

Validity of Cognition and Authority of Scripture


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Classification of cognition Adopting the framework of the *vṛttikāra* (Frauwallner's ed., 26.7–21, 34.19–36.5), Kumāriḷa presupposes the following classification of cognition. First it is classified into two groups, *pramāṇa* (valid cognition) and *apramāṇa*. The latter is further classified into three¹⁾: non-cognition (*ajñāna/jñānābhāva/buddhyanutpatti*), doubt (*saṃśaya*) and error (*mithyājñāna*).²⁾ The last, i.e. error, is identified as such and is negated (*bādhyate*) when one finds faults in its cause (*hetūttadoṣa/kāraṇadoṣa*),³⁾ or when one finds that its object does not exist in the manner that one has cognized it (*arthānyathātva/atathābhāva*).⁴⁾


1. *pramāṇa/samyakpratyaya*
2. *apramāṇa*
 - a. *ajñāna/jñānābhāva/buddhyanutpatti*
 - b. *saṃśaya*
 - c. *mithyājñāna*
 - i. **hetūttadoṣajñānabādhyā*
 - ii. **arthānyathātvaajñānabādhyā*

Mechanism of cognition Kumāriḷa regards validity of cognition (*prāmāṇya*) as a kind of capacity (*śakti*).⁵⁾ This identification implies that validity, for Kumāriḷa, has various features attributed to capacity in general.⁶⁾ Most importantly, in this context, it should innately exist in its locus. In other words, a cognition is valid from itself (*svataḥ*), not from something else (*parataḥ*) such as good qualities (*guṇa*). Therefore when a cognition arises, its validity, i.e. the capacity for a cognition to operate, arises simultaneously.⁷⁾ Considering that a characteristic feature of a capacity (*śakti*) is that it is an *adr̥ṣṭa* to be postulated by *arthāpatti*, one must conclude that validity

is not grasped by its locus, i.e. cognition itself, but only postulated from the result of cognition.⁸⁾ Although it exists in a cognition innately and basically (*utsargāt*), it is exceptionally (**apavādena*) cancelled when invalidity (*aprāmāṇya*) is brought about by a bad quality (*doṣa*) of a cause of a cognition. This point, which could be one of the weakest in his *prāmāṇya*-theory, is not expanded on much by Kumārila. But we can guess from the general characteristics of capacity that validity at this moment only conceals itself temporarily. A bad quality is removed by means of a good quality (*guṇa*) which also belongs to the same cause of a cognition. Then invalidity disappears and innate validity is secured (v. 65). But it is not the case that a good quality directly causes validity (vv. 47ab, 64cd).




Methods for negating an erroneous cognition From the vṛttikāra onwards, the two methods mentioned above are formulated to discover and negate an error (**mithyājñāna*). When one finds a bad quality (*doṣa*) in a cause of a cognition, one can know indirectly (*arthāt*) its invalidity (*aprāmāṇya*) and negate a preceding wrong cognition (v. 58). Or when one discovers that an object is otherwise than he has cognized, he directly knows the invalidity of a preceding cognition and negates it (v. 57ab). These two kinds of cognitions are called “negating cognition” (*bādhakapratyaya/bādhakajñāna*). But following the vṛttikāra, it is common to use the term “negation” (*bādha*) to refer specifically to the latter process.⁹⁾



Mechanism of validity and invalidity in verbal cognition In the context of verbal cognition, a good quality (*guṇa*) or a bad quality (*doṣa*) of a speaker (*vaktṛ*) determines a good or a bad quality of speech (*śabda*), which is in turn the direct cause of a hearer’s cognition (v. 62). To explain, speech ceases to be a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) when a bad quality of a speaker is transferred into it (*saṃkrānti*). Conversely, speech keeps its status as a means of valid cognition when a good quality removes a bad quality and wards off its undesirable transference (v. 63ab).


The remaining mechanisms are the same as those of cognition in general. A good quality of a speaker removes a bad quality. Then speech is no longer regarded as an invalid means of knowledge (*apramāṇa*) and stands as a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*). Then invalidity of a verbal cognition is removed and innate validity stands (v. 65).



As we may suppose from Kumārila’s work (vv. 22ab, 23, 102cd–110ab), good qualities of speech, derived from good qualities of the speaker, are of two kinds: the fact that it deals with an object that is known through another means of valid cognition (**pramāṇāntaradr̥ṣṭārthaviṣayatva*), and the fact that it has been uttered by an honest man (**āptoktatva*). The former condition guarantees the correspondence between an object and a preceding means of valid cognition, while the latter guarantees that between an acquired information and speech.¹⁰⁾

Securing validity in the case of a Vedic injunction The Vedas, being authorless, lack the only possible source of a bad quality, and therefore never themselves have a bad quality, though they do not have a good quality either.¹¹⁾ But, because there is no possible source of a bad quality, they do not require a good quality from the beginning, which in the case of worldly statements (*laukikaṃ vacanam*) is required in order to guarantee the validity of verbal cognition. In consequence, the condition of not being a means

of valid cognition (*apramāṇatva*) never accrues to the Vedas, because they do not have the undesirable transference (*saṃkrānti*) of a bad quality (v. 68). Thus they keep their innate characteristic, i.e. being a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇatā*). Therefore a cognition from a Vedic injunction never touches invalidity (*aprāmāṇya*) derived from a bad quality. Thus the innate characteristic of validity (*prāmāṇya*) remains in the cognition, without being cancelled.



Impossibility of negating a cognition from a Vedic injunction It has become clear why a cognition from a Vedic injunction is ontologically faultless. A Vedic injunction is always a means of valid cognition (**codanā pramāṇam eva*).¹²⁾ This is why eternity (*nityatā*), or not being made by sentient beings (*apauruṣeyatā*), is required for protecting the authority of the Vedas (vv. 100cd–101a). However, as I mentioned above, one can deny an erroneous cognition by means of a later negating cognition (*bādhakapratyaya*), even though one could not point out a fault in its cause. For that one would need to show that a dharma, more concretely the relationship between cause and effect, e.g., *yāga* and *svarga*, is otherwise (*atathābhāva*) than a Vedic injunction teaches. But the domain of dharma is specifically allowed only to the Vedas, never to be approached by human perception. For perception and Vedic injunction, the two independent, primary and direct means of valid cognition, keep separate functional divisions. With regard to a dharma only a Vedic injunction is a means of valid cognition (**codanaiiva pramāṇam*) (v. 4ab). This is why Kumārila (vv. 110cd–155) is so eager to deny an omniscient being, who could even grasp a dharma. We human beings, according to the Mīmāṃsā system, can never obtain knowledge of a dharma without the teaching of the Vedas, just as a person blind from birth can never obtain knowledge of a particular color without the teaching of a non-blind person.¹³⁾

Therefore it is impossible to deny a Vedic teaching by means of perception. As for the dependent, secondary and indirect means of valid cognition such as inference, because these are dependent on perception (Frauwallner's ed., 24.21: *tanmūlatvāt*; 22.19: *pratyakṣapūrvakatvāt*), they cannot overcome the limitations of perception.

1) *Śloka-vārttika codanā* (=ŚVc), v. 54ab.

2) As D'Sa (Francis X. D'Sa, 1980. *Śabdaprāmāṇya in Śabara and Kumārila*. Vienna, 181) correctly points out, each word of the *pramāṇa*-definition in verse 80 excludes a corresponding *apramāṇa*. But the text he gives (n. 1) of v. 80b *nāpi saṃvādam ṛcchati*, most probably there following Dvārikadāsa Śāstrī's edition, should be corrected to *na viśaṃvādam ṛcchati*, as he correctly translates on p. 180, probably there following the Madras edition (*tasmād dṛḍhaṃ yad utpannam na viśaṃvādam ṛcchati/ jñānāntareṇa vijñānam tat pramāṇam pratīyatām//*). Sucarita Miśra (*Kāśikā* 74.3-4) also enumerates two other kinds of invalid cognition, *smaraṇa* (recollection) and *saṃvāda* (later cognition which agrees with and therefore validates the preceding cognition). Kumārila, too, in the *pramāṇa*-definition in the *Bṛhaṭṭikā* (see below, note 9), in particular by the phrase *apūrvārthavijñānam*, seems to exclude these two from being kinds of *pramāṇa*. But as far as the *Śloka-vārttika* is concerned, as we may see from the *pramāṇa*-definition in verse 80 in particular, Kumārila does not presuppose these two as kinds of *apramāṇa*.

3) In Ratnakīrti's text *hetūktadoṣa* (Thakur's first edition, 105.10, 106.1; Katsumi Mimaki, 1976. *La réfutation bouddhique de la permanence des choses (Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa) et la preuve de la momentanété des choses (Kṣaṇabhāṅgasiddhi)*. Paris, 84.8, 86.14) should be emended to *hetūtthadoṣa*. And Mimaki's note (n. 295) thereon, which associates *hetūktadoṣa* with the five conditions (*pañcarūpa*) of a proper reason, is irrelevant.

4) ŚVc v. 53: *tasmād bodhātmakatvena prāptā buddheḥ pramāṇatā/ arthānyathātva-hetūtthadoṣajñānād apodyate//* D'Sa (*op. cit.* 182) is wrong in interpreting *arthānyathātva* as a synonym of *mithyātva*.

5) ŚVc v. 47cd.

6) For Kumārila's notion of capacity (*śakti*), see Kei Kataoka, 1999. "The Mīmāṃsā Concept of *Samskāra* and the *Samskāra* in the Process of Cognizing a Word-meaning." *Journal of the Japanese Association for South Asian Studies*, No. 11, 22 (n. 32).

7) ŚVc v. 48: *ātmalābhe *hi bhāvānām **kāraṇāpekṣitā bhavet/ labdhātmanām svakāryeṣu pravṛttiḥ svayam eva tu// *hi]* Madras; *ca* Dvārikadāsa ***kāraṇāpekṣitā]* Madras; *kāraṇāpekṣatā* Dvārikadāsa.

8) Kumārila accepts that a valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) itself is apprehended only by another cognition (v. 83), namely, *arthāpatti* (ŚV *śūnya*, v. 182).

9) The following example of *bādha* in the *Bṛhaṭṭikā* clearly refers only to the latter process of negation. *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī* 113.10-12: *tathā bṛhaṭṭikāpi — tatrāpūrvārtha-*

vijñānaṃ niścitaṃ bādhavarjitaṃ/ aduṣṭakāraṇārabdhaṃ pramāṇaṃ lokasaṃmatam//

10) Cf. Kei Kataoka, 2001. “Indo Seiten Kaishakugaku no Hōgenron.” (in Japanese) [The Ultimate Source of Dharma in Mīmāṃsā Exegesis.] *Bukkyō Bunka Kenkyū Ronshū*, Vol. 5, 26–50.

11) ŚVc v. 63cd: **yad vā vaktur abhāvena na syur doṣā nirāśrayāḥ// *yad vā*] Madras; *yadā* Dvārikadāsa.

12) ŚVc v. 4ab.

13) Śābarabhāṣya ad 1.1.2: *naivaṃjātīyakeṣv artheṣu puruṣavacanaṃ prāmāṇyam upaiti, jātīyandhānām iva vacanaṃ rūpaviśeṣeṣu*. Frauwallner’s ed., 18.7–8.