

Scripture, Men and Heaven:

Causal structure in Kumāriḷa's action-theory of *bhāvanā*

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Śabara's conjunctive usage of *bhāva*, *kriyā* and *bhāvanā* Interpreting *Jaiminisūtra* 2.1.1, *bhāvārthāḥ karmaśabdās tebhyaḥ kriyā pratīyeta ...*, Śabara first clarifies his theory of *bhāvanā*. Though he has a developed idea of *bhāvanā* with its three elements, i.e. *sādhya*, *sādhana* and *itikartavyatā*, he uses the terms *bhāva* and *kriyā* too as possible substitutes of *bhāvanā*, probably following the traditional terminology of action seen in the above sūtra, *bhāvārthāḥ* and *kriyā*. On the one hand he interprets *yajeta* as having a *bhāva*-structure: *tathā yateta yathā yat kiñcid bhavati*¹ or *yāgāt svargo bhavati* (A 2099.12). He also glosses it as *svargasyotpattim* (A 375.9) and *phalasya ... niṣpattiḥ* (A 375.8-9). On the other hand he interprets the same *yajeta* as *yāgena svargaṃ kuryāt* (A 2106.17) and *yāgena svargaṃ bhāvayet* (A 2114.7).²

Kumāriḷa's unification of all three as *bhāvanā* alone Using Śabara's concept of *bhāvanā* as a starting point, Kumāriḷa develops the theory further with appropriate modifications. He singles out *bhāvanā* as representing the essential structure of all actions, i.e. the meaning of all finite verbs (*ākhyātāni*), because it is important for him to stress that all actions are essentially causal. Therefore he dismisses the other two, *bhāva* and *kriyā*, but by integrating rather than by excluding them. In his interpretation of the sūtra, he understands *bhāva* in a rather forced manner, through an unusual 'etymology' (*vyutpatti*), as an equivalent of *bhāvanā* (A 374.20-21). And he objects to Śabara's straightforward interpretation of *bhāva* as "becoming" (A 386.16-17), for he needs to find in the sūtra some support for his concept of *bhāvanā*. But this does not mean that *bhāva* is completely discarded in his theory of action. It survives in *bhāvanā*, because *bhāvanā* essentially comprises the two, *kriyā* and *bhāva* (*bhāvanā* = *kriyā* + *bhāva*). *Kriyā*, on the other hand, is "upgraded" to be the same as *bhāvanā* through his skillful analysis.

Analysis of intransitive and transitive verbs For this integration into *bhāvanā*, Kumārila first analyses through *sāmānādhikaraṇya*³⁾ the general structure of actions denoted by finite verbs, especially transitive ones, e.g. *pacati*, *gacchati* and so on, which denote *kriyā*, the meaning of a representative transitive *karoti* (A 376.25-26). *Kriyā*, the action of making, necessarily requires a *kriyamāṇa*, an object to be made, which is nothing but the agent of *bhāva*, the thing that becomes (i.e. arises). Thus he shows the general structure of transitive verbs to be: “The agent of becoming becomes the object of making” (A 377.9-10; *kartr̥* → *kriyā* → *karman=kartr̥* → *bhāva*). For further clarification he defines in contrast the two, *bhāva* and *kriyā*: *bhāva* he defines as “an action of the agent merely acquiring its own body [i.e. coming into existence]” (A 376.27-28); *kriyā* he defines as “an action of an agent which has [already] acquired [its own] body (i.e. existence)” and as “an action which aims at another [thing] acquiring [its] body (i.e. which aims at another thing’s coming into existence)” (A 377.7; A 376.28-29).

“Discovering” the universal structure of causal-action: *prayojaka-vyāpāra* and *prayojyavyāpāra* He next identifies this *kriyā*-structure as being nothing but causal. We can see this as an upgrading of *kriyā* to *bhāvanā*. The *prayojaka*, the agent of a causal action (*hetu* in the grammarian tradition), causes the *prayojya*, the object of the causal action, to become, i.e. makes it an agent of becoming (A 377.24-25; *prayojaka* → *vyāpāra* → *prayojya* → *vyāpāra*). He defines *bhāvanā* as “an action of the causal agent, which has as its subsidiary element ‘the action of the caused object’, which is mentioned by a part of the same [causative] word [e.g. *bhāvayati* and *vikledayati*]” (A 378.5-6; A 378.9). In this way Kumārila establishes causal actions as denoted by finite verbs, especially transitive ones. As he summarises himself, “Thus, through *kriyā*, *bhāvanā* is established in all finite verbs” (A 378.15).

General structure of causal-action Kumārila further proceeds to demonstrate, through the application of this *kriyā*-structure, that even intransitives

and *kṛdantas* essentially have a causal sense (A 381.10; A 379.28). Thus, according to him, we can analyse any action as essentially causal.

Application of *arthātmikā bhāvanā* to *śabdātmikā bhāvanā*: Analysis of *vidhi*-structure Analysing the organic structure of Vedic rituals, Śabara developed his ideas about action and probably invented the concept of *bhāvanā*. Kumārila continues from Śabara’s idea and abstracts a universal causal-structure from all actions, not only Vedic but also worldly, with the device of *prayojakavyāpāra* and *prayojyavyāpāra*. The universal structure of causal-action, not restricted by Kumārila to Vedic ritual actions, becomes ready to be applied to all kinds of actions, not only physical but also verbal, injunction (*vidhi*) in particular, which we can easily see to be relevant to ritual actions. This is evident in the same sūtra, *Jaiminisūtra* 2.1.1, *eṣa hy artho vidhīyate*.⁴⁾ Also the word *codanā*, which is a synonym of *vidhi* and *upadeśa* for Kumārila (*Ślokavārttika autpattika*, v. 11cd), has a causative form, as shown e.g. by Śabara: *ācāryacoditaḥ karomi* (Frauwallner ed., 16.9-10). Kumārila labelled the verbal action, i.e. the injunction, as *śabdātmikā bhāvanā*, in contrast with which he named the physical (and mental) action *arthātmikā bhāvanā* (A 114.14-15; A 378.20-21). Being a *bhāvanā*, an injunction is analyzed with a *prayojaka-prayojya*-formulation. Scriptural passages, *linādis* in particular, cause men to take actions (*linādi* → *bhāvanā* → *puruṣa* → *bhāvanā*).

Connecting *śabdātmikā* and *arthātmikā bhāvanā* As *arthātmikā bhāvanā* comprises three elements (*aṃśas*), *śabdātmikā bhāvanā* too requires three: the *sādhyā* is **puruṣapravṛtti*, i.e. *arthātmikā bhāvanā* (*Ślokavārttika vākya*, v. 275; A 114.17-18; A 389.24); the *sādhana* is *vidhijñāna* (A 114.22-23); the *itikartavyatā* is *prāśastyajñāna*. (A 114.23-24). To explain, Vedic injunctions, *linādis* in particular, accomplish men’s taking action (*arthātmikā bhāvanā*) through *vidhijñāna*. For no one follows an injunction without recognizing it to be an injunction. The *vidhiśakti*, though sufficient by itself to prompt men, is further supported by the knowledge of a praiseworthiness (*prāśastyajñāna*), which is understood from the *arthavāda*-portion.⁵⁾ In this manner, Kumārila succeeds

in connecting two causal actions: *liṅādīs* make men take action, which in turn causes heaven to arise (*liṅādi* → *bhāvanā* → *puruṣa* → *bhāvanā* → *svarga* → *bhāva*).

Analysis and connection of *adhyayanavidhi* *Arthātmikā bhāvanā* is verbalized as *yāgena svargaṃ bhāvayet*, which is a gloss of a Vedic injunction *svargakāmo yajeta*. The agent of this command is the *liṅādīs*, the *bhāvanā* of which can be also verbalized as *vidhijñānena puruṣapravartanaṃ bhāvayet* (= *puruṣaṃ pravartayet*).⁶⁾ But if the *liṅādīs* are the agent of the commands to men to perform (ritual) actions, who is it that commands them in turn to perform the action of commanding men? Kumārila appoints the *adhyayanavidhi*, i.e. *svādhyāyo 'dhyetavyaḥ*, to take this role of “meta-injunction”, which orders other *vidhis*, including itself, to order men.⁷⁾ Thus Kumārila succeeds in interpreting both types of *bhāvanā* as having the same structure and verbalization.

adhyayanavidhi → *bhāvanā* → *liṅādi* → *bhāvanā*

liṅādi → *bhāvanā* → *puruṣa* → *bhāvanā*

puruṣa → *bhāvanā* → *svarga* → *bhāva*

Three layers of causal-action: Kumārila’s framework of interpreting Vedic ritual Starting out from Śabara’s concept of *bhāvanā*, Kumārila succeeds in showing that *bhāvanā* encompasses the entire process of Vedic ritual, from the *adhyayanavidhi* to heaven’s arising (*bhāva*), including all the subordinate necessary elements of *prāśastya* and so on. Thus he establishes the Mīmāṃsā framework for interpreting the Vedas and Vedic rituals, namely a consistent three-layered structure of causal actions.

1) Śābarabhāṣya ad 2.1.1: *tathā yajeta yathā kiṃcid bhavati*. Ānandāśrama first ed. (=A), 375.3. Maṇḍana Mīśra (*Bhāvanāviveka* 23.1, 166.3-167.2 in Ramaswami’s ed.) clearly presupposes the reading *yajeta* not *yajeta*. I also accept his *yaj*, though there is a variant which omits it. Their witnesses too support the accepted readings, namely the *Bṛhatī* and the *Ṛjuvimalā*.

2) For further clarification of Śabara’s usage and intention, see K. KATAOKA “Naraseru no Kaishaku gaku”, *Indo Tetsugaku Bukkyō gaku Kenkyū*, 3, 1995, 47–60.

3) *Mahābhāṣya* ad 1.3.1: *kiṃ karoti? pacati*. Cf. H. KURODA “Kumārila no Bhāvanā setsu ni tsuite (1)”, *JIBS* 28-1, 1979, 458–456.

4) Kumārila explains the content of *eṣa ... arthaḥ as kuryād yajinā svargam* (A 375.25).

5) *Tantravārttika* ad 1.2.7, A 114.25: *tatra vidhiśaktir* (-śaktir] Oxford ms., according to K. HARIKAI: *Koten Indo Seiten Kaishaku gaku Kenkyū*, Fukuoka, 1990, 492; -vibhaktir A) *avasīdati, tāṃ prāśastyajñānam uttabhnāti*.

6) A 114.17-20; HARIKAI (op. cit. 119) takes “*pravartanam*” as intransitive, as if a synonym of *pravṛtti*, but Kumāṛila seems to intend a causative, for he could have used *pravṛtti* instead of *pravartana* if he had intended an intransitive sense. But I agree that it is confusing, for logically we expect *pravṛtti* here, not *pravartana*, as a *sādhya*.

7) A 114.16-17: *svādhyāyādhyayanavidhinetaḥ sarve vidhāyakāḥ svādhyāyapadopāttaś cātmā niyujyate bhāvayed iti*. HARIKAI (op. cit. 119) takes “*ātmā*” as equivalent to *puruṣa* (probably following G. Jhā’s translation), but this is clearly not intended. See e.g. *Nyāyasudhā*, p. 32; *Ajitā*, p. 29 in Allahabad ed., part 2, pp. 7-8 in Harikai’s ed.