

# Saṃskṛta-sādhutā

Goodness of Sanskrit

Studies in Honour of  
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## Is Killing Bad? Dispute on Animal Sacrifices between Buddhism and Mīmāṃsā<sup>1</sup>

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*idaṃ puṇyam idaṃ pāpam ity etasmin padadvaye/  
ācaṇḍālaṃ manuṣyāṇām alpaṃ śāstraprayojanam//  
(Vākyapadīya I 40)*

### Scope and object of this article

Bhartṛhari says: “Teaching is of little purpose in regard to the two things ‘this is good’ and ‘this is bad,’ because [all] people down to untouchables know [them].” This is thanks to the existence of *śiṣṭas* who can see unobservable things with their divine eye. Therefore their words are unquestionable authorities for all people, who can just adopt the words of these reliable speakers without bothering to learn *śāstra*-teachings. But not all participants in intellectuals' debate around Bhartṛhari's time agreed. The moral evaluation of Vedic ritual killing was one of the topics of debate.

Brahmanical apologetics on ritual killing have been thoroughly investigated by Halbfass [1992:87–129]. He has also collected almost exhaustively various sources relevant to the *saṃsāramocakas* or “the liberators from *saṃsāra*.” According to him, the oldest witnesses of “the liberators from *saṃsāra*” are Dhammapāla (around 500 AD), Bhāviveka (Bhāvaviveka/Bhavya, ca. 490–570 AD) and Kumārila (ca. 600–650 AD). The object of this short article is to add to the list a reference to 脱生死者 (\**saṃsāramocaka*) by Saṅghabhadra (衆賢: ca. 430–490 AD), an *abhidharma* scholar who critically comments on verses of Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa* from the *vaibhāṣika* point of view, to elucidate his criticism which clearly targets Mīmāṃsā advocacy of ritual killing. Saṅghabhadra's *Abhidharmanyāyānusārasāstra* (阿毘達磨順正理論) is available only in its Chinese translation (translated in 653–4 AD) by Xuan Zang (玄奘: 602?–664 AD). In order to understand Saṅghabhadra's arguments in Sanskrit and place them in their historical context, I have also consulted Bhāviveka's *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā*. The two critical editions and two translations of the ninth chapter of the *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* by Kawasaki and Lindtner are

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1 I thank Arlo Griffiths and Harunaga Isaacson for comments.

also utilised here to update our knowledge. Kumāriḷa's *Mīmāṃsāślokaṵārttika*, which was already carefully investigated by Halbfass, is made use of here to illustrate a Brahmanical defence and counterattack to the criticism by Buddhists and other heterodox thinkers. Based on these materials, the present article aims at reconstructing various forms of argumentation concerning the topic of ritual killing current around Bhartṛhari's time (ca. 450–510 AD) and afterwards, and sets out a hypothesis concerning their historical development.

### Chronological chart of relevant authors<sup>2</sup>

400	Bhavadāsa		
450	Vasubandhu	Vasurāta	
	Saṅghabhadra	Bhartṛhari	Mādhava
500	Dignāga		
	<i>Vṛttikāra</i>		
	Śabara		
550	Bhāviveka		
	Bhartṛmitra		
600	Kumāriḷa	Dharmakīrti	
650	Prabhākara		

### *Ahetuvādin* and *viṣamahetuvādin*<sup>3</sup>

In the opening verse of the fourth chapter of the *Abhidharmakośa* Vasubandhu (ca. 400–480 AD) states that “the diversity of the world is produced by karma” (AK 4.1a: *karmajāṃ lokavaicitryam*). Expounding on Vasubandhu's passage, Saṅghabhadra refers to an opponent who holds the “no-cause theory” (\**ahetu-vāda*). The opponent objects: “It is observed in this world that the diversity of things such as fruit and stones has no particular cause, because just a single seed produces many fruits and because varieties of stones or the like are not preceded

2 This tentative chart is based on Frauwallner [1961] and other chronological studies as well as my own hypotheses.

3 The Sanskrit names *ahetu-vāda/-vādin* and *viṣamahetu-vāda/-vādin* are attested, e.g. in *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (BB 394.1–2: *ahetu-viṣama-hetu-vādinah*) and *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* (43. 14: *ahetuvādayapadeśah*; 61.29: *viṣamahetuvādah*; ad 72.11: *ahetuvādī*; and other instances).

by seeds. Thorns, razors and swords are sharp and bean peels are black. There is this kind of diversity. Who made it? ... There is no particular cause observed for the diversity of fruits, etc. Causes that are not observed should not be regarded as existent.”<sup>4</sup>

After having refuted the above theory of no cause, Saṅghabhadra next introduces a *\*viśamahetuvādin* or “the proponent of unequal causes,” who criticises the Buddhist karma view and asks: “How is it correctly known that violence leads to undesirable fruit and that non-violence leads to desirable fruit?”<sup>5</sup> The opponent assumes that ritual killing, which is regarded as evil by the Buddhists, is rather meritorious in that it is a cause of a desirable fruit (*\*iṣṭaphala*).<sup>6</sup> He distinguishes between ritual and non-ritual actions of killing, and claims that killing preceded by mantras in a ritual can bring about a desirable fruit (*\*yajñe mantrapūrvikā bhūtahimseṣṭaphaladāyini*).<sup>7</sup> That an apparently evil action rather leads to merit can be named a fault of *\*hetuphala(bhāva)vaiparītya* or inversion (of the relationship) between cause and effect.<sup>8</sup> Here Saṅghabhadra (and Vasubandhu as well) is defending the Abhidharma theory of similarity (*sādrśya*) between cause and effect in opposition to the proponent of unequal causation (*\*viśamahetuvādin*).

### The principle of reciprocity and similarity between cause and effect

In order to balance one’s moral account, there needs to be “similarity” (*sādrśya*) between the pain one has given to the other and the pain one will have to suffer.<sup>9</sup> According to Vasubandhu, three kinds of fruits will result from an action of killing (*prāṇātīpāta*), and each corresponding pair of cause and effect has “a certain similarity” (AKBh 712.3: *sādrśyaviśeṣa*): “To explain, first a slayer has caused pain to the object being killed, killed it, and destroyed its power. Therefore he [will suffer] three kinds of fruit, because he has caused pain, killed it, and destroyed its power (4.85cd). Because he has caused pain to the other, he will suffer in hell due to ‘the maturation effect.’ Because he has killed [it], he

4 NA (Taisho 29, 529a9–14): 現見世間。果石等物。衆多差別。無異因故。謂從一種。有多果生。無種爲先。有石等異。棘鋒銛利豆皮黑等。衆相差別。是誰所爲。... 無現異因。不現見因。亦應非有。

5 NA (Taisho 29, 529c23–24): 惡因論者。作是詰言。如何定知。害得非愛果不害得愛果。

6 Cf. the Siddhāntin’s rejoinder (NA, Taisho 29, 529c29): 是故定知。非殺害因。能招愛果。

7 NA (Taisho 29, 530b14–15): 有執祠祀明呪爲先。害諸有情。能招愛果。

8 NA (Taisho 29, 530b9–14): 故無因果成翻對失。... 是故亦非因果翻對。

9 See Schmithausen [2000: 266] for Jaina sources on “similarity.”

will have a shorter life due to ‘the out-flow effect.’ Because he has destroyed its power, external herbs will be powerless due to ‘the dominant effect.’”<sup>10</sup>

In his *\*Abhidharmayāyānusārasāstra* (阿毘達磨順正理論) Saṅghabhadra further elucidates the above-cited passage and says that when a slayer receives fruits they have three kinds of similarities (*\*sādrśya*) to three respective causes.<sup>11</sup> As Vasubandhu explains, there is a certain kind of similarity between cause and effect. Good conduct causes a similar good result and bad conduct causes a similar bad result (either in this life or in future lives).

Bhāviveka further refines this karmic view of similarity and puts this idea into a syllogism:<sup>12</sup>

[Proposition:] An action [of killing will bring] to [the body] of an agent, although unseen [as being in the future], a fruit corresponding to that which it has brought about to the seen body [of the victim].

[Reason:] Because it is killing.

[Example:] Just like another [action of killing].

Just as an agent of mundane killing will receive in the future life a pain similar to the pain that he has caused in the victim's observable body, similarly an agent of ritual killing will receive suffering in the future life. Here the construction *yādṛk ... tādṛk* clearly indicates the similarity between the effects (*phala*) upon victims and slayers.<sup>13</sup>

10 AKBh 712.4–10: *prāṇātīpātām hi tāvat kurvatā māryamāṇasya duḥkham utpāditām māritam ojo nāśitam. ato 'sya—duḥkhanān māraṇād ojonāśanāt trividham phalam* (4.85). *parasya duḥkhanād vipākaphalena narake duḥkhito bhavati. māraṇān niṣyanda-phalenālpāyur bhavati (niṣyandaphalenālpāyur bhavati corr.; niṣyandaphalam ālpāyur bhavati ed.). ojonāśanād adhipatiphalenālpaujaso bāhyā ośadhayo bhavanti.*

11 NA (Taisho 29, 530b4–9): 謂造業時。諸殺生者。令他受苦。隔斷他命。令他怖畏。失壞威光。故受果時。有三相似。謂苦他故。於地獄中。受極重苦。爲異熟果。斷他命故。於善趣中。受命極促。爲等流果。壞他威故。感外藥物皆少精光。爲增上果。

12 MHK 9.40: *yādṛk phalam adhiṣṭhāne dr̥ṣṭe hi kurute kriyā/ kartus tādṛg adṛṣṭe 'pi, \*himsātvāt, tadyathetarā// (\*himsātvāt em. (cf. Tib. *bsad pa yin phyir*); *hinsād vā K; himsā vā tad L*) Lindtner [2001: 20] translates *adhiṣṭhāne* differently: “whether the authority is seen or not seen.” Kawasaki [1992: 381] interprets *dr̥ṣṭe* and *adṛṣṭe* as if it is connected with *phalam*.*

13 Two verses (MHK 9.38–39) that precede this verse describe two syllogisms that both prove that ritual killing (*antarvedyām himsā; himsā yajñe*) will lead to an undesirable fruit (*aniṣṭaphaladā*) because it is deliberate (non-accidental) killing (*saṁcintyābhrānti-*

Kumārila, however, formulates a syllogism, that is quite similar to Bhāviveka's, although its scope is extended from killing to action in general.<sup>14</sup>

[Proposition:] Killing produces for its performer after death a fruit similar to that of its target.

[Reason:] Because it is a kind of action.

[Example:] Just like liberality as enjoined in the [Vedic] teaching [, which gives a corresponding fruit to its performer after his death].

The construction *yādṛk ... tathāvidham* is the same as Bhāviveka's. But the analogy is here between giving and killing and not between two types of killing. Just as giving will bring about an effect for the agent in the future life corresponding to that caused in the target, i.e. pleasure in the case of giving, similarly killing will lead to an effect corresponding to that caused in the targeted victim, i.e. suffering in the case of killing. Thus there is a similarity between the effects upon the target and the agent in every action. As Halbfass noted [1992:116, n.12], Kumārila in the *Tantravārttika* (TV 203.13) seems to label this concept as "the conformity to an action" (*karmānurūpya*).

### Being preceded by mantras

The first view of unequal cause (*\*viśamahetuvāda*, see n. 7) that Saṅghabhadra refers to is similar to a view that Bhāviveka mentions in the *Mīmāṃsātattva-nirṇayāvatāra* chapter of his *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā*. Both mention the ap-

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*māraṇāt*) or because it is a deliberate cause of pain which ends life (*saṃcintya-jīvitocchediduḥkhādhānāt*) like other killing outside a sacrifice. The present verse, too, must describe a similar proof that equates ritual killing with killing outside ritual. Therefore *kriyā* (40b) and *yathetarā* (40d) should be interpreted as referring to the action of killing and not action in general. The reason, *himsātvāt*, the reading of which is clearly supported by the Tibetan translation (*bsad pa yin phyir*) as well as Kawasaki's translation(!) against the two editions (Kawasaki: *hinsād vā tad*; Lindtner *himsā vā tad*), requires this interpretation and not another possible interpretation that takes this verse as describing action in general.

14 MŚV *codanā*, v. 235cd–236ab: *viśaye 'syāḥ phalaṃ yādṛk pretya kartus tathāvidham// himsā kriyāviśeṣatvāt sūte śāstroktadānavat/*

plication of mantras. The following syllogism is presented by an opposing Mīmāṃsaka:<sup>15</sup>

[Proposition:] [Ritual] Killing is not regarded as [a cause] that brings about an undesirable fruit.

[Reason:] Because it is controlled by a spell.

[Example:] Just like the [beneficial] use of poison [controlled by a spell].

The reasoning in the *Madhyamakahr̥dayakārikā* is more sophisticated than that in the *Nyāyānusāra*, because the former mentions the magical effect of mantras and not their mere existence. Replying to the opponent, Saṅghabhadra points out the undesirable consequence that, “If that is the case, this action of killing by recourse to black magic or curse, such as causing [one’s enemy] to suffer fever or to end [his] life, would be accepted as [the cause] that can bring about a desirable fruit.”<sup>16</sup> Indeed *abhicāra* rites of black magic taught in the Vedas, such as Śyena, Vajra and Iṣu, are simply accepted by Śabara (ca. 500–550 AD) as evil actions of killing that cause undesirable fruits.<sup>17</sup> Unlike Kumārila, Śabara accepts that such evil black magic is not enjoined by the Vedas as something to be done, but that it is simply described as an efficient means for a person who desires to kill an enemy notwithstanding the consequences.<sup>18</sup>

Saṅghabhadra can be seen as having pointed out that the reason “being preceded by mantras” (*\*mantrapūrvaka*) is uncertain, i.e. too wide for defining an action that does not lead to an undesirable fruit. Similarly, Bhāviveka also points out the fault that the reason “because it is controlled by a spell” (*mantrapariḡrahāt*) is uncertain (*anaikāntika*), because illicit intercourse with a woman

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15 MHK 9.32abc: *viṣopayuktivad dhīm̐sā yadi mantrapariḡrahāt/ nābhīṣṭāniṣṭaphaladā*. For the meaning of *mantrapariḡraha* (*manreṇa pariḡrahaḥ* and not *mantrasya pariḡrahaḥ*), see, e.g. MSA 59.5: *māyāmantrapariḡrhitāṃ (-mantrapariḡrhitāṃ corr.; -yantrapariḡrhitāṃ ed.) bhrāntinimittāṃ kāṣṭhaloṣṭādikam*; BhK 172.7–8: *viṣam iva mantrapariḡrhitāṃ bhuñjāno na saṃkliṣyate*. The gloss in the *Tarkajvālā* (284a3: *śnags kyis yoṃs su bzun ba’i dug, \*manreṇa pariḡrhitāṃ viṣam*) also supports my interpretation.

16 NA (Taisho 29, 530b16–17): 若爾呪術。或以厭禱。令遭熱病。乃至命終。應許此殺能招愛果。

17 ŚBh ad 1.1.2, 20.13–16.

18 ŚBh ad 1.1.2, 20.16–19. See also Halbfass [1992:89].

by magically seducing her with a spell is accepted as an evil action though it involves the application of mantras.<sup>19</sup>

### For the sake of victims<sup>20</sup>

The second view of unequal cause (*\*viṣamahetuvāda*) that Saṅghabhadra refers to is as follows:<sup>21</sup>

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19 MHK 9.33abc: *mantrākaraṣaṇacūrṇādyair* (*mantrākaraṣaṇacūrṇādyair* corr.; *mantra-karaṣaṇacūrṇādyair* K; *mantrakaraṣaṇacūrṇādyair* L) *agamyāgamaṇaṃ* (*agamyāgamaṇaṃ* K; *āgamyāgamaṇaṃ* L) *hi yat/ tenānaikāntikaḥ* (*tenānaikāntikaḥ* L; *tenānekāntikaḥ* K) *pūrvah*. “Since there is [illicit] intercourse with a forbidden woman by seducing her by force of [magical] powder, etc. for attracting [women which are effective because of the power of] mantras, therefore [the reason *mantrapari-graha*] is uncertain.” There are varieties of possibilities concerning the compound *mantrākaraṣaṇacūrṇa*. (I thank Shingo Einoo, Toru Tomabechi and Harunaga Isaacson for suggestions.) 1. a *dvandva* compound of *mantrākaraṣaṇa* (= *mantreṇākaraṣaṇam*) and *cūrṇa* (which refers to *cūrṇena vaśīkaraṇam*); 2. *mantra*, *ākaraṣaṇa* and *cūrṇa*; 3. *mantrākaraṣaṇa* and *mantracūrṇa*; 4. *cūrṇa* that is *mantrākaraṣaṇa(karaṇa)*; 5. *cūrṇa* for the sake of *mantrākaraṣaṇa*. The compound structures of 1 and 2 are odd as a *dvandva*, because *ākaraṣaṇa* is different in type from the other two. Logically, the example given here should include the application of mantra so that it fulfills the condition *mantrapari-graha*. (Cf. different interpretations by Kawasaki [1992: 380] and Lindtner [2001:18].) The Tibetan translation *sñags sogs phye mas bkug pa yis* seems to presuppose *\*mantrādicūrṇākaraṣaṇena-* (unmetrical) or the like that may refer to “seduction [of a woman] by means of enchanted powder” or “seduction [of a woman] by means of powder after [reciting] a mantra” by interpreting *mantrādi* as *mantrapūrvaka*. But *Tarkajvālā*’s explanation (284a6) *sñags daṅ phye ma la sogs pas bkug pa’i* seems to presuppose *mantracūrṇādyākaraṣaṇa* (seduction by means of a mantra and powder, etc.). Whatever the original reading and its interpretation may be, the word must refer to a process of seducing a woman by recourse to mantra and powder (or enchanted powder). Powder is not effective until it is enchanted (*abhimantrita*). Therefore I prefer interpretation 5 for the time being. For *vaśīkaraṇacūrṇa*, see, e.g. Bāṇa’s *Kādambarī* 227.9: *bahukṛtvah saṃprayuktastrīvaśīkaraṇacūrṇena*. (I thank Harunaga Isaacson for suggestions and the reference to the *Kādambarī*.)

20 See also Halbfass [1992:99f], in particular Malayagiri’s explanation of the *saṃsāra-mocakas* as being compared to a benevolent doctor.

21 NA (Taisho 29, 530b17–19): 此呪術等。非欲利樂所害有情。祠祀明呪。意欲利樂所害羊等。故能害者。雖害有情。猶如良醫。不招苦果。

This black magic or the like does not aim at benefiting the creatures to be killed. Ritual mantras [however] aim at benefiting goats, etc. to be killed. Therefore the agent of killing, though he hurts creatures, does not bring about suffering-fruit, just like a good doctor.

Good doctors afflict their patients for a while, but their operation is for the patients' benefit and therefore it will not bring about an undesirable fruit. Similarly, ritual killing preceded by the application of mantras is for the sake of victims, because victims killed in Vedic sacrifices will obtain better lives after death. Manu also accepts that sacrificed victims will obtain better lives.<sup>22</sup>

The background idea of this view is what Kumārila calls *lokaprasiddhi* or consensus among people. Namely, everyone agrees that helping (*anugraha*) is good (*dharma*) and meritorious (*puṇya*) and that causing pain (*pīḍā*) is bad (*adharma*) and sinful (*pāpa*). A person who helps others is called dharmic and a person who afflicts others is called adharmic.<sup>23</sup> Following this criterion, ritual killing can be defended and claimed to be good, because in the end it helps its victims though it causes them pain at first.

Refuting the opponent, Saṅghabhadra mentions the problematic case of the *saṃsāramocakas* (脱生死者) or the liberators from *saṃsāra*, who claim that they

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22 *Manusmṛti* 5.40: *oṣadhyah paśavo vṛkṣās tiryāñcaḥ pakṣiṇas tathā/ yajñārtham nidhanam prāptāḥ prāpnuvanty ucchritḥ punaḥ//* Olivelle [2005]: “When plants, domestic animals, trees, beasts, and birds die for the sake of a sacrifice, they will in turn earn superior births.”

23 *MŚV autpattika* 1–3: *pratyakṣādaḥ niṣiddhe 'pi nanu lokaprasiddhitaḥ/ dharmādharmau pramāsyete brāhmaṇādivivekavat//1// dhārmikādhārmikatvābhyām pīḍānugrahakāriṇau/ prasiddhau hi, tathā cāha pārāśaryo 'tra vastuni//2// idaṃ puṇyam idaṃ pāpam ity etasmin padadvaye/ ācaṇḍālaṃ manuṣyāṇām alpaṃ śāstraprayojanam//3//* “1. [Objection:] Surely, although perception and the like are denied [as being valid sources for them], dharma and adharma are established by consensus among people. [This is] similar to [the case in which] a Brahmin and so on are discerned [as such by consensus among people]. 2–3. For a person who hurts or who helps [others] is known [by consensus among people] as being, respectively, adharmic or dharmic. And with regard to this matter, the son of Parāśara[, i.e. Vyāsa,] states as follows: \*[Vedic] teaching is of little purpose in regard to the two things ‘this is good’ and ‘this is bad,’ because [all] people down to untouchables know [them].” (\*This *śloka* is not found in the critical edition of the *Mahābhārata*, but in *Vākyapadīya* I 40. See also Halbfass [1991: 120, n. 51].)

kill worms, ants, etc. (by using swords and sticks) for the benefit of these creatures:<sup>24</sup>

The liberators from *samsāra*, who injure worms, ants, etc. with the thought of benefiting worms, ants, etc., too, would bring about desirable fruits. [But] it is not the case that fruits [of ritual killing and killing by the liberators from *samsāra*] can be different [when] both kill creatures similarly for the benefit [of the victims], whether by means of mantras or swords and sticks.

Following the opponent's reasoning, it would follow that a slayer will obtain either good or bad result depending on the intention underlying his action of killing, and that similarly victims to be killed will obtain either good or bad results depending on their understanding of their being killed.<sup>25</sup> Results would be completely dependent on subjective judgments and not on the objective nature of the action in question. But this is not the case. A slayer cannot bring about a desirable fruit by his action of killing that forces his victim to obtain alleged merit.<sup>26</sup> Just as the liberators from *samsāra*, who injure creatures, do not produce good fruits but only bring about bad ones, similarly rituals that involve violence, even if preceded by mantras, must also bring about only undesirable fruits.<sup>27</sup>

Furthermore, there is no true parallelism between a good doctor and a sacrificer. Good doctors, out of desire to benefit patients, perform an operation on them and thus make others feel better. The doctor and people around him confirm the effect now and not in the future life. Although doctors cause their patients to suffer from pain for a while, they can still be good doctors and do not produce moral demerit.<sup>28</sup> The opponent himself accepts that goats, etc., being ignorant, cannot distinguish between merit and demerit. They are killed and their pain here and now is unendurable. Although the opponent claims that

24 NA (Taisho 29, 530b20–22): 脱生死者。亦以利樂蟲蟻等心。害蟲蟻等。應招愛果。非以明呪。或以刀杖。同爲利樂。殺害有情。果容有異。

25 NA (Taisho 29, 530b22–24): 如能殺者。要依自心善惡有殊。得福非福。如是所殺羊等蟻等。應由自心得福非福。

26 NA (Taisho 29, 530b24–25): 非由強殺令彼福生。以之爲因。當招愛果。

27 NA (Taisho 29, 530b25–27): 如脱生死者。害他有情。不爲善果因。但招惡果。如是祠祀明呪爲先。亦應唯招非所愛果。

28 NA (Taisho 29, 530b27–530c1): 良醫於彼。非同法喻。以諸良醫爲欲利樂諸有病者。勤加救療。令他安樂。現非後生醫及傍人知功驗果。雖令病者暫苦觸身。而彼良醫。不生非福。

ritual killing will bring about a desirable fruit in the future, the agent of killing and people around him cannot confirm it in the here and now.<sup>29</sup>

### Being taught by scripture

The opponent might further claim that although a slayer and people around him do not observe the effect instantaneously, one knows through the Veda, i.e. a means of valid cognition, that ritual killing does not bring about moral demerit.<sup>30</sup> Saṅghabhadra refutes the opponent by questioning the validity of the Veda and then starts discussing the Mīmāṃsā view of *vedāpauruṣeyatva* or the authorlessness of the Veda<sup>31</sup> as well as other relevant views, e.g. that of *śabdanityatva* or eternity of sounds. Bhāviveka, too, puts a similar view into a syllogism:<sup>32</sup>

[Proposition:] [Ritual killing is not regarded as a cause that brings about an undesirable fruit.]

[Reason:] Because it is taught by [one's own/a general] scripture.

[Example:] Just like the action of giving.

Bhāviveka points out the defect of this proof by distinguishing between two possible cases of alleged “scripture.” If ritual killing is taught in “one’s own scripture” (*svaśāstra*), i.e. in the Veda in the case of ritual killing, the liberators from *saṃsāra* (*saṃsāramocaka*) would be vindicated,<sup>33</sup> i.e. they too could claim that their action of killing is not sinful because it is taught in “their own scripture.”

On the other hand, if the opponent presents the reason in a general way without specification, i.e. if a general scripture, not a particular one, is intended as the scripture, the reason “because it is taught in the scripture” would not be established as valid for one side of the two disputants. For Buddhists do not accept the Veda as valid and therefore the reason “because it is taught in the [Vedic] scripture” would not be acceptable as valid for them. Therefore the

29 NA (Taisho 29, 530c1–3): 然彼自許。羊等愚癡。不能了知。福與非福。既被殺害。現苦難任。雖說未來當招愛果。而能殺者及彼傍人。俱不現知。

30 NA (Taisho 29, 530c4–6): 殺者傍人。雖不現證。而由明論定量故知。祠祀害生不生非福。

31 NA (Taisho 29, 530c7): 寧知明論是定量耶。以明呪聲體是常故。謂諸明論。無製作者。

32 MHK 9.32d: *śāstrokteṛ vāpi dānavat//*

33 MHK 9.35ab: *svaśāstra eva ced ukte siddhaḥ saṃsāramocakaḥ/* But both Kawasaki [1992: 380] and Lindtner [2001: 18] interpret *saṃsāramocaka* as if it is equivalent to *saṃsāramocana* (liberating [them] from *saṃsāra*).

reason would have the fault of being *anyatarāsiddha* or “not being established for one of the sides.”<sup>34</sup>

### *Kratvartha and puruṣārtha*

*Jaiminisūtra* 4.1.1 announces “Then therefore the inquiry into [the elements] for the sake of ritual and [the elements] for the sake of the human being” (JS 1193: *athātaḥ kratvarthapurūṣārthayor jijñāsā*). Mīmāṃsakas distinguish two kinds of elements, i.e. elements for the sake of ritual (*kratvartha*) and elements for the sake of human being (*puruṣārtha*). Ritual killing is for the sake of ritual and therefore meritorious, whereas killing outside ritual is for the sake of the human being and therefore sinful.

Saṅghabhadra mentions nothing that pertains to this kind of view. But Bhāviveka does formulate a pertinent syllogism.<sup>35</sup>

[Proposition:] Ritual killing of animals does not bring about an undesirable fruit.

[Reason:] Because it is for the sake of that [ritual and not for the sake of its agent].

[Example:] Just like an activity of cooking is accepted as being for the sake of brahmins.

The action of cooking is regarded as a beneficial cause that will bring about a desirable fruit for a cook in the future, because it is for the sake of brahmins and not for the sake of the cook himself. Similarly, the action of killing can be regarded as a beneficial cause that will bring about a desirable fruit for a slayer in the future, because it is for the sake of ritual and not for the sake of the slayer. Ritual killing is “for the sake of that” (*tādarthyā*). It is performed selflessly for the sake of ritual and not out of greed for the agent’s own sake.

Bhāviveka gives a counterargument in order to show that animals are not established as being for the sake of ritual and that therefore the reason “because

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34 MHK 9.35cd: *sāmānyena ca hetūktau syād anyatarāsiddhatā*//

35 MHK 9.36: *yajñe paśūnām hiṃsā cen nāniṣṭaphaladāyini/ tādarthyād brāhmaṇārthā hi yatheṣṭā pacanakriyā*// But Kawasaki [1992: 380] interprets *yatheṣṭā* as if equivalent to *yatheṣṭam* (according to their wish). Lindtner [2001:19] interprets *tādarthyāt brāhmaṇārthā* quite differently: “because one does it for the same purpose that one does something for the sake of a priest.”

it is for the sake of ritual” is not established.<sup>36</sup> Women are enjoyed (*bhogyā*) by men and regarded as being for the sake of their enjoyers (*bhoktrārtha*). Men have clear motivation. Men’s enjoyment of women cannot be regarded as selfless. It simply comes out of their passion. Similarly, sacrificed animals are eaten (*bhogyā*) by sacrificers and therefore must be regarded as being for the sake of eaters (*bhoktrārtha*). Animals cannot be regarded as being for the sake of ritual (*yajñārtha*). They are simply for the sake of the human being (*puruṣārtha*). Therefore the opponent’s reason “for the sake of that” (*tādarthyā*) is not yet established as being applicable to the animals. Thus the syllogism has the fault of *hetvasiddhatā* (non-establishment of a reason).

As Halbfass [1992: 94–95] noted, Prabhākara holds the same view that ritual killing can be justified because it is “for the sake of ritual.”<sup>37</sup> It is possible that here Bhāviveka refers to a forerunner of Prabhākara. Elsewhere<sup>38</sup> Bhāviveka refers to what I tentatively call the theory of dharma manifestation (*dharmābhivyaktivāda*) that is similar to a Mīmāṃsā view mentioned by Bhartṛhari.<sup>39</sup> Considering the possibility that the Mīmāṃsaka referred to by Bhartṛhari might be Bhavadāsa,<sup>40</sup> the view mentioned by Bhāviveka might also be attributed to Bhavadāsa, or possibly other forerunners of Prabhākara. But this remains speculative.

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36 MHK 9.37: *bhoktrārthāḥ paśavo ’bhīṣṭā bhogyatvāt tad yathāṅganā/ tasmād yajñārthatāsiddheḥ paśūnām hetvasiddhatā//* “[Proposition:] It is accepted that animals are for the sake of their enjoyer. [Reason:] Because it is enjoyed. [Example:] Just like a woman. Therefore the reason is not established, because it is not established that animals are for the sake of ritual.”

37 *Bṛhatī* 40.6–7: *tasmād abhicārasyanarthatām pratipādayitum kṣamaḥ, nāgnīṣomīyādeḥ, kratvarthatvāt.* “Therefore [this general prohibition of killing] can communicate that black magic is *anartha* and not that the animal sacrifice for Agni and Soma is, because the latter is for the sake of ritual [and not for the sake of the human being].”

38 MHK 9.10 and 9.55.

39 See Kataoka [2000] and Aklujkar [2004].

40 See Bronkhorst [1989].

**Each action has a certain capacity as prescribed by the Veda  
(śaktibhedavyavasthā)<sup>41</sup>**

After refuting perception (MŚV *codanā*, vv. 232cd–234ab), inference (234cd–243ab) and consensus among people (243cd–249ab), which may prove that ritual killing is sinful, Kumāriḷa introduces a skilful opponent whom Umbeka (ŚVTṬ 112.13) identifies to be Mādhava, a Sāṃkhya theorist often called “destroyer of Sāṃkhya” (*sāṃkhyānāśaka*).<sup>42</sup> The Vedic prohibition “one should not kill any living beings” (*na hiṃsyāt sarvā bhūtāni*) prohibits killings in general. It informs us that killing is the cause of downfall (*pratyavāya*) (249cd–250ab). The role of a Vedic teaching is to communicate a hidden causal relationship as it is not to dynamically add or remove that relationship (250cd–251ab). Ritual killing is the same act of killing as that prohibited by the Veda. Therefore it must have the same capacity as that of other killings (251cd–252ab). The Veda cannot change the nature of reality.

According to Kumāriḷa, however, this reasoning does not work. One should take into consideration that an action may be the same, but have different effects from person to person according to their qualifications (*adhikāra*). Drinking *surā*, a specific kind of alcohol, is not prohibited for sūdras, though it is prohibited for the other three classes, i.e. brahmins, kṣatriyas and vaiśyas. The same act of drinking *surā* has different values for different kinds of people (252cd–253ab). This is also the case for the Vaiśyastoma ritual, which brings about fruits only for vaiśyas, but not for brahmins and kṣatriyas (253cd).

It is not only the person in charge but also the date that affects differences between the same action. For example, the new and full moon sacrifice is not effective if it is performed on the fifth day (254a); the Agnihotra offering is not effective if it is performed at midday and not in the morning and evening (254b). Therefore only an action as prescribed by the Veda as such and such, and not any action of the same kind, has the particular kind of fruit as promised (254cd–255ab).<sup>43</sup>

Therefore if one understands from a [Vedic] teaching that a certain action (*yādṛśam karma*) [performed] in a certain way is capable of

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41 See also Halbfass [1992: 91] for the following explanation of Kumāriḷa's *Mīmāṃsāśloka-vārttika*.

42 See Halbfass [1992: 116, n. 16].

43 MŚV *codanā*, v. 254cd–255ab: *tasmād yad yādṛśam karma yatphalotpattiśaktikam// śāstreṇa gamyate, tasya tādṛśasyaiva tat phalam/*

producing a certain fruit, [only] it, in the same form [as prescribed] (*tādrśasyaiva*), has that [particular] fruit.

The formula *yādrśam ... tādrśasya* indicates that the present verse is a parodied counterattack on the opponent's principle that Kumārila formulates in verse 235cd–236ab (*yādrk ... tathāvidham*) and Bhāviveka in MHK 9.40 (*yādrk ... tādrk*).

It is true that a Vedic teaching causes only a cognition of capacities and does not add them or remove them (256cd). But it informs us of the specific different capacities residing in different actions (257ab). There are also worldly examples such as eating, which has a different effect for a healthy or a sick man (257cd–258ab). Similarly, the same act of killing can have different effects according to whether or not it is within a Vedic ritual (258cd).

### A hypothesis concerning the historical development

Step 1. Theoretically speaking, the identification “Killing is nothing but killing” (*prāṇātīpāta, māraṇa, bhūtaḥimsā*) is the most basic criticism of ritual killing. Brahmanical defenders of ritual killing therefore must have made an attempt to establish a distinction between ritual and non-ritual actions of killing. Qualifications of killing by “inside a sacrifice” (*yajñe*), “being preceded by mantra” (*mantrapūrvaka*) or “being controlled by a spell” (*mantraparigraha*) are devices for setting up such particular situations under which killing is justified. As Kumārila intended (MŚV *codanā*, v. 223cd–224ab), killing is “generally” (*utsargeṇa*) prohibited but is “exceptionally” (*apavādena*) allowed. This first phase of vindication of ritual killing is recorded by Saṅghabhadra and Bhāviveka. Replying to this defence, Saṅghabhadra and Bhāviveka both point out the existence of magical rituals which will finally lead to bad effects. Śābara, too, has to accept that *abhicāra* types of ritual are evil because, being actions of killing (*ḥimsā*), they are prohibited and taught as a cause of “down-fall” (*pratyavāya*). In fact, Buddhists themselves accepted exceptional killing. Vasubandhu's definition of killing (*prāṇātīpāta*) as “error-free killing of others after deliberation” (*saṃcintya parasyābhrāntimāraṇam*) assumes that accidental homicide is not sinful. Therefore, disputants of both camps must have searched for another criterion to distinguish acceptable from unacceptable killing.

Step 2. The second criterion is based on the consensus among people (*lokaprasiddhi*) that helping (*anugraha*) is good and that causing pain (*pīḍā*) is bad. Ritual killing causes pain (*duḥkhādhāna*) to its victim and therefore is evil. This reasoning presupposes the moral system of karmic retribution that

Kumārila calls *karmānurūpya*. One will have to suffer pain corresponding to the pain that the victim has suffered. Abhidharmic arguments about the similarities (*sādrśya*) between cause and effect can be placed in this line of karmic balance of give-and-take. Bhāviveka and Kumārila generalise this balanced retribution in a sophisticated formula of *yādrk ... tādrk*. Relying on the same principle, however, it is possible for defenders of ritual killing to counterattack and argue that ritual killing rather helps its sacrificed victims in the end and therefore may be regarded as good according to the same principle. Saṅghabhadra's opponent mentions the simile of good doctors, who help patients in the end despite causing initial pain. Arguing against the simile of good doctors, Saṅghabhadra points out the existence of “the liberators from *saṃsāra*” (*saṃsāramocaka*), who claim that they kill worms, ants and the like for the sake of these victims. Kumārila's reference<sup>44</sup> to the liberators from *saṃsāra* is in a similar context in which he shows that there is no consensus among people about good and bad.

Step 3. As Saṅghabhadra noticed, the final effect of ritual killing is unobservable, whereas the effect of a medical operation is observable in this life. Therefore one cannot easily judge whether or not an action is sinful. Perception (*pratyakṣa*) is not enough to calculate the moral balance. Thus scripture (*śāstra*) is introduced for judgment. Saṅghabhadra and Bhāviveka both mention (Mīmāṃsā) proponents who defend ritual killing because of “being taught by scripture” (*śāstrokti*). Bhāviveka goes further and distinguishes between “one's own scripture” (*svaśāstra*) and “a scripture” without any specification (*sāmānyena*). The first possibility is a relativist view that the moral value of one's action is decided in accordance with “one's own scripture” and not a scripture that everyone follows. The same action of ritual killing, therefore, could be meritorious for some people but evil for others. This moral relativism is not accepted by both camps. Bhāviveka refers in this context to the liberators from *saṃsāra* (*saṃsāramocaka*), who kill worms, ants and the like following their own scripture. The second view, on the other hand, assumes an objective view of morality: a particular action that is enjoined as being meritorious is always meritorious whichever scripture one may follow. (This view, by the way, leads to Kumārila's idea of objective *śakti* of actions.) But the Vedic scripture, which enjoins ritual killing, is not accepted as an authoritative, reliable source for Buddhists. Both Saṅghabhadra and Bhāviveka dispute the authoritativeness of the Veda and discuss related topics such as eternity of sounds. Bhāviveka gives a precise expression “not being established for one of the sides” (*anya-*

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44 MŚV *autpattika*, v. 5cd. See Halbfass [1992: 120, n.51].

*tarāsidhatā*) to describe the fault of the reason “being taught by the [Vedic] scripture.”

Step 4. Mīmāṃsakas must have been forced to offer a criterion other than the Veda to defend ritual killing. Saṅghabhadra records no argument of this phase. Bhāviveka, however, refers to an opponent who appeals to the (typical Mīmāṃsā) distinction between “for the sake of ritual” (*kratvartha*) and “for the sake of the human being” (*puruṣārtha*). Vedic ritual killing, unlike killing outside ritual and black magic described in the Veda, is not motivated by desire for one's own good. If it were motivated by a selfish desire, the killing would be sinful. But ritual killing, such as the animal sacrifice for Agni and Soma (*agnī-śomīyapaśu*), is selflessly conducted simply because it is “for the sake of ritual” and must be done as a step in the process of the whole ritual, the main of which is, e.g. a Soma sacrifice such as Jyotiṣṭoma. This view of Bhāviveka's opponent is inherited by Prabhākara and his followers.

Step 5. The above criterion “being for the sake of the human being” and “being for the sake of ritual” still assumes the “give-and-take” moral accounting system described in Step 2: giving a deficit to others and thereby crediting oneself is regarded as bad. Kumārila completely rejects this commonsense presupposition as being unreliable and in many cases nonfunctional, e.g. in the case of illicit intercourse with a teacher's wife and drinking alcohol.<sup>45</sup> As already noticed by Saṅghabhadra (from Steps 2 to 3), a future result is beyond the scope of perception. Kumārila restores the criterion “being taught by the Vedic scripture” (described in Step 3) which has been criticised by Bhāviveka as not being acceptable for Buddhists and which has been adversely utilised against Mīmāṃsā by Mādhava, a Sāṃkhya theorist. From the contextual structure of the *codanā* section of the *Mīmāṃsāślokavārttika* as well as from the theoretical intimacy, it seems that Kumārila's idea is mostly inspired by Mādhava's criticism which is an artful combination of 1 and 3. Mādhava identifies ritual killing with killing that is prohibited by the Veda. In this way he utilises the authoritativeness of the Veda against Mīmāṃsā. Kumārila first establishes that there is no other reliable source than the Veda concerning dharma and adharma, i.e. religious and moral good and bad. He denies the possibility of omniscience alleged by Buddhists. Thus the Veda is the only source of information of dharma and adharma that are otherwise inaccessible. Kumārila presupposes the objectively fixed value of each action and therefore introduces the concept of *śakti* in the discussion. Each action has different but fixed capacity (*śakti*). But Kumārila does not forget to add a relativist flavour to his view by adding the condition that

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45 See Halbfass [1992: 90].

this capacity, which is otherwise unobservable, can be known only through the Veda, and that therefore it resides in an action exactly as described. Thus the same action can lead to different effects according to different situations and different types of qualified performers (*adhikārin*). Only the Veda can tell which is morally good or bad in a particular situation for a particular person.

**Arguments between Mīmāṃsakas (M) and  
Buddhists (B) as well as Sāṃkhyas (S)**

- 1 B: Ritual killing is identified as killing.  
M: It is exceptionally accepted.  
B: But black magic, etc. lead to undesirable fruit.
- 2 B: Ritual killing is bad, because injuring is bad.  
M: Ritual killing rather helps its victims.  
B: The vicious *saṃsāramocakas* claim that they help their victims.
- 3 M: Ritual killing is taught by the scripture.  
B: The scripture is not accepted as reliable.
- 4 M: Ritual killing is for the sake of ritual.  
B: It is for the sake of the human being.
- 5 S: Ritual killing is the same killing that the Veda prohibits. (1B+3M)  
M: A certain action under certain conditions prescribed for a certain person has a certain unobservable capacity that is known only through the Veda.

	NA (Taisho 29)	MHK (IX)	MŚV ( <i>codanā</i> )
1 B M B	530b14–15 530b16–17	38 32abc 33–34	
2 B M B	529c23–530b14 530b17–19 530b20–c4	39–40	235cd–236ab, 243cd
3 M B	530c4–6 530c6–531a19	32d 35	
4 M B		36 37	
5 S M			249cd–252ab 252cd–260ab

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- AK(Bh): *Abhidharma Kośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu*. Ed. P. Pradhan. Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1967.
- Kādambarī: Kādambarī by Bāṇa and His Son*. Ed. Peter Peterson. 2 parts. Bombay: Government Central Book Depot, 1889, 1899.
- JS: *Jaiminisūtra*. See TV.
- TJ: *Madhyamakahrdayakārikāvṛtti-Tarkajvālā, sDe dGe Tibetan Tripiṭaka bsTan ḥGyur. dBu Ma 3*. Tokyo: Sekai Seiten Kanko Kyokai, 1977.
- TV: *Tantravārttika. Śrīmajjaiminipraṇītaṃ Mīmāṃsādarśanam*. Ed. Subbāśāstrī. 6 *bhāgas*. Poona: Ānandāśramamudraṇālaya, 1929–34.
- NA: *Nyāyānusāra* or 阿毘達磨順正理論 (*Abhidharmanyāyānusārasāstra*). Taisho Shinshū Daizōkyō vol. 29.
- Bṛhatī: Bṛhatī of Prabhākara Miśra*. Ed. S.K. Rāmanātha Śāstrī (Part I), Madras: University of Madras, 1934.
- BB: *Bodhisattvabhūmi*. Ed. Unrai Wogihara. Tokyo: Sankibo Buddhist Book Store, 1971.
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- MHK: *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā*. K: See the edition in Kawasaki [1992]; L: *Madhyamakahrdayam of Bhavya*. Ed. Chr. Lindtner. Chennai: The Adyar Library and Research Centre, 2001.
- Manusmṛti*: See Olivelle 2005.
- MSA: *Mahāyāna-sūtrālamkāra*. Ed. Sylvain Levi. Paris: Librairie Honoré Champion, 1907.
- MŚV: *Ślokavārttikavyākhyā Tātparyaṭīkā of Umveka Bhaṭṭa*. Ed. S.K. Rāmanātha Śāstrī. Rev. K. Kunjuni Raja & R. Thangaswamy. Madras: University of Madras, 1971.
- LAS: *Saddharmalaṅkāvatārasūtra*. Ed. P.L. Vaidya. Darbhanga: The Mithila Institute, 1963.
- VP: *Bhartṛharis Vākyapadīya*. Ed. Wilhelm Rau. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1977.
- ŚBh: *Śābarabhāṣya*. See Frauwallner 1968.
- ŚVTT: *Ślokavārttikatātparyaṭīkā*. See MŚV.
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