A Critical Edition of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī:*
— The Buddhist Refutation of Kumārila's Criticism of *Apoha* —

Kei KATAOKA
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A survey of research

The Buddhist theory of *apoha (exclusion)—‘cow’ denotes negation of non-cows and not a positive entity such as a universal <cowness>—is one of the topics that have attracted many scholars of Indian philosophy and Buddhist studies. Its description in general introductory books on Buddhist logic, such as Stcherbatsky [1930-32], has contributed to excite readers’ interest in this paradoxical doctrine of negation as the meaning of a word and as the object of conceptual cognition. A detailed study by Mookerjee [1935] on *apoha based on Sanskrit texts hitherto published has provided a foundational hypothesis of its historical development, distinguishing three main phases: 1. Dignāga (who is criticized by Uddyotakara and Kumārila), 2. Later Buddhists, notably Śāntarakṣita, and 3. and Ratnakīrti (who criticizes Vācaspati).

As in the case of many other topics in Indian philosophy, the most important pioneering work for philological and historical research on *apoha was carried out by Frauwallner [1932-37]. His series of articles "Beiträge zur Apohlehre" elucidated the *apoha theory of Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇavārttika (PV) I and Dharmottara’s *Apokapākaraṇa (AP). Frauwallner’s careful study is based on their Tibetan translations of these works. Sāṅkṛtyāyana discovered the original Sanskrit texts of PV, Manorathanandin’s *Pramāṇavārttikāṭkā (PVV) and Karṇakosāgar’s *Pramāṇavārttikāsāvyrtītka (PVSVT) in Tibet and published them in 1938, 1938-40 and 1943 respectively. He also reconstructed the Sanskrit text of Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇavārttikāsāvyrti (PVSV) based on its Tibetan translation and its commentary PVSVT. On the basis of Sanskrit manuscripts, Malvania and Gnoli published editions
of PVSV in 1959 and 1960 respectively.


Hattori’s Japanese translation with detailed annotation of the *apoha* chapter of Kumārila’s *Stikavārttikā* (SV) appeared in 1973-75. Since 1978 Akamatsu published a number of important articles clarifying the Buddhist theory of *apoha* both theoretically and historically. Ogawa [1981a][1981b] elucidates Jñānaśrīmitra’s theory of *apoha*. Concerning the criticism of the Buddhist theory of *apoha* by Nyāya scholars, Hattori [1979b][1980] studied Udyotakara’s *Nyāyavārttikā* (NV) and Akamatsu [1982] studied Jayanta’s *Nyāyamājanīrti* (NM), Bhāsarvajña’s *Nyāyabhaṃga* (NBhū), Vācasspatimitra’s *Nyāyavārttikatattvātātmanjīta* (NTVT) and Śridhara’s *Nyāyakandāda* (NK). Contrasting the *Vidhvādīn* and *Pratiṣedhavādīn*, Akamatsu [1986] concludes that the historical development of the Buddhist theory of *apoha* must have been as follows.

- **Digna (480-540)**
  - **Dharmakīrti (600-660)**
    - **Śantarakṣita (725-788)**
    - **Dharmottara (750-810)**
      - **Vidhvādīn**
      - **Pratiṣedhavādīn**
    - **Jñānaśrīmitra (980-1030)**
  - **Ratnakīrti (1000-1050)**

Katsura [1986][1988] reviews the ‘remarkable advancement’ of recent research on *apoha* and shows that it is time to reconsider Mookerjee’s hypothesis. His careful study of Jñānaśrīmitra’s theory of *apoha* demonstrates that the apparently new idea of Jñānaśrīmitra in fact stems from Dharmakīrti at least in germ, e.g. with regard to the simultaneous understanding of both affirmation and negation (cf. also Ogawa [1981a]).

The loss of the original Sanskrit texts of Dignāga’s *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (PS) V and Dharmottara’s AP is a major obstacle for us in attempting to proceed further in reconstructing the historical development of the *apoha* theory in detail. However, the gap can be filled in by carefully studying non-Buddhist texts. Kumārila criticizes Dignāga and Jayanta criticizes Dharmottara. Jayanta first depicts Kumārila’s criticism of *apoha* and thus provides us a summary in prose to understand Dignāga’s theory from the viewpoint of a severe opponent. The relevant portion has been critically reedited by the present author in Kataoka [2008]. Jayanta then reproduces the Buddhist refutation of Kumārila’s criticism clearly based on Dharmottara’s PA; as Cakradhara’s commentary NMGBh (132.24: *jñānārthābhyāṁ anya eveti dharmottaraḥ*) and modern studies such as Frauwallner [1937] and Hattori [2006] demonstrate. This is the portion that is reedited in the present article.

It is noticeable that previous research has a tendency to see the whole history of *apoha* from the viewpoint of the latest theorists such as Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti. Needless to say, however, it has to be borne in mind that these scholars were engaged in refuting their own opponents such as Vācaspāti and Sutarīta (the latter is referred to as *kaumārīla*). They have their own motivation that is quite different from their predecessors such as Dharmakīrti, who must have been targeting his own opponents in the seventh century. Dharmottara’s old view that was once most influential is discarded by Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti by pointing out that his theory ‘is supported neither by ordinary people, tradition nor philosophers’ (JNIĀ 229.16-17: *alabhikam anagaman atarkataśyam*) and labeling him simply as *pratiṣedhavādīn* (RNĀ 54.4). Jayanta’s perspective provides us with another look at the history and motives for various theories of *apoha*.

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1 For studies on PSV, see Hattori [2000:138].
his view could indeed be classified as the second, according to Jayanta’s scheme. One should perhaps also take into consideration that Sāntaraksitī was rarely referred to in brahmansical texts. There is no hint in NM that Jayanta knows TS.\(^6\)

Dignāga, Kumārila and Dharmakīrti

A noun such as ‘cow’ denotes a universal (jāti) or an entity qualified by a universal (ātmat). Dignāga criticizes these and other brahmansical views by replacing the universal with ‘exclusion of other things’ (anyāpōka) or ‘being excluded from other things’ (arthakāramārttīti). According to Dignāga, a word denotes an entity qualified by the exclusion from other things (sabdo ‘arthakāramārttītisāgat eva bhavān aha).\(^5\)

Kumārila captures the parallel structure between the two views. Namely, both views presuppose a qualified entity. Therefore Dharmakīrti correctly designates the theory of apōka as criticized by Kumārila as tadeśaṃpāka (PV I 64, see below).

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{jāti} & \quad \text{anyāpōka} \\
\text{dravya} & \quad \text{bhāva}
\end{align*}
\]

As Jayanta’s description of the first view ‘abhāsavāda’ suggests, Kumārila first reinterprets Dignāga’s apōka as being equivalent to an external nonexistent (abhāva)

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4 Cf. also Hattori [2006:68]: “But Jayanta makes no mention of the responses to and counter-criticism of Kumārila’s criticism by Dharmakīrti, Sāntaraksitī and Kamalaśīla. It is to be surmised that this was perhaps because in late ninth-century Kashmir, where he lived, the main current of Buddhist philosophy was represented by the thought of Dharmottara, who had also been active in Kashmir, but for the moment I wish to refrain from being any more explicit in this regard.”

5 PSV ad V 364 (quoted in PVSV 62.27-63.1).

6 SV apōka 1: aṣṭamyathītāṃ sānāyaṇaṃ vācyam yāt parādāpāṇam/ gotanāṃ vāṣṭa eva tair uktam aṣṭāyām aṣṭamāṃ padaṃ/ “It is clear that the [Buddhists] who postulate a universal ‘exclusion from non-cows’ as being expressed [by the word ‘cow’] are referring precisely to the real entity ‘cowness’ with the word ‘exclusion of non-cows’.”
and severely criticizes it by making the point that the alleged <not non-cows> (exclusion from non-cows, aformatter) is nothing but cowness (gottvā). Double negation of a cow comes to be the same as affirmation of a cow, as is pointed out by Kumārila in the opening verse of the apoha section of the Ślokavārttika.9 The ontological status of apoha and of anya are now questioned. As Hattori [1975:24][2006:68] points out7 and Akamatsu [1980][1986:70] explicitly claims, one can regard Dharmakīrti’s apoha-theory as a reply to Kumārila. See, for example, Dharmakīrti’s reply to a criticism of just the kind which is made by Kumārila.

PV I 64 (34.17-18):

tenāyāpohāvasaye tadbhāvopapavaranam/
pratyābhikātāṃ prthivāt kai syād duṣo jātiadibutoh/

Therefore, concerning the object (i.e. locus) of exclusion of other things, the [opponent’s] explanation of the [Buddhist] view of tadbhāvā (a locus qualified by apoha) is refuted, for if [apoha and its locus were] different, the problem that applies to [the non-Buddhist view of] universal and its locus would apply [similarly to the Buddhist view of apoha].

As Jayanta correctly paraphrases in section 1 of the present edition, Dharmakīrti points out his opponent’s misunderstanding of apoha as being an external entity <nonexistent> (abhāvā) separate from its locus. Indeed, Dignāga’s way of presenting apoha is vulnerable to Kumārila’s criticism.8

The problem of double negation pointed out in ŚV apoha v. 1 and v. 97 is one of the most serious objections to which the Buddhists must respond.10 As Kumārila points out in v. 97 and Jayanta clarifies in section 5 in Kataoka [2008:185], because other things such as horses to be excluded, are also essentially an apoha and therefore a kind of nonexistent (abhāvā), the apoha, i.e. abhāvā, that is different from abhāvā, would be a positive entity. In other words, apoha that is different from abhāvā, would be nothing but existent (bhāvā).

abhāvā, = apoha + anya (= apoha = abhāvā.)

On the other hand, if the apoha is not different from other things to be excluded, a cow would be equal to non-cows. These and other problems that Kumārila has pointed out in ŚV come out from his wrong assumption that apoha is a separate entity <nonexistent>. In other words, Kumārila presupposes the tadbhāvia view and thereon

9 In this regard, remarks by Mookerjee [1935] and Katsura [1986] are both to be reconsidered. Mookerjee [1935(1967): 131]: “There are indications which warrant us to suppose that Dignāga put forward the theory of apoha as a pure negation without any positive reference and his theory came in for ruthless animadversion first in the hands of Uddyotakara and then of Kumārila.” Katsura [1986:171]: “Further, if we look into the works of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, it is rather difficult to regard them as pure Negativists. A fragment of Dignāga quoted by Dharmakīrti, “A portion of the real object is known through the exclusion of the other object; a linguistic term (śabda) expresses the object qualified by the negation of the other objects,” even shows a close affinity to the Snyanvāṣṭika theory.” (underlined by Kataoka) Katsura’s objection to Mookerjee, especially concerning the misleading passage ‘without any positive reference’, can be partly justified, because Dignāga accepts a positive entity qualified by apoha. But Katsura misses the point of ‘pure negation’. As Jayanta describes, Kumārila assumes that Dignāga’s apoha is nothing but abhāvā distinct from its locus. This is the ‘pure negation’. Whatever Mookerjee really intends with the word ‘pure negation’ here, it seems to me that Kumārila correctly captures Dignāga and that therefore Dharmakīrti gives up holding Dignāga’s view that he designates tadbhāvā. It is true, as Katsura assumes, that the basic structure remains the same for Dignāga, Jñānāṣṭikā and Ratnakīrti (RNA 342. avatārāviniṣṭo viśūś sabdamun arthaḥ). But it does not mean that Dignāga’s view “shows a close affinity to the Synthetist theory; ‘Pure negation’, i.e. apoha as an external abhāvā distinct from its locus, and ‘pure Negativists’, i.e. pratisedhavāśtin, are to be distinguished as they belong to completely different contexts. One would fall into anachronism if one claimed that Dignāga already anticipated Jñānāṣṭikā’s synthetic theory that intends to overcome the defect of a śāntarāṣṭa, such as Sāntarāṣṭa, and a pratisedhavāśtin, such as Dharmottara.

7 See, for example, Hattori [2006:68]: “Dharmakīrti provides answers to several of the points raised in Kumārila’s criticism.”
8 See his translation of PV SV 34:19 yad abhāvā as “Ce que [Kumārila] dit”. (Akamatsu [1986:70])
applies the logic of double negation. But his presupposition is false according to Dharmakirti.

PVSV 32.15-17:

$tatvayy apy apo na vyatyay a vyanyaya eva vyatyay a, tatvayy ater nivartamanyaya tatbhavaaprasaagat, tatkha ca vyatyay a apy abhava, tasmad yaiva vyatyay a sa eva vyatyay a.$

Furthermore, with regard to ‘exclusion of the other’ (anyayopaha), it is not the case that exclusion (vyatyay a) and the excluded (vyatyay a) are absolutely different. For, [if they were different], the thing [such as a cow] that is [different and therefore] excluded from ‘exclusion of the other’ (tadvyatyay a) would be equal to the affirmation of the other. [To explain, a cow would be equal to a horse, because a cow is the double negation of a horse, i.e. a cow is not a non-horse.] And then even the exclusion [e.g. of a cow from a horse] would not occur [because a cow is equal to a horse]. Therefore exclusion is not different from the excluded.  

Dharmakirti explains a problem caused by this separation, probably modeling it on Kumārila’s criticism in v. 1 and partly in v. 97, in which Kumārila uses the logic of double negation. If vyatyay a (in tadvyatyay a) is different from vyatyay a, vyatyay a would be equal to tad, because vyatyay a is different from the negation of tad. Double negation of tad results in the affirmation of tad.

$vyatyay a = tad (=agau$h)$

$\Rightarrow$

vyatyay a

10 ŚV apoha 97: abhava ca ca yo bhavah sa cet tasmad vilakhyanah bhava eva bhava, no ced gaur agau$h te prasyayataev. “And if the negation, of a nonexistent, were different from the latter, it would be equal to an existent. If [it were] not [different], a cow would be equal to a non-cow for you.”

11 Cf. a translation by Ōta (1979:80).


Against this criticism, Dharmakirti makes it clear that exclusion (apo$h, niyay a, vyatyay a) is ontologically not different from the excluded (niyay a, vyatyay a).

$niyay a \sim \text{ anya}$

$\Rightarrow$

niyay a

As Jayanta makes clear in the opening section 1 of the present edition when describing a Buddha view that is most probably attributed to Dharmakirti,13 apo$h is not an external nonexistent (abhava) but only an internal cognition itself (antararjñāna). Conceptual cognition grasps its own part (svatman) and does not operate towards something external. Sucarita specifies it as jñānākara and Ratnakirti more correctly bahiradhyasto vikalpabuddhyākara (RN 55.1).

The Buddhist view of apo$h as jñānamāśa

It is perhaps necessary to examine whether the view of jñānamāśa referred to by Jayanta can be attributed to Dharmakirti. In ŚV apo$h 38b Kumārila proposes a view that a form that appears in a cognition plays the role of universal as a real entity (sāmānayam vastuśṛṇam hi buddhyākara bhavisyati).14 Dharmakirti explicitly rejects this view of buddhyākara.

PVSV 40.3-5: $\text{evam tarhi buddheva pratibhāso jñānarūpatvāt sann eva sāmānayam. tan na yasmāt—jñānād ahyayāvān ca kathā arthāntaram vratet// (PV I 71cd)}$

(Q) Then the reflective image that precisely belongs to a cognition is a universal as it exists being essentially a cognition.

12 Cf. also section 2.3 in the present edition.

13 Hattori [2006:66] also attributes to Dharmakirti this view that Jayanta describes as abhāvyakītarva śaro$h (section 3.2 in the present edition).

14 See also Karpalagomin’s clarification in PVSV T 175 (ad PV I 71cd).

[Q:] It is true that a form in a cognition does not belong to [different] individuals. But [it operates as a universal] by superimposing the nature of those [individuals], i.e. by superimposing externality, to that appearance in a cognition. In this way, the daily activity of ‘generic’ is possible by error.

[D:] This is exactly [the view] that the [Buddhist] proponent accepts. Merely [there is a difference] that individuals which by nature have the same effect and which are excluded from [other things] not having the same effect are the cause of this kind of conceptual cognition. In this way, Dharmakīrtī accepts that this cognition [of a universal image] is based on exclusion of other things.

Kuṇakagomin admits that an internal image that essentially is part of cognition functions as a kind of universal. Śāntarakṣita also accepts a reflective image that appears in a cognition (TS 1005ab: jñāte bhāty arthapratisāmbhāyam; 1011ab: tadrāpatratisāmbhāya dhīyate). Kamalasila (TS 352.5-24) discusses in detail the difference of the Buddhist view from that of the buddhyakāravādin, i.e. Bhartṛjaya. a proponent who has the same view proposed by Kumārila in SV apoha 38ab, who accepts it as an absolute truth that an image in a cognition is the referent of a word.

TS 890 (352.5-24): apohavādiniḥ buddhyakāro bāhyaratpātaya grītataḥ sabartikā iti bhāsyata eva... buddhyakāravadina tu buddhyakarāḥ paramarthako vēya iṣyata iti mahānaṃ viśeṣāḥ.

[Opponent:] The [Buddhist] proponent of *apoha*, too, definitely states that an image in a cognition that is grasped as an external object is the meaning of a word. ...[Buddhist:] The [non-Buddhist] proponent of buddhyakāra claims that an image in a cognition is the referent [of a word] from the viewpoint of the absolute truth. Therefore there is a big difference [from the Buddhist view].

Opponents tend to simplify the Buddhist view and reduce *apoha* to buddhyakāra, an image that appears in cognition. But Buddhists emphasize that *apoha* is not accepted from the viewpoint of the absolute truth (*paramārthakaḥ*).\(^{10}\) Dharmakīrtī

--- 489 --- (10)

--- 488 --- (11)
and his followers do accept buddhakara, but only in the mundane level. Buddhakara plays the role of universal only practically. Thus, we can probably say that the second Buddhist view that Jayanta refers to is attributed to Dharmakirti and his followers before Dharmottara, at least by Buddhist logicians up until Sантaraksita. At least one can say that Jayanta understands Dharmakirtian view before Dharmottara as jñānaśīvāda in contrast to Dharmottara's aropitavāda.

Dharmottara's view

Dharmakirti clarifies that the demarcation between 'that' (tad) and 'other things' (anyā) to be excluded is determined from the viewpoint of their utility. That is to say, <other things> are those which do not have the same effect (atathārtha). Thus, according to Dharmakirti as is described by Jayanta's representation, <exclusion of other things> (anuvyāpa) is reinterpreted as <being excluded from those which do not have the same effect> (atathārtha atathārtha).

vikalpa → svāsa

niyata = niyatti ↔ anya (atathārtha)

This solution by Dharmakirti is not the final one. As Jayanta describes in section 2.4, then our conceptual cognition (vikalpa) evoked by a noun 'cow', which has only a vague image of cow, would become equal to direct perception (grahana). In other words, when we grasp exclusion (vyaërtti), we grasp the entity being excluded (niyata), too, because the two are not different from each other according to Dharmakirti's reinterpretation. Furthermore, as a certain opponent whom Jayanta refers to as kecana

A parallel discussion is found in Mookerjee [1935(1987): 112-113] and Ogawa [1999]. See, e.g. Ogawa [1999:283] “Thus, for the Vaiśyūkaraṇa, the word does have its object, directly a conceptual representation and indirectly Brahman. While for the Buddhist epistemologists the word never touches the reality, for the Vaiśyūkaraṇa it does in one way or another.”

and whom Dharmottara refers to in his Apohaprakaraṇa15 rightly points out, if we followed this view that one grasps the entity being excluded (vyāyarta-grahana-saśke), it would be necessary to simultaneously grasp the three items (trītraya-grahana): 1. the entity that is excluded from other things (vyāyarta); 2. the cause by which it is excluded (vyāyarta viśvyāyarta), namely, <not having the same effect> (atathārtha atathārtha); and 3. the other things from which it is excluded (vyāyarta).

Contrary to Dharmakirti, Dharmottara separates the two, i.e. niyata and niyatti so that conceptual cognition and perception are distinct. Ontologically speaking, apoha is neither external nor internal (nāntar na bahār), but a certain image that is superimposed (āropitam kītīd ākāramātra) on an entity, as he proclaims in the opening verse of the Apohaprakaraṇa.16 It is unreal (nītattva) and false (ālka). In other words, the object of conceptual cognition is a shadow of an entity. Conceptual cognition (vikalpa) is colored only by the shadow of an entity (dṛṣṭa-āśraya) and not by the entity itself (dṛṣṭa-āśraya), and different from perception (darsana) with respect to their objects.

vikalpa → aropitakara=chaya=vyāyarti ↔ anya (atathārtha)

| darsana → | dṛṣṭa |

One can regards Dharmottara's unique view of apoha as being partly inspired by his teacher Aracā (ca. 710-770 AD). Aracā states that a form which functions as a kind of universal (sāmanyakaraṇa) is untrue (niśrṣṭa) and that it cannot be a reflective image of a conceptual cognition (vikalpa-pratibimba).
can propose that Dharmottara’s main motive to introduce a new view inspired by his
teacher is the concern that the old view of *vikalpatrītiṃbha* in fact cannot overcome
the defect that Dharmakīrti intends to avoid in PV I 71cd. Insofar as an internal image
is essentially part of cognition, it is real (vastūrapā) and remains to be an existent (sann
eva) and therefore cannot take the role of universal.

Dignāga, Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara

From the preceding investigation we can probably draw a historical development
of the theory of *apoha* up to Jayanta as follows.

1. **Dignāga**  → **Kumārila**
2. **Dharmakīrti**
3. **Śāntarakṣita**  → **Arcaṭa**  → **Dharmottara**  → **Jayanta**

Recapitulating the three Buddhist views that Jayanta describes, *apoha* is
ontologically defined as follows:

1. **Dignāga**: *apoha* = *abheya* (as interpreted by Kumārila)
2. **Dharmakīrti**: *apoha* = *budhyākāra*, *atathāyaparāyatita* (because *vyāvyāti* =
   *vyāvyāti*)
3. **Dharmottara**: *apoha* = *kaścid āropita abhāraḥ* (neither external nor internal)

Epistemologically, their theories of *apoha* as viewed by Jayanta can be described
as follows:

1. **Dignāga**: a word denotes an entity qualified by exclusion and thus operates
   externally.
2. **Dharmakīrti**: conceptual cognition grasps its own part (*svāṁsīa*) and thus
operates internally.

3. Dharmottara: conceptual cognition is colored by a shadow of an entity (driṣṭa-saccan) that is neither internal nor external.

It is evident that Jayanta makes clear the difference of the three views by distinguishing the three phases: external → internal → neither external nor internal. He also contrasts the latter two views which we can attribute to Dharmakīrti (and his subsequent followers) and Dharmottara respectively as ‘a path based on the appearance of itself’ (atmabhāyatigarbha saranī) and ‘a path based on the appearance of nonexistent’ (asatkhayātigarbha saranī), by using Maṇḍana’s scheme of classifying cognitive error (viḍharṇa).

Dharmakīrti: atmabhāyatigarbha saranī
Dharmottara: asatkhayātigarbha saranī

18 Not only Jayanta but also Dharmottara is conscious of the difference of his view from Dharmakīrti’s. An opponent in AP 587(238.22) criticizes Dharmottara’s final view by pointing out that his view of apoha as being untrue and false (aham po mad pa) contradicts Dharmakīrti’s statement in PVin II that assumes apoha as being saṃsārābhāsa, i.e. an internal image. PVin II 46.7: saṃsārābhāsa ‘hare ke rādhāyavasālayena pravartanāti. Of course Dharmottara justifies his view by reinterpreting Dharmakīrti’s statement. But this shows that Dharmottara implicitly criticizes Dharmakīrti. As Jayanta correctly captures, there is a clear and substantial difference between Dharmakīrti’s and Dharmottara’s views. But Frauwallner [1937] finds no substantial difference between the two. Frauwallner [1937:290, n.1]: “Den Unterschied zwischen dieser allgemeinen, und der Lehre Dharmakīrtis hat Jayantibhajta gut hervorgehoben... Auch Dharmakīrti hatte nicht das Vorstellungsbléd an sich als Gegenstand der Vorstellungen bezeichnet, sondern nur insofern es nach außen verlegt erscheint. Aber Dharmottara hat die Verschiedenheit von der Erkenntnis als solcher sicher hervorgehoben, wenn er auch, wie seine Darstellung zeigt, den Zusammenhang zwischen Erkenntnisbild und Gegenstand der Vorstellung nie aus dem Auge verloren hat. Über die tatsächlichen Verhältnisse bestand also keine Meinungsverschiedenheit. Nur in der Art, wie sie aufgefaßt und ausgedrückt wurden, liegt der Unterschied.” Frauwallner’s observation that dismisses the sharp contrast between the two views is in contrast with Jayanta’s understanding of the historical development of apoha.

A Critical Edition of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta’s Nityamāhārti:

From the perspective of Jayanta at least, Dharmakīrti regards apoha as an extension of internal cognition itself that appears as if external being influenced by various residual impressions (§3.2), whereas Dharmottara denies any kind of existential possibility of apoha (§3.1). It exists neither internally nor externally. It is a certain image merely superimposed. It is an appearance of nothing (asatkhya).

The appropriateness of the name ‘exclusion’

Whereas the negative term ‘apoha’ (exclusion) is suitable in Dignāga’s view, it is not necessarily so in the latter two views. Therefore, it is necessary for them to show how the negative name fits in its referent. Dharmakīrti presupposes apoha as an extension of internal cognition. This is not a negative entity but positive. It would be proper for him to say that the cognition produced by hearing “cow” has cognition itself as its object. Dharmottara presupposes apoha as a certain superimposed image that is neither external nor internal and that is neither existent nor nonexistent. His view would imply that the object of conceptual cognition is a superimposed image and not exclusion. How could the expression ‘exclusion’ as the object of a noun or ‘exclusion as the object of conceptual cognition’ fit in? According to Jayanta’s description of Dharmottara’s view (§2.4, 2.6, 2.8), the negative term ‘exclusion’ is used not on the basis of our actual feeling (pratisamstānaḥ), but it is a figurative usage (apacara) applied only symbolically (vy ukti). This is a usage by analytic scholars (nitiṣaṇaḥ, nyāyaḥ) and not ordinary people in everyday activity (nayakṣvara). Jayanta’s explanation of the other view is simpler. The usage is based on ‘the connection with the shadow of exclusion’ (§3.2: vy ukti tīcchayogātmak).

The problem of activity (prāṇāti)

The apoha theory denies a non-Buddhist view that conceptual cognition has an external entity as its object (pratibhāva). But our activity deals with an external entity and not exclusion. Therefore it is necessary to explain how people who have undertaken action (prāṇāti) will obtain an external entity (västumāpāti). Buddhists have to explain the gap between the object of conceptual cognition and that of activity.
Jayanta’s manner of description reveals that there are two different views inside Buddhism, probably one attributed to Dharmakirti and the other to Dharmottara.

Dharmakirti: drṣṭya- arabhāvyavāsāyaḥ → pravṛtti
Dharmottara: drṣṭya- vikaraṇam → pravṛtti

Dharmakirti holds that combining the seen and the conceptualized (drṣṭya- vikaraṇam) is the cause of activity. In other words, the cause is the determination of oneness (abheda- śyavāsāya). Dharmottara reinterprets this ‘making one’ (vikaraṇa), ‘ascertainment of oneness’ (abheda- śyavāsāya) or ‘determination of non-object as an object’ (anarthaka- ‘rṇādyavasāya) as being equivalent to ‘non-determination of distinction’ (bheda- śyavāsāya) (§ 4.1, 4.4). The cause of activity, according to Dharmottara, is not positive ascertainment of oneness but only the lack of distinction between the seen and the conceptualized. As Jayanta correctly surmises out, one can perhaps suggest that Mañḍana’s description of the Prabhakara view of cognitive error (bhrānti) that error is in fact not an error but a mere lack of distinction (bheda- śyavāsāya, vikaraṇa, abhyādsya) has influenced Dharmottara’s view of bheda- śyavāsāya.

An additional manuscript consulted in the present edition

In addition to a Devanāgarī manuscript A, and a Malayālam manuscript K, I consult yet another manuscript Z, written in Sāradā script, for the present edition.

Abbreviations and conventions

For the abbreviations and conventions used in the present edition, see my previous editions of selected portions of the Nyāyasaṅgīta, Kataoka [2003b] [2004] [2005] [2007a] and [2008].

Acknowledgment

I thank Dominic Goodall, S.A.S. Sarma and Harunaga Isaacson for their help in obtaining copies of manuscripts. I am indebted to the following libraries and institutes for giving me permission to consult manuscripts: The Ganganatha Jha Kendriya Sanskrit Vidya Peetha, Allahabad; the Malayalam Department of the University of Calicut, Calicut; the Oriental Research Library, Srinagar. Last but not least I am much obliged to Harunaga Isaacson, Toshikazu Watanabe and Alex Watson for their comments on my final draft.

Correction to Kataoka [2008]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Printed text</th>
<th>Correct text</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>p. 1, 1.5</td>
<td>only upto v. 38</td>
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<td>p. 9, 11.16-17</td>
<td>śābreya śābaleya</td>
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<td>p. 9, 1.23</td>
<td>bāhuleyaḍīguś</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p. 28, 1.2</td>
<td>अपोहातमनः</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*1 thank Yasutaka Muroya for the correction of these two errors.

I adopt a variant reading. Accordingly change the order of variant readings in the apparatus.

Abbreviations and Bibliography (see Kataoka [2008] for those unmentioned here)

AP: Dharmottara’s Apokāraparipa. See the Tibetan text edited in Frauwallner [1937].
A Critical Edition of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta’s Nyāyamañjīrti:


Kajiyama, Yûichi 1960: "Ratnakirti no Apoharon." *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies,* 8-1, 76-83.


Synopsis

1. Apoha antaro jñaāśātmātī paksāḥ
2. Apoha nāntaro na bābha iti paksāntaram
   2.1 āropitavatam
   2.2 jñānoparaṇājatvam
   2.3 vyāvyāśtiadavat bhedābhedaśacācā
   2.4 vyāvyāśtiśayatvasamātirjanām

2.5 saujātyāvyāśātyaparāvṛtti
2.6 apohatvopacāraḥ
2.7 rūpapatrayām
   2.7.1 bhāvābhāvasadharṣāvatam
   2.7.2 niyatarūpāvatam
   2.7.3 bāhāyāropitayāḥ sādṛśyam
2.8 anyāpohāśīśayatvam
3. Baudhāvatadvayopasūnyāraḥ
   3.1 asatheyātygarbhaḥ sarāṇītṛṣṭaḥ
   3.2 atmyayātygarbhaḥ sarāṇītṛṣṭaḥ
4. Pravṛttiṣyupadānaṃ
   4.1 arthāvat
   4.2 bhedānadhyaasayāyāt pravṛttiḥ
   4.3 prāptyapadānaṃ
   4.4 laukikānām abhimānaḥ
   4.5 upasūryahāḥ
5. Apohasamārthanaṃ
[1 আঘাদ আন্তরে শানায়মুখি পক্ষঃ]

উচ্চতে—তন্ত্রবিবিধতবৈদিত্তযাত্রানামাভিধানম।

পরামার্থিকতযাত্রায়নন্দনিপাসিত।

নেহাগতার। সৃষ্টো দেবেন্দ্রচরি হেনালী।

যতে এই ব্যাখ্যাত্বার্থিত, ততে এবং স্থিয়রাজ কাল্পনিকাধী 

কিন্তু ভ্যামন্ত্র এবং আবার যথার্থ শিক্ষামূলক থেকে।

[2 অপহরণ নান্দরো ন বাঙাল ইতি পক্ষান্তরঃ]

চতুর্দিকে নালিস্ত। নায়োমান্ত্রো ন বাঙাল যোগসং কিন্তু জ্ঞানাধার—

থেকে যাবলি কেয়রো স্বাধীনতা কিন্তু জ্ঞানাধার

[2.1 আরামিততম]

নন্দ বিদ্বান ভাবে—পরমার্থ তত্ত্বে বিদ্বান এবং এই শাব্দিক উপহরে।

পরামুখিকতায়নন্দনিপাসিত।

নেহাগতার। সৃষ্টো দেবেন্দ্রচরি হেনালী।

যতেই এই ব্যাখ্যাত্বার্থিত, ততে এবং স্থিয়রাজ কাল্পনিকাধী 

কিন্তু ভ্যামন্ত্র এবং আবার যথার্থ শিক্ষামূলক থেকে।

[2.2 আন্তরপ্রজ্ঞক চরণঃ]

নন্দ বাঙাল এবং আন্তর্গত আন্তর্ক্রম আন্তর আন্তর শাব্দিকতার ব্যাখ্যা ও কমিন্টি।

নন্দেই দৃশ্যমাত্রায়নন্দরকাঃ। উচ্চতে—দৃশ্যমাত্রায়নন্দরকাঃ।

নন্দেই দৃশ্যমাত্রায়নন্দরকাঃ।

নন্দেই দৃশ্যমাত্রায়নন্দরকাঃ।

নন্দেই দৃশ্যমাত্রায়নন্দরকাঃ।

নন্দেই দৃশ্যমাত্রায়নন্দরকাঃ।
2.3 व्यावृत्तितत्त्वमेंदेखियाँच्या
नन्द व्यावृत्तितत्त्वमेंदेखियाँच्या तथा व्यावृत्तितप्रचलित स्वतंत्रत्व ते
देखियाँच्या व्यावृत्तितप्रचलित स्वतंत्रत्व स्वतंत्रत्व ते
 देखियाँच्या व्यावृत्तितप्रचलित स्वतंत्रत्व स्वतंत्रत्व ते

5 नेत्रदेखावा. न विकल्पावंत्तु व्यावृत्ति गृहस्वात्त। न च पारमाथिकी
की व्यावृत्ति। अपि तु किंवलेक्षित आचार। वास्तवतः हि

1 तच्च व्यावृत्तिसमाज | Nyāyamaṇjarigranthihīnga 133.5: तच्च भक्त (इ) मद्दता।
2 इत्यदित् | See Nyāyamaṇjarī H 6.10–11: तत्परताविवस्तु विकल्पम्: व्यावृत्ति
एव तत्परताविवस्तु विकल्पम्: व्यावृत्ति
3 व्यावृत्तिसमाज | Nyāyamaṇjarigranthihīnga 133.6: व्यावृत्तिसमाज
-वती

5 नन्द ते देखियाँच्या | Cf. Pramāṇavārttikavārttī 32.15–17: तत्साधनसाधनें
न व्यावृत्तितप्रचलित एव व्यावृत्ति: तत्साधनसाधनें
तथा तच्च व्यावृत्तिसमाजः तत्साधनसाधनें एव व्यावृत्ति
9 अपि तु किंवलेक्षित आचार: | Nyāyamaṇjarigranthihīnga 133.9: अपि

tु किंवलेक्षित आचार। वास्तवतः हि
নান্দনকারীয়ের চার তৃতীয় অংশ

নন্দনকারীর প্রথম অংশ

নন্দনকারীর দ্বিতীয় অংশ

নন্দনকারীর তৃতীয় অংশ

নন্দনকারীর চতুর্থ অংশ

নন্দনকারীর পঞ্চম অংশ

নন্দনকারীর ষষ্ঠ অংশ

নন্দনকারীর সপ্তম অংশ

নন্দনকারীর অষ্টম অংশ

নন্দনকারীর নবম অংশ

নন্দনকারীর দশম অংশ

নন্দনকারীর অ্যান্ডাট অংশ
भाषास्थ यूँ वस्तुन्तः स्वरूपार्थिवतः न विकल्पातर्भोपनिशिविशिवाभावापेक्षा नियतरूपः बाञ्चार्यसदुप्रयते। न चेष्टा रूपवयति वाङ्ग्र वस्तुनि युजयते।

[2.7.3 बाङ्गारीपियोऽसः गौरायम्]
बाङ्गारीपियोऽसः गौरायम् “एकक्षरप्रक्ष्यसत्त्व” हति न्यायेन पीनरुक्तवाङ्ग्रज्ञिविशिवार्थः न्यायम्। अवान्हा चारोपितं

594(245).19–21: de'ī phiyir cig šos kyi rañ bzin gyis ston pa ṅid du rtogs pa'i 'nan par rtog pa ni ṅes pa'i don rtogs par byed pa yin no//; Nyaya-
mañjarigranthibhaṅga 133.16–17: गौरिवायसित्ति या नियतरूपत्ति गृहीतात: सा अन्यत्वच्छेदमन्तरेण नैति यदि उक्तं ततः।
2 अन्यथा नियतपरिच्छेदमन्तरेण | Nyaya-maṇjarigranthibhaṅga 133.15–16: अन्यथा नियतपरिच्छेदमन्तरेण विभावित। वस्तुवर्यवच्छेदमन्तरेण गृहित:।
2 विनिर्विधं च वस्तु न गृहिताः | Nyaya-maṇjarigranthibhaṅga 133.18: सिद्धं च वस्तु न गृहिताः।
5 एकक्षरप्रक्ष्यसत्त्वः | Pramāṇavārttika I 43: एकक्षरप्रक्ष्यसत्त्व: स्वयम्। को न्याय न द्वृत्तः भाग: स्वयम: प्रायः: परिधिः॥; this is also quoted in NM II 13.14–15 and NM I 239.12–13.

दे किंन्दिपि भनन् “अयोध्” [ MVA,Z1; ] किंकस्मि न्यूसयमसयासचः K1 ।
1 संबावासान्तकः [ M⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰⁰̄ 467 — 32

— 467 — (33)
वृत्तिच्छायायोगादेशाद्विधयुक्ते उच्चयते — इतियमसत्त्यातिगभूमि सर्वरणिः।

[3.2 आत्मसत्यातिगभूमि सर्वरणिः]
अथ तथा विकल्पप्रतिविकल्पक ज्ञानारुपमेव तद्विकल्पक सिद्धि कल्पनेत्रतं विचित्रबयोगादेशाद्विधा लोकयात्राः सिद्धिः।
वृत्तिच्छायायोगात्मक तद्विकल्पक इति व्यवहितंते। संयमसत्त्यातिगभूमि सर्वरणिः।

1 तद्विकल्पकभावते ] Cf. Dharmottara’s Apohaprañcatana 593(244).25-28: 
 गात यावं मि बुध पां राह भिंं स्तन पां नूर्म पर रोग पर भूषि रो 'द्रा भार' 
 कइ तस्म पर ऐ टार 'सजर ते'।
 5 विभिन्न हो विचित्र तथा सिद्धायोगादेशाद्विधा लोकयात्राः सिद्धिः।

1.8 आत्मसत्यातिगभूमि]]
2.2 आत्मसत्यातिगभूमि]]
3.1 आत्मसत्यातिगभूमि सर्वरणिः]]
5.6 आत्मसत्यातिगभूमि]]
6.6 आत्मसत्यातिगभूमि]]

1 'सत्यमसत्यातिगभूमि' न्यायामानीजग्रहितं बालं 134.6: 'सत्यमसत्यातिगभूमि]
1 'सत्यमसत्यातिगभूमि' बालं 134.6: 'सत्यमसत्यातिगभूमि]
1 'सत्यमसत्यातिगभूमि' बालं 134.6: 'सत्यमसत्यातिगभूमि]
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1 'सत्यमसत्यातिगभूमि' बालं 134.6: 'सत्यमसत्यातिगभूमि]
1 'सत्यमसत्यातिगभूमि' बालं 134.6: 'सत्यमसत्यातिगभूमि]
নন্দনামাণি | Nyāyamaṇiārjunaṁbhāṅga 134.8: নন্দনামাণিপতি। যত দু-দুর্বলকারী প্রকারের বিজ্ঞানে যে সম্প্রদায়ে স্বর্গীয় মানুষের বিকাল্যায় বিকাল্যায় বিকাল্যায় এর প্রতিপাদ।

নন্দনামাণি | Nyāyamaṇiārjunaṁbhāṅga 134.5-6: বিজ্ঞানের প্রাচীন সময়ে বিকাল্যায় বিকাল্যায় বিকাল্যায় এর প্রতিপাদ।

নন্দনামাণি | Nyāyamaṇiārjunaṁbhāṅga 134.5: বিজ্ঞানের প্রাচীন সময়ে বিকাল্যায় বিকাল্যায় বিকাল্যায় এর প্রতিপাদ।

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[4.3 प्रायोगिकाद]  
प्राविष्टा । दृष्टयिर्विवर्तिकिकSwarupagati, परंपरा, । तथ्य-कथावत्त - 
तकायां विषयवन्ध्या । दृष्टयिर्विवर्तिकिक, ततो विकल्पः, ततः पुत्र्वित्तिर। ।
अथे हि मूलबन्धनमुपलयन प्रवर्णमात्माजीता । अपरकरमिः -
तमणिर्वित्तात्यं कृत्तीकाविवर्तिकितां विभावयं मणिवुल्क्य प्रव -
वर्तमानः । यथु तु मूले व्यवस्थं नास्ति, तत्र यात्राहृत्विवर्तमानो विवर्तित्यथे एव, विप्रभावितां प्रववर्तमानः ।

1 दृष्टयिविवर्तिकिक] Pramāṇavārttikasavṛtti itikā 171.6-7: नार्घ्विकल्पः, तथा दृष्टयिविवर्तिकिक।
5 अपरकर्म:- ... प्रवर्तनान: | Pramāṇavārttikasavṛtti 43.3-5: तत्तत्रित -
बद्वत्तानां किलकत्तानामत्तत्तिताभिस्मृयं पदे वनमालस्वत्वं: मणिप्रभावितां मणिद्वितीयः।
Pramāṇavārttika 181: तत्तत्रित वनमालस्वत्वं वंदकालेनमिति यथः। नार्घ्विकल्पः पदे किलकत्तानां मणिद्वितीयः।
Pramāṇavārttikasavṛtti itikā 191.13-16: किलकत्तानां मणिद्वितीयः। नार्घ्विकल्पः पदे
किलकत्तानां मणिद्वितीयः। तथा किलकत्तानां मणिद्वितीयः। नार्घ्विकल्पः पदे
किलकत्तानां मणिद्वितीयः।

[4.4 लोकिकानामत्तिता:  
एवं बाह्यस्व शृंखलानिगुणिनुमस्तितेन विकल्पस्य समुपसवितेषु “बाह्यस्य श्रोवः वा यया प्रतित तिरा; 
तत्च च च चर्च काचास्य प्रास:” इत्यभिन्नति न वयमानीवसायनमुलः। तथे तथा “वयमानीवसायनमुलः। 
5 यथायथसायनम्:  | Nyāyamañjarigranthibhāṣa 134.10: यथायथसायिनी -
मूले बहीरप्रत्यायायथसायनां दोषाहीरप्रत्यायायथसायनां। नस्यायायथसायनसि। 
5 यथायथसायनः  ... चालावणिवर्तमानः] Dharmottara's Apoapakaraṇa 588(239.18-20: जी लार और एक दि खो नास्ति मा यिन पा प्रियर ला/ दि खो नास्ति क्या नि ला बात दु मा यिन पा प्रियर फो रो जेन ब्यो।
NM 1.63-15: तयहे भवितः ... यथायथसायनम् (वत्कालः) में; तदन्तः यथाययसायनम्। तथा चालावणिवर्तमानः। 
6 यथायथसायनः  | Nyāyamañjarigranthibhāṣa 134.11-12: वयमानीवसायनम्। यथायथसायनम्। 
प्रतिभास्य इति। अंगहि यथायथसायनम्। यथायथसायनम्। तथा चालावणिवर्तमानः। 
6 यथायथसायनः  ... चालावणिवर्तमानः] Pramāṇaśīrṣa 46.7-8: वयमानीवसायन प्रवर्तितात्मकम् नास्तित्वादस्याप्रत्यायायथसायनोऽवविनविननि -

dharmaNarcara’s Apoapakaraṇa 587(238.22-23: जी न्यायदंदुनिजिकाः 71.5: 
तथायथसायनम्। वयमानीवसायनम्। तथायथसायनम्। तथायथसायनम्। तथायथसायनम्।
པད་པཐོབ་པས་གཞི་ལ་བསྟེན་པོ། ལ་དེ་ེན་ཤིང་ཡུལ་ཐིང་བཞི་བཞི་ཞིང་
གསར་ཤེས། ལེགས་པ་ལྟར་བསྐོད་པ།

[4.5 བསོད་ནམས་]
ཐེག་སྒྲ་མེད་ལོངས་པ་བསྤོད་པའི་བརྒྱུད་ནག་
ཐོབ་པ་ལོངས་པ་བཞི་བཞི་བཞི་ཞིང་

[5 འབྲོ་བོས་སྲིད་]
ཏང་མོ་དེ་ཞིང་ཐོབ་པ་ བཞི་བཞི་བཞི་བཞི་ཞིང་

1 བསྟོད་པོ། དེ་དང་། དོན་དངོས་ནི་དུས་ནང་བཞི་བཞི་བཞི་
ཞིང་ཡིན་པའི་བཞི་བཞི་བཞི་བཞི་ཞིང་

2 བསྟོད་པོ། དེ་དང་། དོན་དངོས་ནི་དུས་ནང་བཞི་བཞི་བཞི་
ཞིང་ཡིན་པའི་བཞི་བཞི་བཞི་བཞི་ཞིང་

3 བསྟོད་པོ། དེ་དང་། དོན་དངོས་ནི་དུས་ནང་བཞི་བཞི་བཞི་
ཞིང་ཡིན་པའི་བཞི་བཞི་བཞི་བཞི་ཞིང་

4 བསྟོད་པོ། དེ་དང་། དོན་དངོས་ནི་དུས་ནང་བཞི་བཞི་བཞི་
ཞིང་ཡིན་པའི་བཞི་བཞི་བཞི་བཞི་ཞིང་

5 བསྟོད་པོ། དེ་དང་། དོན་དངོས་ནི་དུས་ནང་བཞི་བཞི་བཞི་
ཞིང་ཡིན་པའི་བཞི་བཞི་བཞི་བཞི་ཞིང་
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