In the Mimamsa tradition, man-made statements, in contrast to perception or Vedic injunctions, are not ultimately counted as primary sources of information. Kumārila inherits Saddhara's idea that man-made speech can convey only a speaker's cognition (vaktirjñāna) and not the actual object in question. Thus the essential part of Dharmakirti's view on speech as being vakrubhiprayukta is already found in the Sahārabhāṣya. It is more appropriate to say that Dharmakirti's idea of vakrubhiprayukta was proposed by Kumārila or some other Mimamsakas than to say that Dharmakirti inverted it building on Dignaga's epoḥa theory.

INTRODUCTION

In the Mimamsa tradition, man-made or mundane statements (pauruseya/laukika-vacana) are not ultimately counted as primary sources of information. In contrast to Vedic injunctions (cādam/vidhi/āśтра), which are ultimately the single source of knowledge of dharma (and adharma), man-made speech, including even Manu's teaching (manayadsttra) or "Manu's recollection" (manavat), acquires at best only the position of a secondary source which is "Veda-based." A man-made statement again has a secondary position when opposed to direct perception (pratyakṣa). It

* I thank Vincent Esho, Ash Griffin, Harunaga Ienagona, Helmke Knorr, Jonathan Silk, Ernst Steidlefenn and Alex Watson for valuable suggestions and comments.
1. This idea is clear in Jaiministhe 1.1.2 (cādamālakṣaṇe 'yaḥ dharmayav); and other relevant passages such as 1.3.3 (ārthermaya lubāmālakṣaṇo bhūtaham anupakṣyan muh.), 2. (Śāvakabhāṣya ad 1.1.2, P.1.12-12 aviśeyes cedel api dharmi.

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can be valid only if it is based on perception (pratyakṣa/sāpyāvaka) or some other valid sources and if it is also conveyed in a correct way, e.g., uttered by a honest speaker.¹

Mundane matters Religious matters

1. Primary source
   pratyakṣa (etc.)
   codanā

2. Secondary source
   lankādakārya
   lankādakārya

Historically speaking, it is probably the Mimāṃsā tradition that first clarified the distinction between Vedic injunctions and smṛti. This is recorded in Jainaśīlaśāstra 1.3.1–2. Smītyādikārakara.⁴ There the śāstra appeals to the distinction between perception and inference, i.e., the contrast which is homologous with that between a Vedic injunction and a smṛti passage. A smṛti passage can be regarded as ammāna or an inferential reason, inasmuch as it allows us to infer its Vedic source.⁵

alidriyāka dharmaśadharma

1. pratyakṣa (etc.) codanā
2. ammāna smṛti

Considering the old Mimāṃsā conception of pramāṇa found in the discussion of ṣāṣṭikāryas or criteria of hierarchy between two ritual elements,⁶ the essential difference between perception and inference or a direct revelation (śrutī) and an indirect, evidential verbal expression (śloka) lies in the "distance" (śīpakāraka) from the goal aimed at or the meaning to be conveyed (arthā). Perception or a direct revelation conveys the information directly, whereas inference or an evidential verbal expression can do it indirectly, i.e. only by presupposing its source. In this respect, this distinction between perception and inference or a revelation and an evidential verbal expression can be regarded as a specific instance of Mimāṃsāka's general di-

When Mimāṃsakas investigate the nature of man-made speech, they assume this "direct/indirect" dichotomy and its parallelism with the distinction between perception and inference. For example, it is most natural for Sabara and Kumārila to conceptualize inference as "being preceded by perception" (pratyakṣa/sāpyāvaka) as well as to describe man-made speech as "having a perceptible object" (śīpakāraka), "being based on the sense faculty" (alidriyakāra) or more generally "being based on a source" (śīlāmadhārā). Thus, describing the intention of an opponent, Kumārila states:

For speech always should convey a meaning which is [already] known, through another means of valid cognition. And it is, i.e., speech cannot be a means of valid cognition in itself, just as recollection [cannot, because it relies on a preceding cognition].⁷

According to our normal experience, speech conveys to a hearer an object that a speaker has experienced through a means of valid cognition such as perception. Like recollection (smṛti), speech in itself is not a reliable, independent source. Just as a recollection is valid only when it is based on an original experience, man-made speech is valid only when it is based on perception or the like.

3. Śāṅkaraśāstra 1.3.1, 18.3–6: sat tu lankaśa vacanam, tvat tvat pratyakṣa paripāta mitrāpyyataḥ svam, ca uttāraṁ tu tat, abhistūpratyakṣa (śīlā) ca etc. 4. Śukakārakāra, 10.7.1–2. 5. Śakavatīrtha, pātanādaya-kāraṇa 12.30.6. 6. Śakavatīrtha, pātanādaya-kāraṇa 12.30.6. 7. Śakavatīrtha, pātanādaya-kāraṇa 12.30.6. 8. Śakavatīrtha, pātanādaya-kāraṇa 12.30.6.
Here one can clearly see that Kumārila uses the "direct/indirect" dichotomy, as indicated by the words svayam and pramāṇatattvātātma, and the parallelism to recolection as indicated by svavivrtit.

In the following I would like to elucidate Kumārila’s concept of man-made speech, for Kumārila’s description, especially that in the codexina section of the Ślokavārttika, is not clear enough for us to determine his own view. Rather, his view seems to sway between the two opposing views as to whether man-made speech is a means of valid cognition (pramāṇā) or not.

MAN-MADE SPEECH AS NOT BEING A MEANS OF VALID COGNITION

In spite of Kumārila’s apologetic interpretation as found in Ślokavārttika šāstra, v.1.14, it seems almost certain that the old tradition represented by the Vṛttikārā as referred to in the Śabarahāya does not count man-made speech as an independent source or pramāṇā. The Vṛttikārā, after inference, mentions only sāstra, i.e., Vedic teaching, and not verbal testimony in general (śabdā).

As for a [Vedic] teaching, it is knowledge of an object which is not in contact [with the sense faculties], through cognition of speech.²

Kumārila accepts that this sāstra is nothing but Vedic teaching (candanā upadeśa), and therefore does not include man-made speech.³ Thus, there is no definition of verbal testimony in general in the Śabarahāya.

The lower status of man-made speech is reconfirmed by Saṅkarā’s discussion in Śabarahāya ad 1.1.2. In contrast to the Veda, which is the direct source of dharma, Saṅkara grants a man-made statement (pararūpya-vacanam) only a secondary position. He clearly states that a man-made statement can be valid only when it is uttered by a “trustworthy person who has correct knowledge” (pratyaya < pratyaya ‘by samjñātā),¹¹ or seen from another standpoint,¹² only when his speech “has perceptible

⁹. Śabarahāya ad 1.1.2-3-4 (Vṛttikārā), p.336. Śātrasā uddhavikāritānta ca ucyate vijñāti

¹⁰. Ślokavārttikā śāstra, v.3.2: codanā upadeśa ca śastrām evam ucyate

¹¹. Ślokavārttikā śāstra, c.3.37-14: pratyaya ‘by samjñātā ity esanam asrē hi tathādharatmaḥ āṅga ’ty ity esanam api samjñātā udgatīś ca.” Ātyātāntaka ca ut padeśa ucyate sāstra ātmanādṛṣṭāḥ

¹². For the interpretation of Śāstra, which connects the two conditions (pratyayasā daśāndādārūpya-vacanam), see Kāśyapa a. 1.1.2. Sikharavāla in the Pañcarāja (2.3-4) interprets it as a sign of renunciation the same thing and not as a sign of rigid option (vikalpa).

Objects” (indriya-vijñāna), i.e., when he conveys what he has directly perceived. Saṅkara presupposes the following process: first an object (vijñāna) is perceived through the sense faculty (indriya) by a speaker; thus he obtains a cognition (pratyaya), i.e., perceptual cognition (pratyayatā) then he utters a statement (vacana), which produces a cognition (jñāna) in a hearer’s mind.

pratyaya
vijñāna — indriya — pratyaya — vacana — jñāna

If a speaker tries to convey an imperceptible object, such as dharma, he naturally fails, for his speech “comes out of human knowledge” (śāstra) and thus what he conveys is a mere fantasy. As Saṅkara explicitly states, “it cannot be cognized by a human being without a [Vedic] revelation.” (Π 8.5-6: alakṣya hi tat parasya jñānām iti vacanat.) A man-made statement of dharma comes out of delusion (vyaṁbhā).¹³

vyaṁbhā

φ — φ — parasya — upadeśa — jñāna

At the best, as in the case of Manu, a human being can communicate dharma only when his speech is based on the Veda.¹⁴
dharma — Veda — Manus — upadeśa — jñāna

In the above view, Saṅkara accepts to some extent the validity of a man-made statement: it is valid if it is based on a reliable source such as perception or the Veda. Immediately after this view, however, he introduces another view, which also elucidates the difference between Vedic injunctions and man-made statements. Surprisingly, he denies here the validity of man-made speech in general with regard to external objects.

¹³. Śabarahāya ad 1.1.2. Folk 1: upadeśa hi vyaṁbhā api bhavati.

¹⁴. See note 12.
Furthermore, from a man-made statement arises a cognition "this person understands thus" and not [a cognition] "this object is thus". A man-made statement can convey what a speaker has in mind and not what there is or the actual state of an external object. A human being cannot independently convey true information about an object per se via speech. Because of this negative feature, a cognition based on a man-made statement sometimes is erroneous, as we often experience. This negative (or sceptical) view of man-made speech represents a developed form of the above view, in particular, the view expressed with the words punarabhādhitaprabhāva and vāyuḥsaṁhāta.

\[ \phi - \phi - \text{parusā} - \text{upadēsa} - \text{jhūnā} \]

From the sequential order of these two different views in the Śābaraḥāṣṭa, which are, as is often the case, connected with the conjunction api ca (F.13.12), it seems that Śābara inherited the first view from the preceding tradition and that he added as the second a fresh view either of his own or of someone else. This negative view of man-made speech may look rather surprising, because we have often learnt that the Mīlanīśīya system holds optimistic views on speech and the world. Although it is true that Śābara's second view is motivated by his intention to clarify the difference between man-made speech and Vedic revelation, and therefore should not be emphasized too much, it is nonetheless a historical fact that his influential commentator Kumārila has expanded on Śābara's idea and further investigated the nature of man-made speech.

**Kumārila's Negative View on the Nature of Man-Made Speech**

In Śūkraśtatikā codana, in particular vv. 160-162, Kumārila directly comments on the Śābaraḥāṣṭa passages mentioned above, and elaborates:

16. Śābaraḥāṣṭa ad. 1.x.13-15. 16.23: api ca parāśraya vacanat "evam ayaṃ parāśraya
vādā" iti bhavati pratipadya, na "evam ayaṃ artha" iti.

Vater Śābara's negative view of the cognitive process of man-made speech. Taking into consideration other explanations in the codanaśītra section, Kumārila's view can be summarized as follows. A trustworthy person (āptā) does not lack any of the three problems which can interfere in the process of uttering a sentence: between the object in question (artha) and cognition (dīti), between cognition (dīti) and intention (vīrakṣā), and between intention (vīrakṣā) and the utterance of a sentence (vākyā). On the other hand, a speaker who has not directly experienced the object in question (artha), a liar (anayatvādīntantavadī), or a confused man (bhṛnta) does have a problem in the process. A speaker may convey a piece of incorrect information; even if he has experienced the object in question, he may tell a lie; or even if he intends to speak honestly, he may fail to express himself correctly.

\[ \text{artha} \rightarrow \text{dīti} \rightarrow \text{vīrakṣā} \rightarrow \text{vākyā} \]

(āptā) (anayatvādī) (bhṛnta)

Whereas Śābara takes into consideration man-made statements which are either true or false, without paying attention to the possibility of a dishonest or confused speaker, Kumārila carefully excludes dishonest and confused utterances as being exceptional. Limiting in advance the matter of discourse to the general case of a trustworthy speaker in this way, Kumārila contrasts man-made statements with Vedic ones: a man-made statement, though uttered by a trustworthy speaker, is valid with regard to the speaker's cognition alone. Thus Kumārila states:

The cognition of a speaker is known from the sentence of a trustworthy person; in other cases [there is a] failure.

Although a hearer understands the object in question from a speaker's statement, a hearer's knowledge is valid only with regard to a speaker's cognition, and not the actual object in question. Kumārila considers that a man-made statement has a limited power (sakri) which enables it only to convey
a speaker's cognition. Therefore it can convey the object in question only indirectly, through being based on some reliable source.

And at first appearances are indifferent [i.e. they do not cause a certain, valid, cognition of an object itself], because they are separated from the object by the cognition [of the speaker]. But validity can be established because of the possibility that there is a cause of the speaker's cognition.26

One can again see the parallelism with recollection (smrty) and inference behind Kumārila's explanation. A man-made statement can be valid only when it is based on a proper cause (hetu) of information such as perceptive means or a Vedic injunction.

artha – hetu – vākyājña – sābdha – upreṣṭhyāya

The power of a man-made statement extends to a speaker's cognition and not further. A hearer needs an additional process of confirmation in order to determine the object is question.27 Thus, concerning an external object, man-made speech is essentially not an independent source, free from an additional condition. In other words, it "has a person as the cause [of its validity]" (pūnam cittirita).28 The Veda, on the other hand, is an independent source in sharp contrast to man-made speech. It does not have a speaker's cognition as the prerequisite for validity and therefore it is never false.29

20. Ślokavārttikā cod. 24, v. 167: tajñānāntarātmakac ca sāvdha śārdha uddāyant prāmāṇyaśāpyam u pariṣṭhitvāt katu viśvaśāntvāt katu śārdha śārdha
21. Ślokavārttika cod., v. 167 artha pāramitā prattā tā śārdha śārdha śārdha
22. Ślokavārttika cod., v. 167 artha pāramitā prattā tā śārdha śārdha śārdha
23. Ślokavārttika cod., v. 167 artha pāramitā prattā tā śārdha śārdha śārdha
24. Ślokavārttika cod., v. 167 artha pāramitā prattā tā śārdha śārdha śārdha

26. Ślokavārttika cod., v. 187: tajñānāntarātmakac ca sāvdha śārdha uddāyant prāmāṇyaśāpyam u pariṣṭhitvāt katu viśvaśāntvāt katu śārdha śārdha
27. Ślokavārttika cod., v. 187 artha pāramitā prattā tā śārdha śārdha śārdha śārdha śārdha śārdha
28. Ślokavārttika cod., v. 187 artha pāramitā prattā tā śārdha śārdha śārdha śārdha śārdha śārdha
29. Ślokavārttika cod., v. 187 artha pāramitā prattā tā śārdha śārdha śārdha śārdha śārdha śārdha

Other evidence further confirms that Kumārila himself has as his final view this negative view of the limited power of man-made speech. In commenting on another passage of the Śāhardhāya, Kumārila states that Sabara accepts on the provisionally (abhavasya) the operation of a sentence (vākyasampraptam) towards the object to be conveyed.30 In other words, according to Kumārila's interpretation, Sabara accepts as his final view that man-made speech operates toward a speaker's cognition and not toward an external object.

MAN-MADE SPEECH AS BEING A MEANS OF VALID COGNITION

Kumārila clearly limits the power of man-made speech in contrast to the Veda, and accepts that it is not an independent source of information. This is clear in the caṇḍālaśāman section of the Ślokavārttika. In the sābdha (or śārdha) section, on the other hand, Kumārila seems to proceed in the other direction. He clearly accepts the validity of man-made speech. Interpreting the definition of sābdha or Śāardha teaching found in the Vṛttikāragratha (Sbh ad 1.3.3-5), Kumārila decides the validity of verbal testimony in general (sābdha). He states that it is pointless to mention it in the context of Vedic exegesis31 and that it is automatically understood if one defines the characteristic feature of Vedic teaching.32

Here Kumārila clearly accepts that valid speech is not limited to the Veda alone. Man-made speech, too, can be valid, and therefore is counted as a means of valid cognitions if it is understood by a trustworthy speaker. In this way, Kumārila accepts the validity of man-made statements against the original intention of the Vṛttikā and Śāardha.

requires neither the cognition of a speaker in order to be ascertained as authoritative nor is it inert.

26. Ślokavārttika cod., v. 187: atmataḥ prabhakaranam vākyasampraptam ucyayā [Sahara] states that (it is different, after having provisionally accepted) an operation of a sentence towards an external object, which is in fact separated by a speaker's cognition.
27. Ślokavārttika sūtra, v. 187: atmataḥ prabhakaranam vākyasampraptam ucyayā
28. Ślokavārttika sūtra, v. 187: atmataḥ prabhakaranam vākyasampraptam ucyayā
29. Ślokavārttika sūtra, v. 187: atmataḥ prabhakaranam vākyasampraptam ucyayā
30. Ślokavārttika sūtra, v. 187: atmataḥ prabhakaranam vākyasampraptam ucyayā
31. Ślokavārttika sūtra, v. 187: atmataḥ prabhakaranam vākyasampraptam ucyayā
32. Ślokavārttika sūtra, v. 187: atmataḥ prabhakaranam vākyasampraptam ucyayā
One can probably see here the paradigm change of his time by which Kumārila, unlike Prabhākara, can no more hold the archonistic view of the old Mīmāṃsā system. In a sense, Kumārila reaches a compromise in the common, secular view as represented, e.g., in Nyāyaśāstra ad 1.1.2. There Pakṣalavāmanī states that the Nāyaśākta definition of verbal testimony (vāda) is "a definition common to speech of sages, divinity and barbarians" (145: nyāyaśāskṛtaḥ saṃsāraṁ samāyaṁ). Even barbarians can be "trustworthy" (apta) and their speech can be valid (perhaps even with regard to dharma as is hinted by Pakṣalavāmanī's expression aptaḥ khalu sakṣaṭkāṭaśabdamāḥ). Pakṣalavāmanī's criticism can be regarded as aiming at a conservative view of the Mīmāṃsā system.

**THE STATUS OF MAN-MADE SPEECH**

Thus, with regard to the exact status of man-made speech, there is a question as to whether or not it is a means of valid cognition (pramāṇa). In his time, Kumārila had to accept its validity. But, at the same time, he had to demarcate it to some extent in accordance with the Mīmāṃsā tradition. He could not give unlimited power to man-made speech, lest it may climb to a high position equal to the Veda.

Under these circumstances, Sābara gives a good hint to Kumārila as to how to solve the dilemma. It seems that Sābara himself does not pay much attention to the exact status of man-made speech. He is probably satisfied with its lower status in relation to the Veda. In the second view, he even reduces its power to the realm of a speaker's cognition. For him, man-made speech is not an independent category of pramāṇa or means of valid cognition. Thus here is no problem at all for Sābara to depress its status.

Kumārila inherits Sābara's idea that man-made speech can convey only a speaker's cognition (vāda, vāda), and not the actual object in question. But he does so on the premise that it also comprises a subcategory of means of valid cognition. It is valid, but is so within its own domain, i.e., only with regard to a speaker's cognition. Thus there is a demarcated territory or a clear division of domain in correspondence to each means of valid cognition. In this respect, even the Buddha's statement can be regarded valid concerning its own domain, i.e., the Buddha's cognition, although it cannot be accepted as valid with regard to the external object (in particular, religious matters), it communicates. Similarly, even the Veda can be concluded to be invalid beyond its territory.

Even the Veda is false with regard to an object beyond its own function.

Thus, as a whole, Kumārila succeeds in presenting a new view on the validity of man-made statements. Unlike his predecessors such as the Vṛttikāra and Sābara, Kumārila accepts man-made statements as a subcategory of means of valid cognition. But at the same time, he grants this type of means of cognition a limited power which enables it to convey only a speaker's cognition, either correct or incorrect, concerning the external object that the speaker has intended to express.

**pratīyā**

| artha — mula/hetu | pratīyāya | vacana | bhāsa

**vyākhyā**

| φ | φ | avatāraya | vacana | bhāsa

Amplifying this view, one must conclude that even Manu's speech is valid primarily with regard to his cognition, and not to the meaning it is supposed to convey. Kumārila will probably agree. But in this case one can establish its validity with regard to the object in question, because one can prove that Manu's teaching is based on the Veda alone. As was al-

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27. Sūkṣmaśāstra 21, 2:7-9: "The nature of the word is not to convey the will of the speaker. For even those statements of the Buddha, etc., are true with regard to internal lougangistic [i.e., a speaker's cognition which is to be communicated], which was mentioned above, but with regard to an external object, they have no function. I.e., cannot convey it to a 

28. Sūkṣmaśāstra 21, 2-9: "The end of my teaching is to establish this view. I.e., to show that the nature of the Buddha's teaching is that it can be known by an external object, even if it is taught to a speaker's cognition, which is to be communicated, but is valid only with regard to the external object, and not with regard to the internal object, which is the object of the teacher's teaching. Therefore, this view is valid."

29. This is proved by Kumārila through arthasāstra. Tāntāraśāstra 13.2. A 16-22: "According to the teaching of the Buddha, etc., the end of my teaching is to establish this view. I.e., to show that the nature of the Buddha's teaching is that it can be known by an external object, even if it is taught to a speaker's cognition, which is to be communicated, but is valid only with regard to the external object, and not with regard to the internal object, which is the object of the teacher's teaching. Therefore, this view is valid."

30. This is proved by Kumārila through arthasāstra. Tāntāraśāstra 13.2. A 16-22: "According to the teaching of the Buddha, etc., the end of my teaching is to establish this view. I.e., to show that the nature of the Buddha's teaching is that it can be known by an external object, even if it is taught to a speaker's cognition, which is to be communicated, but is valid only with regard to the external object, and not with regard to the internal object, which is the object of the teacher's teaching. Therefore, this view is valid."
ready mentioned, "utterances are indifferent, because they are separated from the object by the cognition of the speaker." But validity can be established because of the possibility that there is a cause of the speaker's cognition."

A POSSIBLE POSITION OF KUMĀRAŚILA'S VIEW IN THE HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

It does not seem that Śāhara had intended in advance a change of the entire system when he presented the second view concerning the validity of human speech. Rather, it is more likely that he wrote this for its own sake in order to emphasize the difference between Vedic and man-made speech. Nevertheless, the negative feature of this view is distinctive in the context of the positive (or trusting) views on the validity of speech held by others during this period. Although further investigation is required and it is beyond the scope of this short article, I will like to conclude by making a short remark concerning Kumārila's possible position in history, in particular in juxtaposition to Dharmakīrti, perhaps the most famous scholar who holds that speech conveys only a speaker's intention (vāktraṁ/papajñāsākara).50

Even Dignāga (ca. 640-540 AD), who dismisses the positive aspect of word-meanings (padārtha) and thus establishes the apoha theory, presupposes as a whole the positive Viśeṣajñā view on the universe of discourse, as Katsura 1997 has convincingly shown. Unlike Dharmakīrti, Dignāga never says that speech "refers to the speaker's intention." For him conceptualization (sahajānta), in other words, "connecting names, universals and the like" (pratimāniruttamāyacatvam), is not limited to an individual person but is a rather a social process shared by everyone. Thus it is not surprising that Dignāga accepts the Viśeṣajñā scheme of categories to some extent.

Śāhara (ca. 500-550 AD) clearly encouraged Kumārila (ca. 640-690 AD) to take the negative view that man-made speech primarily conveys a speaker's cognition alone. In this light, we have to reconsider our non-

50. See footnote 30. 51. Pramāṇavarttika-kāraṇa 603.3-13; mārtirvadatūrvarhūvahāvāveśāvahāyāvṛtthō sahā nāsaḥbāhūvāhāvāvahāyāvṛtthō sahā [vāktraṁ/papajñāsākara]." Because utterances do not have an indispensable (essential) connection with entities, external objects are not established on the grounds of them, for they indicate [only] the intention of the speaker [and not the actual state of external objects].
And, if we accept, as is normally accepted, that Dharmakirti presupposes Kumārila's śāhāvatārtika or possibly a similar Mīmāṃsā view current among scholars it is more appropriate to say that Dharmakirti's idea of sākratāpyāpannāsikā was prefigured by Kumārila or some other Mīmāṃsākāśa than it is to say that Dharmakirti invented it building on Dignāga's apana theory. It is, at least, ahistorical to consider Dharmakirti's view as being influenced by earlier Buddhist tradition alone.

My suggestion accords with the fact that Dharmakirti's earliest work (Hetuprakārama incorporated as Pramāṇavārttikā I with Pramāṇavārttikāvavṛtti) was composed primarily against the Mīmāṃsā, and that some of his theories, e.g. on anupalabdhi, in their starting points are very much influenced by Kumārila or others of similar views.37 It is therefore not surprising that the Mīmāṃsā view on man-made speech wielded influence over Dharmakirti.

### References and Abbreviations

#### References

**Śāhāvatārtika.** See Śāhāvatārtika (A).

**Tattvāvatārtika.** See Śāhāvatārtika (A).


**Pramāṇavārttikāvavṛtti.** The Pramāṇavārttikā of Dharmakirti: the First Chapter with the Autocommentary, Ed. Ramon Gobbi, Oriental Research Institute, Sèvay, no. 126, 129. Rome: Lettura Italiano per il Medio e Estremo Oriente, 1996.

**Pramāṇavārttikā.** Dignaga's Pramāṇavārttikā. Chapter 1. A hypothetical reconstruction of the Sanskrit text with the help of the two Tibetan transcriptions on the basis of the theoretically known Sanskrit fragments and the linguistic materials gained from Jñānadeva's Bhāṣṭāra. Ed. Erast Steinkeller. (https://ika.oulu.33/33/Sanskrit/08_P_0.pdf)

**Śāhāvatārtika.**
- See Frauwallner 1998.

**Śākyaśāstra.** My text is based on my own unpublished edition prepared on the basis of seven published editions and five manuscripts.


**C** Mitmamasmāśākārtikā Srimat Kanmārashākhātattupadāvatāsūtaṃ Nīkhalalata-teṣāyatārītratātāpathāsadaśātāśramimagratātānayā Ndyupanakālatyāyā Vajrayāpanitātanam. Janrane: Chowkambha Sanskrit Series Office (The name of the editor of this revised edition and the year of publication are not given).


34. See Klosser 2009.