AD 500, is not *smṛtiḥetusaṃskāra but samskārakarman or its unseen effect. (Kumārila, too, discussing śabdābhivyakti in the Ślokavārttika śabdanyatā vv.51c-87b, accepts this character of sāṃskāra and establishes the Mimāṃsā position of the ṣrotrasaṃskāra.)

Mahābhāṣyadipikā prathamānika 8.1: sa ca nādah śrotrasāṃskṛtaḥ vartate. tadanugrhītam śrotram śabdopalabdhau samarthaḥ bhavati, ... ity eke. ape-ṣe samāsyaiva. ... ubhayor ity ape. MBhD I 17.15-17.

And this sound functions to help the ear. The ear helped by this [sound] becomes capable of the perception of speech. ... So say some. Others say that it is the speech [which is helped by this sound]. ... Others say that it is both [i.e. ear and speech, which are helped by this sound].

Vākyapadīya I. v.80 (VP 44.25-26):

indriyasayaiva samskārah śabdasyaivobhayasya vā/
kriyate dhvanibhir, vādās trayo ’bhivyaktivādināṁ//

Sounds produce samskāra (arrangement) either in the organ [of hearing], speech or both. [There are] three doctrines held by those who maintain that [speech is] manifested.

The samskāra mentioned here has the features of the samskārakarman as dravyapradhāna and *prajñanasāmārthyajanaka. The expression “śrotrasāṃskṛtaḥ” shows the dravyapradhāna-aspect of the samskārakarman. Further, “śabdopalabdhau samarthatā bhavati” reminds us of
Śabarásvāmin’s description of *samskārakarman*, i.e. “padārtho bhavati yogyaḥ kasyacid arthasya” and “tatra (=prayojane) sāmartyam janayantī”.

VI. The intention of Kumārila

In the following I shall examine the motivation of Kumārila, who admits that the *samskāra* here is *vāsanā* or a mental trace, in order to show that his interpretation does not contradict our conclusion but in fact supports it if we understand his intention properly. In the Ślokāvārttika *sphoṭavāda*, he introduces three interpretations of this *samskāra*. (The following synopsis of the Ślokāvārttika is based on [Omae 1998a], with a slight modification by the present author. Maṇḍana’s *Sphoṭasiddhi* offers us a good survey of Kumārila’s three positions (1, 3i, 3ii below), which correspond to the *pūrvapakṣas* of v.5, vv.6-7, v.8 in the *Sphoṭasiddhi* [Iyer 1966: 13, 16-17, 20]. An English summary is available in Iyer’s introduction. Vācaspati, applying Maṇḍana’s criticism about the cause of cognizing a word-meaning (*padārtha*) to that of a sentence-meaning (*vākyārtha*), also explains (and criticizes) three positions in his *Tattvabindu*. 1=TB 25.13-26.13; 3i=TB 26.14-28.7; 3ii=TB 29.1-33.6.)

1 *samskārakalpanā* vv.74-90

2 anugraha (*adrṣṭakalpanānirāsa*) vv.95-98

3 *samskāra=vāsanā* vv.99-112
   
   i *samskāra=vāsanā* (*smṛtihetu+arthapratyayahetu*) vv.99-104
   
   ii *samskāra=vāsanā* (*smṛtihetu*) vv.109-112
      
      a citrabuddhi (*pūrvavarṇasmṛti+antyavarṇapratyayakṣa*) v.111
      
      b samuccayajñāna (*samastavarṇasmṛti*) v.112

1 Postulation of the *samskāra* (*samskārakalpanā*)

The first position interprets the *samskāra* in the Śābarabhāṣya by appealing to the analogy with “various subtle functions” (v. 76c: *sūkṣmā vyāpārabhedāḥ*) in ritual, which are postulated in order to connect theoretically each temporary ritual act so that one can explain their efficacy. The unseen subtle functions which Kumārila mentions correspond in the ritual context to the unseen effects (*adrṣṭa*) such as *apūrva* and purification. This position, therefore, is to be understood as that which takes the *samskāra* to be an unseen effect. (A summary in Japanese is given in [Omae 1998b: 468].)

2 Refutation of postulating unseen effects (*adrṣṭakalpanānirāsa*)

The second position intends to explain the phenomenon of cognizing a word-meaning without a postulation of any unseen effects. (A summary is given in [Omae 1998b: 468].)
Without postulating the [unseen] \textit{samskāra}, the last phoneme, due to functioning immediately after them [i.e. preceding phonemes], helped and given [by them] the capacity [to let one cognize a word-meaning], can be a communicator.

This position, presupposing the same structure of the \textit{samskāra-karman} as in the previous position, regards the capacity (\textit{sāmarthya}) or the effect produced through the assistance (\textit{anugraha}) as a seen object (\textit{drṣṭa}), unlike the previous position, which takes it as an unseen object. It is, however, theoretically impossible in this case, as Kumārila points out, to posit an \textit{anugraha-phala} or \textit{sāmarthya} within the domain of the “seen” world, without having recourse to something which fills the time gap between the preceding phonemes and the last phoneme.

\textbf{3 \textit{samskāra} as a mental trace (\textit{samskāra}=\textit{vāsanā})}

The final interpretation is the one which was to define his followers’ orthodox interpretation. Kumārila pays attention to the fact that this particular \textit{samskāra} requires a different capacity from the common \textit{samskāra}, which functions as a cause of recollection (\textit{smṛtiḥetu}).

Although the \textit{samskāra} is already posited separately as a cause of recollection, its capacity for other effects is not denied.

In this way, Kumārila, after identifying Šabra’s \textit{samskāra} as the well-known cause of recollection, i.e. a mental trace (\textit{bhāvanā, vāsanā}), postulates on to this “seen” locus a new “unseen” property, i.e. the capacity (\textit{sāmarthya}) of being a cause to cognize a word-meaning (\textit{arthabuddhiḥetutva}). (A summary is given in [Omae 1998b: 468-467])

Therefore it is not the existence of \textit{samskāra} that is thus postulated by this [author, i.e. Šabara]. Only its being the cause to cognize an object is postulated as an unseen object.
This idea apparently assumes the maxim which is formulated later as “dharmikalpanātah dharmakalpanā laghīyasi” (To assume the property is lighter than to assume the locus.). To explain, Kumārila intends to reduce the assumption so that he could show the superiority of the Mīmāṃsā theory over the sphoṭa theory. By postulating a mere property (dharmakalpanā), he makes the presumption even lighter than that of Śabara, who postulates the locus itself (dharmikalpanā) in Kumārila’s eyes.32) Our assumption is confirmed by a parallel discussion by Kumārila in the Ślokāvārttika śūnyavāda, where a Buddhist opponent, using the Mīmāṃsakas’ own idea, applies this general rule to attack their position that an external object (arthā) is postulated.

Ślokāvārttika śūnya, v. 18:
anekakalpanāyāś ca jyāyasī hy ekakalpanā/
śaktimātrasa bhedaś ca vastubhedād viśiṣyate// SV 194.26-28
For [in general], it is better to postulate one thing than to postulate many. And [when it is inevitable to postulate one thing] the separation [and postulation] of a mere capacity is superior to the separation [and postulation] of an entity. (It is better to postulate a vāsanā, i.e. the capacity of a cognition, than to postulate an external object, in order to explain the fact that we grasp blue etc.)

The Buddhist regards the vāsanā as a capacity (śakti) of a cognition (jñāna), the postulation of which is less and better than postulating an entirely separate entity, i.e. an external object (arthā). In the same manner but on a different level, Kumārila, in our relevant portion of the sphoṭavāda, considers the arthabuddhihetutva to be a capacity (sāmarthya) of a well-known cause of a recollection, i.e. samskāra as equivalent to vāsanā (v. 103: tasya [samskārasya] arthabuddhihetutvam; v. 102: sāmarthyaṃ ... tasya [samskārasya]). In consequence we can assume that Kumārila intends this position, which postulates only an unseen capacity “arthabuddhihetutva” in the well-known samskāra (=vāsanā, mental trace), to be better than the first interpretation, which postulates an entirely separate entity “samskāra” (an unseen effect of a preparation-act).33)

This attitude of reduction leads him to the further step that one does not need to postulate at all a new capacity, i.e. arthabuddhihetutva. For, so long as one can get the same result with this samskāra, it is better to depend on its well-known character, i.e. smṛtihetutva, without postulating a new capacity. (Summary is given in [Omae 1998b: 467])

Ślokāvārttika sphoṭa, v. 109:
yad vā pratyakṣataḥ pūrvaṃ kramajñāneṣu yat param/
samastavarnavijñānam tad arthajñānakāraṇam// SV 380.14-15
Or, first cognizing sequentially [the individual phonemes] by perceptions, one cognizes
afterwards all the phonemes. This cognition is the cause of cognizing a [word-]meaning.

Kumārila shows two further possible models. In both cases recollection (smāraṇa) plays a key role as a “time-gap-filler”: 1. a variegated single cognition which has access to both present and past phonemes (v. 111: citrarūpāṃ ...buddhim sadasadvānarocarām.), i.e. a cognition which consists of the perception of the last phoneme and the recollections of the preceding phonemes, becomes the cause of cognizing a word-meaning; 2. a single recollection of all phonemes (v. 112: smaraṇam ...sarveṣu), including the last phoneme, is the cause of cognizing a word-meaning. (Cf. [Omae 1998b: 467].)

This idea presupposes the maxim “drṣṭe saty adṛṣṭakalpanānyāyyā”. In this way, Kumārila, excluding a postulation of an unseen effect (adṛṣṭakalpanā), finally develops the Mimāmsā theory that it is possible to cognize a word-meaning from the last phoneme simply through recollecting the (preceding or all) phonemes.

As mentioned before, the superiority of the Mimāmsā theory to the sphoṭavāda depends on the smaller number of unseen objects postulated. Kumārila, starting from the position that the saṃskāra is an unseen effect, intends to reduce the weight of postulation as far as possible: first he halves the postulation, i.e. he postulates only a new capacity, i.e. arthabuddhihetutva, through the identification of the saṃskāra as the well-known cause of a recollection (vāsanā); then he goes further and finally succeeds in completely avoiding any new postulation, by utilizing the well-known character of the vāsanā, i.e. smṛtihetutva. It can be observed that Kumārila tries to add his own contribution, while being fully aware of the previous idea that one has to postulate the unseen locus itself.

\[dharmikalpanā → dharmakalpanā → kalpanā-abhāva \text{(saṃskāra=vāsanā)}\]

Regarding his intention to contribute to the Mimāmsā theory through reducing postulation, one can see that Kumārila’s interpretation that the saṃskāra is nothing but a vāsanā rather supports our conclusion that there existed the position that the saṃskāra was an unseen effect.

VII. Conclusion

1. The saṃskāra mentioned in the Śābarabhāṣya is not related with smarana and therefore different from *smṛtihetusamskāra, because the Vṛttikāra mentions smarana besides the *antyavarnakaraṇaṃvāda.

2. The saṃskāra mentioned here is regarded by the Vṛttikāra as adṛṣṭa while the process of smarana is shown in this context as devoid of any adṛṣṭa. So saṃskāra here is different from *smṛtihetusamskāra.
3. *Smṛtiḥetusamskāra* belongs to the ātman, according to its definition, while the *samskāra* mentioned here does not belong to the ātman but to the last phoneme. So these two are different.

4. The structure of *samskāra* and *samskāra* (*=adrṣṭaḥ samskāra*) is consistent with that of this *samskāra*.

5. The way to decide the preferable view, based on choosing that which has the smaller number of the unseen effects, is common to both.

6. The parallel discussion by Bhartṛhari supports this interpretation.

7. Kumārila’s commentary, which mentions the same interpretation as ours and is motivated by a particular intention to go two steps beyond it, supports rather than opposes our interpretation, considering his special motivation.

### Abbreviations and Texts


**BhP** *Brhaṭi of Prabhākara Miśra with the Bhāṣyapariśiṣṭa of Śālikanātha*. Ed. S.K.Ramanatha Sastri. Madras, University of Madras, 1936.


**TB** *Tattvabindu by Vācaspatimiśra with Tattvabīhāvanā by Ṛṣiputra Parameśvara*. Ed. V.A.Ramaswami Sastri. Annamalai University, 1936.


### Secondary Sources


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1) According to the Mimamsā siddhānta, śabda is defined as the object which is grasped by the organ of hearing (cf. śrotagrāhaneḥ aryathe ... F 38.4). So those eternal sounds which are made manifest by human beings as well as by drums are equally regarded as śabda. Therefore it is too narrow to translate śabda as ‘speech’. The relevant portion of the Śābarabhāṣya, however, which mainly deals with the argument with the so-called sphoṭavādins, has nothing to do with drum sounds. What the Vyrtikāra intends as śabda here is that which communicates a word-meaning, i.e. either varṇa or sphoṭa. So it is ‘meaningless’ to translate śabda as ‘sound’. Furthermore, it might cause an unnecessary confusion to translate śabda as ‘sound’, since ‘sound’ includes dhvani (or nāda), which Mimāṃsakas clearly distinguish from the eternal śabda. For these reasons I translate here śabda as ‘speech’.

2) Śābarabhāṣya ad 1.1.3-5, Vyrtikāra: tasmād gaur iti gakārādi visarjāniyāntam padam akṣarāny eva, na tebhya vyatiriktaṁ anyat padam nāma iti. F 40.9-10. “Therefore the word “gauḥ”, which begins with /g/ and ends with /h/, is nothing but phonemes. It is not a distinct thing beyond these [phonemes] called “word.””

3) “Erinnerung” [Strauss 1932: 17] ;  “impression” [Jha 1973: 19] ;  “Śabara says that the meaning is conveyed by the last letter aided by the impressions produced in the mind by the preceding letters. ... The impressions or saṃskāra-s are the traces left on the mind by experience and can produce the recollection, when needed, of what has been experienced.” [Raja 1969:111] ;  “Der letzte Laut zusammen mit dem durch die früheren Laute erzeugten Eindruck bringt (den Gegenstand) zur Kenntniss.” F 39 ;  “impressions” [D’Sa 1980: 78] ;  “The invisible binder between phonemes are “mental dispositions” (saṃskāra) only, imprinted by previous phonemes. The last phoneme associated with mental impressions produced by previous ones, is that which makes us know (the object). Thus, in case of audition and comprehension of a language, saṃskāras work like a sort of immediate memory.” [Kapani 1992-93: 22-23]

4) Vaiśeṣikasūtra 9.22: ātmamanasoh saṃyogaviśeṣāt saṃskārāc ca smṛtiḥ. VS 70.11. “Recollection [arises] from a particular conjunction between ātman and manas and from saṃskāra.”

5) Daśpadārthī 53 (Reconstructed Sanskrit): smṛtiḥetur iti ya ātmasamaveta ekadravyo dṛṣṭānamānajñānasamskārajanyo bhāvanāviśeṣaḥ sa eva smṛtiḥetur ity ucye. “Cause of recollection: That which is inherent in soul, has one substance [as its locus], is produced by direct or inferential cognition or impression, and which is a particular mental act, is called cause of recollection.” [Miyamoto 1996: 175]

6) Praṣastapādabhāṣya 304: bhāvanāsaṃjñākas tv ātmaguno dṛṣṭaśrutumabhūteṣv artheṣu smṛtipratyabhijñānahaḥ bhavati. P 62.6-7. “Besides, that [saṃskāra] called “bhāvanā” is a quality of the ātman and becomes the cause for recollection and recognition of objects experienced,
either seen or heard."

7) Ślokavārttikā sphota, v.99: 

atha vā vāsanaivāstu samskārah sarva eva hi /
dṛṣṭehānāgrhīte ’rthe samskāro ’sūti manvate //
SV 378. 24-28. “Or, the samskāra [mentioned in the Śābarabhāṣya] can be [interpreted as] nothing but a mental trace. Because each and every [expounder] admits that there is a samskāra after an object is grasped by a firm cognition.”

8) According to the Prakaraṇapañcikā (PrP 457-458), samskārakarmans are divided into four, i.e. āpti (to get), upatti (=utpādana, to generate), viκṛti (to deform), and samskṛti (to purify). Among them, only the samskṛti (also called samskāra) has an unseen effect (also called samskāra).

Kumārila already presupposes this classification. Tantravārttikā ad 1.3.24: ko vā samskārah upattiprāptivikārāpurvāsādhanasāmarthyādhiṣṭanām kriyata iti. A 270. 21-22.

9) Śābarabhāṣya ad 2.1.7: 


“For the material is subordinate, since the accomplishment of the act [itself] is the thing that is most to be reached [in this act].”

10) Cf. Śābarabhāṣya ad 2.1.4: bhavyārthās te bhiṣṭārthāiḥ samuccarītāḥ. bhūtasya bhavyārthātāyām drṣṭārthaḥ. bhavyārthasya prayojanavata upattir arthavaḥ, sā ca bhūtena kriyata iti drṣṭo ’rthāḥ. bhavyasya punar bhiṣṭārthātāyām na kiṃcid drśyate, kalpyate cādṛṣṭam. A 388.12-15. “Those [words], which denote the [objects] which should be produced, are pronounced together with those denoting the produced [objects]. If the produced [object] is for the sake of the [object] which should be produced, it has a seen purpose. The production of the object which should be produced, which has its [own] purpose, is useful. And that [production of the object to be produced] is made by the produced [object]. Thus the purpose is seen. By contrast, if [the object] to be produced is for the sake of the produced [object], no [purpose] is seen and [so] an unseen [effect] is [to be] assumed.”


“However [it is] not [so]. Because those [pavamāneṣṭis] aim for that [ritual fire]. For pavamāneṣṭis are for the sake of the ritual fire. If the ritual fire is for the sake of sacrifices, then setting up of fire, which aims for that [fire], would assist sacrifices. But the sacrifices lack purpose. The setting up of fire too, which is for the sake of those [sacrifices], would lack purpose. [Opponent:] How then are the pavamāneṣṭis for the sake of the fire? [Siddhāntin:] Only because [pavamāneṣṭis would become] purposeless [according to your view]. And because [according to our view] fires have purpose. The sacrifices, though [they are] to be produced, should be done for fires, which are [already] produced. (=The maxim “bhūtām bhāvyāyopadīṣyate” is not applied to this case.)
Therefore the setting up of the fires is not for the sake of the *pavamāneṣṭīs.*

12) Śābarabhāṣya ad 4.3.15

13) Śābarabhāṣya ad 2.1.7: *alpiyasy adṛṣṭakalpanā nyāyya.* A 406.7; Śābarabhāṣya ad 2.2.1: *adṛṣṭārthānām upakārakalpanālpiyasya nyāyya.* A 462.1-2.

14) Śābarabhāṣya ad 3.1.22: *nānāv āhavanīyo 'tra yāgasyādhiṣṭhikaṇaṭvena guṇabhātah śṛṣṭyate.* satyaṃ. adhitkaṇaṃ āhavanīyaḥ. tathāpi tv āhavanīyārtha eva yāgaḥ. prayaṇaṇaṭvād āhavanīyasya, niṣprayaṇaṇavād pavamaṇāhahvisāṃ. kathām eṣāṃ niṣprayaṇaṇāt. phalāśravānāt.

kalyāṇaḥ phalam iti cet, satyaṃ kalyāṇaṃ. agnīsaktāras tu tatphalam, na svargaḥ. svarge kalpyaṃe dvīr adṛṣṭaḥ kalpyeta, homāca ca svarga bhavati, tasya cāhavanīyānāpāro 'dṛṣṭaḥ samśkāra iti. tasmād agraṇārthatā pavamaṇāhahvisāṃ. A 737.11-738.1. “[Opponent:] Here [in this passage], the offering fire is taught [by the locative-ending] to be the subservient element, in as much as it is the locus of the sacrifice. [Siddhāntin:] True, the offering fire is the locus. But even though [it is] so, the sacrifice is only for the offering fire. Because the offering fire has a purpose but the *pavamāneṣṭīs* lack a purpose. [Opponent:] Why do they (=pavamaṇāneṣṭīs) lack a purpose ? [Siddhāntin:] Because [their] fruit is not [explicitly] taught. [Opponent:] [Their] fruit is to be assumed. [Siddhāntin:] True, [it is] to be assumed. But their fruit is purification of the fire, not heaven. If heaven is assumed, then something unseen would be assumed twice: heaven arises from the offering and another unseen, i.e. purification of the offering, [arises] by the offering fire. Therefore the *pavamaṇāneṣṭīs* are for the fire.”

15) Strictly speaking, the fruit is not *tandula* itself but the *tandula*’s suitability (*yogyatā*) for *purodāsa* produced in the *vṛīhi.* The same is so of *piṣṭa.*

16) Śābarabhāṣya ad 11.1.27: *vṛīhin avahanti tandulāṃ pinaṣṭi ityevamād-inām drśṭa-prayaṇo-ānām kriyānām ā tandemānirvṛtye prayaṇo syāt. kutāḥ. etāṣāṃ prayo-prayākṣo 'ṛtho nirvṛtyate. tandemāḥ piṣṭāni ca. tais ceha prayaṇo-ānām, purodāsāsa kāryatvaṁ. tasmād etāṣāṃ tadārtha eva prayaṇo viṇṇāyate. yadi sakrd eva musalasyodyamananāpitāne kṛtvotpṛṣyeta upalāyā vā prakaṛṣṭaṇānaparāsane, yad eṣāṃ kāryam tan naiva nirvṛtyeta. ata āṣāṃ tannirvṛttyāpavargaḥ syāt. ā tandemānirvṛttēr ā ca piṣṭanirvṛttēr abhyāsa iti.* A 2115 [misprinted as 3015]. “Those acts which have a seen purpose [prescribed as] e.g. “One threshes rice.” and “One grinds rice.” etc. are performed until the threshed rice [or the ground rice] is accomplished. [Opponent:] Why? [Siddhāntin:] Because in performing these [acts], a visible purpose is accomplished: threshed rice and ground rice. And these are useful in this [sacrifice], because a rice-cake is to be made [from them]. Therefore performing these [acts] are known to be for that [rice-cake] only. If one gives up after only a single [performance of] raising and pounding the pestle or pushing and pulling the millstone, their result to be made (=rice-cake) would be never accomplished. Therefore [one should know that] they are completed by accomplishing that (=threshed rice, ground rice). That means [one should] repeat [the action] up to the accomplishment of threshed rice and the
accomplishment of ground rice.”

17) "śabde cen nimittabhūte svayam avabhyate. F 34.21. “If, when speech is present as a cause [for the cognition of an object], one cognizes [the object] oneself, [then] ..... .”

18) atha gaur ity atra kah śabadah. gakāрукāravisarjanīyā iti bhagavān upavarsah. śrotagrahane hy arthe loke śabdaśabdaḥ prasiddhah. te ca śrotagrahaṇāḥ. “Then what is the speech in this “gaūḥ”? The reverend Upavāra [says], [Pratijñā]: “[The phonemes] /g/ /au/ /h/ [are speech].”

[Udāhāraṇa:] Because the expression “speech” is universally known in this world as referring to the object grasped by the organ of hearing. [Upanaya:] And they (/g/ /au/ /h/) are grasped by the organ of hearing.”

19) yady evam arthapratyayo nopapadyate. katham ? “[Opponent (=Sphoṭavādin) :] If so, the cognition of an object is inexplicable. [Question:] Why ?”

20) 1. ekaikākśaraviṇīhāne (ḥy) ’ṛtho nopalabhyate. 2. na cākṣaravyatirikto ’nyaḥ kaścidaḥ asti samudāyo nāma yato ’ṛthapratipattiḥ syāt. yadā (hi) gakāro na tadā aukāravisarjanīyau. yadā aukāravisarjanīyau na tadā gakārah. “[Opponent:] In cognizing each phoneme, the object is not apprehended. And there is nothing distinct beyond the phonemes, a so-called whole (=/gaūḥ/), through which the object is cognized. When /g/ is [there], /au/ and /h/ are not. When /au/ and /h/ are [there], /g/ is not.”

21) ato gakārādivyatirikto ’nayo gośabdā ’sti yato ’ṛthapratipattiḥ syāt. “Therefore there is a distinct speech ‘gaūḥ’ beyond phonemes such as /g/ etc. through which one cognizes the object.”

22) antarḥite (‘pi) śabde smaraṇāḥ arthapratyaya iti cet. na. smṛter api kṣaṇikatvād aksaraś ca tulyatā. “[Question:] Although the speech has disappeared, one cognizes the object by recollection. [Opponent:] No. [For] the recollection, since it also is momentary, is similar to phonemes.”

23) pūrvavarṇajantitasamskarasahito ’nayo varṇaḥ pratvāyaka ity adosāḥ. “[Siddhāntīn:] The last phoneme accompanied by a samskāra, which is born out of the preceding phonemes, makes [one] cognize [the object of a word]. So there is no problem.”

24) nanv evam (api) śabdāḥ artham pratipādāyāmaḥ iti laukikam vacanam anupapannam syāt. ucyate. yadi nopapadyate anupapannam nāma. na hi laukikam vacanam anupapannam ity etāvātā pratyakṣādibhir anavagamyamāno ’ṛthāḥ śakyō ’bhupagantum. laukikāni vacanāny upapannārthāny anupapannārthāni ca drṣyante. yathā devadatta gām abhyāja ityevamādini. daśa dādīmāni śaḍ apūpā ity evamādini ca. “[Opponent:] Then the worldly usage “We understand an object through a word.” would become inexplicable. [Siddhāntīn:] We answer. If [it would become] inexplicable, let it be inexplicable. For we can not accept an object that is not apprehended by perception etc. by the mere reason that worldly usage would be inexplicable. Among worldly usages, [both] are seen, [i.e.] those which have explicable objects such as “Devadatta, drive the cow near.” and those which have inexplicable objects such as “Ten pomegranate fruits, six cakes of flour.”(Cf. Mahābhāṣya 1.2.45, Kielhorn ed. I. 217.12-13.)”
25) nanu ca šāstrakārā apy evam āuh, pūrvāparibhūtaṁ bhāvam ākhyātenācaṣṭe vrajati pacati ity upakramaprabhṛtyapavargaparyantam iti yathā. na šāstrakāravacanam apy alam imam artham apramāṇakam upapādayitum. “[Opponent:] Moreover the revered author of the Šāstra (=Nirukta 1.1) also states as follows: One denotes by a verb an action which is sequential (pūrvāparibhūta). For instance [one denotes with the verb forms] ‘he goes’ ‘he cooks’ [an action] which starts with the undertaking and ends with the completion. [Siddhāntin:] Even the statement by the author of the Šāstra cannot make explicable such an object that lacks means of being known.”

26) api ca naivaitad anupapannārtham. aksārebhyaḥ samskārah, samskāraḥ arthapratipattir iti bhavanty arthapratipattāv aksarāṇi nimittam. guṇa eṣa śabaṇa iti cet. 1. na guṇo ’kṣareṣu nimitabhāvah. tadbhāve bhāvāḥ tadabhāve cābhāvāḥ. 2. athāpi guṇaḥ syāt. na guṇaḥ śabdo mā bhūd ity etavatā pratyaksādibhir anavagamyamāno ’ṛthāḥ śakyah parikalpayitum. na hy agnir māṇavaka ity ukte agniśabdō guṇa mā bhūd iti jvalana eva māṇavaka ity adhyavasiyate.

“Moreover, this [laukikavacana] does not have an inappropriate object. For the phonemes do become a cause for cognizing an object in this way: From phonemes [arises] a samśkāra, from the samśkāra [arises] a cognition of an object. [Opponent:] This speech (=phonemes) is secondary [as a cause for the cognition of an object]. [Siddhāntin:] The character of the phonemes as a cause is not secondary. Because if they (=phonemes) exist [the cognition arises], and if they do not exist [the cognition does] not arise. Or [it] may be secondary. We cannot posit such an object that is not apprehended by perception etc. by the mere reason that the speech should not become secondary. For, when it is said, “The boy is a fire”, it is not determined, “The boy is an actual fire.”, by the [mere] reason that the speech “fire” should not become secondary.”

27) na ca prayākṣo gākāṛādibhyo ’nyo gośabda iti. bhedaddarśanāḥbhāvāḥ abhedaddarśanāca ca. gākāṛādini hi prayāksāṇi, tasmād gaur iti gākāṛādī visarjanāyāntam padam aksarāṇī eva, na tebhīyo vyaṭiriktam anyat padām nāma iti. “And the speech “gauḥ” distinct from [phonemes such as] /g/ etc. is not visible. Because [its] distinction [from phonemes] is not seen and [its] non-distinction [from phonemes] is seen: For [only] phonemes /g/ etc. are visible [i.e. “gauḥ” is not seen as distinct] and therefore the word “gauḥ” which starts with /g/ and ends with /h/ is only phonemes, not the so-called word, which is distinct and beyond those [phonemes] [i.e. “gauḥ” is seen as non-distinct].”

28) nanu samśkārekalpanāyāṁ apy adṛśakalpanā. ucyate. śabdakalpanāyāṁ sā ca, śabdakalpanā ca. tasmād aksarāṇī eva padam. “[Opponent:] Also when a saṃskāra is assumed, [you] are assuming something unseen. [Siddhāntin:] In [your case of] assuming the speech (=a whole pada “gauḥ”), [there exists] that [assumption of the saṃskāra] and the assumption of the speech. Therefore a word is nothing but phonemes.”

29) adṛṣṭo yo ’śruto vārthaḥ sa nāṣīty avagyamaye/ tasmīṁn asati drṣṭā cec chruto vā na
“The object which is unseen or unheard is understood as non-existent, so far as the [object] seen or heard is not contradicted in case it (=the unseen or unheard) does not exist. If [it is] contradicted, it (=the unseen or unheard) is to be assumed, through which that (=the seen or heard) become purposeful. If the difference is not understood [between assuming less and more], one should not assume even one [additional unseen or unheard object] more than that [which is already assumed].”

30) Śālikanātha noticed this problem. yadi bhāvanātmakaḥ tadā tasya varṇasmṛtimārthahetutvād ... antarhite śabdā ity ato na viśeṣāh. BhP 36.14-37.2. “If [the sanskāra mentioned in the Śābarabhāṣya is] a mental trace in nature, then, since it [i.e. sanskāra] is a cause of a mere recollection of [each] phoneme, ... [this opinion is] not different from that which is proclaimed as ‘antarhite śabde ...’."

31) Ślokavārttika sphaṭa, v.101: sanskāre nisprāmaṇe tu pūrvavṛttatvavakalpanam/ nisprāmaṇakam eveti nānugraha-phalaṁ// SV 379.4-5. “On the other hand, if the sanskāra lacks its evidence [i.e. if you do not accept the existence of sanskāra], there is no evidence to assume [those preceding phonemes’] having functioned before [the last phoneme, since the pūrvavṛttatva lacks its locus.]. Therefore the effect of assistance [by preceding phonemes] would be impossible.”

32) One should not forget that Kumārila has his own well-defined notion of capacity (śakti, sāmartha) and that he uses the term consistently. I can point out at least three dimensions of Kumārila’s concept of a capacity: 1. ontologically, a capacity belongs to an entity, e.g. jñānasakti to ātman (ātma, vv.72c-73), bodhāsāmārthya to śabda (arthāpatti, v.5), dāhanaśaktatā to vahni (arthāpatti, v.3), *vahanāsakti to ratha (sphaṭa, vv.86, 89) and so forth. It is subsidiary to its locus (āśraya, ādhāra) and so it should disappear if its locus is destroyed (nirālambana, vv.194-196b). It is atīndriya (upāmāṇa, v.14; śabdaniyatā v.45), innate (codanā, v.47cd), therefore unquestionable (ākṛti, v.28cd: na ca paryānuyogō ’sti vastu-ānukāšteh kadācana). It is made manifest by vyāñjaka, functions as a cause (kārana) of its own particular result (śūnya, v.253) and therefore does not bring about other result (sambandhākṣepa, v.33cd: gavāder nābhidhānasaktit devadattapade yathā); 2. epistemologically it is an “unseen” (adṛṣṭa) object which should be postulated from a seen result (kārya) through the arthāpatti-pramāṇa, which functions so long as there remains an anyathāmupapatti. Once the anyathāmupapatti is solved, there is no justification to postulate any more (sambandhākṣepaparipṛcchā, v.29: anyathāmupapattyā ca śaktisadbhāvavakalpanam/ na caikāyaiva siddhe ’rthe bahvinām kalpaneṣyate/). Since a capacity functions as a cause and is postulated based on a visible kārya, it is sometimes called kārṇumeyā (ākṛti, v.26cd; śabdaniyatā, v.44ab). But, strictly speaking, arthāpatti is different from anumāna, as is established in the arthāpattipariccheda (arthāpatti, v.85cd: bhedābhedē visṃvīdāḥ kṛtā tatra ca nirṇayah); 3. exegetically, in conformity with the rule that less postulation is better (because the
arthāpatti does not function any more once the trouble of anyathānupapatti is solved), a capacity, being an unseen object, should be reduced if possible (śūnya, v.18ab; vākyavv.121-122b). If a postulation is inevitable, the postulation of a capacity is regarded as better than that of a whole entity (śūnya, v.18cd), considering the ontological weight of a capacity as subsidiary and “lighter” than that of its locus. In the present context, Kumārila equates the arthabuddhihetutvata to a capacity (sāmarthya) and clearly says that one can fulfill the job by postulating only the arthabuddhihetutvata as an unseen object (v.103cd: tasyarthabuddhihetutvam adṛṣṭaṁ kevalam kṛtam). Therefore it is not inappropriate to assume that Kumārila has in his mind the distinction between dharma and dharmin. One might argue that since Kumārila does not explicitly use the terms dharma or dharmin, it is totally irrelevant to apply the general rule here. But the reason why he does not mention it, I think, is rather that such a way of analysis is so familiar and automatic that he, as a Māṇīmsaka, does not need to proclaim “I am applying such and such a rule”, not that he does not presuppose such an idea. One of the famous Māṇīmsa traditions in Kerala, in fact, supports my view. Ṛṣiputra Paramēśvara, in his Gopālikā commentary on Maṇḍana’s Sphoṭasiddhi passage (SS 48.4-5: tasmāt kāryāntaraparikalpitasattākasya saṃskāryasyaiva śākyantaraparikalpanāmātram astu), mentions that the relevant position of the vāsanāpākṣa is intended to avoid the postulation of a locus, “mātrasabdena dharmikalpanāṁ vyāvartayati” (SS 51.17). He further explains that the problem in the first interpretation “saṃskārakalpanā” is the postulation of a locus (dharmikalpanā), “nanv eṣa saṃskārāḥ smṛtiḥetuh, anyo vā. tatra smṛtiḥetoh śakteḥ śākyantarāyogah ityādir eva dūṣanām, anyatve dharmikalpanaiva doṣa iti” (SS 86.9-10). (cf. Tattvaribhāvanā, a commentary on the Tattvabindu by the same author: smṛtibije hi dharmamātram kalpyam. adṛṣṭāntare tu dharmy api. TB 28.11-12.) After regarding Paramēśvara’s explanation, we can see that it is not only relevant to bear in mind the general idea, but essential in order to understand Kumārila’s intention in this context.

33) On the contrary, if one does not accept that Kumārila bears this maxim in mind, we would not be able to explain his statements which contrast the opposite characters of the two things: saṃskārā (=vāsanā), the existence of which becomes the locus of the capacity arthabuddhihetutvā, is well accepted by everyone (i.e. drṣṭa), while the arthabuddhihetutvā, which is the capacity (sāmarthya) of the saṃskārā, is not well established and therefore is to be newly posited as an unseen object (adṛṣṭa). Furthermore, we also would not be able to explain why this interpretation is preferable for Kumārila to the first if we assume that Kumārila is unaware of the different “heaviness” of dharmin and dharma, since the number of postulations is the same in both cases, i.e. saṃskārakalpanā and arthabuddhihetutvakalpanā, and therefore there would be no criterion to judge the latter better.

In the context of Vedic exegesis, Māṇīmsa explicitly uses its view of the different “weight” of an entity and its property in discussing padārthas (ritual elements) and their krama (sequence).
Ritual elements such as sipping (ācamana) and so forth, even though they are taught in smṛti-texts, have privilege over the sequence taught in śruti-texts. Therefore the act of sipping can enter between the vedakaraṇa and vedikaraṇa and split them, even though these two elements are taught to be immediate neighbors in sequence (vedam kṛtvā vedim kuryāt). For it is inappropriate to cancel padārthas in favor of krama, which is a subsidiary element (guṇa) of padārthas. (Śabarabhāṣya ad 1.3.7: ācamanam padārthaḥ, padārthānāṁ ca guṇaḥ kramaḥ. na ca guṇāmurodhena padārtho na kartavyo bhavati. A 198.5-199.2) Kumārila mentions the general idea behind this discussion: “dharmaḥ harmivirodeḥ ca dharmaḥ balavattarāḥ//” A 196.25. (And when there is a contradiction between a locus and its property, the locus is stronger [than the property].) The basic idea which supports the above argumentation is consistently seen in our relevant discussion of the “heaviness” of postulation.