Kumārila’s Critique of Omniscience*

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Theoretical background of Kumārila’s critique of omniscience  Kumārila is a sub-commentator in the Mīmāṃsā tradition: he comments on the Śābarabhāṣya, which is the oldest extant commentary on the Jaiminisūtra. Three different but serial works are attributed to him: Ślokavārttika (ad 1.1.1–1.1.32), Tantravārttika (ad 1.2.1–3.8.44) and Tuptikā (ad 4.1.1–12.4.47). He is also known to have written another but now lost work, the Bṛhaṭṭikā, fragments of which were gathered from the Tattvasaṅgraha and other works.1 The Ślokavārttika (and the Bṛhaṭṭikā) deal(s) with philosophical ideas which provide the theoretical basis for the following arguments about the exegesis of the Vedas and their rituals. One of them is his critique of omniscience,2 which

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2 In the third All-India Oriental Conference held in Madras in 1924, Kuppusvāmini Śāstrī [1925] pointed out for the first time that a now lost work of Kumārila called Bṛhaṭṭikā must have existed. His disciple K.S. Rāmasvāminī Śāstrī [1925] [1928] gathered fragments of the Bṛhaṭṭikā from various sources and further confirmed that there must have existed a work of Kumārila called Bṛhaṭṭikā other than the extant Ślokavārttika. Frauwallner [1962] investigated chapters of svatah-prāmāṇya-parīkṣā and atindriyārthadarśi-parīkṣā of the Tattvasaṅgraha, a work by a Buddhist monk Śantaraksita (A.D. 725–788), which summarizes various philosophical views current in his time, and concluded that the verses quoted from an opponent Mīmāṃsaka must be quotations from Kumārila’s lost work Bṛhaṭṭikā. He also pointed out that Kumārila’s notion of vyāpti, i.e. logical invariable concomitance which enables inference, had developed from the Ślokavārttika to the Bṛhaṭṭikā most probably due to the influence of Dharmakīrti, in particular, his first work *Hetuprakaraṇa (which was later incorporated as the first chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika with the auto-commentary), and determined the sequential order of Kumārila’s two works as well as the date of Kumārila, who must be a contemporary of Dharmakīrti. Against Frauwallner, however, Taber [1992] suggested a possibility of the contrary sequence from the Bṛhaṭṭikā to the Ślokavārttika. (Taber [2001], making a bit of concession, did not draw back his main line.) Steinkellner [1997], replying to Taber’s critique, supported Frauwallner’s view. The same is the case with Kellner [1997] and Krasser [1999]. Krasser [2001:194, n.75], taking into consideration the mutual influence of Kumārila and Dharmakīrti, pointed out the possibility that the sequence of their works is Ślokavārttika→*Hetuprakaraṇa (=Pramāṇavārttika I with the auto-commentary)→Bṛhaṭṭikā→Pramāṇavārttika II–IV.

3 For Kumārila’s critique of omniscience, there are a Japanese translation of the relevant portions of the Ślokavārttika by Harikai [1985] and one for the Tattvasaṅgraha by Kawasaki [1992]. For
Kumārila himself calls sarvajñavāda, a discussion which takes place in commenting the codanā-sūtra (1.1.2), in other words, in the context of protecting the authority of Vedic scripture. But why does he have to deny the possibility of omniscient beings? I shall try to elucidate briefly the theoretical background of his critique.

Kumārila, who played an important part in developing the Mīmāṁsā theory of truth, holds that validity (or absence of invalidity) of Vedic scripture is guaranteed by two conditions: The first is apauruṣeyatā, i.e. not being composed by a human being. This property theoretically makes it possible that the Vedas are absolutely free from human faults. A fraud may tell a lie out of greed, but the Vedas never do because they are free from such bad qualities (doṣa). The second is bādhabhāva, i.e. not being denied later. It is theoretically impossible for us human beings to insist, e.g. “I have not attained heaven, though I did Vedic rituals”. Because what the Vedas tell us in connection with a future fruit is beyond our perception, we cannot test them and disprove what they teach. This property makes it possible for the Vedas to keep their unique domain never to be invaded by other pramāṇas. Thus the validity (pramāṇya) of the Vedas is protected, because it is never touched by the two invalidating factors, i.e. fault of causes (kāraṇadosa) and subsequent denial (bāda).

But omniscient beings such as the Buddha and the Jina may pose a threat to the Vedas because they can invade and access the territory monopolized by the Vedas, i.e. the domain of dharmas. The Buddha in meditation and the Jina in the kaivalya-state free from karma may “see” imperceptible dharmas and find out that Vedic teachings are false. Therefore it is necessary for Mīmāṁsākās to make clear the different domains of different means of valid cognition (pramāṇa).

Śābarabhāṣya ad 1.1.2: aśakyam hi tat puruṣeṇa jñātum ṛte vacanat.
(Frauwallner [1968:18.5–6])

For a human being is unable to cognize that (heaven arises from an agni-
hotra offering etc.) without a [Vedic] statement.

the background and secondary literature with regard to Indian, in particular, Buddhist concept of omniscience in general, see Kawasaki [1992]. Fujiyama [2001], which deals mainly with the Jaina concept of omniscience, is also helpful for our present concern especially in giving a brief survey of previous studies. With regard to Kumārila’s critique of omniscience in particular, Pathak [1931] undertook the task of comparing the two works (see Fujinaga [2001:5–6] for a critical evaluation of Pathak’s work). Kawasaki [1992:262–269] makes “a chart of comparison” to show verse-numbers of the Tattvasaṅgraha corresponding to those of the Ślokavārttika for the relevant portions with brief summaries of each verse-group of the Ślokavārttika.

3Tantravārttika ad 1.3.1, A 163.27.
4For Kumārila’s theory of truth, see Hattori [1992] (in Japanese) and Kataoka [2002], as well as secondary literature referred to therein.

5For the original context of this portion of the Śābarabhāṣya and the concept of the different domains of different pramāṇas, see Kataoka [2001] [2003b].
Here Śabara, commenting on the second sūtra, denies that human beings are able to perceive a dharma, primarily following the original idea of the fourth and fifth sūtras, where Jaimini compares perception (pratyakṣa) and Vedic teaching (upadeśa). Kumārila, on the other hand, further develops Śabara’s idea, taking account of its implication, and starts his critique of omniscient beings. Thus this single line of the Śābarabhāṣya leads Kumārila to write in total 45.5 verses in the Ślokavārttika (and at least 119 verses in the Bhāṭṭikā as counted in the Tattvasaṅgraha vv. 3127–3245).

Purpose, procedure and limitation of this article   This article aims at clarifying Kumārila’s intention and way (or pattern) of thought presupposed either consciously or unconsciously in his critique of omniscience. For the sake of this goal, I first compare the textual structure of the relevant portions of his Ślokavārttika and Bhāṭṭikā (fragments gathered from the Tattvasaṅgraha), that is to say, put side by side two synopses of the texts and see what corresponds and what does not. As we will see, the two texts have similar structures in their contextual frameworks as a whole.

On the basis of this structural agreement at a superficial level, I infer the author’s intention behind it, elucidating what Kumārila has in mind in composing his critique of omniscience. Then I investigate his manner of critique in each argument, paying attention also to the non-corresponding portions inasmuch as they occupy important positions in the whole context. It is clear already from the big difference in the number of their verses that the Bhāṭṭikā, which has at least 119 verses counted from the Tattvasaṅgraha, has more detailed arguments than the Ślokavārttika, which has only 45.5 verses. Therefore I do not go into each detail of the Bhāṭṭikā in the lower hierarchy of the contextual structure. Instead I concentrate on the upper hierarchy, aiming to find significant differences of the relevant portions.

I also refrain from discussing in a general and thorough fashion some problems which are connected but secondary for our present concern (though they are important for the history of Indian philosophy in general), i.e. the sequence of the Ślokavārttika and the Bhāṭṭikā and the relationship of Kumārila and Dharmakīrti. I touch on these problems when it is necessary and relevant to do so, but only in minimum. Therefore what I suggest in the following with regard to these problems are mere suppositions which are of course based on my investigation of a limited number of sources, i.e. the relevant portions of Kumārila’s critique of omniscience.

Textual structure of Kumārila’s critique of omniscience   The following is the synopsis of the text, compared side by side, of the relevant portions of the Ślokavārttika (codaṇa, vv. 110cd–155) and the Bhāṭṭikā (gathered from Tattvasaṅgraha vv. 3127–

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6For the relationship of Kumārila and Dharmakīrti concerning the Buddha’s authority and compassion, see Kataoka [2003a] (in Japanese).
3245). Numbers in parentheses following verse-numbers show the total numbers of the relevant verses.

Slokavārttika vv. 110cd–155(45.5)
1 bhāṣyaavyākhyānam 110cd–111(1.5)
2 sarvam jānātīṣy ayuktam: 
   pramāṇavyavasthā 112–115(4)

Tattvasaṅgraha vv. 3127–3245(119)
1 bhāṣyaavyākhyānam 3127(1)
1.1 sarvasaṅgādīṭhaḥ 3128–3142(15)
1.2 sarvasmiṁ jñāte dosāḥ 3143–3156(14)
2 sarvam jānātīṣy ayuktam:
   2.1 sarvadārasaninirāsāsah
      2.1.1 pramāṇavyavasthā 3157–3166(10)
      2.1.2 atiśayamāryādā 3167–3173(7)
      2.1.3 upasamhāraḥ 3174ab(0.5)
   2.2 sarvasārasaninirāsāsah 3174cd–3183(9.5)

3 sarvajñatvāpauruṣeyatve 116(1)
4 sarvajñā[tvā]-abhāvah
4.1 pratyakṣa-abhāvah 117ab(0.5)
4.2 anumāṇa-abhāvah 117cd(0.5)
4.3 śādha-abhāvah 118–120(3)
   4.3.1 ekānumāṇanirākaraṇam 121–132(12)
   4.3.2 smṛtyavicchedanirākaraṇam 133–136(4)

5 sarvajñapraṇītāvāsanirāsāsah
5.1 drṣṭārṇopadeśah 137(1)
5.2 adṛṣṭārṇopadeśah 138–140(3)
6 kevalajñānasarvajñānirāsāsah 141–142(2)
7 nityāgamadārasanaravajñānirāsāsah 143–151(9)
8 atulyatvopasamhāraḥ 152–155(4)

One can see that the main framework of the two texts basically corresponds. The agreement is particularly clear in section 3 sarvajñatvāpauruṣeyatve, where Kumārila proposes with one verse to compare the Buddha’s omniscience (sarvajñatva) and the Vedas’ being authorless (apauruṣeyatva).

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7 For the relevant portions of the Ślokavārttika, there is a synopsis by Harikai [1985:50–51], and one for the Tattvasaṅgraha by Kawasaki [1992:271–273]. These two synopses are different from mine with regard to the viewpoint of division.

8 According to Ratnakīrti (R 27.19), the verses beginning with v. 3186 (which should deal with the argument of absence of verbal testimony) are counted as 47 (cf. Kawasaki [1992:302]). Section 6 criticizes the Jainas, who claim that the Jina in the state of kaivalya free from karma is omniscient (see, e.g. Fujinaga [2001]). The opponents criticized in section 7, according to Umbeka, are Vedāntins. But Kumārila himself seems to presuppose Buddhists and Vaiśeṣikas as his opponents. Tantravārttika ad 1.3.11, A 230.14–17: sākyāyādyaḥ ‘pi hy evam vadanty eva yathā—uptpādād vā tathāgatānāṁ anuttapādād vā sthitāveṣaṁ dharmānīyataḥ—iti. tataḥ ca vedavan nityāṇaḥ te ‘pi ced āgama maṭāḥ/ codanañkṣayo dharmas tadvataḥ ‘pi ṛṣayāyate// ad 1.3.12, A 235.22–23: yathā māmāṇṣakratrastāḥ sākyavaīśeṣikādayah/ nitya evaṁ gamaḥ smākam ity abhū śānyacetānavaḥ//
The two texts agree in assuming someone’s (mis)understanding that both the Buddhist and the Mīmāṃsaka theories are equally defective in postulating something unseen (adṛśta): Buddhists insist that the Buddha, though a human being, is omniscient, and Mīmāṃsakas insist that the Vedas, though a mere collection of sentences, are authorless and eternal. Thus both of them postulate something supernatural, i.e. something unseen in this world, and therefore equally defective. But in fact, as will be shown by Kumārila in the concluding section 8 atulyatvopasamhārah, Buddhists postulate more than Mīmāṃsakas, and therefore the latter can finally win the competition of reducing postulation of unseen things under the Mīmāṃsā exegetical rule (nyāya) that less postulation is better. In this manner Kumārila shows the “difference” (proclaimed in v. 3184) and solves the problem.

The other main parts of the texts, too, are similar in both the Ślokavārttika and the Brāhmaṇīya. In section 1 bhāṣyaśākhyānam Kumārila comments briefly on the original sentence of the Śārabhāṣya. Then in section 2 sarvam jānātīty ayuktam he shows that it is impossible to cognize everything, in particular, appealing to the different domains of different types of means of valid cognition. Section 3, which I explained above, is followed by section 4 sarvajña[ tvā]/abhāvah, in which Kumārila shows that an omniscient being or omniscience cannot be cognized by any type of means of valid cogn-

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9 Šlokavārttika codanā, v. 116:
sarvajñakalpanānyais tu
vede cāpauruṣeyatā/
tulyavat kalpitā yena
tenedaṃ sampradhāryatām//

Others, however, suppose that [the two theories, i.e.] postulation of an omniscient being and the Vedas’ being authorless, are as if equal [in postulating something unseen, and therefore equally defective]. Therefore this [matter] should be correctly investigated.

Tattvaśāṅgṛaha v. 3184:
sarvajñatvam ca buddhāder
yā ca vedasya nityatā/
tulye jalpanti ye tebhyo
viśeṣāḥ kathyate ’dhunā//

Now the difference [of the Veda from the Buddha] is taught for those who say [falsely] that the Buddha’s omniscience and the Veda’s eternity are equal [in postulating something unseen].
nition. Similarly section 5 sarvajñapraṇītātvanirāsah, in which Kumārila shows that it is impossible for an omniscient being to teach, is found in both of his works. Thus the main frameworks of the textual structures agree in both texts. Those discussions which appear only in the Brhatṭikā, such as 1.1, 1.2, 2.1.2, 4.4 and 4.5, are subordinate to the main arguments and therefore do not change the textual framework as a whole.

Kumārila’s intention behind the structure  What then exactly is consistent in structure in the two texts, and what is Kumārila’s intention behind it? There is a hint in section 3 mentioned above, where Kumārila compares two positions: The opponents, most representatively Buddhists, proclaim omniscience of the Buddha or others and Mīmāṃsakas proclaim the Vedas’ being authorless. The latter property apauruṣeyatā is usually given in Mīmāṃsā to show that the Vedas are authoritative, and this is the main theme in the present codanā-chapter. Therefore the Mīmāṃsakas’ proposition and reason must be: “The Veda is valid, because it is authorless (*codanā pramāṇam, apauruṣeyatvāt).” Similarly the Buddhists’ are assumed to be: “The scripture (or the Buddha’s teaching) is valid, because it is taught by the omniscient Buddha (*āgamaḥ or buddhavacanam) pramāṇam, sarvajñabuddhapaṇītātvāt.” This assumption is supported by the following verses of the concluding section 8.

Ślokavārttika codanā, vv. 152–153ab:

-evam ca kalpayanty anye yāvad āgamasiddhaye/
tāvan na kalpayaty, etat samatvam jaimineḥ parāh //
na hi drṣṭādhikaṃ kiṃcit prāmāṇye tena kalpyate/

And thus [, as shown above,] he (Jaimini) does not postulate as much as others do in order to establish [the validity] of scripture. Such is the similarity of Jaimini with others! For he [i.e. Jaimini] postulates nothing more than seen things for the sake of validity.

Postulation of omniscience and postulation of being authorless are “for establishing the scripture (āgamasiddhaye)” and “for the sake of validity” (prāmāṇye). In other words, these two properties are given as reasons to show that their scriptures (or cognition attained from their scriptures) are valid.

Mīmāṃsā *codanā pramāṇam, apauruṣeyatvāt

Buddhism *āgamaḥ pramāṇam, sarvajñabuddhapaṇītātvāt

Viewing again the whole structure while keeping in mind the present context of “establishing authority of scripture”, it is likely that Kumārila, assuming the Buddhists’ reason “because it is taught by the omniscient Buddha” (*sarva-jña-buddha-praṇītātvāt), examines the meanings of each component word of this reason. This is
clearer in the Brhaṭṭikā than in the Ślokavārttika. He extracts five parts from this reason and discusses each of its words: 1. omni- (sarva); 2. -scient (jīna); 4. omniscient (sarvajña); 4'. the omniscient Buddha (sarvajñabuddha); 5. being taught (praṇīta).

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\text{From these parts the division of the corresponding Ślokavārttika can be guessed.}
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The Ślokavārttika seems to assume a slightly simpler reason “because it is taught by an omniscient being” (sarvajñapraṇītatvāt) and discusses: 2. omni-scient or cognizing everything; 4. an omniscient being; 5. being taught. But the other items “omni” and “the omniscient Buddha” are not clear. We can see that the division of the Brhaṭṭikā is more detailed. In the following I shall examine each of these items and Kumārila’s discussions of them.

**Comparison of the opening verses** As I briefly mentioned above, the different domains of different means of valid cognition (pramāṇa) are intended when Śabara says, “For a human being is unable to cognize that without a [Vedic] statement”.

In the beginning of both the Ślokavārttika and the Brhaṭṭikā in the present context, Kumārila interprets this original statement of the Śabarabhāṣya, which is the target of his whole critique of omniscience in these sub-commentaries.

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\begin{align*}
\text{Ślokavārttika codanā, vv. 110cd–111:} & \quad \text{Tattvasaṅgraha v. 3127:} \\
nānena vacaneneha & \quad \text{dharma-jñatvanirākriyā//} \\
sarvajñatvanirākriyā// & \quad \text{kevalo ‘tropayujyate/} \\
vacanād tā ity evam & \quad \text{vijñanāh. puruṣāh kena vāryate//} \\
apavādo hi saṃśritah/ & \quad \text{//}^{11} \\
yadi saṁbhīh pramāṇāh syāt & \quad \text{vijñanāh kena vāryate//} \\
sarvajñāh kena vāryate// & \quad \text{puruṣāh kena vāryate//}
\end{align*}
\]
Here, with this statement, [Šabara] does not [intend to] deny [the possibility of] “being omniscient”. For [Šabara], saying “without a [Vedic] statement”, relies on an exception [and allows in general an omniscient being who knows a dharma from a Vedic statement]. If [a person is] omniscient through six means of valid cognitions, who denies him?

If denial of being a person who cognizes dharmas alone is useful here, who denies a person who cognizes everything else [other than dharma]?

What Kumārila assumes here is the division of domains of the perceptible and the dharmic, which is a traditional contrast found already in Jaiminisūtra 1.1.4 (pratyakṣa-sūtra) and 1.1.5 (autpattika-sūtra): Perception deals with the perceptible world, while Vedic injunction deals with imperceptible dharmas. In this way each of these means of valid cognition (pramāṇas) have their own distinct fields and function separately without crossing each other. Therefore it is impossible for a human being to know dharmas without relying on the Vedas. In other words, one can have access to dharmas only through the intermediation of the Vedas. The Ślokavārttika refers to this division of domains with a straightforward interpretation of Šabara’s phrase “without a [Vedic] statement” (ṛte vacanāt).

In the Brhaṭṭikā, however, Kumārila refers to the same division but with a focus on the scope of “everything” (sarva) to be cognized by an omniscient being (sarvajña). If an omniscient being cognized everything and thus invaded the domain of dharmas, he would be harmful for Mīmāṃsā. For he steps in the Vedas’ distinct and unique domain of dharmas and thus transgresses against the division of perception (etc.) and the Vedas. According to Mīmāṃsakas, dharmas should not be included in “everything” to be cognized by an omniscient being. But if “everything” does not include dharmas, there is no harm for Mīmāṃsā.

**Awareness of the scope of “everything”** While the Ślokavārttika immediately moves to the next topic, section 2, after the opening verse of interpretation just looked at, the Brhaṭṭikā deals in detail with the problem of the scope of “everything” (sarva) as a connected and subordinate part of the beginning interpretation of section 1. Kumārila examines all the possible objects of “everything” in 1.1 sarvaśabdārthah and points out problems in cognizing “everything” in 1.2 sarvasmiṁ jñāte dosāḥ. Thus it is clear that he is conscious of the problem with regard to the scope of “everything” which should not include dharmas. In the following I briefly look at these discussions without going into details.

First, in 1.1 sarvaśabdārthah, Kumārila questions what is intended by the word “ev-
“everything” (*sarva*) and enumerates various possibilities. For example, if “everything” is “everything” limited in a particular context, as when we say “he knows everything about it”, such a cognizor of “everything” is not harmful for Mīmāṃsā, because “everything” does not include dharmas (v. 3128). Similar is the case with a person who cognizes “everything” around him, i.e. unimportant worldly things such as sesame oil, water, ghee and so on (v. 3130). But a person who cognizes literally “everything” including religiously important dharmas, is to be definitely denied (v. 3135), because he transgresses the division of domains of perception (etc.) and the Vedas. Only the Vedas, not perception, are regarded to be able to approach the dharmic domain (v. 3141).

Thus, because there is no dharmajña who cognizes dharmas directly, it is logically concluded that there is no sarvajña who cognizes everything including dharmas. Nevertheless, if one supposed that “everything” to be cognized by an omniscient being is literally everything, one would have several undesirable consequences. Because “everything” should include even impure tastes and the like, an omniscient being, though supposed to be pure, would directly taste such impure materials (v. 3144). Though an omniscient being must know everything including Brahmanic education such as the contents of the Vedas etc., it is not actually the case (v. 3145). Furthermore it is strange that there is mutual disagreement among omniscient beings such as the Buddha, the Jina and Kapila, who are supposed to be omniscient and therefore should cognize the same things (vv. 3147–3152).

In this way, the Brhaṭṭikā clearly denies a dharmajña(tva), with a special attention to the exact extent of “everything” to be cognized by an omniscient being. It is important for Mīmāṃsakas to deny a dharmajña, but not so much to deny a sarvajña himself.

Summary of 1 Kunārila in the Brhaṭṭikā makes clear his intention to deny a dharmajña in particular by referring to the different domains of perception (etc.) and the Vedas, intending to deny “omni” (*sarva*) found in the reason of Buddhists etc., “because it is taught by an omniscient being”. In the Ślokavārttika, however, though he refers to the same division of domains, he concentrates on a straightforward interpretation of Śabara’s sentence. There Kunārila unconsciously presupposes a literally omniscient being who really cognizes everything and does not raise a question about the exact scope of “everything”.

This different attitude leads us to suppose that Kunārila in the Ślokavārttika was

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12This is further confirmed by verses 121–132, where Kunārila criticizes the notion of an omniscient being who speaks truthfully with regard not only to dharma but to both domains: the visible/worldly (v. 121ab: indriyādisambandhavisayye; 125a: āsraddheyārtha; 127a: dharmadharmātirikte ‘rthe) and the invisible/religious (v. 121d: āsraddhey ‘rthe; 126a: alaukikārtha).
not aware of the problem of the scope of “everything” to be cognized by an omniscient being, simply presupposing a literal omniscient being, while in the Bṛhaṭṭikā he has become aware of the problem and makes clear his intention to deny dharmajñā instead of sarvajñā. It seems difficult to suppose the contrary sequence that the Bṛhaṭṭikā precedes the Ślokavārttika, because Kumārila develops his idea in the Bṛhaṭṭikā in comparison to the Ślokavārttika.

If my argument is correct, I can conclude that Kumārila in the Bṛhaṭṭikā that follows the Ślokavārttika develops his idea from sarvajñā to dharmajñā, and that he expresses in the Bṛhaṭṭikā this change of his attitude. A similar attitude is also found in Dharmakīrti,13 who asserts that what he is proving is the existence of a person who teaches the four truths, not an omniscient being. This parallelism between Kumārila and Dharmakīrti will be one of the important points to be considered when one discusses their relationship.14 I point out here only the possibility.

Impossibility of “cognizing everything” In interpreting the Śabarabhāṣya passage mentioned above, Kumārila assumes the different domains of perception (etc.) and Vedic injunction in accordance with the original idea seen from the Jaiminisūtra that a human being does not have direct access to dharmaśa that are unique objects of the Vedas. This idea of the different domains of different pramāṇas is fully explained in the next section 2, “Impossibility to cognize everything”. The following verses are almost the same in both the Ślokavārttika and the Bṛhaṭṭikā and have no significant difference in meaning.

13 Pramāṇavārttika II (pramāṇasiddhi), v. 34 (Dvārikadāsa ed.): heyopādeyatattvasya sābhuyapāyasya vedakah/ yah pramāṇam asāv iṣṭo na tu sarvasya vedakah// “A person who communicates what is to be abandoned [i.e. dukkha-satya] and taken [i.e. nirodha-satya] together with [their respective] means [i.e. samudaya-satya and mārga-satya respectively] is regarded as an authority, not a person who communicates everything.”

14 Dharmakīrti’s attitude which is found in Pramāṇavārttika II is already hinted at in his earlier work Pramāṇavārttika I.

Pramāṇavārttika I v. 217:
heyopādeyatattvasya sopāyasya prasiddhitah/
prudhānārthāvisāpaśvādād anumānaṇaṃ paratru vā// (Gnoli 109.13–14)
Or [scripture] is [valid] inference with regard to other [domain]. For it does not betray [us] with regard to a primary thing, because [its contents, i.e.] the truth of what is to be abandoned and what is to be taken with their means are established.

Here Dharmakīrti clarifies that what is taught as “a primary thing” by the Buddha is the four truths, which is also qualified as “useful for the purpose of human beings” (Gnoli 109.17: puraśārthopayogin) in contradistinction to “a useless thing” (Gnoli 109.18–19: nisprayaṇa).
However, a man, who assumes a person who, through [using] one means of valid cognition, is omniscient, surely understands with an eye everything such as taste.

But people today cognize particular kinds of objects through particular means of valid cognition. The same [should] have been true even in those days [of the Buddha and others].

It is impossible to cognize tastes with eyes. In other words, there is a clear division of function among different sense-faculties of seeing and tasting etc. with regard to their objects. Kumārila applies this division of sense-faculties in a general way to that of pramāṇas, and thus tries to reject the idea of Buddhists and others that the Buddha etc. can cognize dharmas through perception, and more typically, that they can directly see dharmas. In the following verses he shows, taking into consideration the development of cognitive capacity, that the division of domains of different pramāṇas, like that of sense-faculties, is to be kept unbroken. (Each word of Ślokāvṛttīka codanā v. 114 is divided into three verses in the Brhaṭṭīka, namely, Tattvasaṅgraḥa vv. 3159–61. I show corresponding phrases with underlines. I also show Tattvasaṅgraḥa v. 3173 though it is not consecutive, because it corresponds to Ślokāvṛttīka codanā v. 115.)
Even when a superiority [of a sense-faculty and the like] is seen, it [i.e. superiority] should stay in the [functional domain of] perceiving those things which are remote, subtle and so on, because it [can] not transgress their [i.e. the sense-faculties’] own objects. An ear [for example] does not function towards a color.

Those people who are known to be eminent in wisdom, intelligence and power, too, are [eminent only] with a bit of [relative] difference, not because of seeing invisible things.

For even a wise person, though able to see subtle things, supercedes other persons without transgressing the respective category [i.e. limitation of the various kinds of objects].

We see that people [can] excel, with regard to sounds which are grasped by the faculty of hearing, by grasping [sounds which are] remote [or] subtle, not because they grasp color etc. [by means of the faculty of hearing].
And it is never seen that a perception has even a bit of capacity with regard to a future thing; [It is] never [seen that] an inference and so on [have a capacity] in lack of an [informing] mark and so on.

And it is never seen that a perception has even a bit of capacity with regard to a future thing; an inference and so on do not arise without an [informing] mark and so on.

A human being, however eminent he is, cannot cognize dharmas without relying on the Vedas, because he cannot transgress the different domains of different pramāṇas. What Kumārila emphasizes here is that one should keep “horizontal division”, in other words, that one should not invade one’s neighbor’s garden. This idea is seen both in the Ślokavārttika and the Brāhmapātha. The Brāhmapātha adds other instances such as that one cannot know astrology though he has mastered grammar (v. 3164). These exemplify the same “horizontal division”.

• In both the Ślokavārttika and the Brāhmapātha, Kumārila shows generally the different domains of different pramāṇas through the example of sense-faculties, and thus shows the impossibility of cognizing dharmas directly, as that would transgress the horizontal functional division of pramāṇas.

• What Kumārila presupposes as an omniscient being is a person who cognizes everything with one pramāṇa and thus cognizes dharmas.

• As we see in the concluding verse v. 115, Kumārila describes generally without specifying what “one pramāṇa” is and does not say whether it is perception or inference. But he seems to presuppose as a typical omniscient being a person who “sees” everything, as is hinted by the expression atindriyadarsaṇāt (v. 3159d) and the sarcastic expression “a man understands with an eye everything such as taste” (v. 112cd).

Limitation of developing capacity While the Ślokavārttika ends the present topic “Impossibility to cognize everything” with the discussion that we have just considered, the Brāhmapātha continues the same topic but from a different viewpoint, namely that of “vertical limitation” instead of “horizontal division”. Kumārila emphasizes here that a human being, whatever efforts he makes, cannot go beyond his given limitation.
Tattvasaṅgraha vv. 3167–68:

daśahastāntaram vyomno yo nāmotplutya gacchati/
na yojanam asau gantum śakto 'bhūsasātair api//
tasmād atiśayajñānair atidūrgatair api/
kiṃcid evādhiśaṃ jñātum śakyate na tv atāndriyam///

[Even] a person who jumps and goes ten hastas (about 180 inches) long [in the sky] cannot go one yojana (8 or 9 miles), even after hundreds of repeated exercises.

Therefore preeminent cognition, though it goes very far, is capable of cognizing only a bit more, not an invisible thing.

Instead of denying “horizontal” domain-division of pramāṇas, Kumārila shows here “vertical” limitation of the development of human cognitive capacity. Human capacity for cognition does not develop infinitely.

As was pointed out already by Inami [1986], Kumārila’s verse v. 3167, which denies infinite development of human capacity, suggests his “close relationship” with Dharmakīrti, who holds that the Buddha’s compassion grows infinitely through practice, and refers to an opponent who claims that our capacity is limited with the same example of jump as in the verse v. 3167. Furthermore Dharmakīrti adds another example of water’s heat, which never goes beyond its limited temperature.18

As we saw, the idea of vertical limitation is found only in the Brhaṭṭīkā, not in the Ślokavārttika. The simplest possible scenario is that Dharmakīrti criticizes Kumārila’s idea of vertical limitation found in the Brhaṭṭīkā and insists that the Buddha’s compassion develops infinitely. It is difficult, however, to suppose the opposite scenario that Kumārila adopts as his own proposition the idea of the opponent postulated by Dharmakīrti.

“Seeing” and “hearing” Whether in the first argument of horizontal domain-division of different pramāṇas found in both the Ślokavārttika and the Brhaṭṭīkā, or in the second argument of vertical limitation of human capacity found only in the Brhaṭṭīkā, what matters is impossibility of cognizing everything. Kumārila particularly tried to refute the possibility of someone “cognizing everything” (omni+scient), i.e. a part of the opponents’ whole reason “because it is taught by the omniscient [Buddha]”. This intention is clear in both the Ślokavārttika and the Brhaṭṭīkā.

18 Pramāṇavārttika II (pramāṇasiddhi) v. 122: abhyāsena viśeṣe 'pi laṅghanodakatāpavat/ sv-abhāvatikramo mā bhūd iti cet ... //. “If [an opponent] says that, although [Buddha’s compassion attains] excellence by means of practice, there should not be transgression of one’s own nature as [in the case of] a jump and the heating of water ...”
And what Kumārila assumes a typical omniscient being to be is, as we normally assume of the Buddha etc., a person who cognizes through perception (v. 3166d: *pratyakṣikaraṇa*), more typically, a person who sees imperceptible objects (v. 3159d: *atīndriyadarśana*) and who sees directly (v. 3174b: *sākṣād draṣṭā*). This is further supported by the following *Brhaṭṭikā* verse, which contrasts a person who cognizes by seeing and one who cognizes by hearing.

\[\text{Tattvasaṅgraha v. 3174:}\]
\[\text{tasmād atīndriyārthaṁ sākṣād draṣṭā na vidyate/}\]
\[\text{vacanena tu nityena yah paśyati sa paśyati//}\]

Therefore there is no such person that sees directly imperceptible objects. But a person who sees by the eternal statement [i.e. the Veda] [really] sees [imperceptible objects].

It is confirmed by the expression *sākṣād draṣṭā* of the pādas ab, which, starting with the word *tasmāt*, sums up preceding discussions. That section 2.1 aims at denying “cognizing everything by seeing”. By contrast the pādas cd discuss a person who cognizes everything by hearing, and the following portions of the *Brhaṭṭikā* similarly deny cognizing through human statements, i.e. statements other than the eternal Vedas. Thus it is likely that Kumārila in 2.1 and 2.2 in the *Brhaṭṭikā* presupposes a contradistinction between “seeing” and “hearing”.

**Denial of an omniscient being** In section 3 Kumārila raises a question with regard to “comparison of sarvajñatā and apauruṣeyatā” with one verse that we looked at before, and then in section 4 denies an omniscient being (sarvajña) or omniscience (sarvajñatā) both in the Ślokavārttika and the Brhaṭṭikā by means of examining perception, inference and verbal testimony which may establish an omniscient being or omniscience. Thus he examines each means of valid cognition (pramāṇa) in order to deny the opponent’s proposition, “There exists an omniscient being” or “[He] is an omniscient being”. What he intends here is to criticize “an omniscient being”, a portion of the opponent’s whole reason “because it is taught by an omniscient being”.

Both the Ślokavārttika and the Brhaṭṭikā have only one verse for denying both perception and inference altogether, while there are more verses composed for examining in detail verbal testimony. In the following I show only the main arguments without going into details which are subordinate to the main portion of denying verbal testimony.

15
Perception: First ordinary people like us do not see now an omniscient being.

Inference: And postulation that there was an omniscient being is impossible unlike denial thereof.

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19 117ab Cf. Madhyamakahr.dayak¯arik¯a 9.15ab (Kawasaki [1992:411])

20 3186b nityah] Pc R ; nitya- BGP ac tv asa-] GP ; ca sa- B

21 3187c prakalpeta] em. (Tib: rigs pa yin) ; prakalpyeta BGP a

22 The terminology dr.s.t.o ... ekadesah comes from the definition of inference by the vr.ttik¯ara. Šabarabh¯as.ya ad 1.1.3–5 (vr.ttik¯ara): anum¯anam. j˜n¯atasam. bandhasya aikadesadarsanad ekadesa.ntare ‘sannikr. s.t.e ‘rthe buddhih. . (Frauwallner [1968:30.18]). “Inference is a cognition of another portion, an object which is not connected [i.e. which is not known by other means of valid cognition], by means of seeing one portion of/j˜n¯atasya sam. bandhasya and j˜n¯atasya dvayasya.)

The reading v¯a is a bit disturbing, because otherwise one can interpret the verse quite straightforwardly, as e.g. Kamalaśīla does: “And there is no seen portion as an inferential mark which could make us infer [an omniscient being].” But v¯a seems quite secure, though it is not supported by the Tibetan translation, because the verse appears in the same form also in the Ratnak¯irtinibandh¯aval¯ı and the Prameyakamalam¯artana.

Kamalaśīla explains the verse as follows neglecting (or not knowing) v¯a: tasm¯ad dr.sah prasid-dho liingabh¯uta ekadesah pakṣadharmaḥ, sa na sambhavati nirūpyam¯ano yaḥ sarvajñam anumāpayet. (TSP 1005.11–12)

For the time being, I suggest the possibility that Kumāraśīla uses dr.sah ... ekadesah from the viewpoint of Mīmāṃsakas, and liūga mainly from that of Buddhists: “We do not perceive now, as shown
[Verbal testimony:] And an omniscient being cannot [be postulated] on the ground of a scripture. For his [own scripture] would have the [undesirable consequence of] mutual dependence [with an omniscient being]. How is it understood that a text written by others is a means of valid cognition [while the author is not omniscient]? Also it is impossible in this world to find an eternal scripture which intends that [i.e., to teach the temporary existence of an omniscient being].

[Verbal testimony:] Nor is there any scriptural injunction which is eternal and makes [us] know an omniscient being. On the other hand, how can an artificial [and therefore] untrue [statement] make [one] know him [i.e, an omniscient being]? If other people know an omniscient being from nothing but his own statement, how is it possible for these two, being mutually dependent, to be established?

Both the Ślokavārttika and the Brhaṭṭikā have exactly the same half-verse for denying perception, and examine inference very briefly with only a half-verse. As for verbal testimony, Kumārila in both works assumes the same three possibilities, i.e., an eternal (i.e. non-artificial) scripture like the Vedas and two types of artificial verbal testimony which are either taught by an omniscient being himself or the other non-omniscient beings. Though the sequence of presentation of these three types of verbal testimony in the previous half-verse, any ekadeśa which make us infer an omniscient being. And even regardless of the present situation which is bad for you, there is theoretically no inferential mark which could allow you to infer an omniscient being. For there is neither svabhāvatetu nor kāryahetu for inferring an omniscient being.”

Comparing the two verses in the Ślokavārttika and the Brhaṭṭikā, we can observe that the latter is much more carefully composed in several points. The verse in the Ślokavārttika presupposes a simple analogy: “there is no omniscient being at present, therefore there must have been none in the past, either.” And this verse, using the terminology kalpanā, does not clearly show itself as a denial of inference, though it is clear from the context what Kumārila intends.

The verse in the Brhaṭṭikā, on the contrary, clearly shows itself as a denial of inference by using familiar terms such as ekadeśa, liṅga and anumāpayet. Furthermore, instead of relying on a mere analogy with the present situation, the verse more carefully denies the inference of an omniscient being, by following the definition of inference: According to the Mīmāṃsā definition of inference, inference functions on the basis of at least two conditions, namely jñātasambandhasya and ekadeśadarśanāt. First the relationship or invariable concomitance (vyāpti) between a reason and an omniscient being should be known beforehand in the same manner that that of smoke and fire is known well. This requires one to perceive beforehand the related items, i.e. a reason and an omniscient being. But the latter, as shown in verse 3185ab, is not seen at present. Therefore the first condition jñātasambandhasya is not fulfilled. Nor is the second condition ekadeśadarśanāt fulfilled, as is shown in verse 3185c drṣṭo na caekadeśaḥ.

Thus the verse in the Brhaṭṭikā is not only richer in contents than that of the Ślokavārttika as a denial of inference, but also fits the context, namely, it is well connected with the former half-verse 3185ab.
testimonies is different, Kumārila points out the same faults in both works. Thus we can see that in both of his works Kumārila denies in a very similar way the possibility of three means of valid cognition communicating the existence of an omniscient being.

The Brhatṭikā adds to these three means of valid cognition upamāna and arthāpatti, which communicate either, “An omniscient being is similar to this” or “What the Buddha teaches is impossible unless he is omniscient.” In this way the Brhatṭikā denies each of five possible means of valid cognition for cognizing existence (bhāva) and therefore establishes non-existence (abhāva) of an omniscient being, in accordance with the Mīmāṃsā theory of epistemology which enumerates in total six means of valid cognition by adding “non-existence” (abhāva) (of the preceding five means). Thus we can confirm that the Brhatṭikā is more systematic and well-arranged than the Śloka-vārttika.

Denial of “the omniscient Buddha” Even though it is proved that an omniscient being exists or might exist, this does not mean that the Buddha is omniscient, and therefore the authority of his teachings is not established. In the Brhatṭikā Kumārila points out that it is irrelevant to their purpose for the opponents to make efforts to prove an omniscient being in general and thus denies the Buddhists’ claim that “the Buddha is omniscient”. This discussion is not found in the Śloka-vārttika.

_Tattvasaṅgraha_ vv. 3229–3232:

\[narah ko ‘py asti sarvajñas tatsarvajñatvam ity api/
\]sūdhanaṃ yat prayujyeta pratijñānyūnam eva tat//
\[sisādhaśīrito yo ‘ṛthaḥ so ‘nayaḥ nābdhātyate/
\]yat tūcyate na tatsiddhou kiṃcid astiprayojanam//
yadīyāgamasyatvasiddhyai sarvajñatocye//
\[na sā sarvajñāsāmānayāsiddhimātreṇa labhyate/
\]yāvad buddho na sarvajñas tāvat tadvacanaṃ mṛṣā/
yatra kvacana sarvajñē siddha tatsatyatā kutah//

Also a proof [employed to establish that] “there exists some omniscient being” [or] “that [certain person] has omniscience” is only [a type of wrong proof, namely] “devoid of proposition”.

The import [“The Buddha is omniscient”] which [you] wish to prove is not stated by this [proposition shown above]. On the other hand it is of no use to establish what is stated [above].

For the sake of establishing truthfulness of scripture of a particular person [his] omniscience is claimed. [But] this [establishment] is not attained merely by establishing [the existence of] an omniscient being in general.
As long as the Buddha is not omniscient, his teaching is false. How [does it follow] that that [teaching of the Buddha] is true if some [person] or other [in general] is proved to be omniscient?

This section 4', which is found only in the Brhaṭṭikā, can be regarded as that which criticizes “the omniscient Buddha” in the whole reason, “It is taught by the omniscient Buddha”. This indicates, on the other hand, that the Ślokavārttika assumes a more general reason in the form “because it is taught by an omniscient being”. As I showed before with regard to the arguments concerning the pramāṇas, this section strengthens our impression that the Brhaṭṭikā has more elaborate discussions than the Ślokavārttika. And as indicated in the present expression, “As long as the Buddha is not omniscient, his teaching is false” (v. 3232ab), the Brhaṭṭikā is more eager to criticize in particular the Buddha instead of an omniscient being in general. This seems to be another reason why Kumārila throws the item “the omniscient Buddha” into the whole reason to be denied.

Denial of “being taught by an omniscient being” In section 5 Kumārila raises questions about the action of teaching by an omniscient being and shows its impossibility. I quote in the following all the passages in this section of the Ślokavārttika and the Brhaṭṭikā putting the corresponding verses side by side. While the latter halves of this section correspond closely in the two works, the first halves show difference in meaning, though the main target, i.e. denial of the teaching-action of an omniscient being, is common to both of his works. I quote verses continuously dividing them into two halves.

Ślokavārttika codanā, v. 137:
rgādīrahitā cāsmin
nirvyāpāre vyavasthīte/
desānānyarpratītaiva
syād ṛte pratyavekṣantāt//

Tattvasaṅgraha vv. 3237–39:
dāśabhūmigataś cāsau
sarvādāśbhūmigataś cāsau
śuddhasphātikatulyena
sarvāṃ jñānena buddhyate//
dhyānanāṭaḥ ca sarvārthah-
viṣayāṁ dhāraṇāṁ dadhat/
tathā vyāptaḥ ca sarvārthaiḥ
śaktō naivopadeśane//
yadā copadīṣed ekam
kimciṣaṃāṇayavakṛtvat/
ekadāśājñāyitaṁ tan
na syāt sarvajñabhāṣitam//

233238a -pannaś BGP_n; -yattaś P_n
And when he is established to have no action because he lacks desire and so on, [his] teaching must have been nothing but taught by others without any investigation.24

And he, after attaining the ten levels, when all of [his] desire etc. are completely destroyed, cognizes everything with a cognition similar to a pure crystal.

And he, after obtaining [the state of] meditation, keeps concentration which aims at everything as its object, but is never able to teach being filled with everything in this way.

And if he, like an ordinary speaker, taught one particular thing, what [he teaches] would be that which is uttered by a cognizer of [only] one thing (ekadesajña), not uttered by a cognizer of everything (sarvajña).

Ślokavārttika codanā, vv. 138–140:

sānnidhyamātrutas tasya
puṃsāś cintāmaṇer iva/
niśsaranti yathākāmaṃ
kudādibhyo ’pi deśanāḥ//

Tattvasaṅgraha vv. 3240–45:

tasmin dhyānasamāpanne
   cintāratnavad āsthite/
   niścaranti yathākāmaṃ
   kudādibhyo ’pi deśanāḥ//
   tābhīr jijnāsitān arthān
   sarvān jānanti mānavāḥ/
   hitāni ca yathābhavyaṃ
   ksiṣpram āsādayanti te//

24 Prof. K. Yoshimizu, in the conference held at Kyoto University on Dec. 14th, 2002, kindly pointed out to me that Sucarita connects pāda d (ṛte pratyaveksanāt) with pādās a-b and thus interprets the subject of pratyaveksaṇa (savikalpaka type of thinking) as “the Buddha” himself, not “others”. For Sucarita (ŚVK 133.9: na ca itad apya anuṭhitasya sambhavatiṣy abbhiprāyapāha — rta iti) understands pāda d “[because the Buddha in meditation] does not have conceptualization”. But it is more natural to connect pāda d with c, as Umbeka (M 78.27) does. And there is a clear motive for Sucarita to prefer this forced interpretation: he tries to read here what Kumārila will teach in the Brhadārtikā, i.e. comparison of meditation and out-of-meditation. This impression is further strengthened by his preceding explanation (ŚVK 132.23–27), again clearly forced, where Sucarita says that the state of being without activity (nirvyāpāra) (in pāda b) is preceded by the state of non-conceptualization (avikalpa), instead of connecting it with absence of desire etc. mentioned in pāda a (rāgādirahite).

25 3241c šha- DMI; nīṣṭa- M ; nīśca- R
26 3240a -panne BGP; -dhiste R ; kudā-] R ; kuṭy- BGP_a
27 3241c -bhavyaṃ] BGP_a; -yogaṃ R
evamādy ucyamānāṃ tu
śraddadhānasya śobhate/
kudgādiniḥsīrtatvāc ca
nāśvāso deśanāsu naḥ//28

kim nu buddhapraṇītāḥ syuh
kim u kaiścid durātmabhīḥ/
adṛṣyair vipralambhārthāṁ
piśācādibhir īrītaḥ//31

[Buddhists:] “The teachings of the man flowed out of even a wall etc. as he wished because of his mere presence, in the same manner as [everything wished for appears from the presence] of a cintāmaṇi.”

[28] 139a tu] DMI, hi R - āc ca] DMI, -āt tu R
[29] 3242b -nēṣu] BGP, -nasya R -iḥ prār-] BGP, -īr ar- R
[31] 140b kim u] DMI; kim vā R
[33] 3245b -r eva īrītaḥ] BGP, -iḥ parikalpitāḥ R
“[Are they] taught by the Buddha [himself]? Or [are they] uttered by someone evil-minded such as a ghost and the like, who is invisible, in order to deceive [us]?”

Or [are they] stated by an evil-minded ghost and the like without [their] being visible?” Therefore those who regard [themselves] as wise men should not trust these [teachings].

Kumārila in the first halves denies the possibility of the Buddha teaching, assuming a normal action of teaching, i.e. teaching with his mouth moving. In the second halves, on the contrary, he denies the possibility of superhuman forms of teaching without physical action, e.g. the supernatural phenomenon of the Buddha’s effortless teaching which in accordance with his will flows out of even a wall etc. just by his mere presence. Thus he assumes here two different forms of teaching, normal and supernatural.

First I briefly examine the latter halves, which, not only in their meanings but also in their styles, show a clear correspondence between the Ślokavārttika and the Brhadārāṇi. Because the normal form of teaching is denied in the first halves due to the impossibility that an omniscient being cannot perform the physical action of teaching, the opponent in the latter halves proposes a superhuman form of teaching and insists that the Buddha’s teaching flows at will out of a wall etc. without his making efforts to move his mouth. However, this kind of supernatural phenomenon is believed only by devotees, never by outsiders. Furthermore, because this is a teaching of a wall etc., it does not fulfill the condition of “being taught by a reliable person” (āptopadistatā) and therefore cannot be valid. And it is possible as well that the teaching might be done by invisible ghosts etc. Thus we can see that the main points of the second-half argument beginning with “a teaching of a wall etc.” are common in both the Ślokavārttika and the Brhadārāṇi.
In the first halves, on the contrary, Kumārila assumes a normal action of teaching and shows that an omniscient being is not able to teach. This goal itself is common in both the Ślokavārttika and the Bṛhaṭṭikā. Thus section 5 as a whole, consistently in the first and the second halves, can be regarded as a portion which aims at denying “being taught [by an omniscient being]” of the whole reason “because it is taught by an omniscient being”.

Comparison of the manner of denial of an action of an omniscient being

As I showed, both the Ślokavārttika and the Bṛhaṭṭikā, in the first halves, too, have the same goal of denying “being taught by an omniscient being”, but they deny it in different ways. In the following I compare the two ways of denial in the first halves, i.e. Ślokavārttika codanā, v. 137 and Tattvasaṅgraha vv. 3237–3239.

As for the process of an action, it is generally accepted in Indian philosophy that activity (vyāpāra) is necessarily preceded by desire (rāga or icchā). Therefore activity is impossible without desire. But the omniscient Buddha is regarded as a vītarāga, a person free from desire. Therefore he should have no desire and consequently no action. What is called the Buddha’s teaching, therefore, cannot be the teaching of the omniscient Buddha, but of someone else. This is the manner of critique in the Ślokavārttika. Kumārila here presupposes the usual causal link: desire leads to an action of teaching. In other words he implies a critique, “The Buddha is not omniscient, because he taught”, on the ground of the Buddhists’ own reason “because it is taught by the Buddha”.

In the Bṛhaṭṭikā, on the other hand, Kumārila points out the gap between the state of meditation and that of teaching. To explain, the Buddha in meditation cannot teach, even though he cognizes everything. But once he comes out of meditation and teaches, what he tells us is only limited and does not differ from words of ordinary people. Kumārila’s critique here relies on the contradiction between the state of meditation and that of teaching, in other words, the state of an omniscient being (sarvajña) and the state of a person who cognizes only a part (ekadeśajña). Thus this contradiction could be formalized: “In the state of meditation, he cannot teach. But if he teaches, he cannot be omniscient.” Instead of inferring a desire hidden in the mind, Kumārila focuses here on the actual scene of teaching and points out the gap between infinite knowledge and finite speech.

34 In Indian philosophy, as shown, e.g., in the Nyāyasūtra 1.1.2 (duḥkha-janma-pravṛtti-doṣamithyajñānānām uttarottarāpāye tadantarabhāvad apavargaḥ), an undertaking of an action is regarded as having the following process: ignorance → desire etc. → undertaking → rebirth → pain. The opposite is the process for liberation: knowledge → absence of desire etc. ... → cessation of pain=liberation.
Dharmakīrti’s reply  I showed the difference between the Ślokavārttika and the Brhatīṭikā in the first halves of Kumārila’s critiques of the teaching-action of an omniscient being. To each of these critiques there are apparently corresponding replies from Dharmakīrti. In Pramāṇavārttika I v. 12 with the auto-commentary, assuming an opponent who proposes “The Buddha is not omniscient, because he taught”, Dharmakīrti shows that the reason “because he taught” is inconclusive.35 This responds to Kumārila’s critique in Ślokavārttika codanā v. 137, which focuses on the causal

35I will briefly examine Dharmakīrti’s critique relevant for our present concern skipping its details. The following is the verse which I suppose attacks the Ślokavārttika. (Dunne [1996] gives a good explanation regarding this verse with the auto-commentary as well as the difference of Dharmakīrti’s attitude from Candrakīrti. There he gives a footnote which refers to Kumārila’s Ślokavārttika codanā v. 137 but does not discuss further. It is also suggested by Dharmakīrti’s saṅgrahā-śloka (Pramāṇavārttika I v. 31d) which recapitulates its preceding argument including the present verse 12, that Dharmakīrti is attacking Kumārila when he criticizes in a general way what he calls sesavaṇa anumānam, whose representative example is the present inference of desire from the action of teaching. This is clear in particular from Dharmakīrti’s phrase “not due to a [mere] observation” (v. 31d: na darṣanat), which denies Kumārila’s experiential attitude as shown in, e.g., Ślokavārttika anumāna v. 12ab: bhūyodarṣana. See Steinkellner [1997] for this saṅgrahā-śloka.)

Pramāṇavārttika I (svārthānūmāna) v. 12:
vipakṣe dṛṣṭimatreyanā käryasamānyadarsanāt/
hetujānāṃ pramāṇabham vacanād rāgitādīvatis// Gnoli 9.1–2
“It is pseudo-pramāna to cognize [by inference a particular] cause due to observing a general result [common to other causes] by means of a mere non-observation in a dissimilar case, in the same manner as [inferring the Buddha’s] having desire because of [his action of] teaching.”

What Dharmakīrti attacks here is the same syllogism implied by Kumārila: “The Buddha is not omniscient, because he taught”. The problem, according to Dharmakīrti, is that the validity of an inference is not necessarily secured “by means of a mere non-observation in a dissimilar case” (vipakṣe dṛṣṭimatreyanā), i.e. that one cannot hope that an inference will be valid again in the future just because one has not seen so far a counter-example. Numbers of positive experiences do not guarantee a future success. This critique can be applied to Kumārila’s inference as follows: It is accepted from our limited experiences so far that a person devoid of desire never teaches. In other words there is a positive concomitance (anvaya) that whoever teaches has a desire. But, because there are two types of desire, either good or bad, one can never decide from a general result, i.e. a mere teaching-action, whether its cause is a good desire, i.e. compassion, or a bad one, i.e. greed. Thus Dharmakīrti says, “A person devoid of greed, too, [does speak] in the same manner that a person with greed speaks. Therefore [it is] not understood on the ground of a mere speech-action.” (Gnoli 9.7–8: atra yathā rakto bravīti tathā virakto ‘piṣi vacanamātrād apratipattih.) As shown in Dharmakīrti’s irony “If you infer it [i.e. greed etc.] in other [people] because you have seen greed in yourself when[every] you speak, there would be [an undesirable consequence of over-extension] (Gnoli 9.20–21: vaktavyā utmanī rāgādārśanēnānyatra tadanumāne ‘tiprasaṅgah, vyabhicārāt), the logical reason “teaching-action” deviates from greed, i.e. a bad type of desire. In other words the Buddha’s action of teaching itself does not necessarily prove that he had greed. One can never deny the possibility that he may have taught because of compassion.

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relationship between desire and teaching. In Pramāṇavārttika III vv. 92–94, on the other hand, assuming an opponent who denies an omniscient being on the ground of the contradiction between omniscience and teaching-action, Dharmakīrti proves that the contradiction is not logically established.36 This replies to the Brhaṭṭikā (= Tattvā
darśanam) which is considered to be a main commentary on the Brhaṭṭika. Kawasaki [1992:244-245] [1996:312-313] (both in Japanese) explains them with reference to Nyāyabindu III kk. 69-71.


Pramāṇavārttika III (pratyakṣa) vv. 92–94:

\[\text{uktyādeḥ sarvatpratyabhāvādipratisedhavat/} \\
\text{atindriyanām arthaṇām virodhasyaprasiddhitaḥ/} \\
\text{badhyabhādhaṁ kah syātāṁ yady uktaśavidau/} \\
\text{tādrśa 'napalabdhes ced ucyatāṁ saiva sādhanaṁ/} \\
\text{aniścayakaranāḥ proktam idṛṣyānupalambhanam/} \\
\text{tan nātyantaraparokṣeṣu sadasattāviniścayau/} \]

(Tosaki [1979:167–169])

For example, there is a case where one denies an omniscient being or [the soul’s] existence after death etc. on the ground of an action of speaking [or being a human being] etc. For [imperceptible] objects beyond sense-faculties [such as an omniscient being or soul’s existence after death] are not established to be contradictory [with an action of speaking or being a human being].

If an action of speaking and a cognition coexist, what is the contradiction [between an action of speaking and an omniscient being etc.]?

[Opponent:] Because of non-perception of this kind [of human being who speaks being omniscient]. [Reply:] If you say so, you should speak of it [i.e. non-perception] as a reason.

But non-perception of this kind [of imperceptible object] is taught as non-decisive. Therefore there is no determining of either the existence or the non-existence of [imperceptible] objects which are absolutely beyond sense-faculties. (Cf. Japanese translation of Tosaki [1979:166–169])

The opponent here presupposes contradiction between an action of speaking (uktī) and an omniscient being (sarvavit) (v. 92ab). This is corresponding to Kumārila’s view of contradiction that one cannot be omniscient if he speaks and that an omniscient being cannot speak. To this Dharmakīrti replies, on the ground that an omniscient being is absolutely imperceptible, that there is no contradiction between two of them (v. 92cd). The opponent must show, using non-perception as his reason, that one never perceives a person who is a speaker as well as an omniscient being (v. 93). As Dharmakīrti replies, however, this non-perception does not make a logical reason (v. 94ab). For an omniscient being (or omniscience), like the soul’s existence after death, is absolutely imperceptible. One cannot perceive the omniscience of another’s mind. As a result non-perception of an omniscient being (or omniscience) is classified as “non-perception of what is not perceptible” (adrśyānupalabdhi), not “non-perception of what is perceptible” (drśyānupalabdhi), and therefore does not prove the non-existence of an omniscient being (v. 94cd). With regard to an omniscient being, because he (or his omniscience) is absolutely imperceptible, though one does not perceive him, one cannot conclude his non-existence and therefore his contradiction with an action of speaking. Therefore, according to Dharmakīrti, it is wrong to rely on reasoning as seen in the Brhaṭṭikā that concludes, by means of
Mutual relationship with regard to the Buddha’s teaching  As far as Kumārila’s critiques of teaching-action and Dharmakīrti’s corresponding defences are concerned, it is likely that the argument of the Ślokavārttika is criticized by Pramāṇavārttika I, and that of the Bhāṭṭikā is criticized by Pramāṇavārttika III. Taking into consideration the sequence of Dharmakīrti’s works supposed by Frauwallner [1954], the whole sequence can be postulated as “Ślokavārttika → Pramāṇavārttika I → Bhāṭṭikā → Pramāṇavārttika III”. If this assumption is correct, it is possible to say that Kumārila has changed his manner of critique in the Bhāṭṭikā, taking into consideration Dharmakīrti’s reply in Pramāṇavārttika I against the Ślokavārttika. Thus Dharmakīrti’s reply in Pramāṇavārttika I which possibly motivates Kumārila to change his manner of critique, explains well why there is a difference in manner of critique between corresponding verses of the Ślokavārttika (v. 137) and the Bhāṭṭikā (v. 3237–3239).

Conclusion  In the above I compared Kumārila’s two works, Ślokavārttika and Bhāṭṭikā, with regard to his critique of omniscience and investigated in particular sections 1–5, which showed correspondence in form when I compared their synopses, taking note of similarity of verses and contextual structure. I also tested my hypothesis that Kumārila constructed the contextual framework of his arguments assuming opponents, in particular Buddhists, who claim, “Scripture (Buddha’s teaching) is valid, because it is taught by the omniscient (Buddha etc.)”. With regard to the whole framework of contextual structure, my conclusions are as follows:

- The Ślokavārttika, in criticizing omniscience, assumes opponents who claim, “Scripture (Buddha’s teaching etc.) is valid, because it is taught by an omniscient being” (*āgamah pramāṇam, sarvajñapraṇītatvāt), divides the reason the contradiction between an action of speaking and omniscience, that the Buddha is not omniscient on the ground of his action of speaking.

By the way, with regard to the basic rule that one should show non-perception as a reason in order to show contradiction, Dharmakīrti, already in his earliest work Pramāṇavārttika I with the auto-commentary, says, “With regard to a contradicting thing, too, if there is no non-perception [of it], [its] contradiction is not understood.” (Gnoli 5.12–13: viruddhāsyāpy anupalabdhyabhāvātena virodhāpratipattih). And he shows that the state of being devoid of desire (vairāgya) is an unseen thing (adṛṣṭa) and that it is impossible to establish contradiction (bādhyābādhakābhāva) by means of an unseen thing (Gnoli 15.23–25). However there is no discussion of the contradiction between an action of speaking and omniscience as in the Bhāṭṭikā and Pramāṇavārttika III. This may suggest that Dharmakīrti in Pramāṇavārttika I was not aware of Kumārila’s critique of contradiction found in the Bhāṭṭikā.
into three parts, examines each, i.e., “cognizing everything” (*sarvaṃ jānāti), “an omniscient being” (*sarvajña) and “being taught by an omniscient being” (*sarvajña-praṇīta), and denies each of them in sections 2, 4 and 5.

- The Bṛhaṭṭikā, on the other hand, assumes “Scripture (Buddha’s teaching etc.) is valid, because it is taught by the omniscient Buddha (etc.)” (*āgamaḥ pramāṇam, sarvajñabuddhapraṇītatvāt) and divides the reason into five parts, i.e. “everything” (*sarva), “cognizing everything” (*sarvaṃ jānāti), “omniscient” (*sarvajña), “the omniscient Buddha” (*sarvajñabuddha) and “being taught by the omniscient Buddha” (*sarvajñabuddhapraṇīta), which are denied in sections 1, 2, 4, 4’ and 5.

It is clear that Kumārila, in both the Ślokavārttika and the Bṛhaṭṭikā, constructs the contextual framework with a consistent intention to deny the reason proposed by opponents who claim validity of scripture taught by the Buddha etc. This is Kumārila’s intention behind the contextual framework suggested by correspondence between the Ślokavārttika and the Bṛhaṭṭikā. The non-corresponding arguments, on the other hand, in particular found only in the Bṛhaṭṭikā, suggest the following:

- Only the Bṛhaṭṭikā has arguments in sections 1.1 and 1.2 which deal in detail with the scope of “everything”. This suggests that Kumārila is increasingly sensitive about the question whether “everything” includes dharmas and that he distinguishes between sarvajña and dharma-jña.

- The argument “limitation of developing capacity”, is found only in the Bṛhaṭṭikā in section 2.1.2. This suggests that Kumārila pays attention not only to a horizontal functional division of pramāṇas but also a vertical limitation of human cognitive capacity.

- Among the arguments subordinate to section 4, which denies valid means of cognizing an omniscient being or omniscience, denials of upamāna and arthāpatti are found only in the Bṛhaṭṭikā. This suggests Kumārila’s intention to deny all the possible pramāṇas for the sake of thorough argument.

- Only the Bṛhaṭṭikā has the argument which denies “the omniscient Buddha” (4’). This suggests again Kumārila’s intention to make his argument thorough enough. Furthermore this makes clear that Kumārila intends to deny the Buddha in particular instead of denying an omniscient being in general.

The following is suggested by the portions in the Ślokavārttika and the Bṛhaṭṭikā which have different emphases or points of argument, although they correspond closely regarding the form of the verses and location in the whole structure.
• In the opening section 1, interpreting the original passage of the Śābarabhāṣya, the Ślokavārttiika simply assumes a literally “omniscient being” who cognizes everything, but the Brhaṭṭikā, being sensitive about the scope of “everything”, indicates Kumārila’s concern that “everything” should not include dharmas and that a dharmaṇa is to be denied.

• In denying “being taught by the omniscient (Buddha)” in section 5, the Ślokavārttiika attacks the causal relationship between desire and teaching-action, but the Brhaṭṭikā points out the contradiction between the state of meditation (being omniscient) and that of teaching. Thus the two works criticize the same matter, i.e. the teaching-action of the Buddha, in different ways.

In this way I examined three types of texts regarding the main points of Kumārila’s critique of omniscience in the Ślokavārttiika and the Brhaṭṭikā, namely, those portions which correspond to each other in both works, those which do not, and those which show superficial correspondence but differ in significance. The second non-corresponding portions of the Brhaṭṭikā, in particular, suggest that Kumārila intends to make his argument thorough and that his view is more developed and deepened than in the Ślokavārttiika. Therefore it is likely that the Ślokavārttiika is followed by the Brhaṭṭikā, at least from my limited investigation. And there are some traces which indicate the relationship between Kumārila and Dharmakirti. These sources examined and combined together in the most straightforward way suggest the following sequence: Ślokavārttiika → Pramāṇavārttiika I → Brhaṭṭikā → Pramāṇavārttiika II, III. But this matter is to be further considered, taking into account various sources including portions other than Kumārila’s critique of omniscience.

Abbreviations and Bibliography

Tattvasaṅgraha


Pₐ A manuscript preserved in Pāṭaṅa Jain Bhaṇḍāras, No. 6679. See Catalogue of the Manuscripts of Pāṭaṅa Jain Bhaṇḍāras. Part III. Ed by Muni Jam-buvijaya ji. (Pₐ: Readings of the manuscript before alteration; Pₐc: Those as altered.)

Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā
Tantravārttika


Pramāṇavārttika


Pramāṇavārttika-svāvṛtti


Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī


Ślokavārttika


I1 A manuscript preserved in India Office (British Library): San Ms IO 3739 = Catalogue No. 7976.


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