A Critical Edition of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī:
The Buddhist Refutation of āṇṭī

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**Introduction**

The portion of the *Nyāyamañjarī* edited in the present article is the beginning of the fifth āṇṭīka, the section in which Jayanta discusses word-meanings (padārtha), whereas in the sixth āṇṭīka he discusses sentence-meanings (vākyārtha). The aim of the entire fifth āṇṭīka is to refute the Buddhist idea of arthāsaṃsparsīta, i.e. the view that words do not touch or contact (i.e. refer to) real entities, and to establish the Naiyāyika view that words refer to things qualified by universals (jātimat, tadvat)\(^1\). Buddhists deny the existence of universals (āṇṭī), i.e. generic properties (ādānya), and instead posit "exclusion of others" (anuvāpa) as the meaning of words. Therefore, Jayanta needs to refute anuvāpa before he can justify the existence of universals in this āṇṭīka. The present portion comprises two parts: Jayanta's introduction to the fifth āṇṭīka and his presentation of the Buddhist refutation of universals.

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1 After rejecting the Buddhist criticism (duṣṭaparicāra) and establishing (śādhanā) the brahmanical view that external reality (bāhyo ṛtakā) is the word-meaning, Jayanta further discusses in detail which of the three, āśrtya, syakti or jāti, is denoted by a word. NM II 47.7-8: evam siddhe bāhyo ṛtakāe nirastēru tadāpahārīru tatākatātaksāreṇa adhīnā vicārape gopaddāh kim āśrtya vācakāḥ, uta syaktēḥ, atkā jāti tītī. “Having established an external object and expelled the Buddhist robber who [tries to] take it away, now the following is examined: does the word ‘cow’ denote form, individual or universal?’
For more detailed information on the context of the present portion in the entire Nyāyamañjiri, see the introduction in Kataoka [2008]. Textual problems in the published editions such as the Vizianagaram edition and the Mysore edition are also discussed there. For a survey of research on apoha and its historical and theoretical development, see the introduction in Kataoka [2009]. A summary presented in Kataoka [2010] deals with Jayanta’s response to the Buddhist criticism of jāti and therefore is most relevant to the present portion edited here. In the following I confine myself to giving a summary of the present portion and discussing related problems.

Summary

Buddhists claim that linguistic items (sabda) do not touch real entities. To the contrary, brahmanical schools hold that linguistic items refer to real entities. As an a priori restriction, Jayanta limits the word under discussion to the domain of jātiśabda. In other words, when jātiṃati is claimed to be the meaning of a word, the “word” intended here is not just any word but only a jātiśabda. Jayanta assumes the following typology of linguistic items (§ 1.1–1.4).

sabda
1. pada
1.1. nāman (subanta), including upasarga, nipāta, karmapravacanīya
1.1.1. jātiśabda
1.1.2. dravyaśabda (NM II 64.8–16)

A locus that has a universal, i.e. the so-called tadvat (=jātiṃati) in the Nyāya school, is the meaning of a word. This is Naiyāyikas’ final view (§ 1.5.1). Buddhists attack the Naiyāyika view by pointing out that words do not touch reality because the universal (jāti) is not real and therefore there can be no such thing as a jātiṃati, i.e. what Naiyāyikas claim to be the meaning of a word (padārtha) (§ 1.5.3).

The Buddhists raise the following question: by what means is a universal (jāti) cognized? Perception (pratyakṣa), i.e. non-conceptual cognition (nirvikalpaka), cannot grasp it. The universal cowness is a generic property (sāmānyya) common to every cow. One cognizes cowness in such a way: “This is a cow.” “This is a cow.” Therefore, it is necessary to first connect several cows in order to cognize their generic property, i.e. the universal cowness. But perception, which is produced immediately after one turns the eye to the object, does not have this capacity of synthesizing (anusāmadhāna) several cows (§ 2.1–2.2). Nor does conceptual cognition subsequent to perception attest the existence of a universal, because conceptual cognition by its very nature does not have the ability of touching reality (§ 2.3). This also applies to inference (anumāna) and verbal testimony (sabda). Being conceptual, they do not touch reality (§ 2.4).

There is no such thing called a universal separate from individual objects. Only individuals (vyakti) exist. If cowness existed as separate from individual cows, it should be possible to observe it separately from individual cows (§ 3.1). Furthermore, a difference of place (desahedha) is not observed. Cowness, if it were different from cows, could be grasped at a locus different from the loci of cows (§ 3.2). Thus, it is impossible to grasp only cowness without cows. When a
cow is not cognized, cowness is not cognized either (§ 3.3). Therefore, cowness does not exist separately from individual cows.

After this comprehensive statement, the Buddhists proceed to examine and refute individual brahmanical views, i.e. the views of the Naiyāyikas (§ 4.1), the Vaiśeṣika (§ 4.2), the Prabhākara (§ 4.3), the Bhaṭṭas, in particular Kumārila (§ 4.5), and the Vedāntins (§ 4.6).

The Naiyāyikas explain the reason for the inseparability of universals from individuals by focusing on the particular way in which universals reside (eyṛti) in individuals, e.g. that cowness resides only in cows and not horses, etc. But what exactly is the mode of this residing (eyṛti) in individuals? If a universal as a whole (kārtityena) resides in a particular cow, it cannot reside in other cows. On the other hand, if it resides in each individual cow partially (ekadelenā), i.e. with a tiny part of cowness, no cow has the entire cowness. Furthermore, it is generally accepted that cowness does not have parts. Naiyāyikas may claim that cowness as a whole resides in a particular cow and simultaneously resides as a whole in another cow, too. But such a mode of residing has never been experienced in other cases and thus lacks the corroboration from similar examples (§ 4.1.1).

The Vaiśeṣika call this kind of relationship “inherence” (samavṛti) and consider it to be the relationship between a locus and its super-locus which are inseparably connected (ayyatasiddha). But a “relation” is possible between separate things and not inseparable things. For example, a man can have a relationship with a woman, but he cannot have a relationship with himself (§ 4.2.1). A substance (dravya) which inseparably possesses a quality (guna) is never observed separately from the quality (§ 4.2.2). The relationship which Vaiśeṣika technically calls ayutasiddhi is nothing but the state of being established as one (aikyena siddhiḥ). Therefore, by definition it cannot be a kind of relationship (sambandha) which takes place between two relata (§ 4.2.3). If a relation has not yet arisen (anispaṇṇa), it cannot have a relationship. But if it has already arisen (nipattata), it exists separately (yutasiddha) from the other relatum and cannot be regarded as inseparably connected (§ 4.2.4).

The Prabhākaras call the relationship between universals and individuals rūparāpitvalaksyāḥ sambandhaḥ, i.e. the relationship between rūpa and rūpin. But they cannot themselves clarify what exactly this rūpa is. It can neither be color, form, nor essence. They introduce only a new name without a substantial content (§ 4.3).

The omnipresence (sarvasarvasatva) of universals that all brahmanical schools accept is also problematic. Is a universal present literally in all things (sarvasarvasata) or only in every (relevant) individual (piṇḍasarvasata) (§ 4.4)? If cowness existed everywhere, even a white horse would be recognized as a cow. The theory of manifestation (abhivyakti) does not explain why cowness is made manifest only in cows. Because once cowness is made manifest by a particular cow, it ought to be observed everywhere and not just in the cow. It does not make sense to say that cowness is omnipresent although it is not grasped everywhere (§ 4.4.1). Nor is it the case that cowness exists only in individual cows. Before a particular cow is born, cowness did not exist there. But after it is born, it comes to exist. From where does this cowness come? It is accepted that universals are not subject to movement. The universal cowness cannot arrive at one particular cow after leaving another. Nor does it reside in each individual only partially (§ 4.4.2).

Kumārila holds a Jaina-like view that a single entity possesses two aspects: that of being generic (anugāmin), and that of being particular (vyārtta). He regards universals as being different-cum-non-different (bhinnābhinnā) from individuals. The cognition of a generic property (śāmānya-pratyaya) and the cognition of a particular (viśeṣa-pratyaya) are not erroneous (bhāranti). With regard to a single entity both cognitions take place without contradiction. Therefore, an entity has two aspects (dvayātma) that are grasped by perception (§ 4.5.1). This view of Kumārila is untenable, because it is contradictory to state that a single (eka) entity has many aspects (nāmārūpa). A single entity cannot be a generic property (śāmānya) and simultaneously a particular (viśeṣa) (§ 4.5.2). The cognition of a generic property cannot be non-conceptual but only conceptual. Therefore such a cognition must be an error (§ 4.5.3).

The Vedāntins, in particular the sattādvaiva-vādins, hold that perception at
first grasps mere existence (sadrūpa, sanmātra, sattā), and that subsequently the object is conceptualized as a pot, etc. But this goes against the fact that it is only after having grasped a particular (nastussvalakṣāna) that one grasps the generic property "existence" (sattā) (§ 4.6). As shown above, perception grasps only individuals (bheda) and not generic properties (sāṁanya) (§ 4.7).

A question is raised against the Buddhists who deny the existence of generic properties as to how they explain the cognition of a recurrence (anuvṛttapratyaya), e.g. the cognition of "cow" that we repeatedly have with regard to individual cows (§ 5). The Buddhists respond that they regard the cognition of recurrence as merely conceptual (vikalpmātra) and not based on real objects. They point out a good counter-example that demonstrates the conceptual nature of the cognition. We do have the cognition of "generic property (sāṁanya)" with regard to generic properties such as sattā, dravyatva and guṇatva. They are all recognized as "universals". As brahmanical theorists accept, however, it is not necessary to postulate universality that is common to all generic properties. In other words, generic properties do not have another, higher generic property, since the brahmanical schools themselves accept that "generic properties do not have a generic property" (niḥsaṁānyāni sāṁānyāni) (§ 5.1).

Uddyotakara and Kumārila, representative scholars of brahmanical schools, solved the problem of universality by introducing the notion that Jayanta calls upādhi, i.e. an accidental, external factor that causes people conceptually (and erroneously) to cognize universality. Uddyotakara introduced the notion of "inherence in many things" (anekārthasaṃsaṅgya). For example, both cowness and horniness inhere to many things, i.e. cows or horses. Therefore, they are cognized similarly as "universal". Kumārila introduced the notion of "producing a single cognition with regard to many" (bhinnesā ekadāṅkaranam) in addition to Uddyotakara’s idea that Kumārila calls "one thing residing in many" (ekasya bhinnesā uprātiḥ). But Buddhists rebut by applying the same reasoning to cowness. The cognition of "cow" is caused by an upādhi, not by cowness, with respect to individual cows in a similar way as the cognition of "universality" is caused by an upādhi with regard to generic properties. Thus, the Buddhists can explain the cognition of universals as caused by an upādhi and not by objective universals. They countermand the existence of universals by using the brahmanical notion of upādhi that originally was introduced by brahmanical theorists to solve the problem of universality. But what exactly is this upādhi for Buddhists? Dharmakīrti, clearly reworking Kumārila’s notion (2), replies that "producing a single effect" (ekārthahariprakārita) is the upādhi. For example, individual cows are cognized as "cow" because they produce the same effect such as carrying or milking (vāhadoḥdāī kāryam) (§ 5.2).

But the alleged single effect is not in fact single, because the effect of a particular cow is different from the effect of another cow. To this criticism the Buddhists reply by claiming that this is a case of upacāra or figurative expression operating due to the absence of distinction (bhedabuddhabhāvah). It is true that the effect of a particular cow is cognized as different from that of another cow. But it is not the case that the effect of a particular cow is cognized as different from that of another cow in a similar way that it is cognized as different from that of a particular horse. In other words, the two effects caused by the two cows can be cognized (figuratively) as the same due to the absence of distinction (§ 5.3).

Of course, brahmanical schools can still criticize the Buddhist view by pointing out that the two effects are different and not single. Dharmakīrti then satisfies the opponent by presenting a single perception (darsana) as the single effect. For example, the two cows produce the same perception in a perceiver’s mind (§ 5.4).

As Dharmakīrti already noticed, the perception is not in fact single but remains multiple, because the instance of perception is different with respect to each individual cow (pratītyaṃkhi bhinnam eva). Dharmakīrti solves the problem by introducing a single pratītsaṃsara or a single judgment (§ 5.5). Although instances of perception are multiple and not single, they have a single effect, i.e. a single judgment "cow". Through this single effect perceptions can be regarded as

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2 See Kataoka [2010:215(66)].
one. For example, people have the cognition of "cow" after perceiving a śāhuleya cow and similarly they have the same cognition of "cow" after perceiving a bāhuleya cow. Consequently, perceptions are regarded as non-different (abhedim) from each other because they produce a single judgment. And similarly, individual cows are regarded as non-different (abhinnatā) because they produce a single (non-different) perception. As shown above, it is not necessary to accept the existence of universals because the cognition of recurrent things (anuvrttabuddhi) can be explained as caused by the external factor upādhi (§ 5.5).

As is clear from the above summary, the Buddhists do not accept universals. But how do they explain the operation of words (śabda) and inferences (anumāna) without accepting universals (§ 6)? Words necessitate the prior grasping of the relationship between words and their meanings. Inferences necessitate the advance learning of the invariable concomitance between probans and probandum. But one cannot learn the relationship just by looking at individuals. First, with regard to all individuals, one cannot grasp the relationship, because there is an infinite number of individuals. Second, with regard to a limited number of individuals, it is useless to learn the relationship, because the relationship learned in this way cannot apply to the rest of individuals for whom the relationship is not yet learned. For words and inferential reasons, unless learned, do not produce proper cognition of meanings and probandum (§ 6.1).

The Buddhists reply: This sort of anxiety would occur if one believed that words and inferences operate with regard to particulars (svakāśaṇa). But it is not the case that they operate towards particulars, i.e. the objects of perception. Although their operation is not based on perceivable objects, it does not undesirably follow that words necessitate other words for learning them and that an inference requires another inference for learning it. There is no danger of infinite regress (anavasthā). They operate with regard to the object of conceptualization (nīkālāpiṣayasya vṛttīḥ), because, as explained above, they do not deal with real entities (avastuṇiṣayā) (§ 6.2).

Although Buddhists do not accept the real entity such as cowness that recurs in individual cows as the object of conceptualization, they can in this way explain the operation of words and inferences. Words and inferences operate towards "exclusion from non-X" (atadṛṣṭapaṇa-vṛttī), i.e. what Dignāga calls "exclusion of others" (anyāpoha). Ascertainings cognitions (nīcāya) have as their objects "exclusion from non-X" that does not exist externally but appears to be external (6.3).

Conceptual cognitions do not touch external entities. Their function is only to exclude a falsely attributed notion of non-X, thereby determining a cow as "This is not a non-cow" (āghur sa bhavati). A perceptual cognition has grasped the totality of the object's aspects and therefore no room is left for a subsequent, conceptual cognition. These deal only with exclusion and serve to refute (nīṣedhāya) a superimposed form (samāropitākāra) caused by error (bhrama) (§ 6.4).

Brahmanical theorists might deny the Buddhist view, and instead suggest that an object has many qualifiers (vīśeṣaṇa) as its properties, and that only one of them that has not been grasped by a previous cognition, is freshly grasped by a subsequent, conceptual cognition. In this way they claim that conceptual cognitions touch real entities, i.e. qualifiers. But Dharmakīrti rejects this view of the qualifier and the qualified by examining the relationship between the contributive capacity (upakārasakti) and the contributed (upakāra). According to the opponents, a locus object has many qualifiers. Therefore they have to accept that these qualifiers contribute to the locus by means of some capacities (ṣakti). But the locus is not seen as separate from the contributive capacities that its qualifiers have. Therefore the locus is not distinct from the capacities. But if the locus is not distinct from the capacities, a subsequent, conceptual cognition has no fresh qualifier to grasp because the object has been grasped by perception as embedded with all qualifiers. Thus, one must conclude that conceptual cognitions and words operate towards exclusion (apoha) and not real entities (§ 6.5).
Consulted editions and manuscripts

In the present edition the Srinagar manuscript Z1 used in Kataoka [2009] [2010] is omitted, because it does not contain the present portion. But another manuscript designated here as O1 is added.


M\textsuperscript{40} Variants reported in M as ka, a paper manuscript preserved in the Oriental Research Institute, Mysore, according to the prastâvanâ of the first volume. This must be identical with O1 below. But it is not always the case that its reported variants are identical with those of O1. It is also possible that the designation ka is sometimes confused with those of other manuscripts. For example, kha is wrongly printed as ka.

M\textsuperscript{40} Variants reported in M as kha, a published text (mudritakosa) which can be identified either with V or S (the latter is basically a copy of V\textsuperscript{43}).

M\textsuperscript{24} Variants reported in M as ga, a transcript owned by Ātmakûru Dîksâcârya, according to the prastâvanâ in the first volume.

M\textsuperscript{24} Variants reported in M as gha, a manuscript preserved in the Adyar Library, according to the bhûmikâ of the second volume.

M\textsuperscript{24} The editor's own corrections given in the end of the second volume as sodhanika.


A\textsubscript{1} A manuscript preserved in the Ganganatha Jha Kendriya Sanskrit

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K\textsubscript{1} A manuscript preserved in the Malayalam Department of the University of Calicut, No. 2602. Malayalam script. Palm leaf. 188 folios\textsuperscript{40}. Incomplete.

O\textsubscript{1} A manuscript preserved in the Oriental Research Institute, Mysore, No. C1374. Devanâgarî. Paper. Complete. 292 folios.

The relationship between A\textsubscript{1} and O\textsubscript{1}

The Allahabad manuscript A\textsubscript{1} and the Mysore ORI manuscript O\textsubscript{1}, both paper manuscripts written in Devanâgarî script, share many mistakes. For example:

\texttt{sutra-} MVK\textsubscript{1}; \texttt{tatra-} A\textsubscript{1}O\textsubscript{1}

\texttt{-dyava-} MVK\textsubscript{1}; \texttt{-dyava-} A\textsubscript{1}O\textsubscript{1}

\texttt{jatiḥ} MVK\textsubscript{1}; \texttt{matiḥ} A\textsubscript{1}O\textsubscript{1}

\texttt{jâñâyâm} MVK\textsubscript{1}; \texttt{tâyâm} A\textsubscript{1}O\textsubscript{1}

\texttt{tad eva nityâm} MVK\textsubscript{1}; om. A\textsubscript{1} O\textsubscript{1} (eyeskip)

It is probably not the case that one of them is the direct parent of the other.

O\textsubscript{1} has an additional mistake that A\textsubscript{1} does not have. In other words, it is unlikely that O\textsubscript{1} is the direct parent of A\textsubscript{1} (O\textsubscript{1} → A\textsubscript{1}).

\texttt{yathâhā} MVK\textsubscript{1} K\textsubscript{1}; \texttt{yathâhā bhaṭṭaḥ nânistâppatva sambamâho nispatav yulasiddhateti} yathâ O\textsubscript{1}

Nor is it likely that A\textsubscript{1} is copied by O\textsubscript{1} (A\textsubscript{1} → O\textsubscript{1}). In other words, it is not the case that O\textsubscript{1} always inherits the mistakes of A\textsubscript{1}.

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\textsuperscript{4} Folio numbers are written on the recto side of each leaf. The number starts with 0 and ends with 187. So the total folio number is 188 and not 177 as I wrongly counted in Kataoka [2008-6].
They do not seem to be in the direct connection. Rather it seems that they had a close ancestor in common and introduced new mistakes of their own (3: X → [ A₁, O₁]). For example:

-ty alam avāntaracintanena] MVK₁; -ti kim avāmtatena A₁; -ti kim avāmtatena vitatena O₁

The following case can also be explained by assuming that X already has the variant with the highline marks.

nirvikalpakabodhena] K₁; nirvikalpakabodhena MV; ti””kalpakabodhena A₁; ni””kalpakabodhena O₁

It is likely that this ancestor X was written in Devanāgarī script and already had many mistakes, because many errors shared by A₁ and O₁ can be explained by considering the process of (mis)transcribing from Śāradā to Devanāgarī scripts.

subantānām] MVK₁; subartānām A₁O₁
kathā] MVK₁; kārṣā A₁O₁
samavāyā] MVK₁; sumavāyā A₁O₁
parīkarthatāvah] MV; parīkarhatavah A₁O₁; +kharthatavah K₁
asvā] MVK₁; svastra A₁O₁
jhatity evā] K₁; drāgito kha-MV; jāginve vā- A₁; jāginve cā- O₁
cānusandhāna] MVK₁; cānusamānām A₁O₁
auśapādhika] MVK₁; auśapādhika A₁O₁
tayor vṛ] MVK₁; tayovṛ A₁; tayovr- O₁

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-paghatā] MVK₁; paṭṭata A₁; paṭṭata O₁
agaur na] MVK₁; gagaur na A₁O₁

In other words, it is better to assume that this X already has many transcriptional errors than to assume that A₁ and O₁ independently introduced them.

The opening verse of the fifth āhnikā

The prāṇāma verse in the opening of the fifth āhnikā as witnessed in MVAO₁ but lacking in K₁ does not look original.

prasannāya vipannānāṁ dukkhitānāṁ sukhātmane/sampāṇāya drṣṭānāṁ namah kāraṇabāndhaye//
Homege to the Cause-kinsman, who is peaceful for the distressed, blissful for the afflicted, fulfilled for the strongly longing.

Jayanta has no reason at all to give a prāṇāma in the middle of the third to sixth āhnikas, all of which, at least formally speaking, comments on the same sūtra, i.e. Nyāyasaṅgraha 1.1.7: āptopadeśāḥ sadāḥ. Furthermore, the beginning of the seventh āhnikā, for example, does not have a prāṇāma verse, although the place is a big boundary between pramāṇa and prameya and therefore a suitable place for giving a prāṇāma if Jayanta had such a convention. Stylistically and aesthetically, too, the verse in question does not reflect the excellent taste that Jayanta normally shows. Possibly the verse was added later by a scribe (not intending as a part of Jayanta’s text but for the sake of his own merit) when he found it a place suitable for prāṇāma from the viewpoint of quantity, because, as the Mysore edition divides the book into two in this place, it is the beginning of the latter half of the entire book from a quantitative standpoint(5).

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(5) The Vizianagaram edition, the first part of which is much bigger than the second, starts the second volume from the seventh āhnikā.  
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Additional Abbreviations (see Kataoka [2003])
corr. Correction by the editor.
ed. Published edition.
- The manuscript in question intentionally leaves a space with a mark, as is often the case for Devanāgarī manuscripts.
∪ The letter in question is illegible.
+ Lacuna. The number of this mark approximately corresponds to the number of missing letters.

Abbreviations and Bibliography (see Kataoka [2008][2009][2010] for those not mentioned here)


Rinwimala: See Bhāti.


Pramāṇavinīśaya: Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavinīśaya, Chapters 1 and 2. Ed.
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3.2 desābhedasyāgraḥaṇāt
3.3 tadagrahe tadbuddhyabhāvāt

4.1 naivāyikamāvatīcārāḥ
4.2 vaiṣeṣikamāvatīcārāḥ
4.2.1 samāvāyāḥ
4.2.2 dvārayogasambandhāḥ
4.3 apurasiddhavattva
4.3.1 apurasiddhavatvavitāśa
4.4 sārvasaṃsvāvatīcārāḥ
4.4.1 sārvasaṃsvāvatīcārāḥ
4.4.2 niḥsaṃsvāvatīcārāḥ

5.1 bhāttatapatiṣaṃśaḥ
5.2 bhāttamaraṇṭaṃśaḥ
5.3 sāmānyaduddher mithyātmak
5.4 vedaśamatanirśaḥ
5.5 upasamhāraḥ

6.1 sāmānyataḥ sāmānyatāṃśaḥ
6.2 sāmānyatāṃśaḥ sāmānyatāṃśaḥ
6.3 anyoreṇa sānubhāvati
6.4 sānubhāvati sānubhāvati
6.5 sānubhāvati sānubhāvati

John Taber

A Hindu Critique of Buddhist Epistemology.
न्यायमञ्जरी
बौद्धज्ञातिनिराकारणम्।

[1 उपोषाः]
[1.1 न शब्दस्वभावसंस्कृतिः]
अथ यदुकम् — शब्दार्थस्व बालस्वाभिकारकान्ति/वाक्यार्थसंस्कृतिः।
शब्दा इति, तत्र प्रतिविधियेते।

[1.2 शब्दस्व बौद्धविध्यम्]
द्विविधः शब्दः — पदं वाक्यं च। तत्र पदार्थपूर्वकस्तृता वाक्यार्थस्व
प्रथमम् पदार्थो निरूपयेते।

[1.3 पदस्व बौद्धविध्यम्]
पदं च द्विविधम् — नामाल्पयां च। उपस्थानिपातकस्मप्रवचनियां

[3 यदुकम्] Nyāyamañjarī I 412.14-413.3: अथवा तितिवन्नकृतां प्रामाण्यमिति वर्ण-नमः। विश्लेषतात्मकश्चातेशाः स्वभावस्तिः। अन्यत्र निरूपणमात्मको वा
शब्दविधि यथा। अथवा, तस्मिन्य भवते तद्विरुपान्तः। सर्वोऽविद्युत्तमाद च अन्तः.

[9 उपस्थानिपातः] …स्वरूपः। Cf. Nyāyabhāṣya ad 2.2.58: उपस्थानिपातस्यस्तहिः न पञ्चस्तत्रः, लक्षणानां वा वाच्यस्यनिरूपितते। नै, स्थितस्ते च सत्तु नामिको
विकार-वाच्यायतः (वाच्यायतः) em.; ओऽवाच्यायतः, ud.) लोप हृति तत्वोऽपि कारणस्यनिरूपितिः।

[3 अथ] K; प्रमाणयो (प्रसङ्गम वही) विपश्यनां दुःखितां सुखात्मने। सूच-नयीणा दुःखितानां नमः कारणविक्रमः। अथः MV; औषधिक्रमणां नमः औषधिक्रमणां नमः।

[3.1 स्पष्टविधः] V; क्रियान्वयिः 3; शब्दार्थस्व B; K; वाक्यार्थस्व M; MV; K; स्पष्टविधः] MV; K; K; 7 निरूपयेते।

[9 नीयान्यां] K; 9; नीयान्यां।
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[1.5.3 जातिस्वत्विवरणः]
आह। विवाह श्रेणियों को राजनीतिक रूप से वर्गित करना हमारा ध्यान का केंद्र रहता है।

[2 सामाजिक प्रत्यक्षोपयोगम्]

[2.1 प्रत्यक्षोपयोगम् स्वत्वार्थशिल्पम्]
तथा हि न तावसमाजप्रत्यक्षानुमानसहमानसहमानसह, तस्य पू-विनित्यानुसूत्तथव्यक्त्वाधिकारित्वसमाजायामानविवरणार्थातृ।

[2.2 समाजवृत्तिताया: प्रत्यक्षशिल्पम्]
समाजवृत्तिता नाम सामाजिक निजी विभूषण। कथे स्मृतिर्ति सापेक्ष्यमपेक्षाका श्रेणि मय।

धि:। अभिनवभावन वर्तमानाकालात्तुकाि विवाहितायु सूचियार विवाहिताय नामसंदर्भसभी। तत्र न विवाहाः—किर्मिजसमयम्, पवारोऽस्वरूपितत्वम, तत्र न स्वरूपितवर्तमानम्।
5 विवाहोत्तप्त: [Nyāyamañjarī II 47.7-64.6.]

13 समाजवृत्तिता ... मय।] [quoted in Śrīgūḍaprakāśa 300.12-13; cf. Nyāyamañjarī, Kotaoka [2010:86-2.]]

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समाजवृत्तितै तुडू तावसमाजप्रत्यक्षानुमानसहमानसहमानसहमानसह, तस्य पू-विनित्यानुसूत्तथव्यक्त्वाधिकारित्वसमाजायामानविवरणार्थातृ।

[2.3 विविधताम् वस्तुस्वसंक्षेपकोशलोकस्य]
तत्रुभा विविधताम् विविधता स्वभावम् एव वस्तुस्वसंक्षेपकोशलोकस्यानुवयम् इति तद्विशिष्ट्यप्रयत्न न सामाजिक प्रत्यक्षोपयोगससिद्धान्त प्रभुवेद्य॥

[2.4 नामान्यन्यायोः: सामाजिकप्रत्यक्षोपयोगम्]
न नामान्यन्यायोः शब्दम् शब्दम् प्रत्यक्षोपयोगससिद्धान्तसामाजिकप्रत्यक्ष

2 इति।... विवेचन।] [cf. Nyāyamañjarī I 239.1-4: न चैत्यी श्रेणिया प्रथ-मयविविधताविमताम्, श्रेणिया प्रथ-मयविविधताविमताम् —संकेतोपर्याय इत्यतः कालाद्वितीयम्।

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5 तत्रुभा विविधताम् ... शुद्धाचार्य इति।] Nyāyamañjarī, Kotaoka [2010:80-7-81.1]।

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[2.5  वस्तुग्राहितमोर्भनम्]
तत्तथायिद्विभास्तु प्रकारान्तरेण दश्येविषये।

[3  न व्यक्तिविनिकं सामान्यम्]
[3.1  विनानुपपत्तम्]
अतः न व्यक्तिविनिकं सामान्यम्, विनानुपपत्तम्। यथा हि कुलकल्पकल्पबल्लादिनी पुष्पागालोकने न तथा जातिविनिकी इति न तयोभेदः।

[3.2  देशभेदस्यायह्यति]
देशभेदस्य चाह्यह्यति। यत्र बलु हतो व्यक्तिविनिकं तत् तद्भविष्यते-देशभेदस्यदेशान्न्यत्मत्त्वायते, चटादिव पतः। न च वैव जातिवर्गी इति न तयोभेदः।

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[3.3  तद्यथे तदुद्द्वेयात्]
अत्वैवम्, तद्यथे तदुद्द्वेयात्। यद्य ततो व्यक्तिविनिकं तत् तस्म: श्रुतामाल्यामाल्या ५ पिण्याय, घटादिव पतः। न च व्यक्तिविनिकं सामान्यम् नाय जातिविनिकी इति न तयोभेदः।

[4  वृत्त्युपपत्ति]
[4.1  नामविविधत्वविचारः]
तहहृदितवाचार्यवस्तु तद्यथे तदुद्द्वेयायमर्भिषित चेत्। न, वृत्त्युपपत्ति:। किं प्रतिपिण्यं काल्यायनं वैते जातिः उत्तरेकयानेति। इसौ चारापपप्रम्।

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2  तद्यथे तदुद्द्वेयात्] Nyāyamañjarī, Karaaka [2010:89.6]: यदु “देशभेदे- देशान्यत्मत्त्वाय तद्यथे तदुद्द्वेयात्” इति।
7  तदुद्द्वेयात्] Nyāyamañjarī, Karaaka [2010:90.3-4]: यदुक्रमम् “देशभेदे- देशान्यत्मत्त्वाय तद्यथे तदुद्द्वेयात्” इति।
8  किं... कयानेति] Nyāyavārttika ad 2.2.63, 304.20-21: यदुदेशस्यायमर्भिषित गोल्यं तत्तं किं प्रतिपिण्यं परिस्थियाय वैते, अथाकयानेति।

2  अत्वैवम्] MVK; अत्वैवेदेयम्: “भावात् यदी ततो व्यक्तिविनिकं ततस्मात्म: श्रुतामाल्यामाल्या पिण्याय, घटादिव पतेन च वैव जातिवर्गी इति न तयोभेदः। अत्वैवम्। अत्वैव यदी “भावात् यदी ततो व्यक्तिविनिकं ततस्मात्म: श्रुतामाल्यामाल्या पिण्याय, घटादिव पतेन च वैव जातिवर्गी इति न तयोभेदः। अत्वैवम्, 2 तद्यथे] MVK; अत्वैवेदेयम्: “भावात् यदी ततो व्यक्तिविनिकं ततस्मात्म: श्रुतामाल्यामाल्या पिण्याय, घटादिव पतेन च वैव जातिवर्गी इति न तयोभेदः। अत्वैवम्। अत्वैव यदी “भावात् यदी ततो व्यक्तिविनिकं ततस्मात्म: श्रुतामाल्यामाल्या पिण्याय, घटादिव पतेन च वैव जातिवर्गी इति न तयोभेद:।
[4.2 वैशिष्ट्यकमत्वविवाह:]

[4.2.1 समावयः]

या च समावयालिका पिष्टेदु समावयां वृत्तिरूपैः चैत्रदिच्छिन्यं वदति: "अनुतिसिद्धानामानायाभास्मूच्यतां यथा विनिःस्वयं विनिःस्वयं अनुतिसिद्धानां स संबंधेऽकृत्यं कर्म संस्कृतितुष्टम्। अनुतिसिद्धान्ते तु देवधर्म्यं केवलं कर्म संस्कृतितुष्टम्।"

[4.2.2 द्विप्युष्पन्यसंबन्धः]

द्विप्युष्पदोषांस्योऽस्योऽस्य महाबिद्धिः विवाहेऽविवाहि विनिःस्वयं अनुतिसिद्धान्ते तु देवधर्म्यं केवलं कर्म संस्कृतितुष्टम्। तदद्विमोक्षीयस्य अनुतिसिद्धिः

1 पिष्टे... [छ) कृतित: स्वप्निः] quoted in Ślokaśāstra 300.20-21 (पदार्थान्म न स्वप्निः समावयः); cf. Nyāyāvārttika ad 2.2.64, 304.21-22: यदि पिष्टेदु विनिःस्वयं विनिःस्वयं विनिःस्वयं अनुतिसिद्धान्ते तु देवधर्म्यं केवलं कर्म संस्कृतितुष्टम्।

3 एकसहेजवृत्तां... मौदका] quoted in Śīrṣāprakāśa 300.22-23; cf. Nyāyāvārttika ad 2.2.64, 304.22-305.2: अनुतिसिद्धान्ते तु देवधर्म्यं केवलं कर्म संस्कृतितुष्टम्।

5 जातिः... कर्मदेवे[जनाः] Cf. Śīrṣāprakāśa 300.24-301.1: न कर्म निर्यावश्यकेऽदेवे विवाहेऽविवाही विनिःस्वयं अनुतिसिद्धान्ते तु देवधर्म्यं केवलं कर्म संस्कृतितुष्टम्।

8 वैभूतिः... कर्मदेवे[जनाः] Nyāyānājī, Kataoka [2010:90.8]: क्षेत्रस्य इत्य वेदः अहो निपुणता तथा।

10 द्विप्युष्पं... कर्मदेवे[जनाः] Nyāyānājī, Kataoka [2010:90.8]: अनुतिसिद्धान्ते तु देवधर्म्यं केवलं कर्म संस्कृतितुष्टम्।

11 अनुतिसिद्धान्ते तु देवधर्म्यं केवलं कर्म संस्कृतितुष्टम्। अनुतिसिद्धान्ते तु देवधर्म्यं केवलं कर्म संस्कृतितुष्टम्। अनुतिसिद्धान्ते तु देवधर्म्यं केवलं कर्म संस्कृतितुष्टम्।

13 कर्मदेवे[जनाः] Nyāyānājī, Kataoka [2010:90.8]: क्षेत्रस्य इत्य वेदः अहो निपुणता तथा।

14 कर्मदेवे[जनाः] Nyāyānājī, Kataoka [2010:90.8]: क्षेत्रस्य इत्य वेदः अहो निपुणता तथा।

15 कर्मदेवे[जनाः] Nyāyānājī, Kataoka [2010:90.8]: क्षेत्रस्य इत्य वेदः अहो निपुणता तथा।
4.2.4 अव्यवायविनिवृत्ताः

अव्यवायविनिवृत्तारि समवायात्ता संबन्ध एवमेव परिष्ठायतः। यथा वि

- नानष्ठयक्ष्य संबन्धो निष्प्रती युतिसिद्धता॥ इति॥

5 परमाणुकालयोः परमाणुकालयोः संबन्धः इत्यते। नाकाशकालुष्योन्यन्यन्यमिति प्रक्षीत्वेत्रस्थलमादि-विविधानेन। तस्मात् जातिभवोः क्षयवृत्तिरूपयथे।

4 नानष्ठयक्ष्य ... युतिसिद्धता] Šlokavārttika pratyakṣa 146cd (Taber [2005:157]); quoted in Nyāyamañjari, Kataoka [2010:92.5]; Nyāyamañjari-granthihānga 130.7–8: नानष्ठयक्ष्य संदर्भ हस्तक्रम परस्परोऽतयत्—य शाएः

- युतिसिद्धार्थः संबन्धोऽविविधस्य कल्पना । (146ab) इति॥

2 समवायः] MKV₁; समवायः A₁O₁ 2 परिहर्तः] MV; परिहर्तः A₁O₁; ++हर्तः K₁; 3 वथः] MV, K₁; वथः भनः नानष्ठयक्ष्य सनांको निष्प्रती युतिसिद्धतत्ता यथा O₁ 4 युतिसिद्धता। इति] MV,A₁O₁; "सिद्दितेति A₁"; "सिद्दितेति K₁; 6 "कालयोरः] MKV₁; "कालयोरः A₁O₁; 6 "क्रियेवः] VK₁; "क्रियेवः M₄⁸MAO₄; "क्रियेवः M₄⁸(sic) 6 "क्षयस्यः] MKV₁; "क्षयवृत्तिरूपयथे] MKV₁; "क्षयवृत्तिरूपयथे O1; 6 "विनिवृत्तेन] MKV₁; om. A₁; विनिवृत्तेन O₁ 7 काचितः] MVA₁O₁; क्राचितः K₁.
[4.3 প্রাক্কারমতবিচার:]

সুমিষ্টিতাত্ত্ব রূপনিস্তলক্ষণমাখ্যতে জাতিহয়াই: সংবাদঃ। সোঃ। পি নোপপায়। রূপাকার: মুকিসমাগ্রহণ। আকারচন্দ্র: স্বভাবাকারন্তে শ্রুতি প্রয়ান। সামান্য গুণকর্মণ। নো আকারচন্দ্রে।

2 সুমিষ্টিতাত্ত্ব • সংবাদঃ। Brhati ad 1.3.32, 155-6-9 (pūrva-pakṣa): সংবাদঃ। সুমিষ্টিতাত্ত্ব। সুমিষ্টিতাত্ত্ব। আকারচন্দ্রে। সংবাদঃ। আকারচন্দ্রে।

নিরুপার্থক নো পাক্ষিক নাম। জাতিতত্ত্বােন অযোনিত, না হিন্দুরা শ্রুতিপূর্বতল। যদি প্রাণ প্রাণের বিশ্বাস করে। নিরুপার্থক নো তত্ত্ব করে। আকারচন্দ্রে।

3 সুনির্দিষ্টতাত্ত্ব। ব্যবহারিক।

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3 সুমিষ্টিতাত্ত্ব • সংবাদঃ। Brhati ad 3.3.32, 155-6-9 (pūrva-pakṣa): সংবাদঃ। সুমিষ্টিতাত্ত্ব। আকারচন্দ্রে। সংবাদঃ। আকারচন্দ্রে।

নিরুপার্থক নো পাক্ষিক নাম। জাতিতত্ত্বােন অযোনিত করে। আকারচন্দ্রে।

4 সুমিষ্টিতাত্ত্ব। জাতিতত্ত্বােন অযোনিত। আকারচন্দ্রে।

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1. **नानाप्रकाशमेकस्य विश्वं दर्शा स्वयम्भू।**
   दुर्गायणानीयसमस्यामकामकारवारमम।
   तदेक सामान्य स एव विशेषः, तदवैकष तदेक नाना, तदेक नित्यः
   तदेवदानित्यम्, तदेवतित तदेव नास्तिती जैनोऽछिँधमदुःख्याये।

2. **उज्ज्वलमणपि न श्रोभीतः।**
   हृद्यावश विरोधेष्ठि तथा तदवेदनात्।
   उक्तत हि नानुत्तज्जितस्य नेष्पीरीतिः
   विविक्षक्रमविविधविवलख्यादेहि: सत्वेव मन्तवो भवतः॥ न त्वेकः
   वस्तु वहुरूपं भवितुमहिः।**

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नानाप्रकाशमेकस्य विरुद्ध वर्तमान स्वयम्भू।

A Critical Edition of Bhāṣṭā Bhatā Jayantī’s Nyāyamājñī
4.5.3 सामान्यबुद्धिमयत्वम्
एकं हि वस्तुनो रूपम्, इतरकल्याणमयम्।
नानुवलिकस्येव विशंभं उचितः सताम॥
श्रृंगत्वयावस्यसंपा:नेत्रपैक्षेण द्रोहते।
व्यलक्षणम्, अतों मेदसलाचिको, सुनागमो मृणा॥
इंद्रादृश्यमुक्तमपरिश्रीपैक्षेण संविदाम्।
इत्यथाकाराम्बेशन द्वयायुक्तगमो भ्रमः॥
न नेति प्रत्ययावेदिनिथयतं केवलं धियाम्।
किं तु धुंकारेशारतिः कर्तव्यं सूक्ष्मदशशिशि॥
न चैकं शब्दं वसुर निर्विकल्पतं गोरचरः।
व्यवधानानुसन्धानानुगानां भ्रमः।
पेषु न कल्याणमायेन सूक्ष्माभिवरुणां
स वाचनान्यसामथिज्ञमयकु:।

तत्त हि वस्तु अन्यन्यवेदिता भ्रतिता (श्रृंगत्वयाम्) [ em.; श्रृंगति ed. ] पदार्थस्थरपुष्पमभासते, तत्त पाराधानिमित्तं, इतरं कालानिकयगतिम् गमये।

2 इतरकल्याणम् ] MVK₁; हर्ष का A₁ O₁ 3 नानुवलिको ] MVK₁; नानुवलिक M₈ A₁ O₁ 3 सिद्धिमयत् ] MVK₁; कदचित्ज्ञ A₁ 4 श्रृंगत्वयाम् ] K₁; कालानिकयगति म्व; जागिर्ये वा A₁; जागिर्ये वा O₁ 4 श्रृंगत्वयाम् ] MVK₁; अनन्यमयत्वध A₁ 5 चित् किं तु ] MVK₁; चित् किं तु A₀ O₁ 6 एथरम् ] MVK₁; एथरम् A₁ 6 संविदाम् ] MVK₁; संविदाम A₁; संविदाम 10 अगमे् म्व; A₁ K₁ (unmetrical) 11 अगमे् म्व; MVK₁; अगमे् म्व A₁ K₁ 12 तस्मात् म्ये ] VA,K₁ O₁ 12 तस्मात् म्ये M₈ VA,K₁ O₁ 13 वास्मात् म्ये ] MVK₁; वास्मात् म्ये A₁ O₁ 13 अस्मात् म्ये ] K₁; अस्मात् म्ये MVK₁; कर्मिकय म्ये A₁ O₁ 13 अस्मात् म्ये ] K₁; अस्मात् म्ये MVK₁; कर्मिकय म्ये A₁ O₁ 13 अस्मात् म्ये ] K₁; अस्मात् म्ये MVK₁; कर्मिकय म्ये A₁ O₁ 13 अस्मात् म्ये ] K₁; अस्मात् म्ये MVK₁; कर्मिकय म्ये A₁ O₁ 13 अस्मात् म्ये ] K₁; अस्मात् म्ये MVK₁; कर्मिकय म्ये A₁ O₁ 13 अस्मात् म्ये ] K₁; अस्मात् म्ये MVK₁; कर्मिकय म्ये A₁ O₁ 13 अस्मात् म्ये ] K₁; अस्मात् म्ये MVK₁; कर्मिकय म्ये A₁ O₁ 13 अस्मात् म्ये ] K₁; अस्मात् म्ये MVK₁; कर्मिकय म्ये A₁ O₁ 13 अस्मात् म्ये ] K₁; अस्मात् म्ये MVK₁; कर्मिकय म्ये A₁ O₁ 13 अस्मात् म्ये ] K₁; अस्मात् म्ये MVK₁; कर्मिकय म्ये A₁ O₁ 13 अस्मात् म्ये ] K₁; अस्मात् म्ये MVK₁; कर्मिकय म्ये A₁ O₁ 13 अस्मात् म्ये ] K₁; अस्मात् म्ये MVK₁; कर्मिकय म्ये A₁ O₁ 13 अस्मात् म्ये ] K₁; अस्मात् म्ये
[5.2 எகார்கியகாரித்துமொழிமுபாத்தி:] 
ஒப்பாங்கு ஏல் ஸாமான்மாயாந்தராணி இத்தே செத்து. ஆட்சும், பாத்திரம் பெற்ற ஸாமான்மாயாந்தராணி ஒப்பாங்கு ஏல் ஸாமான்மாயாந்தராணி இத்தே செத்து.


4 ஒப்பாங்கு ஏல் ஸாமான்மாயாந்தராணி இத்தே செத்து.] Cf. Nyāyavārttika ad 2.2.64, 304.10.13: அது மாடச்சத்து பெற்று பெற்று. ஸாமான்மாயாந்தராணி இத்தே செத்து.

5.4 दर्शनस्याभिषेकम्
नन्दुः तथा भूतः। न लघुभ्रं वषण्डुमुङ्गःः कार्यम्। बालः। दर्शनमेव तत्ति तथ्योऽकार्यभविषयति, तद्वाभिन्नः।

5.5 प्रत्यक्षस्याभिषेकम्
नन्दुः दर्शनमपि प्रतिवध्यक्षिने तत्तमाङ्गं तत्तमाङ्गान्यायं एकमित्युःपते। यथेऽव शाख्लेयपिण्डानेन सति गौरित्वणनसत्वमारममः। तथेऽव बालेयपिण्डानेन द्विगौरित्वेनव- वमारमहः इति तद्वेक्ताबालेयपिर्वितोःतुः। तद्वेकम्—
एकृत्यमारमहः हेतुवाच्चार्येन।
एकेऽहुःतुभावेन अवकीर्तिनिप्रभुच्छः। इति।
तस्मातीपिताकार्यव्रृत्तवृत्तदुःवेन सामायः नाम किंविद्वास्मवर्तमाति।

6.1 सामायश्रुताःसांमायः
न हि व्यक्तिः संवेदने गृह्यात्मका वा ज्ञित्व।
न सर्वोः, देशकारिकादेव तदनन्त्येनाशक्तिवात् एकत्याण व्यक्तिः। ततो व्यक्तिः स सच्चः प्रत्ययामो दृष्टयते। अमृतात्म- विधिद्वृत्वे न श्रविये प्रत्यतिः जननियुत्त免税े।

6.2 शब्दानुमानगोविकालविधयेः वृत्ति:
उच्चयते। स्वादेशेवे यदि प्रत्यक्षविधिये स्वत्काणे श्रविये ज्ञोः वृत्ति:
स्वातः।
नन्दुः प्रत्यक्षविधिये तयोवृत्ताविनयामायम् अवकीर्तिनिप्रियोऽस्मायः—

8.1 सर्वोः... अवकीर्तिनः
Pramāṇaśācasāvatīka II 109 (Guṇil ed.); pāda
ab is quoted in Nyāyamājanī, Kataoka [2010:101.3, 105.4]; Nyāyamājanī- 
granthishāga 131.3: एकःव्रजसामुः। भौतिकव्यक्ताकार्यजननिचाचार्यः म्यायः इति।
वास्तव: कः पुनर्सर्वाविति चेत्तु उच्च ते।
अतिद्वैपर्यावृत्तिस्वभावविविधतमेष्ट।
बहः: स्थितिम सामान्यान्तरे दि निष्क्रियः॥
या च भूमिभविकल्याणां स एव विक्रियों गिराम।
अत एव हि शास्त्रार्थायों प्रकृतिः॥

5

6.4

विकल्पस्त्र  दत्तसंस्कृतिभिः
तथा हि न विकल्पय वस्तू स्मृतिः।
कुः: ||
एक्षत्वस्वभावविय विद्यते स तः लृभमः
को सुस्ते तु दृष्टे भागे: स्मार्य ये: प्रमाणे: परीक्षेदिः॥

10

तस्माद भविष्यतिमयसारीविताकारात्वीतं निष्क्रियेऽतः प्रवृत्तः। यः -
2 अतिद्वैपर्यावृत्तिः ||
[ Cf. Pramanāvārttika I 83.1: Matsārāsūra (novel ed.) quoted in Nyāyānārāyana I 191.5.12 and will be referred back to in Nyāyānārāyana, Kataoka (2010:105.8); Nyāyānārāyanagranthihaśa I 131.4-7: एक्षत्वस्वभाववियः। एक्षत्वस्वभाववियः।
Cf. Pramanāsūkha I 5: प्रमाणम वेदान्तस्य चेतन्त्रापित्वम प्रकृतिः: स्वाभाविक: स्ववृत्तिकारात्वीतं निष्क्रियेऽतः प्रवृत्तः।]
[6.5 விக்த்யானநாசத்கும்]


4. śrāddhisvaratātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātাতাতাতাতাতাতাতাতातাতাতातাতাতাতাতাতাতাতাতাতাতাতাতাতাতাতাতাতাতাতাতাতাতাতাতাতাতातাতাতাতাতাতাতাতাতাতাতातাতাতাতাতাতাতātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātাতātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātাতātātātātātātātātাতātাতātata-<br> -<br> 

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