Reconstructing the *Dharma-abhivyakti-vāda
in the Mīmāṃsā Tradition

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SUMMARY OF EARLIER RESEARCH

This paper attempts to reconstruct the Mīmāṃsā apūrva-theory which I suggest might be referred to as ‘*dharma-abhivyakti-vāda’ (the theory of dharma-manifestation). Prof. Halbfass has pointed out that the apūrva-theory is refuted by Uddyotakara in Nyāyavārttika on Nyāyasūtra 1.1.7, a portion of which has been translated into Japanese and investigated further by Prof. Akamatsu. For Akamatsu it is still not clear what Uddyotakara regards as the Mīmāṃsakas’ position on apūrva, i.e. what form of the apūrva-theory was dominant after Śabaravāmin and before Kumārila. Yudhiṣṭhira Mīmāṃsaka, with reference to the relevant portions which I will investigate below, attributes this form of apūrva-theory to Bhartṛhari and Bhrātrmitra, but does not clarify its content. Prof. Bronkhorst, apparently relying on Yudhiṣṭhira Mīmāṃsaka, also refers to and translates the same passages, but he too does not comment on the theory. Prof. Ikari, who is mainly concerned with understanding the Vedic thought-world, presents three aspects of action: a latent form of action, once made manifest through human performances, remains effective as an invisible substance. Ikari does not refer to our passages, but his exposition of this Vedic model is important for our *dharma-abhivyakti-vāda as providing a prototype.

SOURCES

1 Bhartṛhari (AD 450-510)
Bhartṛhari, a grammarian who is said to have used an older Mīmāṃsā source (probably Bhavadāsa’s vṛtti, written in the first half of the fifth century) than the Śabarabhāṣya (first half of the sixth century), mentions the Mīmāṃsā theory in his discussion of dharma.

Svavṛtti on Vākyapādiya I.136: tatra kecid ācāryā manyante. na
prakṛtyā kiṁcit karma *duṣṭam aduṣṭam (ed. drṣṭam adṛṣṭam) vā. 
śāṣṭrāṇuṣṭhānāt tu kevalād dharmābhivyaktih, śāstraikramāc ca 
pratyavāyayogah, yeṣām eva hi brāhmaṇavadhādānām viṣayāntare 
pādaṅkatvam, teṣām eva viṣayāntare prakṛṣṭābhivyadayahetutvam 
śāṣṭreṇā vidhiyata iti. VP 224.5-8.

*Following an emendation by Yudhiṣṭhira (Yudhiṣṭhira 1987: 
ḍṛṣṭaḍúṣṭaḥ variant

On this point some teachers think: No action is either impure or 
pure by nature. But dharma becomes manifest only through 
following scriptures, and negative consequences attach [themselves 
to a person] as a result of [that person’s] transgressing scriptures. 
For scripture prescribes one and the same action of killing a 
Brahmin and the like (i.e. drinking wine, etc.,) as a cause of 
downfall in one context as well as a cause of the greatest elevation 
[i.e. rebirth in heaven] in another context.9

The expression ‘abhivyakti’ is used to explain the phenomenon that 
something eternal becomes perceptible in a certain case and not in other 
cases.10 For example, the phoneme /g/, which is considered eternal in 
Mimāṁsā, manifests itself and becomes audible through actual sounds 
(dhvani, nāda), which in this system correspond to conjunctions and 
disjunctions among wind-atoms.11 The eternal cow-ness (gotva) of 
individual cows becomes manifest through individuals (vyakti) and 
makes us recognize: ‘this is a cow’.12 Likewise the eternal dharma 
manifests itself through each ritual performance (karman).

The same idea is also referred to in another work by Bhartrhari, 
the Mahābhāṣyadipikā, together with more details and a metaphor. 
(Yudhiṣṭhira pointed out the relevant portion (Yudhiṣṭhira 1984: 
392)(1987: 34); Bronkhorst translated it into English (Bronkhorst 
1989).)

Mahābhāṣyadipikā : avasthita eva dharmah. sa tv agnihotrādibhir 
abhivyajyate. tatpreritas tu phalaprado bhavati. yathā svāmi 
bhrtyaiḥ sevāyāṃ preryate phalaṃ praty ... . MBhD 25.25-26

Dharma remains forever. But it is manifested by an agnihotra 
offering or the like. Urged by such (agnihotra, etc.), however, it 
gives a fruit. For example, a master is urged to [give] fruit by 
servants when they serve.... (my translation)

This passage refers to the idea that the dharma, although eternal, urged 
by individual performances (tat-prerita) such as the agnihotra offering, 
becomes manifest (abhivyajyate) and functions as a fruit-giver 
(phala-prada). While in the above-mentioned passage of the
Vākyapadiya the eternality of dharma is inferred from the expression ‘abhivyakti’, here dharma is clearly qualified as eternal: ‘which remains forever’ (avasthita eva). Furthermore the agnihotra offering is personified as that which urges the eternal dharma. A reluctant master, urged by servants, gives them fees. Likewise the unchanging dharma, urged by daily performances of agnihotra, is forced to give fruits.

2 Bhāviveka (AD 490-570)
Bhāviveka in the sixth century, who criticized other schools in his Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā, refers to the *dharma-abhivyakti-vāda as an opponent’s view in the chapter called Mīmāṃsā-tattva-nirṇaya-avatāra. (Edited and translated into Japanese by Prof. Kawasaki (Kawasaki 1992: 409, 376), and into English by Prof. Lindtner (Lindtner 1997: 96). The answer from the Buddhist side is given in k. 55.)

Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā IX, k.10:
apUrvo 'pi kriyavyāgyaḥ, kriyā mokṣe 'pi sādhanam/
somapānādikā, vidvān nirjayed antakam yayā//
And apūrva is manifested by a [ritual] act. A [ritual] act such as drinking soma [=soma sacrifice], etc., is also a cause of liberation. Through that [ritual act] the wise man conquers death.

The idea referred to here is that apūrva or ‘a new thing’ is manifested (vyāgya) through ritual acts, such as drinking soma (somapānādikā kriyā). It should be noted that the manifested element here is called ‘apūrva’ instead of dharma. In the surviving Bhāṭṭa14 and Prābhākara15 sources, apūrva is interpreted as ‘new to our knowledge’ or ‘new information’, not ‘new in origination’ or ‘newly born’.

What then is meant by saying that apūrva is manifested through acts? Is it to be interpreted from the viewpoint of epistemology, in such a way that apūrva, which is newly cognized through the Vedas, is manifested through ritual acts? Or should we interpret it from the viewpoint of ontology, in such a way that the eternal dharma is newly manifested in this world through individual acts such as daily agnihotras?

3 Uddyotakara (fl. in the first half of the seventh century AD)
The relevant portion of the Nyāyavārttika is translated into Japanese and analyzed by Akamatsu (Akamatsu 1991). Therefore in the following I pick up only the passages which are important for the
reconstruction of the *dharma-abhivyakti-vāda.*

Nyāyavārttika on Nyāyasūtra 1.1.7:
a. nityam apy apūrvaḥ yo 'bhivyapakṣa tasya phalam, abhivyaktyarthāḥ ca kriyāḥ. abhivyaktaryat eva na kriyā-lopa iti. yenā yad abhivyajyate tasyaiva tat phalapradāt bhavatītī drṣṭām. NV 55.15-17.

Although *apūrva* is [one and] eternal, [only] the person who makes [it] manifest has [its] fruit. And ritual act is [done] for the sake of manifestation. And because it is [done] for manifestation, ritual act is not left unperformed. [For] it is seen that whatever is manifested gives its fruit only to the one who manifests it.

As seen before, the eternal *apūrva* is manifested through acts (*kriyā*) and gives its fruit to humans. Eternal as it is, however, *apūrva* gives its fruit only to the particular person who made it manifest. Individual ritual acts aim at manifestation (*abhivyakty-artha*). In this way their efficacy or purposefulness is guaranteed through the following sequence: ritual acts, manifested *apūrva* and fruit. This theory avoids undesired consequences such as that ritual acts would not be performed (*kriyā-lopa*).

b. svargāpūrvavedatādīśupadeśo na prāpnoti, atīndriyatvāt. yadi sāksātkarāṇam arthasūptih, svargāpūrvedatādādādādādādādādādādādādādādādādīś upadesāś ceti yuktam, nāpāpadesāśo iti. NV 54.17-20.

[Opponent:] [Vedic] instruction does not hold good for (prāpnoti) heaven, *apūrva*, deities and so forth, because they are beyond perception. If the obtaining (*Apta*) of an object is directly perceiving it [as the Nyāyabhāṣya interprets it], verbal usage about them would not be possible, since no one sees heaven, *apūrva*, deities and so forth. Therefore it is proper [to interpret the compound ‘Apta-upadeśa’] as ‘reliable instruction’ [as a karmadhāra], not ‘instruction of the reliable’ [as a śāṣṭhī-tatpuruṣa].

In regard to the compound of ‘āpta-upadeśa’ in the Sūtra, the opponent interprets it as a karmadhāra, i.e. ‘reliable instruction’ instead of as a tat-puruṣa, i.e. ‘instruction of those who reached the object’. In this interpretation the opponent presupposes that *apūrva* is imperceptible (atīndriya) like heaven and deities (cf. Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā IX, k.5). Being beyond the reach of the senses, *apūrva* cannot be reached by anyone, so there is no ‘person who has reached it’ (āpta). Therefore the opponent insists that a tat-puruṣa interpretation is impossible. Furthermore *apūrva*, as well as heaven and deities, is considered here as
an object of Vedic instruction. As *apūrva* is regarded as imperceptible, it can be said to be qualified further as an object of Vedic instruction only.

c. ... *yad āśīrtaṃ tat kasyaicit pratyaksam iti. parārthatvāt, yat parārtham tad api kasyaicit pratyaksam iti. vastutvād āgāmaviśayatvāc ca. yad vastu yac ca paraśya kathyate, tat kasyaicit pratyaksam drṣṭam, yathā ghaṭādaya iti. anītyātvāt kasyaicit pratyaksā iti. NV 55.3-7. *yad* Calcutta ed.; *yad* yad Thakur ed.

[Opponent:] But what is the ground for [your declaration] that heaven and so forth are visible to someone? [Siddhāntin:] We answer. (1) [They are] visible to someone because they have certain generic properties. (a) Because of resting [in a locus]: everything that rests in a locus is visible to someone. (b) Because of being for others: everything that is for others also is visible to someone. (c) Because of being real and the object of authoritative speech: it is experienced that everything that is real and that is communicated to others, e.g. pots, etc., is visible to someone. (2) [They are] visible to someone because they are non-eternal.

In order to show that from the Nyāya point of view *apūrva*, etc., must be perceptible to someone, Uddyotakara refers to their three common properties (*sāmānya*), i.e. *āśīrattva, parārhatvā* and *vastutvā*-cum-*āgāmaviśayatvā*, together with another one property, i.e. *anītyatvā*. Besides *vastutvā* and *āgāmaviśayatvā*, which could be admitted even by the Mimāṃsaka, the opponent who insists that *apūrva*, etc., are imperceptible to anyone is supposed to admit the opposite properties, i.e. *an-āśīrattva, a-parārhatvā* and *nityatvā*. In fact the last-mentioned property *nityatvā* is admitted in the following argument by the opponent in relation to *abhivyaktī*. As is seen from another later source (Jayanta), *an-āśīrattvā* is also confirmed.17

d. athāpidaṃ syāt. ekam apy apūrvām vyaṇjakabhṛdhānavidhānād bhinnam iva bhavati. ... nanu ca khadādibhedān mukhabhedān tadaṇuvidhānād drṣṭaḥ. NV 56.7-10.

Further the following is also possible: *apūrva*, although one, takes form as if different according to the difference of its manifesters. ... [Opponent:] Due to the difference of [the reflecting surfaces], such as a sword, we find that [the appearance of the reflection of] the face differs in accordance with that [difference of reflectors].
Uddyotakara attacks the *apūrva*-theory after first distinguishing two possibilities, i.e. whether it is one or plural. The opponent who holds that *apūrva* is one explains that the one *apūrva* appears as many through many manifesters in the same way that one face is reflected in many surfaces. Considering this, and other examples, such as one eternal phoneme /g/ which manifests itself through many sounds, it is appropriate to assume that the eternal *apūrva* was regarded as one rather than many.

4 Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (AD 600-650)
Kumārila, discussing ‘what is dharma’ or ‘what is the referent of the word “dharma”’ in his subcommentary on *Jaimitiśūtra* 1.1.2, criticizes the idea that dharma is ‘something newly born (*apūrva*-janman).

*Ślokavārttika codanā*, vv.195-196b:
\[
\text{antahkaraṇavṛttau vā vāsanāyāṁ ca cetasah/}
\text{pudgaleṣu ca punyeyeṣu nṛgyune pūrvajanmami//}
\text{prayogo dharmāsandasya na drṣṭo.... / SV 78.5-7}
\]

We do not find the word ‘dharma’ applied [in ordinary usage and the Vedas] to the activity of the internal organ (as in Śāmkhya), the disposition of the mind (as in Buddhism), virtuous souls (as in Jainism), a quality of ātman (as for the Vaiśeṣikas) or ‘something newly born’ (as in Mimāṃsā). [Therefore these are not really dharma.]

As mentioned before, the surviving traditions of the Bhāṭtas and Prābhākaras interpreted *apūrva* to mean ‘something epistemologically new’ or ‘something never cognized through other means of cognition than Vedic instructions’ (mānāntarāvedya). According to the view refuted by Kumārila in this passage, however, *apūrva* is interpreted to be something ontologically new, i.e. a newly born thing. Kumārila’s commentator Sucaritamiśra (*Kāśikā* 160.19-22), after identifying the opponent to be ‘one group of Mimāṃsakas’ (mīmāṃsakaikadeśinah), clarifies the ontological interpretation of *apūrva*: *apūrva* is that which did not exist before ritual acts (*tad dhi na karmanāḥ pūrvam jāyata eva*) and which is produced by them (*kṛte karmani tannispatteḥ*).

5 Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (fl. in the latter half of the ninth century AD)
Jayanta, commenting on *Nyāyasūtra* 1.2.57, tries to protect the authority of the Vedas from the Nyāya position. In this context he discusses ‘what dharma is’. In criticizing other schools, Jayanta
presupposes Kumārila’s above-mentioned description and gives more details. It is to be noted that Jayanta calls the view of ‘apūrva as something newly born’ (apūrva-janman) that of ‘the old Mimāṃsakas’ (vṛddha-mimāṃsakāḥ) as opposed to the views of the followers of Śabara and Prabhākara. (Part of the relevant portion was pointed out by Yudhiṣṭhira (Yudhiṣṭhira 1984: 393)(1987: 35) and translated by Bronkhorst (Bronkhorst 1989: 113).)

Nyāyamaṭhānī on Nyāyasūtra 1.2.57: vṛddhamimāṃsakāḥ yāgadikarmanirvartītya apūrvam nāma dharmaṃ abhivadanti, yāgadikarmāva śābaraḥ bruvate, vākyārtho eva nityātmanā apiurvāsvadabācyah, dharmaśabdādena ca sa evocaya iti prabhākaraḥ kathayanti ... svargayāyāntarālavartinā ca sthirasya nirādhārasyāpiurvasya nispramāṇakatvāt jayajiāminiyapravādo ’py apiṣṭah. NM 664.6-16.

The old Mimāṃsakas maintain that that unprecedented thing (apūrvam nāma) that is accomplished through acts such as sacrifice, etc., should be [accepted as] dharma. Those who follow Śabara maintain that dharma is only ritual act itself such as sacrifice, etc. The Prabhākara school says that what is denoted by the word ‘apūrva’ is nothing but the sentence-meaning which is a command, which again is denoted by the word ‘dharma’. ... And the [so-called] apūrva which exists between sacrifice and heaven, remains for some time and is without proof of itself. Therefore the statement of the old Mimāṃsakas is also not correct. (my translation)

Jayanta explains the apūrva-janman mentioned by Kumārila as ‘that unprecedented thing that is accomplished through acts such as sacrifice, etc.’ (yāgadikarmanirvartītya apūrvam nāma). In other words, Jayanta explains janman as accomplishment by sacrifice, etc. Jayanta confirms that the apūrva mentioned by Kumārila is ontologically new, not epistemologically. Furthermore, the view which Jayanta identifies as that of ‘the old Mimāṃsakas (vṛddha-mimāṃsaka, jayaji-jāminīyā)’ seems, or at least is believed by him, to precede Śabara and Prabhākara, in view of the order in which he mentions the three positions.

This apūrva or ‘new thing’ stands between (i.e. connects) sacrifice and heaven (svarga-yāga-antarālavartin) and remains for some time (sthirā). In other words, it is grasped as that which is accomplished through sacrifice, remains for some time and gives its fruit to the agent. The Bhāṭtas18 and Prabhākaras19 also accept this character of apūrva positing it as a connector which guarantees the efficacy of ritual acts. But the apūrva which Jayanta mentions here does not have a locus
It is different from Kumārila’s *apūrva* which is ‘just a latent force of sacrifices’ (yāgādeḥ śaktimārakam) or ‘just a latent force of an animal or the like’ (paśvāder śaktimārakam) and from the āmaśakti usually accepted by the Bhāṭtas. This character of ‘having no locus’ was already suggested by Uddyotakara.

One still hesitates, however, to understand *apūrva-janman* to mean simply ‘something newly manifested’, because in some cases ‘production’ (janman, nispaṭti, nirvṛtti) is contrasted with ‘manifestation’ (abhivyakti). To recapitulate:

i. According to the ‘old Mimāṃsakas’ who preceded the followers of Śabara and Prabhākara, dharma is not sacrifice, etc., themselves, but a new thing which is accomplished through them.

ii. Although it remains for some time as a fruit-giver after sacrifice, it does not have any locus such as the ātman or sacrifice.

6 Simhasūrigani

Simhasūrigani, a commentator on the *Nayakara* of Mallāvādin, refers to a Mimāṃsā view as that of an opponent. He paraphrases *apūrva* as ‘different from the seen’ (adṛṣṭa) and a ‘particular dharma’ (dharmaviṣeṣa). Furthermore, he records the view of ‘some Mimāṃsakas’ that dharma is nothing but ritual acts themselves, which is in fact identical with Śabara’s position.

Nyāyāgamānumāriṇi on Dvādaśāram Nayakram, vidhīvidhyāra: a. na pūrvo ‘pūrvo, ‘dṛṣṭo dharmaviṣeṣah, ... viśeṣābādāt parasparaviśiṣṭābhir yajñasamsthābhir agnīstomādibhir iṣṭībhīṣ cābhivyaktyavā apūrvā (-vyā apūrvā) em.; -vyāpūrvā ed.) api viśeṣyante dravyamantrād eva ādīvādi viśiṣṭābhīḥ. NC 140.23-141.5

*Apūrva* is what was not before, i.e. a specific dharma which is different from the seen. ... By the word ‘specific’ [in Mallāvādin’s *apūrva-viśeṣa*] is intended the following: the *apūrvas* manifested through sacrifice-types, i.e. agnīstoma, etc., and īṣṭī, which are qualified mutually by each other, are themselves qualified by those [sacrifice-types] which are [again] qualified by [their respective] material, mantras, deities and so forth.

In this passage, *apūrva* is paraphrased as ‘different from the precedent’ (na pūrvah) and further explained as ‘a particular dharma which is different from the seen’ (adṛṣṭa dharmaviṣeṣah). Although this *apūrva* looks at first glance like ‘an epistemologically new thing’, i.e. ‘a new thing cognized only through the Vedas’, it can be interpreted as ‘ontologically a new thing’ if one considers the meaning of ‘a particular
dhārma’ (dharmaviśeṣa): a dhārma, which is qualified through ritual acts which are again qualified variously through their materials and mantras, becomes a particular dhārma different from the seen and is called adṛṣṭa. It is not new in the sense that it is cognized only through the Vedas but new and different from the seen in the sense that it is a particular thing newly manifested in a certain situation.

The description here seems to be parallel to the structure of the relationship between sāmānya, viśeṣa and vyakti.22 The eternal dhārma could be regarded as sāmānya, a particular dhārma which manifests itself being qualified in a certain situation as viśeṣa, and the individual situations which qualify one sāmānya as vyakti. In other words, the one eternal dhārma, when manifested through individual acts which are qualified by each other as well as by their materials, mantras and deities, is at the same time qualified by those same individual acts. One eternal universal ‘cow-ness’, when manifested through individual cows, is qualified by individuals which consist of various parts.23 In the same way, one eternal dhārma, when it is manifested through individual ritual acts and appears as a particular, is qualified through the ritual acts which consist of various elements. The way in which dhārma is qualified is similar to that of bhāvanā, as posited by Śabarā and the Bhāṭṭas, which functions as a core element in ritual-analysis and is regarded as qualified by various elements in the way that a white canvas may be qualified.24 That is to say, the role of bhāvanā as a core element in the bhāvanā-theory of Śabarā and his followers is replaced by apūrva (or dhārma) in the *dharmabhyāvitavāda.

b. mā bhūd yajñasaṃjñāyāh kriyāyā eva dharmatvam, yathā kaiścin mīmāṃsakair evam vyākhyāyate ‘yajñena yajñam ayajanta devāx, tān dharmāni prāthamāny āsan’ (Ṛgveda 1.164.50; 10.90.16) iti. kim kāraṇam. tasminn arthe pratyakṣata evānityāyāḥ kriyāyā anantaram phalasambhandhādaśanāt kriyāvaiphalyadosaprasaṅgac ca. NC 141.5-7

One should not say that it is an act that is called ‘sacrifice’ which is dhārma, in the way that [is held by] those Mīmāṃsakas who interpret in this way the sentence ‘The gods sacrificed sacrifice through sacrifice. Those were the first dharmas’. Why? Because if that is the meaning [of ‘dhārma’], its connection with the fruit is not seen immediately after the act, which is visibly transient, and because of the undesirable consequence that the act may lack fruit [and therefore becomes useless].

Furthermore, if one identified dhārma with ritual acts, as Śabarā did, the direct connection between dhārma and its fruit would become
impossible, because dharma, being transient, cannot remain until the arising of the fruit. Consequently it would become useless to perform ritual acts, because they would not be the means of attaining their fruit. On the other hand, if one follows the *dharma-abhivyakti-vāda, dharma is able to bring its fruit directly when it is manifested through individual acts and becomes ‘a new thing’. In this way the direct connection between dharma and its fruit is guaranteed.

Simhasūri also refers to the exegesis of Vedic passages in accordance with the *dharma-abhivyakti-vāda.

c. agnihotram iti dharmah kriyābhivyayyaingya ucyate. kārye kāranopacārād agnihotrābhivyayyaingyo ‘gnihotram iti. tutah ‘agnihotram dharmam, juhuyād bhāvayet, svargakāmāh’ ity eva vākyārtho nirdoṣa iti. NC 141.7-9

The word ‘agnihotra’ refers to dharma manifested through act. What is manifested through agnihotra is called ‘agnihotra’ through the secondary application to the result of [a word which strictly speaking refers to] the cause. Then the meaning of the sentence ‘agnihotram juhuyāt svargakāmāh’ could be interpreted without any faults as ‘One who wishes heaven should realize dharma’ (dharmam bhāvayet svargakāmāh).

It can be summed up as follows:

i. The Vedic passage ‘agnihotram juhuyāt svargakāmāh.’ can be paraphrased: ‘one who wishes heaven should realize dharma, which is manifested through the agnihotra offering’.

ii. This interpretation enables one to interpret the expression svargakāmāh and the accusative in agnihotram naturally; unlike Śabara who analyzed it in an unnatural way.

iii. It shows clearly the position that dharma, not heaven, is the purpose (karman) of the principal ritual action, and the thing to be accomplished (śādhyā).

It may be noted that apūrva as a particular dharma which is manifested through acts is called a kārya and can be the object of ‘bhāvayet’. It is possible, therefore, to construe the apūrva-janman mentioned by Kumārila as equivalent with ‘a newly manifested thing’. That is to say, janman could be interpreted as manifestation and not production in a strict sense.

Furthermore Simhasūri presents the *dharma-abhivyakti-vāda as his main pūrva-pākṣa, though he is also aware of Šabara’s opposing ‘yāgāti=dharma’ theory. We may assume then that the
*dharma-abhivyakti-vāda* was the main stream theory in the Mimāṃsā tradition at that time.

**CONCLUSION**

Chronology: This theory must go back to the latter half of the fifth century, since Bhārtrhari knew it. The way in which it was referred to by Bhāviveka and Śimhasūrīgani allows us to conjecture that it was dominant in the Mimāṃsā tradition in their time. We may be justified in concluding from Kumārila’s criticism that its dominance was not surpassed even in his day. Jayanta’s expressions ‘jaraj-jaiminiya’ and ‘vrddha-mimāṃsaka’, in contrast with ‘śābara’ and ‘prābhākara’, suggest that he believed that it predated Śabarasmīn.

Content: The eternal dharma which is always there (avasthita eva) becomes manifest (abhivyakta) through actual ritual performances (kriyā, karman) such as agnihotra-homa and soma-yāga, etc. Instead of ‘dharma-abhivyakti’ we also find the expression ‘apūrva-abhivyakti’. Kumārila and Jayanta use instead of abhivyakti the words janman and nir-√ṛt respectively. With the help of Simhasūrīgani we can construe ‘newly-born’ (apūrva-janman) as meaning a certain special dharma yet unseen (adrśto dharmaviṣeṣah), which, in being manifested by the actual performances, is also qualified by them. Uddyotakara sums it up thus: ‘apūrva, although one, takes form as if different, according to the difference of its manifesters’ (ekam apy apūrvam vyahjakabhedānuvidhānād bhinnam iva bhavait).

From the ontological point of view, the eternal dharma corresponds to sāmānya; the actual performances, which function as manifesters, correspond to vyakti; and the manifested dharma or apūrva to viṣeṣa. Man is also seen as a manifester, according to Uddyotakara. From the point of view of Vedic exegesis, the passage ‘agnihotram juhuyAt svargakAmaH’ might be paraphrased thus: ‘One who wishes heaven should realize dharma, which is manifested through agnihotra-homa’. This manifested apūrva is without locus (nirādhāra), remains for some time (sthīra) and brings fruit (phalaprada). Although it is one and eternal, and so might be expected to be common to all people, it brings its fruit only to specific persons because it is they who manifest it (vyahjakabhedāt).

Relationship with the System: If one admits, like Śabara, that dharma
is nothing but ritual acts such as sacrifices, dharma would be transient and non-eternal. In the *dharma-abhivyakti-vāda, on the other hand, the eternality of dharma is not compromised. This enables one to explain easily the eternality of the three concepts referred to in the second Sūtra, i.e. codanā (Vedic instructions), dharma and the relationship between them (codanā-laksyalaksana-sambandha-dharma). This is important for the tarkapāda section, the aim of which is to show that dharma is cognized through the Vedas in a way that is without faults. For the three items are all eternal and lack human agents that might introduce error. Furthermore, unlike Śabara’s theory, according to which apiūrva intervenes between dharma (=ritual acts) and its fruit, the *dharma-abhivyakti-vāda guarantees the direct causal relation between dharma and its fruit.

Thus abhivyakti-vāda, which is resorted to to explain why the eternal thing works at some particular time and not at another, functions as a device which guarantees the eternality of dharma as well as its causal character. Two direct relations, between codanā and dharma and between dharma and phala, are stressed in this theory, so that the second sūtra may be interpreted straightforwardly: ‘codanālaksana ’rtho dharmah’ states that Vedic instructions are the means to cognize dharma, which in turn is a direct cause of the good (sreyaskara) and thus becomes a desirable thing (artha). As a topic of discussion, it may have developed from commenting on the second sūtra, since Kumārila criticized it while expounding the second sūtra.

In Vedic exegesis the *dharma-abhivyakti-vāda allows more natural interpretations than those of Śabara. Two specific features can be pointed out in particular: first that it interprets dharma as an aim of action (karman) as indicated by the accusative in ‘agnihotram’, and secondly that it allows natural analysis of svargakāmaḥ, instead of interpreting the word as expressing that svarga is an aim of bhāvanā.

*Presented on 4 November 1998 in Wolfson College, Oxford, at the seminar ‘Body, Mind and Religion in India’, while I stayed there as Michael Coulson Junior Research Fellow.

<Abbreviations>
Kāśikā Mīmāṁsā Slokavārtika with the Commentary Kasika of


**NOTE**

1 W. Halbfass, ‘Karma, Apūrva, and “Natural” Causes’, *Karma and Rebirth in classical Indian Traditions*, Wendy Doniger O’Flaherty ed., Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, 1980, p. 282: ‘a pre-Kumārila version of the theory of apūrva, basically amounting to the idea of a substrateless and impersonal power which is invoked and manifested by the sacrificial performance, was already discussed and refuted by Uddyotakara in his Nyāyavārttika on Sūtra 1.1.7.’


5 Y. Ikari, ‘Rinne to Gō’ [Sāmrā and karman], *Iwanami Kōza, Tōyō Shisō Dai Rokkan*, Tokyo, 1988, p. 298.


9 Cf. A. Akamatsu, *Koten Indo no Gengo Tetsugaku* [An annotated Japanese

10 Cf. Sābarabhāṣya on Jaiminisūtra 1.1.13: atrāpi yadi śāksyāmo nityātm āsyā vispaśṭam vaktum tato nityapratyayasyaṃarthhāyā kadācid upalambham kadācid anupalambham drśtvā kincid upalambhasya nimittāṁ kalpaśyāmān. tac ca sāmyogavibhāgagadbhāvāvati bhavattāti sāmyogavibhāgā evābhīvyayakāv iti vākyāmān. ‘In this case too, if we can clearly show its (=sahda’s) eternity, then because of the fact that we cognize [it as] eternal, after experiencing that [it is] perceived at some time and not perceived at another time, we assume some cause of perception. And on the basis that [perception] arises when there are conjunction and disjunction, we can say that it is conjunction and disjunction which make [sahda] manifest.’

11 Cf. Sābarabhāṣya on Jaiminisūtra 1.1.13: vāyaviyāḥ sāmyogavibhāgā vāyaviṣṛṣṭvād... ‘Conjunctions and disjunctions of winds, because they are located in winds...’ A 78.4-5.


14 Even Sābara is aware of an interpretation according to which apūrvā is something epistemologically new. Sābarabhāṣya on Jaiminisūtra 9.1.3: tad api hy apūrvām śabdād evāvagamyate. astīti na prāk śabdād anyena praṃāṇenopasaṃkhāyate. A 1646.11-13. ‘For that apūrva also is understood only through speech. It is not shown that it exists by other means of knowledge before speech.’ Kumārila begins the opponent’s view in the apūrva-adhikaraṇa presupposing the interpretation that apūrva is something epistemologically new or not known before. Tantravārttika on Jaiminisūtra 2.1.5: tasmān sarvapraṃāṇāḥpīrvavīd anvartanaṁvāsadrūpam apūrvam prati-pattayam. A 309.13-14. ‘Therefore, apūrva, which is indeed appropriately named, should be construed [literally] as non-existence, because it is apūrva or unknown to all [other] means of knowledge.’

15 Prakaraṇapañcikā vākyārthamātrikā II, v. 25: kriyādhīhinam yat kāryam vedyaṁ mānāntarair na tat/ ato mānāntarāpūrvarvam apūrvam iti gīyate// PP 441. 3-4. ‘The kārya or what should be done, which is different from acts, etc., is not known through other means of knowledge [than the Vedas]. Therefore it is called apūrva, because it is unknown to other means of knowledge [than the Vedas].’

16 It might be improper to attribute this view only to Mīmāṃśa, because the karmadhāraya-interpretation is also seen in one of the traditional interpretations on Sāmkhyākārikā 5 ‘ūptāsrutir āptavacanan tu’. Yuktidipikā on Sāmkhyākārikā 5d: āptā cāsau śrutis ca āptāsrutih. YD 87.5.

17 As for a-parārthatva (not being for others), in other words, pradhānatva (being primary), which is supposed to be related with the sesa or subsidiary element defined as parārth in Jaiminisūtra 3.1.2, the present
article will not discuss it because it is not crucial for the reconstruction of
the *dharma-abhivyakti-vāda.

18 Kumārila, however, emphasizes that apūrva or latent force is not a
separate entity from its locus, namely the sacrifices or their fruit,
considering the position of sakti in his ontology and the relation between
sacrifice and its fruit. Ślokavārttika cdanā, v. 199: tasmāt phala
pravartasya yāgadeh saktimārakam/ utpattau vāpi paśvāder apūrvam na
tatah prthak// ‘Therefore apūrva is just a latent force of, for example,
sacrifices, which act towards the attainment of their fruit, or [just a latent
force] of an animal or the like, which [acts] towards the attainment of its
birth; it is not separate from them.’ Tantravārttika on Jaiminisūtra
2.1.5: yāgād eva phalam tad dhi śaktidvārena śidhyati/
sūkṣmaśaktīyāmākam vā tāt phalam evopājyate// A 395.11-12. ‘For the
fruit which [arises] only from sacrifice is realized through power [of
sacrifice]. Or that which has a subtle power as its nature comes to arise as
nothing but the fruit.’

19 Prakaraṇapañciṅka vākyārthamārka II, v. 24ab: tad dhi kālāntaravāsthānāc
chaktaṃ svargādisiddhaye/ PP 440.22. ‘For it (=kārya) is capable of
accomplishing heaven and so forth because it remains until the time [of its
fruit].’

20 Tantravārttika on Jaiminisūtra 2.1.5: saiva ca puruṣagatā krutagatā vā
yogyatā sāstre ‘sminn apūrvam ity apadiśyate. A 394.10-11. ‘And the
same compatibility, whether it lies in person or ritual, is called apūrva in
this system [i.e. Mimāṁsā].’

21 Cf. Sābaraḥbāṣya on Jaiminisūtra 1.1.12, A 75.11-76.3.
22 Cf. A. Akamatsu, ‘Uddyotakara no Shiso’, p. 386.
23 Cf. Sābaraḥbāṣya on Jaiminisūtra 1.1.3-5, vṛttikāra: atha gaur ity asya
śabdasya ko ‘rthaḥ. sāśnādiśiśākṛtir iti brāhmaḥ. F 40.13-14.
‘[Question:] Then what is the referent of the word ‘cow’? [Answer:] We
answer that [it is] the ākṛti or general form, qualified by the dewlaps and
so forth.’

24 Cf. K. Kataoka, ‘Naraseru no Kaishaku gaku’ [Mimāṁsā theory of causal
action: Śabara’s concept of bhāva, kriyā and bhāvanā.], Indo Tetsugaku