

Reconstructing the **Dharma-abhivṛtya-vāda* in the Mīmāṃsā Tradition

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SUMMARY OF EARLIER RESEARCH

This paper attempts to reconstruct the Mīmāṃsā *apūrva*-theory which I suggest might be referred to as ‘**dharma-abhivṛtya-vāda*’ (the theory of *dharma*-manifestation). Prof. Halbfass has pointed out that the *apūrva*-theory is refuted by Uddyotakara in *Nyāyavārttika* on *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.7,¹ a portion of which has been translated into Japanese and investigated further by Prof. Akamatsu.² For Akamatsu it is still not clear what Uddyotakara regards as the Mīmāṃsakas’ position on *apūrva*, i.e. what form of the *apūrva*-theory was dominant after Śabarasvāmin and before Kumāriḷa. Yudhiṣṭhira Mīmāṃsaka,³ with reference to the relevant portions which I will investigate below, attributes this form of *apūrva*-theory to Bhartṛhari and Bhartṛmitra, but does not clarify its content. Prof. Bronkhorst,⁴ apparently relying on Yudhiṣṭhira Mīmāṃsaka, also refers to and translates the same passages, but he too does not comment on the theory. Prof. Ikari,⁵ who is mainly concerned with understanding the Vedic thought-world, presents three aspects of action: a latent form of action, once made manifest through human performances, remains effective as an invisible substance. Ikari does not refer to our passages, but his exposition of this Vedic model is important for our **dharma-abhivṛtya-vāda* as providing a prototype.

SOURCES

1 Bhartṛhari (AD 450-510)

Bhartṛhari, a grammarian who is said to have used an older Mīmāṃsā source⁶ (probably Bhavadāsa’s *vṛtti*, written in the first half of the fifth century)⁷ than the *Śābarabhāṣya* (first half of the sixth century)⁸, mentions the Mīmāṃsā theory in his discussion of *dharma*.

Svavṛtti on *Vākyapadīya* I.136: *tatra kecid ācāryā manyante. na*

*prakṛtyā kiñcit karma *duṣṭam aduṣṭam* (ed. *drṣṭam adrṣṭam*) *vā. śāstrānuṣṭhānāt tu kevalād dharmābhivyaktiḥ, śāstrātikramāc ca pratyavāyayogaḥ. yeṣāṃ eva hi brāhmaṇavadhādīnāṃ viṣayāntare pātakatvaṃ, teṣāṃ eva viṣayāntare prakṣṭābhyudayahehuvam śāstreṇa vidhīyata iti.* VP 224.5-8.

*Following an emendation by Yudhiṣṭhira (Yudhiṣṭhira 1987: 31). cf. Vṛṣabhadeva (VP 224, n.6): *na drṣṭo nādrṣṭaḥ*] ed. ; *na drṣṭāntaduṣṭāḥ* variant

On this point some teachers think: No action is either impure or pure by nature. But dharma becomes manifest only through following scriptures, and negative consequences attach [themselves to a person] as a result of [that person's] transgressing scriptures. For scripture prescribes one and the same action of killing a Brahmin and the like (i.e. drinking wine, etc.) as a cause of downfall in one context as well as a cause of the greatest elevation [i.e. rebirth in heaven] in another context.⁹

The expression 'abhivyakti' is used to explain the phenomenon that something eternal becomes perceptible in a certain case and not in other cases.¹⁰ For example, the phoneme /g/, which is considered eternal in Mīmāṃsā, manifests itself and becomes audible through actual sounds (*dhvani, nāda*), which in this system correspond to conjunctions and disjunctions among wind-atoms.¹¹ The eternal cow-ness (*gotva*) of individual cows becomes manifest through individuals (*vyakti*) and makes us recognize: 'this is a cow'.¹² Likewise the eternal dharma manifests itself through each ritual performance (*karman*).

The same idea is also referred to in another work by Bhartṛhari, the *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā*, together with more details and a metaphor. (Yudhiṣṭhira pointed out the relevant portion (Yudhiṣṭhira 1984: 392)(1987: 34); Bronkhorst translated it into English (Bronkhorst 1989).)

Mahābhāṣyadīpikā : avasthita eva dharmāḥ. sa tv agnihotrādibhir abhivyajyate. tatpreritas tu phalaprado bhavati. yathā svāmī bhṛtyaiḥ sevāyāṃ preriyate phalaṃ praty MBhD 25.25-26
Dharma remains forever. But it is manifested by an *agnihotra* offering or the like. Urged by such (*agnihotra*, etc.), however, it gives a fruit. For example, a master is urged to [give] fruit by servants when they serve.... (my translation)

This passage refers to the idea that the dharma, although eternal, urged by individual performances (*tat-prerita*) such as the *agnihotra* offering, becomes manifest (*abhivyajyate*) and functions as a fruit-giver (*phala-prada*). While in the above-mentioned passage of the

Vākyapadīya the eternity of dharma is inferred from the expression ‘*abhivyakti*’, here dharma is clearly qualified as eternal: ‘which remains forever’ (*avasthita eva*). Furthermore the *agnihotra* offering is personified as that which urges the eternal dharma. A reluctant master, urged by servants, gives them fees. Likewise the unchanging dharma, urged by daily performances of *agnihotra*, is forced to give fruits.

2 Bhāviveka (AD 490-570)

Bhāviveka in the sixth century, who criticized other schools in his *Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā*, refers to the **dharma-abhivyakti-vāda* as an opponent’s view in the chapter called *Mīmāṃsā-tattva-nirṇaya-avatāra*. (Edited and translated into Japanese by Prof. Kawasaki (Kawasaki 1992: 409, 376), and into English by Prof. Lindtner (Lindtner 1997: 96). The answer from the Buddhist side is given in k. 55.)

Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā IX, k.10:

*apūrvo 'pi kriyāvyaṅgyaḥ, kriyā mokṣe 'pi sādhanam/
somapānādikā, vidvān nirjayed antakaṃ yayā/A³*

And *apūrva* is manifested by a [ritual] act. A [ritual] act such as drinking soma [=soma sacrifice], etc., is also a cause of liberation. Through that [ritual act] the wise man conquers death.

The idea referred to here is that *apūrva* or ‘a new thing’ is manifested (*vyaṅgya*) through ritual acts, such as drinking soma (*somapānādikā kriyā*). It should be noted that the manifested element here is called ‘*apūrva*’ instead of dharma. In the surviving Bhāṭṭa¹⁴ and Prābhākara¹⁵ sources, *apūrva* is interpreted as ‘new to our knowledge’ or ‘new information’, not ‘new in origination’ or ‘newly born’.

What then is meant by saying that *apūrva* is manifested through acts? Is it to be interpreted from the viewpoint of epistemology, in such a way that *apūrva*, which is newly cognized through the Vedas, is manifested through ritual acts? Or should we interpret it from the viewpoint of ontology, in such a way that the eternal dharma is newly manifested in this world through individual acts such as daily *agnihotras*?

3 Uddyotakara (fl. in the first half of the seventh century AD)

The relevant portion of the *Nyāyavārttika* is translated into Japanese and analyzed by Akamatsu (Akamatsu 1991). Therefore in the following I pick up only the passages which are important for the

reconstruction of the **dharmā-abhivṛyakti-vāda*.

Nyāyavārttika on *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.7:

a. *nityam apy apūrvam yo bhivṛyanakti tasya phalam, abhivṛyaktiyarthā ca kriyā. abhivṛyaktiyarthatvāc ca na kriyālopa iti. yena yad abhivṛyajyate tasyaiva tat phalaprādātṛ bhavaṅiti drṣṭam.* NV 55.15-17.

Although *apūrvā* is [one and] eternal, [only] the person who makes [it] manifest has [its] fruit. And ritual act is [done] for the sake of manifestation. And because it is [done] for manifestation, ritual act is not left unperformed. [For] it is seen that whatever is manifested gives its fruit only to the one who manifests it.

As seen before, the eternal *apūrvā* is manifested through acts (*kriyā*) and gives its fruit to humans. Eternal as it is, however, *apūrvā* gives its fruit only to the particular person who made it manifest. Individual ritual acts aim at manifestation (*abhivṛyakti-artha*). In this way their efficacy or purposefulness is guaranteed through the following sequence: ritual acts, manifested *apūrvā* and fruit. This theory avoids undesired consequences such as that ritual acts would not be performed (*kriyā-lopa*).

b. *svargāpūrvadevatādiṣūpadeśo na prāpnoti, aīndriyatvāt. yadi sāksātkaṛaṇam arthasyāptih, svargāpūrvadevatādīn na kaścit paśyatīti tatpratipādako vyavahāro na syāt. tasmād āptaś cāsāv upadeśaś ceti yuktam, nāptasyopadeśa iti.* NV 54.17-20.

[Opponent:] [Vedic] instruction does not hold good for (*prāpnoti*) heaven, *apūrvā*, deities and so forth, because they are beyond perception. If the obtaining (*āpti*) of an object is directly perceiving it [as the *Nyāyabhāṣya* interprets it], verbal usage about them would not be possible, since no one sees heaven, *apūrvā*, deities and so forth. Therefore it is proper [to interpret the compound ‘*āpta-upadeśa*’] as ‘reliable instruction’ [as a *karmadhāraya*], not ‘instruction of the reliable’ [as a *ṣaṣṭhī-tatpuruṣa*].

In regard to the compound of ‘*āpta-upadeśa*’ in the *Sūtra*, the opponent interprets it as a *karma-dhāraya*, i.e. ‘reliable instruction’ instead of as a *tat-puruṣa*, i.e. ‘instruction of those who reached the object’.¹⁶ In this interpretation the opponent presupposes that *apūrvā* is imperceptible (*aīndriya*) like heaven and deities (cf. *Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā* IX, k.5). Being beyond the reach of the senses, *apūrvā* cannot be reached by anyone, so there is no ‘person who has reached it’ (*āpta*). Therefore the opponent insists that a *tat-puruṣa* interpretation is impossible. Furthermore *apūrvā*, as well as heaven and deities, is considered here as

an object of Vedic instruction. As *apūrva* is regarded as imperceptible, it can be said to be qualified further as an object of Vedic instruction only.

c. *kaḥ punar atra nyāyah svargādayaḥ kasyacit pratyakṣā iti. brūmaḥ. sāmānyaviśeṣavattvāt kasyacit pratyakṣā iti. āśritatvāt. *yad āśritam tat kasyacit pratyakṣam iti. parārthatvāt. yat parārtham tad api kasyacit pratyakṣam iti. vastutvād āgamaviśayatvāc ca. yad vastu yac ca parasya kathyate, tat kasyacit pratyakṣam dr̥ṣṭam, yathā ghaṭādaya iti. anityatvāt kasyacit pratyakṣā iti. NV 55.3-7. *yad] Calcutta ed. ; yad yad Thakur ed.*

[Opponent:] But what is the ground for [your declaration] that heaven and so forth are visible to someone?

[Siddhāntin:] We answer. (1) [They are] visible to someone because they have certain generic properties. (a) Because of resting [in a locus]: everything that rests in a locus is visible to someone. (b) Because of being for others: everything that is for others also is visible to someone. (c) Because of being real and the object of authoritative speech: it is experienced that everything that is real and that is communicated to others, e.g. pots, etc., is visible to someone. (2) [They are] visible to someone because they are non-eternal.

In order to show that from the Nyāya point of view *apūrva*, etc., must be perceptible to someone, Uddyotakara refers to their three common properties (*sāmānya*), i.e. *āśritatva*, *parārthatva* and *vastutva*-cum-*āgamaviśayatva*, together with another one property, i.e. *anityatva*. Besides *vastutva* and *āgamaviśayatva*, which could be admitted even by the Mīmāṃsaka, the opponent who insists that *apūrva*, etc., are imperceptible to anyone is supposed to admit the opposite properties, i.e. *an-āśritatva*, *a-parārthatva* and *nityatva*. In fact the last-mentioned property *nityatva* is admitted in the following argument by the opponent in relation to *abhivyakti*. As is seen from another later source (Jayanta), *an-āśritatva* is also confirmed.¹⁷

d. *athāpīdam syāt. ekam apy apūrvaṃ vyañjakabhedānuvidhānād bhinnam iva bhavati. ... nanu ca khadgādibhedān mukhabhedāḥ tadanuvidhānād dr̥ṣṭaḥ. NV 56.7-10.*

Further the following is also possible: *apūrva*, although one, takes form as if different according to the difference of its manifesters. ... [Opponent:] Due to the difference of [the reflecting surfaces], such as a sword, we find that [the appearance of the reflection of] the face differs in accordance with that [difference of reflectors].

Uddyotakara attacks the *apūrva*-theory after first distinguishing two possibilities, i.e. whether it is one or plural. The opponent who holds that *apūrva* is one explains that the one *apūrva* appears as many through many manifesters in the same way that one face is reflected in many surfaces. Considering this, and other examples, such as one eternal phoneme /g/ which manifests itself through many sounds, it is appropriate to assume that the eternal *apūrva* was regarded as one rather than many.

4 Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (AD 600-650)

Kumārila, discussing ‘what is dharma’ or ‘what is the referent of the word “dharma”’ in his subcommentary on *Jaiminīsūtra* 1.1.2, criticizes the idea that dharma is ‘something newly born (*apūrva-janman*)’.

Ślokavārttika codanā, vv.195-196b:
*antahkaranāvṛttau vā vāsanāyām ca cetasah/
puḍgaleṣu ca puṇyeṣu nṛguṇe ’pūrvajanmani//
prayogo dharmāśabdasya na dr̥ṣṭo.... / SV 78.5-7*

We do not find the word ‘*dharma*’ applied [in ordinary usage and the Vedas] to the activity of the internal organ (as in Sāṃkhya), the disposition of the mind (as in Buddhism), virtuous souls (as in Jainism), a quality of *ātman* (as for the Vaiśeṣikas) or ‘something newly born’ (as in Mīmāṃsā). [Therefore these are not really *dharma*.]

As mentioned before, the surviving traditions of the Bhaṭṭas and Prābhākaras interpreted *apūrva* to mean ‘something epistemologically new’ or ‘something never cognized through other means of cognition than Vedic instructions’ (*mānāntarāvedya*). According to the view refuted by Kumārila in this passage, however, *apūrva* is interpreted to be something ontologically new, i.e. a newly born thing. Kumārila’s commentator Sucaritaśra (Kāśikā 160.19-22), after identifying the opponent to be ‘one group of Mīmāṃsakas’ (*mīmāṃsakakaikadeśinah*), clarifies the ontological interpretation of *apūrva*: *apūrva* is that which did not exist before ritual acts (*tad dhi na karmaṇaḥ pūrvam jāyata eva*) and which is produced by them (*kr̥te karmaṇi tanniṣpatteḥ*).

5 Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (fl. in the latter half of the ninth century AD)

Jayanta, commenting on *Nyāyasūtra* 1.2.57, tries to protect the authority of the Vedas from the Nyāya position. In this context he discusses ‘what dharma is’. In criticizing other schools, Jayanta

presupposes Kumārila's above-mentioned description and gives more details. It is to be noted that Jayanta calls the view of 'apūrva as something newly born' (*apūrva-janman*) that of 'the old Mīmāṃsakas' (*ṛddha-mīmāṃsakāḥ*) as opposed to the views of the followers of Śābara and Prabhākara. (Part of the relevant portion was pointed out by Yudhiṣṭhira (Yudhiṣṭhira 1984: 393)(1987: 35) and translated by Bronkhorst (Bronkhorst 1989: 113).)

Nyāyamañjarī on *Nyāyasūtra* 1.2.57: *ṛddhamīmāṃsakāḥ yāgādikarmanirvartyam apūrvaṃ nāma dharmam abhivadanti. yāgādikarmaiva śābarā bruvate. vākyaṛtha eva niyogātmā apūrvaśabdavācyah, dharmāśabdena ca sa evocyata iti prābhākaraḥ kathayanti. ... svargayāgāntarālavartinaś ca sthiraśya nirādhārasyāpūrvasya niṣpramānakatvāt jarajjaiminiyappravādo 'py apeśalah.* NM 664.6-16.

The old Mīmāṃsakas maintain that that unprecedented thing (*apūrvaṃ nāma*) that is accomplished through acts such as sacrifice, etc., should be [accepted as] *dharmā*. Those who follow Śābara maintain that dharma is only ritual act itself such as sacrifice, etc. The Prabhākara school says that what is denoted by the word 'apūrva' is nothing but the sentence-meaning which is a command, which again is denoted by the word '*dharmā*'. ... And the [so-called] *apūrva* which exists between sacrifice and heaven, remains for some time and is without locus, lacks any proof of its existence. Therefore the statement of the old Mīmāṃsakas is also not correct. (my translation)

Jayanta explains the *apūrva-janman* mentioned by Kumārila as 'that unprecedented thing that is accomplished through acts such as sacrifice, etc.' (*yāgādikarmanirvartyam apūrvaṃ nāma*). In other words, Jayanta explains *janman* as accomplishment by sacrifice, etc. Jayanta confirms that the *apūrva* mentioned by Kumārila is ontologically new, not epistemologically. Furthermore, the view which Jayanta identifies as that of 'the old Mīmāṃsakas (*ṛddha-mīmāṃsaka, jaraj-jaiminiya*)' seems, or at least is believed by him, to precede Śābara and Prabhākara, in view of the order in which he mentions the three positions.

This *apūrva* or 'new thing' stands between (i.e. connects) sacrifice and heaven (*svarga-yāga-antarālavartin*) and remains for some time (*sthira*). In other words, it is grasped as that which is accomplished through sacrifice, remains for some time and gives its fruit to the agent. The Bhāṭṭas¹⁸ and Prābhākaras¹⁹ also accept this character of *apūrva* positing it as a connector which guarantees the efficacy of ritual acts. But the *apūrva* which Jayanta mentions here does not have a locus

(*nirādhāra*). It is different from Kumāṛila's *apūrva* which is 'just a latent force of sacrifices' (*yāgādeḥ śaktimātrakam*) or 'just a latent force of an animal or the like' (*paśvāder [śaktimātrakam]*) and from the *ātmaśakti* usually accepted by the Bhāṭṭas.²⁰ This character of 'having no locus' was already suggested by Uddyotakara.

One still hesitates, however, to understand *apūrva-janman* to mean simply 'something newly manifested', because in some cases 'production' (*janman, niṣpatti, nirvṛtti*) is contrasted with 'manifestation' (*abhivyakti*).²¹ To recapitulate:

- i. According to the 'old Mīmāṃsakas' who preceded the followers of Śābara and Prabhākara, dharma is not sacrifice, etc., themselves, but a new thing which is accomplished through them.
- ii. Although it remains for some time as a fruit-giver after sacrifice, it does not have any locus such as the *ātman* or sacrifice.

6 Siṃhasūriḡaṇi

Siṃhasūriḡaṇi, a commentator on the *Nayacakra* of Mallavādin, refers to a Mīmāṃsā view as that of an opponent. He paraphrases *apūrva* as 'different from the seen' (*adr̥ṣṭa*) and a 'particular dharma' (*dharmaviśeṣa*). Furthermore, he records the view of 'some Mīmāṃsakas' that dharma is nothing but ritual acts themselves, which is in fact identical with Śābara's position.

Nyāyāgamānusāriṇi on *Dvādaśāram Nayacakram*, vidhividhyara:
a. *na pūrvo 'pūrvo, 'dr̥ṣṭo dharmaviśeṣaḥ. ... viśeṣaśabdāt parasparaviśiṣṭābhīr yajñasaṃsthābhīr agniṣṭomādibhīr iṣṭibhiś cābhivyaktavyā apūrvā (-vyā apūrvā] em.; -vyāpūrvā ed.) api viśeṣyante dravyamantradevatādiviśiṣṭābhīh. NC 140.23-141.5*
Apūrva is what was not before, i.e. a specific *dharma* which is different from the seen. ... By the word 'specific' [in Mallavādin's *apūrva-viśeṣa*] is intended the following: the *apūrvas* manifested through sacrifice-types, i.e. *agniṣṭoma*, etc., and *iṣṭis*, which are qualified mutually by each other, are themselves qualified by those [sacrifice-types] which are [again] qualified by [their respective] material, mantras, deities and so forth.

In this passage, *apūrva* is paraphrased as 'different from the precedent' (*na pūrvaḥ*) and further explained as 'a particular dharma which is different from the seen' (*adr̥ṣṭo dharmaviśeṣaḥ*). Although this *apūrva* looks at first glance like 'an epistemologically new thing', i.e. 'a new thing cognized only through the Vedas', it can be interpreted as 'ontologically a new thing' if one considers the meaning of 'a particular

dharmā' (*dharmaviśeṣa*): a dharma, which is qualified through ritual acts which are again qualified variously through their materials and mantras, becomes a particular dharma different from the seen and is called *adr̥ṣṭa*. It is not new in the sense that it is cognized only through the Vedas but new and different from the seen in the sense that it is a particular thing newly manifested in a certain situation.

The description here seems to be parallel to the structure of the relationship between *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa* and *vyakti*.²² The eternal dharma could be regarded as *sāmānya*, a particular dharma which manifests itself being qualified in a certain situation as *viśeṣa*, and the individual situations which qualify one *sāmānya* as *vyakti*. In other words, the one eternal dharma, when manifested through individual acts which are qualified by each other as well as by their materials, mantras and deities, is at the same time qualified by those same individual acts. One eternal universal 'cow-ness', when manifested through individual cows, is qualified by individuals which consist of various parts.²³ In the same way, one eternal dharma, when it is manifested through individual ritual acts and appears as a particular, is qualified through the ritual acts which consist of various elements. The way in which dharma is qualified is similar to that of *bhāvanā*, as posited by Śabara and the Bhāṭṭas, which functions as a core element in ritual-analysis and is regarded as qualified by various elements in the way that a white canvas may be qualified.²⁴ That is to say, the role of *bhāvanā* as a core element in the *bhāvanā*-theory of Śabara and his followers is replaced by *apūrva* (or dharma) in the **dharmā-abhivyakti-vāda*.

b. *mā bhūd yajñasaṃjñāyāḥ kriyāyā eva dharmatvaṃ, yathā kaiścin mīmāṃsakair evaṃ vyākhyāyate 'yajñena yajñam ayajanta devās, tāni dharmāni prathamāny āsan'* (Ṛgveda 1.164.50; 10.90.16) *iti. kim kāraṇam. tasminn arthe pratyakṣata evānityāyāḥ kriyāyā anantaram phalāsambandhādarśanāt kriyāvāiphalayadoṣaprasaṅgāc ca.* NC 141.5-7

One should not say that it is an act that is called 'sacrifice' which is *dharmā*, in the way that [is held by] those Mīmāṃsakas who interpret in this way the sentence 'The gods sacrificed sacrifice through sacrifice. Those were the first *dharmas*'. Why? Because if that is the meaning [of 'dharmā'], its connection with the fruit is not seen immediately after the act, which is visibly transient, and because of the undesirable consequence that the act may lack fruit [and therefore becomes useless].

Furthermore, if one identified dharma with ritual acts, as Śabara did, the direct connection between dharma and its fruit would become

impossible, because dharma, being transient, cannot remain until the arising of the fruit. Consequently it would become useless to perform ritual acts, because they would not be the means of attaining their fruit. On the other hand, if one follows the **dharma-abhivyakti-vāda*, dharma is able to bring its fruit directly when it is manifested through individual acts and becomes ‘a new thing’. In this way the direct connection between dharma and its fruit is guaranteed.

Siṃhasūri also refers to the exegesis of Vedic passages in accordance with the **dharma-abhivyakti-vāda*.

c. *agnihotram iti dharmah kriyābhivyāṅgya ucyate. kārye kāraṇopacārād agnihotrābhivyāṅgyo 'gnihotram iti. tataḥ 'agnihotraṃ dharmam, juhuyād bhāvayet, svargakāmaḥ' ity eṣa vākyaṛtho nirdoṣa iti.* NC 141.7-9

The word ‘*agnihotra*’ refers to *dharma* manifested through act. What is manifested through *agnihotra* is called ‘*agnihotra*’ through the secondary application to the result of [a word which strictly speaking refers to] the cause. Then the meaning of the sentence ‘*agnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ*’ could be interpreted without any faults as ‘One who wishes heaven should realize *dharma*’ (*dharmam bhāvayet svargakāmaḥ*).

It can be summed up as follows:

- i. The Vedic passage ‘*agnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ.*’ can be paraphrased: ‘one who wishes heaven should realize dharma, which is manifested through the *agnihotra* offering’.
- ii. This interpretation enables one to interpret the expression *svargakāmaḥ* and the accusative in *agnihotram* naturally; unlike Śabara who analyzed it in an unnatural way.
- iii. It shows clearly the position that dharma, not heaven, is the purpose (*karman*) of the principal ritual action, and the thing to be accomplished (*sādhyā*).

It may be noted that *apūrva* as a particular dharma which is manifested through acts is called a *kārya* and can be the object of ‘*bhāvayet*’. It is possible, therefore, to construe the *apūrva-janman* mentioned by Kumārila as equivalent with ‘a newly manifested thing’. That is to say, *janman* could be interpreted as manifestation and not production in a strict sense.

Furthermore Siṃhasūri presents the **dharma-abhivyakti-vāda* as his main *pūrva-pakṣa*, though he is also aware of Śabara’s opposing ‘*yāgādi=dharma*’ theory. We may assume then that the

**dharma-abhivyakti-vāda* was the main stream theory in the Mīmāṃsā tradition at that time.

CONCLUSION

Chronology: This theory must go back to the latter half of the fifth century, since Bhartṛhari knew it. The way in which it was referred to by Bhāviveka and Simhasūrigaṇi allows us to conjecture that it was dominant in the Mīmāṃsā tradition in their time. We may be justified in concluding from Kumārila's criticism that its dominance was not surpassed even in his day. Jayanta's expressions '*jaraj-jaiminīya*' and '*vṛddha-mīmāṃsaka*', in contrast with '*śābara*' and '*prābhākara*', suggest that he believed that it predated Śābarasvāmin.

Content: The eternal dharma which is always there (*avasthita eva*) becomes manifest (*abhivyakta*) through actual ritual performances (*kriyā, karman*) such as *agnihotra-homa* and *soma-yāga*, etc. Instead of '*dharma-abhivyakti*' we also find the expression '*apūrva-abhivyakti*'. Kumārila and Jayanta use instead of *abhivyakti* the words *janman* and *nir-√vrt* respectively. With the help of Simhasūrigaṇi we can construe 'newly-born' (*apūrva-janman*) as meaning a certain special dharma yet unseen (*adr̥ṣṭo dharmaviśeṣaḥ*), which, in being manifested by the actual performances, is also qualified by them. Uddyotakara sums it up thus: '*apūrva, although one, takes form as if different, according to the difference of its manifesters*' (*ekam apy apūrvaṃ vyañjakabhedaṇuvidhānād bhinnam iva bhavati*).

From the ontological point of view, the eternal dharma corresponds to *sāmānya*; the actual performances, which function as manifesters, correspond to *vyakti*; and the manifested dharma or *apūrva* to *viśeṣa*. Man is also seen as a manifesters, according to Uddyotakara. From the point of view of Vedic exegesis, the passage '*agnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ*' might be paraphrased thus: 'One who wishes heaven should realize dharma, which is manifested through *agnihotra-homa*'. This manifested *apūrva* is without locus (*nirādhāra*), remains for some time (*sthira*) and brings fruit (*phalaprada*). Although it is one and eternal, and so might be expected to be common to all people, it brings its fruit only to specific persons because it is they who manifest it (*vyañjaka-bhedāt*).

Relationship with the System: If one admits, like Śābara, that dharma

is nothing but ritual acts such as sacrifices, dharma would be transient and non-eternal. In the **dharma-abhivṛyakti-vāda*, on the other hand, the eternity of dharma is not compromised. This enables one to explain easily the eternity of the three concepts referred to in the second Sūtra, i.e. *codanā* (Vedic instructions), *dharma* and the relationship between them (*codanā*→*lakṣyalakṣaṇasambandha*→*dharma*). This is important for the *tarkapāda* section, the aim of which is to show that dharma is cognized through the Vedas in a way that is without faults. For the three items are all eternal and lack human agents that might introduce error. Furthermore, unlike Śabara's theory, according to which *apūrvā* intervenes between dharma (=ritual acts) and its fruit, the **dharma-abhivṛyakti-vāda* guarantees the direct causal relation between dharma and its fruit.

Thus *abhivṛyakti-vāda*, which is resorted to to explain why the eternal thing works at some particular time and not at another, functions as a device which guarantees the eternity of dharma as well as its causal character. Two direct relations, between *codanā* and dharma and between dharma and *phala*, are stressed in this theory, so that the second sūtra may be interpreted straightforwardly: '*codanālakṣaṇo 'rtho dharmah*' states that Vedic instructions are the means to cognize dharma, which in turn is a direct cause of the good (*śreyaskara*) and thus becomes a desirable thing (*artha*). As a topic of discussion, it may have developed from commenting on the second sūtra, since Kumāṛila criticized it while expounding the second sūtra.

In Vedic exegesis the **dharma-abhivṛyakti-vāda* allows more natural interpretations than those of Śabara. Two specific features can be pointed out in particular: first that it interprets dharma as an aim of action (*karman*) as indicated by the accusative in '*agnihotram*', and secondly that it allows natural analysis of *svargakāmah*, instead of interpreting the word as expressing that *svarga* is an aim of *bhāvanā*.

*Presented on 4 November 1998 in Wolfson College, Oxford, at the seminar 'Body, Mind and Religion in India', while I stayed there as Michael Coulson Junior Research Fellow.

<Abbreviations>

- A *Mīmāṃsādarśanam*, Subbhāṣāstrī ed., Poona, 1929-34.
 F E. Frauwallner, *Materialien Zur ältesten Erkenntnislehre der Karmamīmāṃsā*, Graz-Wien-Köln, 1968.
 Kāśikā *Mīmāṃsā Slokavārtika with the Commentary Kasika of*

MBhD	<i>Sucaritamīśra</i> , K. Sāmbaśiva Sāstrī ed., Trivandrum, 1990. <i>Mahābhāṣyadīpikā of Bhartṛhari</i> , Fascicle IV, Āhnika I, J. Bronkhorst ed., Poona, 1987.
NC	<i>Dvādaśāraṃ Nayacakram</i> , Part I, Muni Jambūvijayaḥ ed., Bhāvnagar.
NM	<i>Nyāyamañjarī of Jayantabhaṭṭa</i> , Vol. 1, K.S.Varadacharya ed., Mysore, 1969.
NV	<i>Nyāyabhāṣyavārttika of Bhāradvāja Uddyotakara</i> , Anantalal Thakur ed., New Delhi, 1997.
PP	<i>Prakaraṇa Pañcikā of Sri Śālikanātha Mīśra with Nyāya-siddhi</i> , A. Subrahmanya Sastri ed., Varanasi, 1961.
SV	<i>Ślokavārttikam</i> , Dvārikādāsa Śāstrī ed., Varanasi, 1978.
VP	<i>Vākyapāḍīya of Bhartṛhari</i> , K.A. S. Iyer ed., Poona, 1966.
YD	<i>Yuktidīpikā</i> , Vol. 1, A. Wezler and S. Motegi ed., Stuttgart, 1998.

NOTE

- 1 W. Halbfass, 'Karma, Apūrva, and "Natural" Causes', *Karma and Rebirth in classical Indian Traditions*, Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty ed., Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, 1980, p. 282: 'a pre-Kumārila version of the theory of apūrva, basically amounting to the idea of a substrateless and impersonal power which is invoked and manifested by the sacrificial performance, was already discussed and refuted by Uddyotakara in his *Nyāyavārttika* on Sūtra 1.1.7.'
- 2 A. Akamatsu, 'Uddyotakara no Shiso --- NV Kenkyū (2), Apūrva wo Megutte ---' [A study of the *Nyāyavārttika* (2), Uddyotakara on apūrva], *Ihara Shōren Hakushi Koki Kinen Ronbun shū*, 1991, pp. 377-398.
- 3 Yudhiṣṭhira Mīmāṃsaka, *Saṃskṛta Vyākaraṇa-śāstra kā Itihāsa*, Bhāga I, Bahālgarh, 1984; 'Śāstrāvātāra-mīmāṃsā', *Mīmāṃsā-śābara-bhāṣyam*, Yudhiṣṭhira Mīmāṃsaka ed., Prathamō Bhāgaḥ, Bahālgarh, 1987.
- 4 J. Bronkhorst, 'Studies on Bhartṛhari, 2, Bhartṛhari and Mīmāṃsā', *Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik* 15 (1989), pp. 101-117.
- 5 Y. Ikari, 'Rinne to Gō' [*Saṃsāra* and *karman*], *Iwanami Kōza, Tōyō Shisō Dai Rokkan, Indo Shisō* 2, Tokyo, 1988, p. 298.
- 6 J. Bronkhorst, 'Studies on Bhartṛhari', p. 114.
- 7 F 101; E. Franco & K. Preisendanz, 'Bhavādāsa's Interpretation of Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.1.4 and the Date of the Nyāyabhāṣya', *Berliner Indologische Studien* 8 (1995).
- 8 E. Frauwallner, *Geschichte der indischen Philosophie*, II, Salzburg, 1956, p. 23; H. Nakamura, *Shoki Vedānta Tetsugaku shi* [The early history of Vedānta philosophy], Vols. 1-4, Tokyo, 1981, pp. 189-190.
- 9 Cf. A. Akamatsu, *Koten Indo no Gengo Tetsugaku* [An annotated Japanese

- translation of the *Brahmakāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya*.], Vol. 1, Tokyo, 1998, p. 226.
- 10 Cf. *Śābarabhāṣya* on *Jaiminisūtra* 1.1.13: *atrāpi yadi śakṣyāmo nityatām asya viśpaṣṭam vaktum tato nityapratyayasāmarthyāt kadācid upalambham kadācid anupalambham dr̥ṣṭvā kimcid upalambhasya nimittam kalpayiṣyāmah. tac ca saṃyogavibhāgasadbhāve sati bhavatīti saṃyogavibhāgāv evābhivyāñjakāv iti vakṣyāmah.* ‘In this case too, if we can clearly show its (=śabda’s) eternity, then because of the fact that we cognize [it as] eternal, after experiencing that [it is] perceived at some time and not perceived at another time, we assume some cause of perception. And on the basis that [perception] arises when there are conjunction and disjunction, we can say that it is conjunction and disjunction which make [śabda] manifest.’
 - 11 Cf. *Śābarabhāṣya* on *Jaiminisūtra* 1.1.13: *vāyaviyāḥ saṃyogavibhāgā vāyvas̥rativād....* ‘Conjunctions and disjunctions of winds, because they are located in winds....’ A 78.4-5.
 - 12 A. Akamatsu, ‘Kotoba wa Eien na Mono ka Tsukuri dasareta Mono ka --- Bhartṛhari no Baai --- (2)’ [Are śabdās eternal or artificial? --- A case study of Bhartṛhari --- (2)], *Tetsugaku Nenpō* (Kyūdai Bungaku bu), Vol. 55, 1996, pp. 10-11.
 - 13 C. Lindtner, ‘Bhavya on Mīmāṃsā’, *Studia Indologicae*, Vol. 4, 1997, p. 96.
 - 14 Even Śābara is aware of an interpretation according to which *apūrva* is something epistemologically new. *Śābarabhāṣya* on *Jaiminisūtra* 9.1.3: *tad api hy apūrvaṃ śabdād evāvagamyaṭe. astīti na prak̄ śabdād anyena pramānenopasamkhyāyate.* A 1646.11-13. ‘For that *apūrva* also is understood only through speech. It is not shown that it exists by other means of knowledge before speech.’ Kumāṛila begins the opponent’s view in the *apūrva-adhikaraṇa* presupposing the interpretation that *apūrva* is something epistemologically new or not known before. *Tantravārttika* on *Jaiminisūtra* 2.1.5: *tasmāt sarvapramāṇāpūrvatvād anvarthanāmaivāsadrūpam apūrvaṃ pratipattavyam.* A 390.13-14. ‘Therefore, *apūrva*, which is indeed appropriately named, should be construed [literally] as non-existence, because it is *apūrva* or unknown to all [other] means of knowledge.’
 - 15 *Prakaraṇapañcikā vākyārthamātrkā* II, v. 25: *kriyādibhinnaṃ yat kāryaṃ vedyaṃ mānāntarair na tat/ ato mānāntarāpūrvam apūrvam iti gīyate//* PP 441. 3-4. ‘The *kārya* or what should be done, which is different from acts, etc., is not known through other means of knowledge [than the Vedas]. Therefore it is called *apūrva*, because it is unknown to other means of knowledge [than the Vedas].’
 - 16 It might be improper to attribute this view only to Mīmāṃsā, because the *karmadhāraya*-interpretation is also seen in one of the traditional interpretations on *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 5 ‘*āptaśrutir āptavacanan tu*’. *Yuktidīpikā* on *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 5d: *āptā cāsau śrutis ca āptaśrutih.* YD 87.5.
 - 17 As for *a-parārthatva* (not being for others), in other words, *pradhānatva* (being primary), which is supposed to be related with the *śeṣa* or subsidiary element defined as *parārtha* in *Jaiminisūtra* 3.1.2, the present

article will not discuss it because it is not crucial for the reconstruction of the **dharmābhivṛtya-vāda*.

- 18 Kumāṛila, however, emphasizes that *apūṛva* or latent force is not a separate entity from its locus, namely the sacrifices or their fruit, considering the position of *śakti* in his ontology and the relation between sacrifice and its fruit. *Ślokaṁvārttika codanā*, v. 199: *tasmāt phale pravṛttasya yāgādeḥ śaktimātrakam/ utpattau vāpi paśvāder apūṛvaṁ na tataḥ pṛthak//* ‘Therefore *apūṛva* is just a latent force of, for example, sacrifices, which act towards the attainment of their fruit, or [just a latent force] of an animal or the like, which [acts] towards the attainment of its birth; it is not separate from them.’ *Tantravārttika on Jaiminisūtra* 2.1.5: *yāgād eva phalaṁ tad dhi śaktidvāreṇa sidhyati/ sūkṣmaśaktiātmakam vā tat phalam evopajāyate//* A 395.11-12. ‘For the fruit which [arises] only from sacrifice is realized through power [of sacrifice]. Or that which has a subtle power as its nature comes to arise as nothing but the fruit.’
- 19 *Prakaraṇapañcikā vākyārthamātrkā* II, v. 24ab: *tad dhi kālāntarasthānāc chaktam svargādisiddhaye//* PP 440.22. ‘For it (=kārya) is capable of accomplishing heaven and so forth because it remains until the time [of its fruit].’
- 20 *Tantravārttika on Jaiminisūtra* 2.1.5: *saiva ca puruṣagatā kratugatā vā yogyatā śāstre ’sminn apūṛvam ity apadiśyate.* A 394.10-11. ‘And the same compatibility, whether it lies in person or ritual, is called *apūṛva* in this system [i.e. Mīmāṃsā].’
- 21 Cf. *Śābarabhāṣya on Jaiminisūtra* 1.1.12, A 75.11-76.3.
- 22 Cf. A. Akamatsu, ‘Uddyotakara no Shiso’, p. 386.
- 23 Cf. *Śābarabhāṣya on Jaiminisūtra* 1.1.3-5, *vṛttikāra: atha gaur ity asya śabdasya ko ’rthah. sāsānādiviśiṣṭākṛtir iti brūmah.* F 40.13-14. ‘[Question:] Then what is the referent of the word ‘cow’? [Answer:] We answer that [it is] the *ākṛti* or general form, qualified by the dewlaps and so forth.’
- 24 Cf. K. Kataoka, ‘Naraseru no Kaishaku gaku’ [Mīmāṃsā theory of causal action: Śābara’s concept of *bhāva*, *kriyā* and *bhāvanā*.], *Indo Tetsugaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū* 3 (1996), pp. 47-60.