

KUMĀRILA'S NOTION OF PAURUṢEYAVACANA*

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In the Mīmāṃsā tradition, man-made statements, in contrast to perception or Vedic injunctions, are not ultimately counted as primary sources of information. Kumārila inherits Śābara's idea that man-made speech can convey only a speaker's cognition (vaktrjñāna) and not the actual object in question. Thus the essential part of Dharmakīrti's view on speech as being vaktrabhiprāyasūcaka is already found in the Śābarabhāṣya. It is more appropriate to say that Dharmakīrti's idea of vaktrabhiprāyasūcaka was pre-figured by Kumārila or some other Mīmāṃsakas than to say that Dharmakīrti invented it building on Dignāga's apoha theory.

INTRODUCTION

IN THE MĪMĀMSĀ TRADITION, man-made or mundane statements (*pauruṣeya/laukika-vacana*) are not ultimately counted as primary sources of information. In contrast to Vedic injunctions (*codanā/vidhi/sāstra*), which are ultimately the single source of knowledge of dharma (and adharma),¹ man-made speech, including even Manu's teaching (*mānavaśāstra*) or "Manu's recollection" (*manusmṛti*), acquires at best only the position of a secondary source which is "Veda-based".² A man-made statement again has a secondary position when opposed to direct perception (*pratyakṣa*). It

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1. This idea is clear in *Jaiminīsūtra* 1.1.2 (*codanālakṣaṇo 'rtho dharmah*) and other relevant passages such as 1.3.1 (*dharmasya śābdamūlatvād aśābdam anapekṣyam syāt*).

2. *Śābarabhāṣya* ad 1.1.2, F 18.11–12: *asati vyāmohe vedād api bhavati*.

can be valid only if it is based on perception (*pratyakṣapūrvaka*) (or some other valid sources) and if it is also conveyed in a correct way, e.g., uttered by a honest speaker.³

		Mundane matters	Religious matters
1	Primary source	<i>pratyakṣa</i> (etc.)	<i>codanā</i>
		↓	↓
2	Secondary source	<i>laukikavacana</i>	<i>laukikavacana</i>

Historically speaking, it is probably the Mīmāṃsā tradition that first clarified the distinction between Vedic injunctions and *smṛtis*. This is recorded in *Jaiminīsūtra* 1.3.1–2, *Smṛtyadhikaraṇa*.⁴ There the *sūtrakāra* appeals to the distinction between perception and inference, i.e., the contrast which is homologous with that between a Vedic injunction and a *smṛti* passage. A *smṛti* passage can be regarded as *anumāna* or an inferential reason, inasmuch as it allows us to infer its Vedic source.⁵

	<i>aindriyaka</i>	<i>dharma/adharma</i>
1	<i>pratyakṣa</i> (etc.)	<i>codanā</i>
2	<i>anumāna</i>	<i>smṛti</i>

Considering the old Mīmāṃsā conception of *pramāṇa* found in the discussion of *śeṣalakṣaṇa*s or criteria of hierarchy between two ritual elements,⁶ the essential difference between perception and inference or a direct revelation (*śruti*) and an indirect, evidential verbal expression (*liṅga*) lies in the “distance” (*viprakarṣa*) from the goal aimed at or the meaning to be

3. *Sābarabhāṣya* ad 1.1.2, F 18.3–6: *yat tu laukikam vacanam, tac cet pratyayitāt puruṣād indriyaviṣayam vā, avitatham eva tat. athāpratyayitād (-tād) corr.; cf. Ślokovārttikatātparyatikā* 71.17–18; *-tāt puruṣād) anindriyaviṣayam vā, tat puruṣabuddhiprabhavam apramāṇam. aśakyam hi tat puruṣeṇa jñātum r̥te vacanāt*. For Kumārila’s interpretation of these two conditions, i.e. “having been uttered by a *pratyayita* speaker” and “communicating a perceptible object”, see Kataoka 2001.

4. See Einoo 1998 and Pollock 2005 for general descriptions of the *Smṛtyadhikaraṇa*.

5. *Jaiminīsūtra* 1.3.2: *api vā kartṛsāmānyāt pramāṇam anumānam syāt |*

6. *Jaiminīsūtra* 3.3.14: *śrutiliṅgavākyaprakaraṇasthānasamākhyānām samavāye pāradaurbalyam, arthaviprakarṣāt |*

conveyed (*artha*): perception or a direct revelation conveys the information *directly*, whereas inference or an evidential verbal expression can do it *indirectly*, i.e. only by presupposing its source. In this respect, this distinction between perception and inference or a revelation and an evidential verbal expression can be regarded as a specific instance of Mīmāṃsā’s general dichotomy between “direct” and “indirect”.⁷

		<i>aindriyaka</i>	<i>dharma/adharma</i>	<i>artha</i>
1	<i>sākṣāt</i>	<i>pratyakṣa</i> (etc.)	<i>codanā</i>	<i>mūla</i>
2	<i>dvāreṇa</i>	<i>anumāna</i>	<i>smṛti</i>	<i>laukikavacana</i>

When Mīmāṃsakas investigate the nature of man-made speech, they assume this “direct/indirect” dichotomy and its parallelism with the distinction between perception and inference. For example, it is most natural for Śabara and Kumārila to conceptualize inference as “being preceded by perception” (*pratyakṣapūrvaka*) as well as to describe man-made speech as “having a perceptible object” (*indriyaviṣaya*), “being based on the sense faculty” (*aindriyakatva*) or more generally “being based on a source” (*≈mūlasadbhāva*). Thus, describing the intention of an opponent, Kumārila states:

For speech always should convey a meaning which is [already] known through another means of valid cognition. And it [i.e., speech] cannot be a means of valid cognition in itself, just as recollection [cannot, because it relies on a preceding cognition].⁸

According to our normal experience, speech conveys to a hearer an object that a speaker has experienced through a means of valid cognition such as perception. Like recollection (*smṛti*), speech in itself is not a reliable, independent source. Just as a recollection is valid only when it is based on an original experience, man-made speech is valid only when it is based on perception or the like.

7. The Mīmāṃsā view of this dichotomy is best represented in the *Ākrtyadhikaraṇa* (1.3.30–35): a word directly expresses a universal (*sāmānya/ākṛti/jāti*) and not a particular (*viśeṣa/vyakti*); the latter can be expressed “indirectly” only through the former.

8. *Ślokovārttika* *codanā*, v. 22: *pramāṇāntaradṛṣṭam hi śabdō ’rtham prāpayet sadā | smṛtivac ca svayam tasya prāmāṇyam nopapadyate ||*

Here one can clearly see that Kumārila uses the “direct/indirect” dichotomy, as indicated by the words *svayam* and *pramāṇāntaradṛṣṭa*, and the parallelism to recollection as indicated by *smṛtivat*.

In the following I would like to elucidate Kumārila’s concept of man-made speech, for Kumārila’s description, especially that in the *codanāsūtra* section of the *Ślokaṇvārttika*, is not clear enough for us to determine his own view. Rather, his view seems to sway between the two opposing views as to whether man-made speech is a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) or not.

MAN-MADE SPEECH AS NOT BEING A MEANS OF VALID COGNITION

In spite of Kumārila’s apologetic interpretation as found in *Ślokaṇvārttika śabda*, vv. 1–14, it seems almost certain that the old tradition represented by the Vṛttikāra as referred to in the *Śābarabhāṣya* does not count man-made speech as an independent source or *pramāṇa*. The Vṛttikāra, after inference, mentions only *śāstra*, i.e., Vedic teaching, and not verbal testimony in general (*śabda*):

As for a [Vedic] teaching, it is knowledge of an object which is not in contact [with the sense faculties], through cognition of speech.⁹

Kumārila accepts that this *śāstra* is nothing but Vedic teaching (*codanā/upadeśa*), and therefore does not include man-made speech.¹⁰ Thus, there is no definition of verbal testimony in general in the *Śābarabhāṣya*.

The lower status of man-made speech is reconfirmed by Śābara’s discussion in *Śābarabhāṣya* ad 1.1.2. In contrast to the Veda, which is the direct source of dharma, Śābara grants a man-made statement (*pauruṣeyam vacanam*) only a secondary position. He clearly states that a man-made statement can be valid only when it is uttered by “a trustworthy person who has correct knowledge” (*pratyayita < pratyayo ’sya saṃjātaḥ*),¹¹ or seen from another standpoint,¹² only when his speech “has perceptible


9. *Śābarabhāṣya* ad 1.1.3–5 (Vṛttikāra), F 32.3: *śāstram śabdaviññānād asannikṛṣṭe ’rthe vijñānam*.

10. *Ślokaṇvārttika śabda*, v. 12cd: *codanā copadeśaś ca śāstram evety udāhṛtam* ||


11. *Ślokaṇvārttikakāśikā* 112.23–24: *pratyayo ’sya saṃjāta ity etasminn arthe hi tārakādisṃter itajantaṃ pratyayitaśabdāṃ abhiyuktāḥ smaranti*. (Aṣṭādhyāyī 5.2.36: *tad asya saṃjātaṃ tārakādibhya itac*.)

12. For the interpretation of *vā* which connects the two conditions (*pratyayitāt puruṣād indriyaviśayaṃ vā*), see Kataoka 2001. Śālikanātha in the *Parīṣiṣṭa* (9.7–8) interprets it as a sign of rephrasing the same thing and not as a sign of rigid option (*vikalpa*).


objects” (*indriyaviśaya*), i.e., when he conveys what he has directly perceived. Śābara presupposes the following process: first an object (*viśaya*) is perceived through the sense faculty (*indriya*) by a speaker; thus he obtains a cognition (*pratyaya*), i.e., perceptual cognition (*pratyakṣa*); then he utters a statement (*vacana*), which produces a cognition (*jñāna*) in a hearer’s mind.



If a speaker tries to convey an imperceptible object, such as dharma, he naturally fails, for his speech “comes out of human knowledge” (F 18.5: *puruṣabuddhiprabhava*), and thus what he conveys is a mere fantasy. As Śābara explicitly states, “it cannot be cognized by a human being without a [Vedic] revelation” (F 18.5–6: *aśakyam hi tat puruṣeṇa jñātum r̥te vacanāt*). A man-made statement of dharma comes out of delusion (*vyāmoha*).¹³



At the best, as in the case of Manu, a human being can communicate dharma only when his speech is based on the Veda.¹⁴




In the above view, Śābara accepts to some extent the validity of a man-made statement: it is valid if it is based on a reliable source such as perception or the Veda. Immediately after this view, however, he introduces another view, which also elucidates the difference between Vedic injunctions and man-made statements. Surprisingly, he denies here the validity of man-made speech in general with regard to external objects.

13. *Śābarabhāṣya* ad 1.1.2, F 18.11: *upadeśo hi vyāmohād api bhavati*.

14. See footnote 2.

Furthermore, from a man-made statement arises a cognition “this person understands thus” and not [a cognition] “this object is thus”.¹⁵

A man-made statement can convey what a speaker has in mind and not what there is or the actual state of an external object. A human being cannot independently convey true information about an object *per se* via speech. Because of this negative feature, a cognition based on a man-made statement sometimes is erroneous, as we often experience.¹⁶ This negative (or skeptical) view of man-made speech represents a developed form of the above view, in particular, the view expressed with the words *puruṣabuddhiprabhava* and *vyāmohāt*.



From the sequential order of these two different views in the *Śābarabhāṣya*, which are, as is often the case, connected with the conjunction *api ca* (F 18.12), it seems that Śabara inherited the first view from the preceding tradition and that he added as the second a fresh view either of his own or of someone else. This negative view of man-made speech may look rather surprising, because we have often learnt that the Mīmāṃsā system holds optimistic views on speech and the world. Although it is true that Śabara's second view is motivated by his intention to clarify the difference between man-made speech and Vedic revelation, and therefore should not be emphasized too much, it is nonetheless a historical fact that his influential commentator Kumārila has expanded on Śabara's idea and further investigated the nature of man-made speech.

KUMĀRILA'S NEGATIVE VIEW ON THE NATURE OF MAN-MADE SPEECH


In *Slokavārttika codanā*, in particular vv. 160–168ab,¹⁷ Kumārila directly comments on the *Śābarabhāṣya* passages mentioned above, and elabo-

15. *Śābarabhāṣya* ad 1.1.2, F 18.12–13: *api ca pauruṣeyād vacanāt “evam ayam puruṣo veda” iti bhavati pratyayah, na “evam ayam arthah” iti.*

16. *Śābarabhāṣya* ad 1.1.2, F 18.13–14: *viplavate khalv api kaścīt puruṣakṛtād vacanāt pratyayah.*

17. An annotated translation of vv. 160–170 is available in the appendix of Taber 2002.

rates Śabara's negative view of the cognitive process of man-made speech. Taking into consideration other explanations in the *codanāsūtra* section, Kumārila's view can be summarized as follows. A trustworthy person (*āpta*) does not have any of the three problems which can interfere in the process of uttering a sentence: between the object in question (*artha*) and cognition (*dhī*), between cognition (*dhī*) and intention (*vivakṣā*), and between intention (*vivakṣā*) and the utterance of a sentence (*vākya*). On the other hand, a speaker who has not directly experienced the object in question (*adṛaṣṭṛ*), a liar (*asatyavādin/anṛtavādin*), or a confused man (*bhrānta*) does have a problem in the process. A speaker may convey a piece of incorrect information; or even if he has experienced the object in question, he may tell a lie; or even if he intends to speak honestly, he may fail to express himself correctly.



Whereas Śabara takes into consideration man-made statements which are either true or false, without paying attention to the possibility of a dishonest or confused speaker, Kumārila carefully excludes dishonest and confused utterances as being exceptional. Limiting in advance the matter of discourse to the general case of a trustworthy speaker in this way, Kumārila contrasts man-made statements with Vedic ones: a man-made statement, though uttered by a trustworthy speaker, is valid with regard to the speaker's cognition alone. Thus Kumārila states:

The cognition of a speaker is known from the sentence of a trustworthy person; in other cases [there is] a failure.¹⁸

Although a hearer understands the object in question from a speaker's statement, a hearer's knowledge is valid only with regard to a speaker's cognition, and not the actual object in question.¹⁹ Kumārila considers that a man-made statement has a limited power (*śakti*) which enables it only to convey

18. *Slokavārttika codanā*, v. 162ab: *vaktrdhīr āptavākyena gamyate 'nyatra viplutī |*

19. *Slokavārttika codanā*, v. 165: *tenārthapratyayotpāde śrotur jāte 'pi vākyaataḥ | jñāto nūnam aneneti vaktrjñāne matir bhavet ||* “Therefore, though for a hearer a cognition of an object arises from a sentence, there will [also] arise an idea about the cognition of the speaker: ‘Indeed [the object] has been known by him’.”

a speaker's cognition. Therefore it can convey the object in question only indirectly, through being based on some reliable source.

And at first utterances are indifferent [i.e. they do not cause a certain, valid, cognition of an object itself], because they are separated [from the object] by the cognition [of the speaker]. But validity can be established because of the possibility that there is a cause of the speaker's cognition.²⁰

One can again see the parallelism with recollection (*smṛti*) and inference behind Kumārila's explanation. A man-made statement can be valid only when it is based on a proper cause (*hetu*) of information such as perceptual means or a Vedic injunction.

artha — hetu — vaktrjñāna — śabda — śrotṛpratyaya

The power of a man-made statement extends to a speaker's cognition and not further. A hearer needs an additional process of confirmation in order to determine the object in question.²¹ Thus, concerning an external object, man-made speech is essentially not an independent source, free from an additional condition. In other words, it "has a person as the cause [of its validity]" (*pūṇnimitta*).²² The Veda, on the other hand, is an independent source in sharp contrast to man-made speech. It does not have a speaker's cognition as the prerequisite for validity and therefore it is never false.²³

20. *Slokavārttika codanā*, v. 167: *tajjñānāntaritatvāc ca śabdās tāvad udāsate | prāmānyasthāpanam tu syād vaktrdhihetusambhavāt ||*

21. *Slokavārttika codanā*, v. 168: *arthe pūrvaṃ pratīte 'pi niścayo hi tadāśrayaḥ | tenārthajñānagamyāpi prāmānye saiva pūrvabhāk ||* "For though an object is understood beforehand, a determination is dependent on it [i.e. the cause behind the speaker's cognition]. Therefore it is precisely that [cognition of the speaker (*vaktrdhi*)] that is a prerequisite for the validity, although it is understood from the cognition of an object."

22. *Slokavārttika codanā*, v. 169ab: *ato 'tra pūṇnimittatvād upapannā mṛṣārthatā |* "Therefore in the case [of a man-made statement] it is possible that it is false, because it has a person as the cause [of its validity]."

23. *Slokavārttika codanā*, vv. 169cd–170: *na tu syāt tatsvabhāvatvaṃ vede vaktur abhāvataḥ || tadbuddhyantarayo* nāstīty artho 'rthais ca pratīyate | ato na jñānapūrvatvaṃ apekṣyaṃ nāyathārthatā ||* (*-yo nā- C²GMB I, K; -yor nā- C²DPT I; -yo nnā B2) (Cf. also Freschi and Graheli [2005:307, fn.67]). "But it is impossible for the Veda to have that intrinsic nature [of being false], because it has no speaker [i.e. author]. And because there is no intermediation by a [speaker's] cognition, the meaning [of a Vedic sentence] is understood [directly] by means of the meanings [of the words]. Therefore [the Veda]

Other evidence further confirms that Kumārila himself has as his final view this negative view of the limited power of man-made speech. In commenting on another passage of the *Śābarabhāṣya*, Kumārila states that Śabara accepts only *provisionally* (*abhyupetya*) the operation of a sentence (*vākavyāpāra*) towards the object to be conveyed.²⁴ In other words, according to Kumārila's interpretation, Śabara accepts as his final view that man-made speech operates toward a speaker's cognition and not toward an external object.

MAN-MADE SPEECH AS BEING A MEANS OF VALID COGNITION

Kumārila clearly limits the power of man-made speech in contrast to the Veda, and accepts that it is not an independent source of information. This is clear in the *codanāsūtra* section of the *Slokavārttika*. In the *śabda* (or *śāstra*) section, on the other hand, Kumārila seems to proceed in the other direction. He clearly accepts the validity of man-made speech. Interpreting the definition of *śāstra* or Vedic teaching found in the *Vṛttikāragrantha* (SBh ad 1.1.3–5), Kumārila defends the validity of verbal testimony in general (*śabda*). He states that it is pointless to mention it in the context of Vedic exegesis²⁵ and that it is automatically understood if one defines the characteristic feature of Vedic teaching.²⁶

Here Kumārila clearly accepts that valid speech is not limited to the Vedic alone. Man-made speech, too, can be valid, and therefore is counted as a means of valid cognition if it is uttered by a trustworthy speaker. In this way, Kumārila accepts the validity of man-made statements against the original intention of the *Vṛttikāra* and Śabara.

requires neither the cognition [of a speaker in order to be ascertained as authoritative] nor is it errant."

24. *Slokavārttika codanā*, v. 176cd: *abhyupetyārthaviśayaṃ vākavyāpāram ucyate ||* "[Śabara] states [that it is different], after having [provisionally] accepted an operation of a sentence towards an [external] object[, which is in fact separated by a speaker's cognition]."

25. *Slokavārttika śabda*, v. 10: *yat tu gām ānāyetyādivākyasthaṃ śabdakṣaṇam | tasya nehopyogo 'sti tasmāc chāstragatam kṛtam ||* "On the other hand, the defining character of speech [in general], which belongs to a sentence such as 'Bring a cow', is not useful here [in understanding the correct meaning of a Vedic teaching]. Therefore [only] the [definition] of a Vedic teaching is made."

26. *Slokavārttika śabda*, v. 11: *viśeṣaś ca na sāmānyam antareṇāsti kaścana | tasmāt tam apy udāhṛtya sāmānyam lakṣayet sukhām ||* "And there is no particular that exists without a universal. Therefore one can easily define a universal also by citing a particular."

vaidikavacana

laukikavacana

āptapraṇīta

anāptapraṇīta

One can probably see here the paradigm change of his time by which Kumārila, unlike Prabhākara, can no more hold the anachronistic view of the old Mimāṃsā system. In a sense, Kumārila reaches a compromise in the common, secular view as represented, e.g., in *Nyāyabhāṣya* ad 1.1.7. There Pakṣilasvāmin states that the Naiyāyika definition of verbal testimony (*śabda*) is “a definition common to [speech of] sages, āryas and barbarians” (14.5: *ṛṣyāryamlecchānām samānam lakṣaṇam*). Even barbarians can be “trustworthy” (*āpta*) and their speech can be valid (perhaps even with regard to dharma as is hinted by Pakṣilasvāmin’s expression *āptaḥ khalu sāḥṣātkṛtadharmā*). Pakṣilasvāmin’s criticism can be regarded as aiming at a conservative view of the Mimāṃsā system.

THE STATUS OF MAN-MADE SPEECH

Thus, with regard to the exact status of man-made speech, there is a question as to whether or not it is a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*). In his time, Kumārila had to accept its validity. But, at the same time, he had to demarcate it to some extent in accordance with the Mimāṃsā tradition. He could not give unlimited power to man-made speech, lest it may climb to a high position equal to the Veda.


Under these circumstances, Śabara gives a good hint to Kumārila as to how to solve the dilemma. It seems that Śabara himself does not pay much attention to the exact status of man-made speech. He is probably satisfied with its lower status in relation to the Veda. In the second view, he even reduces its power to the realm of a speaker’s cognition. For him, man-made speech is not an independent category of *pramāṇa* or means of valid cognition. Thus there is no problem at all for Śabara to depress its status.

Kumārila inherits Śabara’s idea that man-made speech can convey only a speaker’s cognition (*vaktrjñāna*), and not the actual object in question. But he does so on the premise that it also comprises a subcategory of means of valid cognition. It is valid, but is so within its own domain, i.e., only with regard to a speaker’s cognition. Thus there is a demarcated territory or a clear division of domain in correspondence to each means of valid cognition. In this respect, even the Buddha’s statement can be regarded valid

concerning its own domain, i.e., the Buddha’s cognition, although it cannot be accepted as valid with regard to the external object (in particular, religious matters), it communicates.²⁷ Similarly, even the Veda can be concluded to be invalid beyond its territory.

Even the Veda is false with regard to an object beyond its own function.²⁸

Thus, as a whole, Kumārila succeeds in presenting a new view on the validity of man-made statements. Unlike his predecessors such as the Vṛttikāra and Śabara, Kumārila accepts man-made statements as a subcategory of means of valid cognition. But at the same time, he grants this type of means of cognition a limited power which enables it to convey only a speaker’s cognition, either correct or incorrect, concerning the external object that the speaker has intended to express.



Amplifying this view, one must conclude that even Manu’s speech is valid primarily with regard to his cognition, and not to the meaning it is supposed to convey. Kumārila will probably agree. But in this case one can establish its validity with regard to the object in question, because one can prove that Manu’s teaching is based on the Veda alone.²⁹ As was al-

27. *Slokavārttika codanā*, v. 172: *teṣām api hi yat kāryam pūrvatra pratipāditam | tatra samyaktvam arthe tu vyāpāro naiva vidyate ||* “For even those [statements of the Buddha, etc.] are true with regard to their [own] result [i.e. a speaker’s cognition which is to be communicated] which was mentioned above. But with regard to an [external] object, [they] have no function [i.e. cannot communicate it to a hearer].”

28. *Slokavārttika codanā*, v. 173ab: *svavyāpārātirikte ’rthe vedasyāpi mṛśarthatā |*

29. This is proved by Kumārila through *arthāpatti*. *Tantravārttika* ad 1.3.2, A 163.21–22: *bhrānter anubhavād vāpi punvākyād vipralambhanāt | drṣṭānugunyasādhyatvāc codanaiva laghiyasi ||* “[As the source of Manu’s Smṛti,] only Vedic injunction, inasmuch as it can be established as conforming to evident facts, is less complicated [than any other cause:] [Manu’s] error, [his own] experience, someone else’s utterance, or [Manu’s] deceit.”

ready mentioned, "utterances are indifferent, because they are separated [from the object] by the cognition [of the speaker]. But validity can be established because of the possibility that there is a cause of the speaker's cognition."³⁰

A POSSIBLE POSITION OF KUMĀRILA'S VIEW IN THE HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

It does not seem that Śabara had intended in advance a change of the entire system when he presented the second view concerning the validity of human speech. Rather, it is more likely that he went this far in order to emphasize the difference between Vedic and man-made speech. Nonetheless, the negative feature of this view is distinctive in the context of the positive (or trusting) views on the validity of speech held by others during this period. Although further investigation is required and it is beyond the scope of this short article, I would like to conclude by making a short remark concerning Kumārila's possible position in history, in particular in juxtaposition to Dharmakīrti, perhaps the most famous scholar who holds that speech conveys only a speaker's intention (*vaktrabhiprāyasūcaka*).³¹

Even Dignāga (ca. 480–540 AD), who dismisses the positive aspect of word-meanings (*padārtha*) and thus establishes the *apoha* theory, presupposes as a whole the positive Vaiśeṣika view on the universe of discourse, as Katsura 1979 has convincingly shown. Unlike Dharmakīrti, Dignāga never says that speech "refers to the speaker's intention". For him conceptualization (*kalpanā*), in other words, "connecting names, universals and the like" (*Pramāṇasamuccaya* 1.3d: *nāmajātyādiyojanā*), is not limited to an individual person but is rather a social process shared by everyone. Thus it is not surprising that Dignāga accepts the Vaiśeṣika scheme of categories to some extent.


Śabara (ca. 500–550 AD) clearly encouraged Kumārila (ca. 600–650 AD) to take the negative view that man-made speech primarily conveys a speaker's cognition alone. In this light, we have to reconsider our nor-

30. See footnote 20.


31. *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* 107.20–21: *nāntariyakatābhāvāc chabdānām vastubhiḥ saha | nārthasiddhis tatas, te hi vaktrabhiprāyasūcakāḥ* || "Because utterances do not have an indispensable [causal] connection with entities, external objects are not established on the grounds of them, for they indicate [only] the intention of the speaker [and not the actual state of external objects]."

mal understanding that Mimāṃsakas have a naive view of speech. If one thinks to contrast this position with that of Dharmakīrti (ca. 600–660 AD), I would point out that, historically speaking, the essential part of Dharmakīrti's view on speech as being *vaktrabhiprāyasūcaka* is already found, as explained above, in the *Śābarabhāṣya*, and not in Dignāga's works.³²


32. Generally speaking, Buddhists assume that speech does not touch reality itself. No doubt Dignāga's *apoha* theory is in accordance with this general Buddhist view. But his criticism is mainly on the ontological level of word-meanings (*padārtha*). He replaced positive *jāti*s or *sāmānyas* with negative *anyāpohas*. But once this replacement has been completed, Dignāga is satisfied with the old Vaiśeṣika scheme. Cf. *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* ad k. 36d (quoted in *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* 62.27–63.1): *śabdo 'rthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭān eva bhāvān āha*.



The essential structure of Śabara's idea is different (see footnote 15). The intermediation by the speaker's cognition is emphasized. Furthermore this idea mainly concerns *vākyas* and not *padas*.



Śabara's simple idea is further developed by Kumārila by taking into consideration other possible intermediates (*Ślokaavṛttika codanā*, vv. 160–168ab).



The exact idea of *vaktrabhiprāyasūcaka* is not found in Dignāga, although it is in the same direction as his *apoha* theory in that both negate positive aspects of speech. Thus Dharmakīrti's idea of *vaktrabhiprāyasūcaka* is more akin to Śabara's and Kumārila's than to Dignāga's, though one can regard it as a kind of rigid extension of Dignāga's and the general Buddhist perspective of speech.

And, if we accept, as is normally accepted,³³ that Dharmakīrti presupposes Kumārila's *Ślokaśāstrī* or possibly a similar Mīmāṃsā view current among scholars, it is more appropriate to say that Dharmakīrti's idea of *vaktrabhiprāyasūcaka* was prefigured by Kumārila or some other Mīmāṃsakas than it is to say that Dharmakīrti invented it building on Dignāga's *apoha* theory. It is, at least, ahistorical to consider Dharmakīrti's view as being influenced by earlier Buddhist tradition alone.

My suggestion accords with the fact that Dharmakīrti's earliest work (**hetuprakaraṇa* incorporated as *Pramāṇavārttika* I with *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*) was composed primarily against the Mīmāṃsā, and that some of his theories, e.g. on *anupalabdhi*, in their starting points, are very much influenced by Kumārila or others of similar views.³⁴ It is therefore not surprising that the Mīmāṃsā view on man-made speech wielded influence over Dharmakīrti.

33. See, e.g. Frauwallner 1962, Steinkellner 1997 and Krasser 1999. See also Kataoka 2003 for a survey of research on this issue. Taber 1992 opposes Frauwallner's view.

34. See Kellner 2003.

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- Jaiminīsūtra*. See *Śābarabhāṣya* (A).
Tantravārttika. See *Śābarabhāṣya* (A).
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Śābarabhāṣya.
 A *Śrīmajjaiminipraṇītaṃ mīmāṃsādarśanam*. Ed. Subbāśāstrī. 6 bhāgas. Poona: Ānandāśramamudraṇālaya, 1929–34.
 F See Frauwallner 1968.
Ślokaśāstrī. My text is based on my own unpublished edition prepared on the basis of seven published editions and five manuscripts.
 P *The Pandit* (New Series), Vol. III, 1878 (July 1), pp. 76–100.
 C₁ *Mīmāṃsāślokaśāstrī Śrīmatkumārīlabhaṭṭapādaviracitam Nikhilatan-trā'paratantraśrīmatpārthasārathimiśrapraṇītayā Nyāyaratnākarākhyayā Vyākhyayā'nugatam*. Ed. Tailaṅga Rāmaśāstrī. Caikhambā-Saṃskṛta-Granthamālā, No. 3. Kāśī, 1898.
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 M *Ślokaśāstrīkavyākhyā Tātparyāṭikā of Uṃveka Bhaṭṭa*. Ed. S.K. Rāmanātha Śāstrī. Revised by K. Kunjunni Raja and R. Thangaswamy. Madras: University of Madras, 1971² (1940').
 C₂ *Mīmāṃsāślokaśāstrī Śrīmatkumārīlabhaṭṭapādaviracitam Śrīpārtha-sārathimiśrapraṇītayā Nyāyaratnākarākhyayā Vyākhyayā samalankṛtam*. Banaras: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office (The name of the editor of this revised edition and the year of publication are not given).
 D *Ślokaśāstrī of Śrī Kumārila Bhaṭṭa*. Ed. Swāmī Dvārikadāsa Śāstrī. Varanasi: Tara Publications (or Ratna Publications, according to the cover), 1978.

