

# Dharmottara's Theory of *Apoha*<sup>1</sup>

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## 1 Frauwallner's view of Dharmottara's theory of *apoha*

Essentially Dharmottara has changed nothing of Dharmakīrti's theory of *apoha*.<sup>2</sup> This is Frauwallner's final evaluation of Dharmottara's theory of *apoha*. Dharmottara is completely dependent on Dharmakīrti.<sup>3</sup> And when Dharmottara does deviate from Dharmakīrti's position, it does not concern new ideas but remains a mere reshaping of his predecessor's view.<sup>4</sup>

Frauwallner's view, however, seems to be incompatible with Jayanta's understanding.<sup>5</sup> Frauwallner noticed it and comments on it with a quotation of the relevant passage from the *Nyāyamañjarī*.<sup>6</sup> There, Jayanta contrasts two theories of *apoha* by using Maṇḍana's terminologies of error (*vibhrama*).<sup>7</sup> One theory of

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<sup>2</sup> Frauwallner 1937:287: "An sehr vielem hat er überhaupt nichts geändert, und wo er ändert, handelt es sich im Grunde doch um keine wirklich neuen Gedanken, sondern nur um eine Umformung der Gedanken Dharmakīrtis, wobei er sogar in Widersprüche gerät und das sorgfältig ausgeglichene Ebenmaß von Dharmakīrtis Gedankengebäude stört."

<sup>3</sup> Frauwallner 1937:286–287: "Im wesentlichen ist er doch vollkommen von Dharmakīrti abhängig."

<sup>4</sup> See note 2.

<sup>5</sup> Frauwallner's view is also incompatible with the perspective of Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti, who criticize Dharmottara by labeling him as *sākṣādapohavādin* (JNĀ 203.15) and *pratiṣedhavādin* (RNĀ 54.4). In other words, Dharmottara's view is different from Dharmakīrti's from the perspective of Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti. For the identification of *pratiṣedhavādin* as Dharmottara, see Akamatsu 1984, 1986.

<sup>6</sup> Frauwallner 1937:280, n.1: "Den Unterschied zwischen dieser Auffassung und der Lehre Dharmakīrtis hat Jayantabhaṭṭa gut hervorgehoben (Ny. maj., S. 308, 3-8): *so 'yaṃ nāntaro na bāhyo 'nya eva kaścid āropita ākāro vyāvṛtticchāyogād apohaśabdārtha ucyate itīyam asatkhyātivādagarbhā saraṇiḥ// atha vā vikalpapratibimbakaṃ jñānākāramātrakam eva/ tad abāhyam api vicitravāsanābhedopāhitarūpabhedam bāhyavad avabhāsamānaṃ lokayātrām bi-bharti/ vyāvṛtticchāyogāc ca tad apoha iti vyavahriyate seyam ātmākhyātiagarbhā saraṇiḥ//* Auch Dharmakīrti hatte nicht das Vorstellungsbild an sich als Gegenstand der Vorstellungen bezeichnet, sondern nur insofern es nach außen verlegt erscheint. Aber Dharmottara hat die Verschiedenheit von der Erkenntnis als solcher schärfer hervorgehoben, wenn er auch, wie seine Darstellung zeigt, den Zusammenhang zwischen Erkenntnisbild und Gegenstand der Vorstellung nie aus dem Auge verloren hat. Über die tatsächlichen Verhältnisse bestand also keine Meinungsverschiedenheit. Nur in der Art, wie sie aufgefaßt und ausgedrückt wurden, liegt der Unterschied."

<sup>7</sup> See VV v.1: *ātmākhyātir asatkhyātir akhyātīḥ khyātir anyathā/ parīkṣakāṇāṃ vibhṛāntau*

*apoha*, according to Jayanta, is parallel to the theory of *asatkhyāti* and the other *ātmakhyāti*.<sup>8</sup> As Frauwallner correctly assumes, the former can be ascribed to Dharmottara<sup>9</sup> and the latter to Dharmakīrti,<sup>10</sup> although Jayanta never mentions them by name. Frauwallner initially agrees that Jayanta intends to show a theoretical difference between Dharmakīrti's and Dharmottara's theories of *apoha*. Implicitly dismissing Jayanta's observation, however, Frauwallner concludes that there is no difference of opinion between Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara; and that the difference lies only in the manner of understanding and the mode of expression. Again, Frauwallner finds no fundamental difference between Dharmakīrti's and Dharmottara's theories of *apoha*.<sup>11</sup>

But is it the case that Dharmottara's theory of *apoha* is essentially non-different from Dharmakīrti's? Can one conclude, as Frauwallner does, that the difference is superficial, not fundamental? Is Jayanta's observation mistaken or not to be taken seriously? In the following the present author elucidate this problem by carefully examining the models of *apoha* theory that Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara presuppose.

## 2 Dignāga's theory of *apoha*

Before examining Dharmakīrti's theory of *apoha*, we must first review Dignāga's theory of *apoha*,<sup>12</sup> since Dharmakīrti's model developed out of Dignāga's.

Dignāga replaces universals (*jāti*) accepted in brahmanical schools with exclusion of others (*anyāpoha*). The word "cow" expresses "not being non-cows", i.e. the exclusion of non-cows. Universals such as cowness do not exist at all in the external world. It is precisely the exclusion of non-cows that we conceptualize as "cow." As Jayanta observes, Kumāriila understands this exclusion to be equivalent to nonexistence (*abhāva*), a kind of external reality (*vastu*) in Kumāriila's system of ontology.<sup>13</sup>

Kumāriila's interpretation can be justified. According to Dignāga, "cow" denotes negation of non-cows. Therefore, the meaning of "cow" is precisely the

<sup>8</sup>See §3.1 and §3.2 of the *Nyāyamañjarī*, Kataoka 2009:34–35. According to the theory of *ātmakhyāti*, it is cognition itself (*ātman*) that appears (*khyāti*) as an external, real entity, whereas it is a nonexistent (*asat*), i.e. an unreal, fabricated fiction (*āropita*), that appears and that is not distinguished from an external, real entity according to the theory of *asatkhyāti*. Dharmottara's notion of *āropita* has a connotation of being unreal, fictional and fabricated. See JNĀ 230.4: *āropitam ity api kalpitam evocayate*. "Furthermore, when you say *āropita*, you refer to precisely *kalpita*."

<sup>9</sup>This is proved by Cakradhara's commentary NMGBh (132.24: *jñānārthābhyām anya eveti dharmottaraḥ*).

<sup>10</sup>I discussed it in Kataoka 2009:9–12.

<sup>11</sup>Hattori also, though admitting that Dharmottara "was an original thinker", and "made some amendments", maintained that he "basically followed Dharmakīrti's views" (Hattori: 2006:68).

<sup>12</sup>For Dignāga's theory of *apoha*, see Katsura 1988, 1999, Hattori 2006 and Pind 2009.

<sup>13</sup>*Nyāyamañjarī*, Kataoka 2009:26.3–4: *apoho yady abhāvātmā bahir abhyupagamyate/ tato bhavati bhāvataḥ vāgajālam na tv asau tathā//* "If [we] accepted *apoha* to be an external negation by nature, the net of [critical] words from you would apply. But it is not so."

nonexistence (*abhāva*) of non-cows. It can be classified as mutual nonexistence (*anyonyābhāva*) among the fourfold classification of nonexistence that Kumārila presents.<sup>14</sup> In this way, the nonexistence of non-cows, in place of universal cowness, functions as a generic property of all individual cows. As Dignāga describes, “a word denotes things exclusively as qualified by preclusion of other referents (*śabda 'rthāntaranivṛtviśiṣṭān eva bhāvān āha*).”<sup>15</sup>

Dignāga criticizes the Naiyāyika model of *tadvat*, “[a locus] which has that”: a word expresses individuals qualified by a universal. Dignāga's own model, however, remains similar to the Naiyāyika model of *tadvat* as a whole. Only the role of universal is replaced by *apoha*.

### 3 Dharmakīrti's theory of *apoha*

#### 3.1 Criticism by Kumārila

Assuming Dignāga's *apoha* to be equivalent to nonexistence, i.e. a kind of external entity, Kumārila points out various problems with this model.<sup>16</sup> As Kumārila points out in the opening verse of his criticism, negation of non-cows, “not being anything that is not a cow,” necessarily presupposes affirmation of *cowness*. “Clearly those people who postulate that [a word] expresses negation of non-cows as a common property [in fact] have referred precisely to the real entity cowness with the term ‘the exclusion of non-cows’.”<sup>17</sup> Indeed double negation leads to many undesirable consequences. Not non-cows amounts to being the same as cow. These and other problems that Kumārila has pointed out in the *Ślokavārttika* are explained in prose by Jayanta.<sup>18</sup>

#### 3.2 Dharmakīrti's strategy

Quite correctly Kumārila understands Dignāga's theory as being essentially parallel to the Naiyāyika view of *tadvat*. In order to avoid Kumārila's criticism, Dharmakīrti has changed the model drastically.<sup>19</sup> He agrees that the Buddhist model of *apoha* would lead to problems if it were identified with the view of *tadvat*. But this is not the case, replies Dharmakīrti.<sup>20</sup> Opponents misunderstand the Buddhist

<sup>14</sup>ŚV *abhāva*, 2cd–4.

<sup>15</sup>PSV ad V 36d (quoted in PVSV 62.27-63.1), translation quoted from Pind 2009:106. Cf. Pind 1999.

<sup>16</sup>For Kumārila's criticism of *apoha*, see Hattori 1973, 1975.

<sup>17</sup>ŚV *apoha*, 1: *agonivṛtīḥ sāmānyam vācyam yaiḥ parikalpītam/ gotvaṃ vastv eva tair uktaṃ ago'pohagīrā sphuṭam//*

<sup>18</sup>See the synopsis of the *Nyāyamañjarī*, Kataoka 2008:17–18. Cf. also Hattori 2006.

<sup>19</sup>For Dharmakīrti's theory of *apoha*, see Frauwallner 1932, 1933, 1935; Vetter 1964; Dunne 2004, 2011; and Tillemans 2011.

<sup>20</sup>PV I 64 (34.17-18): *tenānyāpohaviṣaye tadvatpakṣopavarṇanam/ pratyākhyātaṃ pṛthaktve hi syād doṣo jātitadvatoḥ//* “Therefore, concerning the object (i.e. locus) of exclusion of other things, the [opponent's] explanation of the [Buddhist] view of *tadvat* (a locus qualified by *apoha*) is refuted, for if [*apoha* and its locus were] different, the problem that applies to [the non-Buddhist view of]

theory, which does not posit negation as a common property from the beginning. Instead, the Buddhist model, according to Dharmakīrti, starts from real entities, i.e. individuals such as cows. Individual cows cause us to erroneously cognize cowness. But *cowness* never exists.

The difference in the two theories can be described, as modern scholars do, in terms of “top-down” and “bottom-up.”<sup>21</sup> Following Jayanta’s perspective, however, the difference can be described in terms of “external” (*bahir*) and “internal” (*antar*).<sup>22</sup> The object of conceptual cognitions is essentially an external negation for Dignāga whereas for Dharmakīrti it is an internal image or aspect (*ākāra*, *pratibhāsa*, *pratibimba*) that appears in a cognition.<sup>23</sup>

### 3.3 Dharmakīrti’s model of *apoha*

Trees, for example, produce in our mind the same image due to their nature (*prakṛtyā*) and to the nature of residual impressions (*vāsanā*). We perceive a tree and have a conceptual cognition “tree”. Because of this generic image (*ākāra*), our identifying cognitions (*pratyavamarśa*) or recognitions (*pratyabhijñāna*) “tree”, which are conceptual cognitions (*vikalpa*) that we have on each occasion after perceiving a tree, are regarded as identical. We have one and the same identifying cognition with respect to different individual trees. Hence perceptions (*darśana*, *dhī*) that precede these conceptual cognitions and that are in fact different from each other can be regarded as being non-different (*abhedinī*). Hence the objects such as individual trees that produce these perceptions and that are different from each other can be regarded as non-different (*abhinna*).<sup>24</sup> Trees are cognized generically. Different individual trees are grouped under the category “tree”. All trees accomplish the same effect (*artha*, *kārya*), i.e., the conceptual cognition “tree”, whereas water, for instance, does not have that effect.<sup>25</sup> Accomplishing the same effect (*ekārthasādhana*) functions as a common property.<sup>26</sup> Putting it in a negative form, it is “exclusion from those that do not have the same effect” (*atatkāryaparāvṛtti*) that functions as a common property

universal and its locus would apply [similarly to the Buddhist view of *apoha*].”

<sup>21</sup>See, for example, Tillemans 2011.

<sup>22</sup>See Kataoka 2009, in particular 2009:15–16. The following passage is most explicit. NM II 45.8–10: *vyāvṛttir api bāhyā cet, tadavasthā kaumāriladūṣaṅāśaniḥ. āntaratve tu na tayā vikalpoparāgaḥ kartuṃ śakyah. nāntar na bahir iti tu bhaṅgībhaṅgītimātram (bhaṅgībhaṅgītimātram] em.; bhaṅgītibhaṅgīmātram ed.)*. “Furthermore, if exclusion is external, the thunderbolt of criticism by Kumāriḥ remains valid. If it is internal, however, it cannot color conceptual cognition. But the statement that it is neither internal nor external is a mere fraudulent talk.”

<sup>23</sup>Śākyabuddhi makes it clear that *vikalpapratibhāsa* is the *apoha* (etymologically interpreted as *apohakaraṇa*) that Dharmakīrti considers as the denotation of a word. See *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā* ad I 40 (Ishida 2011:198): *vikalpabuddhipratibhāsas tu tṛtīyaḥ, anyo 'pohyate 'neneti kṛtvā, yo 'yaṃ sāstrakārasya śabadavācyatayābhimataḥ*.

<sup>24</sup>PV I 109. See Dunne 2004:121.

<sup>25</sup>PVSV 41.3–6.

<sup>26</sup>PV I 73.

of individual trees.<sup>27</sup> As Dharmakīrti states, this difference (*bheda*) of trees from water, etc., functions as a common property (*sāmānya*).<sup>28</sup> Individual entities have the capacity to produce a notion of universal (*sāmānyajñājananaśakti*) that in fact does not exist at all in the external world.<sup>29</sup> Only a certain set of external things is capable of producing the notion of “tree” whereas other things are not.<sup>30</sup> There is a particular capacity in the object that guarantees the particular concept in the subject.

“As is well known, only analytical scholars discriminate in this way and not ordinary men in everyday activity.”<sup>31</sup> From the perspective of analytical scholars (*vyākhyātāraḥ*), what unifies individual cows is in fact the same conceptual cognition that has one form.<sup>32</sup> Ultimately (*paramārthena*), universals do not exist (*asat*).<sup>33</sup> From the perspective of ordinary men in everyday activity (*vyavahartāraḥ*), however, an internal image and an external entity are intermingled. “They take action after mingling what is seen and what is conceptualized.”<sup>34</sup> They erroneously assume an internal image to be identical with an external entity.<sup>35</sup> This process of determination is called *adhyavasāya*.

### 3.4 The weakness of Dharmakīrti's theory

As Jayanta points out in his *Nyāyamañjarī* (§3.4.5.3 in Kataoka 2009), internal images (*ākāra*) that are essentially not different from conceptual cognitions (*vikalpa*<sub>1</sub> and *vikalpa*<sub>2</sub>) are different from each other because instances of conceptual cognition are different from each other. In other words, it is not the case that *ākāra*<sub>0</sub> is the same as Dharmakīrti suggests. Different objects (*artha*<sub>1</sub> and *artha*<sub>2</sub>) produce different conceptual cognitions (*vikalpa*<sub>1</sub> and *vikalpa*<sub>2</sub>) that have different internal images (*ākāra*<sub>1</sub> and *ākāra*<sub>2</sub>). Dharmottara points out in AP 241.5-6 that internal reflections (*pratibimba*), because they are particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*), i.e. unique, inasmuch as they are not different from cognitions, cannot be the meanings of words

<sup>27</sup>PV I 139.

<sup>28</sup>PVSV 42.8; 68.24.

<sup>29</sup>NM II 38.15–16. See also PVSV 50.13–14: *avaśyaṃ cecchatāpi sāmānyam vyaktīnām ekakāryajananaśaktir eṣṭavyā*. “And necessarily you have to accept a capacity of individuals to produce one effect even though you accept a universal.”

<sup>30</sup>Dharmakīrti's view that perceptions (*darśana*) and individuals (*vyakti*) produce the same effect, i.e. *ekapratyavamarśa*, is criticized by an opponent in AP 248.30–249.6. Dharmottara offers a solution quite different from Dharmakīrti's own view. See note 40. Dharmottara is well aware that his view is different from Dharmakīrti's. Therefore in AP 249.24–26 Dharmottara lets an opponent raise a question with regard to the difference, i.e. his deviation from Dharmakīrti's view.

<sup>31</sup>PVSV 39.5–6: *vyākhyātāraḥ khalv evaṃ vivecayanti na vyavahartāraḥ*.

<sup>32</sup>PV I 68: *dhiyā ekārthapratibhāsinyā*; PVSV 38.19: *pratibhāsam abhinnam ātmīyam*; PVSV 41.4: *ekam ekākāram pratyabhijñānam*.

<sup>33</sup>PV I 70.

<sup>34</sup>PVSV 39.7–8: *dṛśyavikalpyāv arthāv ekākṛtya pravartante*.

<sup>35</sup>PVSV 42.18–20: *tatra yo 'rthākāraḥ pratibhāti bāhya ivaika ivānarthakriyākārya api tatkārīva, vyavahāriṇām tathādhyavasāya pravṛtteḥ, ...*

(*śabdābhidheya*).<sup>36</sup> The internal image, *ākāra*<sub>0</sub>, that Dharmakīrti wants to have the role of the universal, cannot fulfill the task, because it is not one but remains just as plural as cognitions and objects. Dharmottara is well aware of this problem. Unlike a single universal which is common to many particulars, such as cowness common to many individual cows, internal images that we have in conceptual cognitions cannot be common with respect to different particulars and therefore cannot unify them because images remain as many. Dharmottara feels that internal images, being essentially instances of cognition, have too much solidity and fixity.

#### 4 Dharmottara's theory of *apoha*

Instead of expecting in vain internal images to be one, e.g. common with respect to individual cows, Dharmottara posits the existence of something external to conceptual cognitions. But at the same time he denies the externality of that something. It is not an existent (*asat*). It is a certain fabricated form (*āropitaṃ kiñcid ākāramātram*), which is neither internal nor external (*nāntar na bahir*), and which is unreal (*nistattva*) and false (*alīka*).<sup>37</sup> When Dharmottara states “neither cognition nor external” in the opening verse of his *Apohaprakaraṇa*,<sup>38</sup> which is later glossed by Jayanta as “neither internal nor external”,<sup>39</sup> he most probably intends to deny Dharmakīrti's “internal” or “cognition” view with the term “neither cognition”. Dharmottara rejects the view that the direct object of a conceptual cognition is an internal image that appears in a cognition. Dharmakīrti's “internal” view assumes that an internal image that is not different from cognition plays an important role in the theory of *apoha*. Dharmottara denies this view. An internal image does not play any active role according to Dharmottara's theory of *apoha*. This is Jayanta's understanding of Dharmottara's view. Jayanta's perspective is indeed confirmed by Dharmottara's own explanations. Dharmottara's modification clearly aims at overcoming the weakness of Dharmakīrti's theory of which Dharmottara is well aware. This is why he takes the third view of “neither external nor internal”.

The fabricated form (*āropitākāra*) functions as a kind of universal. Different

<sup>36</sup>See note 75.

<sup>37</sup>*Nyāyamañjarī*, Kataoka 2009:27.7–8: *yata eva tan nāntar bahir asti, tata eva mithyeti kālpanikam iti gṛyate. kiñ punas tat. āropitaṃ kiñcid ākāramātram vikalpoparañjakam*; Kataoka 27:3: *nanu yad vidyate nāntar na bahiḥ paramārthataḥ*!; see also the opening verse of Dharmottara's AP (note 38). Sucarita's description of Dharmottara's view is similar. ŚVK 2615.9-11 (Adyar manuscript No. 63359): *kas tasyā viṣayaḥ. svākāra evety eke. kalpitaṃ nistattvam alīkam ity anye*. Cf. Kataoka 2009:4.

<sup>38</sup>See Ishida 2008: *buddhyā kalpikayā viviktam aparair yad rūpam ullikhyate buddhir no na bahir yad eva ca vadan nistattvam āropitam/ yas tattvaṃ jagato jagāda vijayī niḥśeṣadoṣadviṣaṃ vaktāraṃ tam iha praṇamya śirasāpohaḥ sa vistāryate*// “The nature which is distinct from others is drawn by the conceptual cognition, as neither the cognition nor the external (object). Paying reverence here with my head to the faultless teacher who is the conqueror and who, stating that unreal and superimposed (nature), taught people the truth, I shall explain in detail that (doctrine of) exclusion (*apoha*)” (Ishida's translation). See also Jambūvijaya 1968 (not quoted in Ishida 2008).

<sup>39</sup>*Nyāyamañjarī*, Kataoka 2009:27.3.

conceptual cognitions have this common form as their objects. Therefore, the difference of conceptual cognitions does not matter in Dharmottara's theory of *apoha*. They have the same object in common and therefore are regarded as one, as Dharmottara explicitly states: "We claim conceptual cognitions caused by the force of perceptions of objects to be non-different [from each other], not because the effects are non-different, but because their objects are non-different."<sup>40</sup> This is a clear denial of Dharmakīrti's device of "accomplishing one effect." Now the *āropita*, a fictional object, fulfils the key role of unification. Be aware of the difference that in Dharmakīrti's system the *ākāra*<sub>0</sub> which is the direct object of a conceptual cognition is inside a cognition, whereas in Dharmottara's system the *āropita*, i.e. the fictional, fabricated form, is not inside a conceptual cognition (and at the same time it is not an external entity outside a cognition). Internal images cannot but remain many whereas the *āropita* can be one and common to different conceptual cognitions.

By avoiding the problem of ontological difference among internal images, Dharmottara succeeds in reinstating Dignāga's simple model of *apoha* being common to different conceptual cognitions. In other words, Dharmottara reestablishes the so-called "top-down" model.<sup>41</sup> Dharmottara's passage quoted above (AP 249.7-9) strongly supports that the device of "accomplishing one effect" (*ekārthasādhana*), which is essential for Dharmakīrti's bottom-up model, no longer plays the primary role in Dharmottara's model in which the *āropita* functions as the cause of unifying individuals as if it were a universal. It is *āropita* and not *ākāra*<sub>0</sub> that is assumed as being one, i.e. being different from others.<sup>42</sup> Of course, he does not revive it as it was, because the "external" theory has been severely criticized by Kumāriila. Dharmottara explicitly denies the externality of the meaning of a word.

At the same time, he remembers to preserve (or include subserviently) Dharmakīrti's ideas of the "bottom-up" model. It is not difficult for this fictional form to have the negative aspect of exclusion based on efficacy. What is excluded from others (*anyavyāvṛtta*) is fabricated.<sup>43</sup> And its understanding consists in the conceptualization of a particular efficacy.<sup>44</sup> When one has the same effect, i.e. concept-

<sup>40</sup>AP 249.7-9: *don mthoñ ba'i nus pa'i rgyu mshan can gyi nram par rtog pa nams ni 'bras bu tha mi dad pas tha dad pa med par mi brjod kyi/ 'on kyañ yul tha mi dad pas so//* Frauwallner 1937:272: "Wir bezeichnen die Vorstellungen, welche durch die Kraft der Wahrnehmung der Gegenstände verursacht werden, nicht deswegen als nichtverschieden, weil sie die gleiche Wirkung haben, sondern weil ihr Gegenstand nicht verschieden ist." Cf. also Akamatsu 1982:933(109).

<sup>41</sup>That Dharmottara's view is akin to Dignāga's is indirectly supported by Ratnakīrti's labeling Dharmottara as *pratiṣedhavādīn*.

<sup>42</sup>AP 247.3-5: *gžan las ldog par sgro btags so žes brjod kyi nram par rtog pa bdag ñid ni ldog pa dañ ldan pa rtogs pa yin no žes ñes pa ma yin no//* Frauwallner 1937:269: "ebenso sagen wir, daß etwas von anderem Verschiedenes übertragen wird, ... aber wir behaupten nicht, daß die Vorstellung selbst, etwas mit einer Verschiedenheit Verbundenen erkennt."

<sup>43</sup>See note 42

<sup>44</sup>AP 247.8-10: *'dir ni gžan dañ ma 'dres pa'i rañ bžin gyis don byed par nram par rtog par byed pa ñid śugs kyis gžan las ldog par rtogs par byed pa yin no žes brjod pa'i phyir gsum du*

alization of the same form, one superimposes non-difference.<sup>45</sup> The ascertainment that the fictional, fabricated form is non-different is based on the same appearing form. And this superimposing cognition explains why perceptions and individual objects are regarded as being similar.<sup>46</sup> Dharmotatra's *apoha*, because it is nothing concrete (*na kiñcid eva*), can absorb many characteristics required for *apoha*.<sup>47</sup>

## 5 Dharmottara's implicit denial of Dharmakīrti's theory

Dharmottara is well aware that his theory of *apoha* contradicts Dharmakīrti's view. He intends to change the "internal" model that Dharmakīrti assumes.<sup>48</sup> But of course Dharmottara cannot openly criticize Dharmakīrti. He implicitly criticizes Dharmakīrti's view. And where contradiction is so explicit that one cannot easily neglect it, Dharmottara tries to reinterpret Dharmakīrti's passages so that they accord with his own view.

According to Dharmottara, conceptual cognitions (*vikalpa*), when they arise, falsely determine (*adhyavasyati*) a fabricated form (*āropita*), which is not a unique form (*svalakṣaṇa*), as being a real entity.<sup>49</sup> We understand conceptual cognitions as

*rtogs par thal ba med do/ / Frauwallner 1937:269-270: "Im vorliegenden Falle aber sagen wir, daß die Vorstellung von etwas Wirksamem in einer mit anderem nicht vermischten Beschaffenheit naturgemäß (sāmarthyāt) etwas von anderem Verschiedenes erkennt. Daher ergibt sich keineswegs, daß jene drei erkannt werden müssen."*

<sup>45</sup> AP 250.17-19: *tha mi dad pa'i rañ bzin du sgro btags pa de nīd ni mtshuñs par snañ ba'i rnam par rtog pa rnam kyis 'jug pa yin te/ Frauwallner 1937:273: "Aber diese Übertragung als nichtverschiedenes Wesen kommt durch Vorstellungen zustande, welche das gleiche Bild zeigen;"*

<sup>46</sup> AP 250.22-27: *gañ gi tshē sgro btags kyi rañ bzin tha mi dad par ñes pa yañ mtshuñs par snañ ba'i dbañ gis yin pa de'i phyir 'bras bu rañ bzin gcig tu sgro 'dogs pa'i šes pa nīd kyis gsal ba rnam dañ mthoñ ba rnam mtshuñs par brjod pa yin no// Frauwallner 1937:274: "Weil also durch die übertragene Beschaffenheit alles Sehen und alles Gesehene nichtverschieden ist und die Bestimmung der übertragenen Wesenheit als nichtverschieden infolge des gleichen Erkenntnisbildes stattfindet, darum sagt man von den Einzeldingen und vom Sehen, daß sie gleich sind, weil sie eine Erkenntnis zur Wirkung haben, welche als ein einziges Wesen überträgt."*

<sup>47</sup> As described by Jayanta in the *Nyāyamañjarī* (Kataoka 2009:32) and Dharmottara in AP 246.14–17, *āropita* has three different aspects, namely, being common to affirmation and negation (*bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇa*), being understood exclusively (*niyatarāpa*), and appearing as if an external object (*bāhyārthasadrśa*). For the first aspect, i.e. that *āropita* (or *āropitasya bāhyatvam*) can be connected with affirmation (*vidhi*) and negation (*niśedha*), see note 48. Cf. also NVTĪ 442.14-16: *tat siddham alikam bāhyatvam (bāhyatvam] J; bāhyam ed.) viṣayo vikalpānām śabdānām ceti. tac cedam anyavyāvrttirūpam, bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇyād atyantavilakṣaṇānām śalakṣaṇyāpādanāc ca tādrūpyānubhavāc ca.*

<sup>48</sup> Therefore Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti rejects Dharmottara's view, saying that it is nonsense. JNĀ229.16–17: *etena yat fikākāra āropitasya bāhyatvaviṣayau vidhiniśedhāv ity alaukikam anāgamam atārkikīyaṃ kathayati, tad apahastitam;* RNĀ 60.12–13: *etena yad dharmottara āropitasya bāhyatvasya vidhiniśedhāv ity alaukikam anāgamam atārkikīyaṃ kathayati, tad apy apahastitam.* Jñānaśrīmitra criticizes Dharmottara's interpretation of Dharmakīrti's passages that I discuss in §6.1 and §6.2. See Akamatsu 1984.

<sup>49</sup> Strictly speaking, it is *bhedānādhyavasāya* (non-determination of a distinction [between the two]) and not *abhedādhyavasāya* (determination of the non-difference [of the two]) that Dharmottara

if they ascertain real entities. But they do not.<sup>50</sup> Remember that in Dharmottara's system, it is a fabricated form (*āropita*) and not an internal image (*grāhyākāra*) that is the direct object of conceptual cognitions (*vikalpa*). Dharmottara clarifies the potential problems of Dharmakīrti's model by introducing the terms *grāhyākāra* and *grāhakākāra*.<sup>51</sup> The former corresponds to what Dharmakīrti refers to as *prati-bhāsa*, *ākāra* or *pratibimba*, and the latter *vikalpa*, *jñāna*, etc. The point is that ontologically *grāhyākāra* and *grāhakākāra* are identical. They are just two aspects of the same cognition. If *grāhakākāras* are many, corresponding *grāhyākāras* cannot be one but remain many. It is the *grāhyākāra* that is the direct object of conceptual cognitions for Dharmakīrti whereas for Dharmottara it is the *āropita*.

Dharmottara's view of *āropita* is incompatible with Dharmakīrti's view in which an internal image is regarded as the object of conceptual cognitions. Therefore, an opponent naturally raises a question: "Isn't it *grāhyākāra* that is the object of conceptual cognitions? Why do you claim that *āropita* is grasped?"<sup>52</sup>

Dharmottara addresses this objection saying that an internal image is the object of a self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*) and not of a conceptual cognition (*vikalpa*). What is ascertained (*niścīyate*) is the object of conceptual cognitions (*vikalpaṣaya*). But an internal image is not ascertained. Therefore, it cannot be the object of a conceptual cognition.<sup>53</sup> Remember that in Dharmakīrti's system an internal image, which is essentially not different from the cognition, is the object of a conceptual cognition, whereas in Dharmottara's system a fictional form posited external to a cognition, a form which is in fact neither external nor internal, is the object of conceptual cognitions. Internal images do not function as a common property, because they are plural just as their essence, i.e. cognitions, are many and different from each other. An internal image or an aspect of a cognition, if it works, can only be the object of a cognition's self-awareness. It does not play a decisive role in Dharmottara's system of *apoha*.

In order to justify his view, Dharmottara quotes PV I 57 that seemingly sup-

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accepts as his own view. See Kataoka 2009:37–38.

<sup>50</sup> AP 237.21–24: *nam par rtog pa rnam ni sgro btags pa'i rañ bžin rañ gi mtshan ñid du med pa ñid žen par skyes pa na dños po ñes pa ñid du skyes pa rtogs pa yin gyi/ de dag dños po yod pa ñid ñes pa ni ma yin no//* Frauwallner 1937:257: "Die Vorstellungen entstehen nämlich, indem sie eine übertragene Wesenheit, welche nicht eigenes Merkmal ist, bestimmen, werden aber so aufgefaßt, wie wenn sie entstünden, indem sie die Dinge bestimmen. Sie bestimmen jedoch nichts Wirkliches."

<sup>51</sup> AP 238.27–34.

<sup>52</sup> AP 237.27–28: *gal te gzuñ ba'i nam pa nam par rtog pa rnam kyi yul ma yin nam/ des na ci'i phyir sgro btags pa 'dzin par brjod ce na/* Frauwallner 1937:258: "(Einwand:) Ist nicht die erfaßte Erscheinungsform (*grāhyākārah*) Gegenstand der Vorstellungen? Warum sagt ihr also, daß sie etwas Übertragenes erfassen?"

<sup>53</sup> AP 237.28–31: *gzuñ ba'i nam pa ni rañ rig pa'i yul yin gyi nam par rtog pa'i ni ma yin no// 'di ltar gañ žig ñes par byas pa de nam par rtog pa'i yul yin no // gzuñ ba'i nam pa ni ñes pa ma yin na ji ltar nam par rtog pa'i yul du 'gyur/* Frauwallner 1937:258: "(Antwort:) Die erfaßte Erscheinungsform ist Gegenstand des Bewußtseins (*svasaṃvedanam*), aber nicht der Vorstellung. Denn was bestimmt wird, ist Gegenstand der Vorstellung. Die erfaßte Erscheinungsform wird aber nicht bestimmt. Wieso sollte sie also Gegenstand der Vorstellung sein?"

ports his view.<sup>54</sup> In this way, Dharmottara tries to conceal his deviation and avoid criticizing Dharmakīrti explicitly. He implicitly criticizes Dharmakīrti and at the same time insists that his view accords with Dharmakīrti's intention. Dharmottara's apologetic strategy of authorizing his view all the more strengthens our impression that Dharmottara is in fact well aware of his deviation and that he intentionally changes Dharmakīrti's system.

Despite the severe rejection by Dharmottara, the opponent still adheres to the outmoded theory of internal image. Echoing Dharmakīrti's passage in PVI in II 46.7,<sup>55</sup> the opponent suggests as follows: a conceptual cognition determines (*adhyavasyati*) its own appearance (*svapratibhāsa*), which is in fact not an external object (*anartha*), as an external object. Therefore this appearance is the object of a conceptual cognition.<sup>56</sup> This view of the opponent perfectly accords to Dharmakīrti's view of *vikalpa*.

Dharmottara enumerates four possible meanings of this "determination" (*adhyavasāya*) of an internal image: it is either grasping (*grahaṇa*), producing (*karaṇa*), connecting (*yojanā*), or superimposing (*samāropa*).<sup>57</sup> The fourth is probably what Dharmottara regards as the view of his main opponent.<sup>58</sup> Therefore Dharmottara refutes the fourth in length.<sup>59</sup> If a conceptual cognition superimposes its own form to an external object, it needs first to perceive its own form and then superimposes it. But this process is impossible, because a cognition does not

<sup>54</sup>PV I 59cd: *yan na niścīyate rūpaṃ tat teṣāṃ viśayaḥ katham*// Frauwallner 1937:258: "Wieso sollte eine Erscheinungsform, welche durch die bestimmende Erkenntnis nicht bestimmt wird, Gegenstand derselben sein?"

<sup>55</sup>See note 63.

<sup>56</sup>AP 238.6–7: *gal te rnam par rtog pa rañ gi snañ ba don med pa la don du lhag par zen pa ma yin nam/ de'i phyir de ni de'i yul yin no ze na/* Frauwallner 1937:258: "(Einwand:) Die Vorstellung bestimmt doch ihr Erscheinungsbild, das nicht Gegenstand ist, als Gegenstand. Daher ist dieses ihr Objekt." Cf. NVTṬ 441.8–9: *svākāram abāhyaṃ bāhyam adhyavasyan vikalpaḥ svākārabāhyataviśaya iti cet.*

<sup>57</sup>AP 238.9–10: *ci ste lhag par zen pa zes bya ba 'di ci yin/ ci 'dzin pa yin nam/ 'on te byed pa yin nam/ de ste sbyor ba yin nam/ ci ste sgro 'dogs pa yin/* Frauwallner 1937: 258: "(Antwort:) Was ist dieses „Bestimmen“ (*adhyavasāyaḥ*)? Ist es ein Erfassen (*grahaṇam*), ein Machen (*karaṇam*), ein Verbinden (*yojanā*) oder ein Übertragen (*samāropaḥ*)?" See NVTṬ 441.11–12: *atha ko 'yam adhyavasāyaḥ. kiṃ grahaṇam, āhosvit karaṇam, uta yojanā, atha samāropaḥ.* Ratnakīrti attributes this criticism to Trilocana. RNĀ 135.5–6: *trilocano 'pūtham adhyavasāyaṃ dūṣayati. ko 'yam adhyavasāyaḥ. kiṃ grahaṇam, ahosvit karaṇam, uta yojanā, atha samāropaḥ.*

<sup>58</sup>Śākyabuddhi, who must have been regarded as the standard interpreter of Dharmakīrti in Dharmottara's time, explicitly interprets Dharmakīrti's *adhyavasāya* as being equivalent to *adhyāropa*. See Śākyabuddhi's *Pramāṇavārttikaṭkā* Ca 7 (Inami et al. 1992:7): *teṣu bhinneṣu vastuṣu svapratibhāsasya (svapratibhāsasya) corr.; svapratibhāsasya ed.) bhāvatvenādhyāropāt. dṛśyavikalpyāv arthāv ekīkṛtya pravṛtter ity arthaḥ. etad uktam bhavati—yasmād bhinnavastudarśanabalenotpadyate, utpannā ca (utpannā ca) corr.; utpannāt ed.) svapratibhāsaṃ bhinneṣu vastuṣv āropya vartate ...*

<sup>59</sup>NVTṬ 441.15: *nāpi svākāram anartham artha āropayati.* Akamatsu 1984, however, erroneously understands the fourth view, in particular the latter subdivision of this view that Jñānaśrīmitra quotes as *ullekhānubhavasamānakālaṃ samāropaṇam* (JNĀ230.1), as Dharmottara's own. Cf. also RNĀ 135.9: *na ca svākāram anartham artham āropayati.*

last for two moments.<sup>60</sup> Neither is it the case that the process takes place in one moment.<sup>61</sup> Therefore, Dharmottara concludes, non-entity (*avastu*) is the object of a conceptual cognition (*vikalpaṣaya*). This is Dharmottara's final view.<sup>62</sup> Dharmottara's discussion makes it clear that he intends to reject Dharmakīrti's view of "internal aspect of a cognition". Instead he wants to posit "something" external to a cognition, which is in fact neither external nor internal.

## 6 Reinterpretation of Dharmakīrti's contradicting passages

### 6.1 PVin II 46.7

It has become clear from the preceding arguments that Dharmottara deviates from Dharmakīrti's system. Therefore an opponent raises another question concerning how to interpret Dharmakīrti's passage that contradicts Dharmottara's claim. In PVin II 46.7, Dharmakīrti clearly states that inference operates by determining its own appearance (*svapratibhāsa*), i.e. an internal image, that is not an object, as an object.<sup>63</sup> Dharmakīrti originally intends the mixing up of what is seen (*dṛśya*) and

<sup>60</sup>AP 238.15–18: *mam par rtog pa ni snar rañ gi snañ ba myoñ nas physis sgro 'dogs pa yañ ma yin te/ dños po skad cig gñis su sdod pa ni med na de ji ltar snar ñams su myoñ ba'i bdag ñid physis don gzan la sgro 'dogs par byed/ Frauwallner 1937:258: "Daß aber die Vorstellung zuerst ihr eigenes Erscheinungsbild wahrnimmt und dann überträgt, ist nicht möglich. Denn es gibt kein Ding, das zwei Augenblicke lang dauert. Wieso kann sie also ihr Selbst zuerst wahrnehmen und dann noch auf einen andern Gegenstand übertragen?"* See NVTṬ 441.15-18 (≈RNĀ 135.9–12): *na tāvad agrhītaḥ svākāraḥ śakya āropayitum iti tadgrahaṇam eṣṭavyam. tatra kiṃ grhītvāropayati, atha yadaiva svākāraṃ grhñāti, tadaivāropayati. na tāvat pūrvah pakṣaḥ. na hi vikalpavijñānaṃ kṣaṇikaṃ kramavantaṃ grahaṇasamāropau kartum arhati.*

<sup>61</sup>AP 238.19–21: *don du sgro 'dogs pa dañ dus mñam pa yin na de ltar na ni 'o na snañ ba ñams su myoñ ba dañ dus mñam du sgro btags pa snañ ba'i rañ bzin ma yin pas .../ Frauwallner 1937:258–259: "Sollte aber die Wahrnehmung des eigenen Wesens und die Übertragung auf den Gegenstand zu gleicher Zeit stattfinden, so kann das, was gleichzeitig mit der Wahrnehmung des Erscheinungsbildes übertragen wird, nicht das Wesen des Erscheinungsbildes sein."* Quoted in JNĀ 230.1: *ullekhānubhavasamānakālaṃ samāropanaṃ apratibhāsarūpaṃ eva* (identified by Akamatsu 1986:89). See also NVTṬ 441.18-21: *uttarasmiṃs tu kalpe 'vikalpasvasaṃvedanapratyakṣād vikalpākārād ahañkārāspadād anahañkārāspadaṃ samāropyamaṇo vikalpenāsvagocarō (vikalpenāsvagocarō) em.; vikalpo nāsvagocarō ed.) na śakyo 'bhinnāḥ pratipattum. nāpi bāhyasvalakṣaṇaikatvena śakyaḥ pratipattum, vikalpajñāne (vikalpajñāne) em.; vikalpavijñānena ed.) svalakṣaṇasya bāhyasyāpratibhāsanāt. RNĀ 135.12–15: uttarasmiṃs tu kalpe 'vikalpasvasaṃvedanapratyakṣād vikalpākārād ahañkārāspadād anahañkārāspadaṃ (-padaṃ) corr.; -padaḥ ed.) samāropyamaṇo vikalpenāsvagocarō (vikalpenāsvagocarō) em.; vikalpena svagocarō ed.) na śakyo 'bhinnāḥ pratipattum. nāpi bāhyasvalakṣaṇaikatvena (-ñāikatvena) corr.; -ñakatvena ed.) śakyaḥ pratipattum, vikalpākāre svalakṣaṇasya bāhyasyāpratibhāsanād iti.*

<sup>62</sup>AP 238.21–22: *dños po med pa nmam par rtog pa'i yul yin no zes gnas pa de yañ 'dod pa yin no// Frauwallner 1937:259: "Daher steht fest, daß etwas Nichtwirkliches Gegenstand der Vorstellung ist, und das ist gerade das, was wir behaupten."* Quoted in JNĀ 230.1: *avastu vikalpaṣaya iti* (identified by Akamatsu 1986:89). See also NVTṬ 441.21-22: *tasmād eṣa vikalpaṣayo na jñānaṃ na jñānakāro nāpi bāhya ity alika evāstheyaḥ.*

<sup>63</sup> PVin II 46.7: *svapratibhāse 'narthe 'rthādhyavasāyena pravartanāt.*

what is conceptualized (*vikalpya*). In other words, what is erroneously determined as an external object is in fact an internal form that appears in a cognition. How does Dharmottara interpret this passage that is incompatible with his view?

For Dharmottara, what is determined as an external object is not an internal image but a fabricated form (*āropita*). Dharmottara cannot agree to the view that a grasped aspect, i.e. the internal image of a cognition, is to be determined as an external object. Therefore he presents a forced interpretation: the grasped aspect (*grāhyākāra*), unlike the grasping aspect (*grāhakākāra*), is not distinguished from a fabricated form (*āropitasvabhāva*). Therefore the grasped aspect (*grāhyākāra*), not being distinguished from a fabricated form (*āropita*), is determined as an external object. It is not the case that the grasped aspect (*grāhyākāra*) itself is determined as an external object such as fire.<sup>64</sup>

According to Dharmottara's interpretation of Dharmakīrti, it is precisely the fabricated form that Dharmakīrti intends as being determined as an external object. Clearly Dharmottara twists the original meaning of Dharmakīrti's passage. He replaces an internal form with a fabricated form that is neither external nor internal.

## 6.2 PV III 164ab, 165

In Dharmakīrti's "bottom-up" theory, only trees, and not water, etc., have the capacity to produce the recognition "tree". Therefore a single form that appears in a conceptual cognition has this difference of capacity as its object. In other words, the difference of capacity in the external world determines what kind of reflected image appears in a cognition. The correspondence between subject and object is thus guaranteed to some degree. This is why inference, though essentially an error, nonetheless works well and does not belie us in the end. Similarly, the word "tree" is connected to an internal image that is determined by the difference of capacities of external objects. This is taught by Dharmakīrti as follows:<sup>65</sup>

164ab: *vikalpapratibimbeṣu tanniṣṭheṣu nibadhyate/*

[The word] is connected to a reflected image of a conceptual cognition that has the [exclusion, i.e. difference, of capacities of external entities] as its object.

Ordinary men determine this internal image as an external entity. This is why they take action, quite erroneously, toward the external world. A form of an object appears in a cognition as if it exists in the external world. But what people understand

<sup>64</sup> AP 238.30–34: *de la sgro btags kyi rañ bžin las nram par ma phyed pas nram par rtog pa ni gzuñ ba'i nram pa don med pa la don du lhag par žen to žes brjod kyi nram par rtog pa bdağ nīd kyi gzuñ ba'i nram pa phyi rol gyi me yin par lhag par žen nus pa ni ma yin no//* Frauwallner 1937:259 "Weil (die erfaßte Erscheinungsform) also von der übertragenen Wesenheit nicht unterschieden wird, ist gesagt worden, daß die Vorstellung die erfaßte Erscheinungsform, welche nicht Gegenstand ist, als Gegenstand bestimmt, es ist aber unmöglich, daß die Vorstellung ihre eigene erfaßte Erscheinungsform als äußeres Feuer bestimmt."

<sup>65</sup> See Tosaki 1979:264 for the text and a Japanese translation.

from hearing a word is not an external object, but a mere image that appears in their cognition. Their linguistic understanding is essentially an error caused by residual impressions. Dharmakīrti explains this as follows:<sup>66</sup>

165: *vyatirekīva yaj jñāne bhāty arthapratibimbakam/ śabdāt tad api  
nārthātmā bhrāntiḥ sā vāsanodbhavā//*

From a word appears in a cognition a reflected image of an object as if it were a separate [external entity], but this, too, is not the object itself. It is an error, arising from residual impressions.

The correspondence and non-correspondence between subject and object is thus explained by Dharmakīrti without leaving any doubt. A reflected image in a conceptual cognition (*vikalpapratiḥimba*) corresponds to the difference of capacity but people determine it as an external entity erroneously. The nature of objects and the nature of residual impressions determine the state of conceptualizations.

The two passages quoted above clearly contradict Dharmottara's view. Therefore Dharmottara presents his own interpretation again in a forced manner. The method is the same as we have seen. An internal form (*ākāra*) and a fabricated form (*āropita*) are understood as being one because they are not determined as being different.<sup>67</sup> So Dharmakīrti's statement with regard to a reflected form is to be interpreted as referring to a fabricated form and not to an internal form. Dharmottara makes this quite explicit. It is this fabricated form that is determined as an external entity.<sup>68</sup>

## 7 The nature of the object of conceptual cognition

Dharmottara makes it clear that the object of conceptual cognition is a fabricated form (*āropita*) and not a reflected image (*pratiḥimba*) that appears in a cognition. But what exactly is this fabricated form that is ascertained by a conceptual cognition? An opponent raises the question: is the object ascertained by a conceptual cognition essentially cognition (*jñānātman*) or something else (*anyat*)?<sup>69</sup> Dhar-

<sup>66</sup>See Tosaki 1979:265 for the text and a Japanese translation.

<sup>67</sup>AP 239.7–9: *zes bya ba la sog pa bśad pa gañ yin pa thams cad kyañ rnam pa dañ sgro btags pa tha dad du lhag par žen pa med pa'i phyir gcig ñid kyi tha sñad du khas blañs nas bśad par la'o//* Frauwallner 1937:259: "... so ist dies alles als unter der Voraussetzung gesagt zu betrachten, daß Erscheinungsform und Übertragenes als Einheit aufgefaßt werden, weil sie nicht als verschieden bestimmt werden."

<sup>68</sup>AP 239.9–13: *yañ na ni rnam pa 'di lta bu'i phyogs su sgro btags ñid la gzugs brñan du brjod pa yin gyi gzuñ ba'i rnam pa la ni ma yin no// gañ gi phyir sgro btags pa la ni phyi rol du ñes par byas pa yin pa'i phyir phyi rol 'dra ba phyi rol gyi gzugs brñan zes brjod par nus pa yin no//* Frauwallner 1937:259–260: "Ferner ist von diesem Standpunkt aus „Spiegelbild" mit Rücksicht auf das Übertragene gesagt und nicht auf die erfaßte Erscheinungsform. Denn beim Übertragen kann man, weil es als außen bestimmt wird, wie beim Äußeren von einem Spiegelbild des Äusseren sprechen."

<sup>69</sup>AP 239.14–15: *gañ žig rnam par rtog pa nams kyiñ ñes pa'i don de yañ gañ yin/ ci šes pa'i bdag ñid yin nam/ 'on te gžan yin že na/* Frauwallner 1937:260: "(Einwand:) Was ist also dieser

mottara's answer is simple: it is neither of them. If the object of conceptual cognition were an internal image and therefore essentially cognition itself, it would rather become an object of self-awareness (*anubhava*) and not of a conceptual cognition.<sup>70</sup> This point has been already made clear by Dharmottara in the previous section (AP 237.28–31) in which he explained that an internal image is the object of cognition's self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*).<sup>71</sup> Nor is it an external object. Dharmottara quotes in AP 239.21–24 an appropriate passage from PV I that explicitly states that the object of a word does not exist in the external world.<sup>72</sup>

In discussing the nature of conceptualization (*vikalpa*) that has the unreal (*avastu*) as its object, Dharmottara further clarifies his position that the object of conceptual cognition is not a grasped aspect (*grāhyākāra*), i.e. a reflected image in a cognition (*buddhipratibimba*), as some people wrongly hold.<sup>73</sup> Here again he refers to the same point that a grasped aspect (*grāhyākāra*) is not the object of conceptual cognition (*vikalpaviṣaya*) but rather is an object of cognition's self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*).<sup>74</sup>

“Therefore how is [the meaning of a word] a reflected image in a cognition (*buddhipratibimba*)? How can a scholar (*tarkavid*) ... assume that a reflected image (*pratibimba*), although it is a particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) being non-different from a cognition, is to be expressed by a word (*śabdābhidheya*)?”<sup>75</sup> Dharmottara

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Gegenstand, der durch die Vorstellungen bestimmt wird? Ist er seinem Wesen nach Erkenntnis, oder ist er etwas anderes?”

<sup>70</sup> AP 239.15–17: *cuñ zad kyañ ma yin no źes smra'ol/ ma ñes pa ni ñams su myoñ bas grub pa źes pa ñid ni ...* / Frauwallner 1937:260: “(Antwort:) Wir sagen: Er ist keines von beiden. Denn die Erkenntnis wird nicht bestimmt und ist durch die Wahrnehmung erwiesen;”

<sup>71</sup> See note 53

<sup>72</sup> PV I 84: *yathāpratīti kathitaḥ śabdārtho 'sāv asann api/ sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ ca vastuṇy asya na saṃbhavaḥ//* “This meaning of a word [i.e. universal] is spoken of according to conceptual cognition, although it does not exist. It is also the case for ‘having the same locus.’ Both are impossible with regard to a real entity.”

<sup>73</sup> AP 240.22–26: *de'i phyir de ltar rnam par rtog pa rñams kyis ñes par byas pa'i yul gzuñ ba'i rnam pa'i bdag ñid ma yin pa dañ/ rañ gi mtshan ñid du med pa'i rañ bžin gyi bdag ñid du bsgrubs pa na blo'i gzugs brñan ñid sgra'i brjod bya yin no źes 'ga' źig rtogs pa gañ yin pa de gsal ba yin no//* Frauwallner 1937:261: “Indem wir auf diese Weise nachgewiesen haben, daß der von der Vorstellung bestimmte Gegenstand nicht das Wesen der erfaßten Erscheinungsform hat und eine Beschaffenheit zum Wesen hat, welche nicht eigenes Merkmal ist, ist auch die Ansicht einiger, daß das Spiegelbild in der Erkenntnis durch die Worte ausgedrückt wird, widerlegt.”

<sup>74</sup> AP 240.26–29: *gañ źig rnam par rtog pa'i yul yin pa de sgra'i yul yin gyi/ rañ rig pa'i yul ni ma yin no // rnam par rtog pa'i yul gañ yañ ñes pa de yin na gzuñ ba'i rnam pa ni ñes pa ma yin te/ źes pa'i cha ñes pa ñams su myoñ ba med pa'i phyir ro//* Frauwallner 1937:261: “Gegenstand der Worte ist nämlich das, was Gegenstand der Vorstellung ist, aber nicht der Gegenstand des Bewußtseins (*svasaṃvedanam*). Und Gegenstand der Vorstellung ist das, was bestimmt wird; die erfaßte Erscheinungsform wird aber nicht bestimmt, da ein Bestimmen eines Teiles der Erkenntnis nicht wahrzunehmen ist.”

<sup>75</sup> AP 241.2–7: *de'i phyir ji ltar blo'i gzugs brñan yin/ rtog ge rig pa rgyu mtshan 'ga' źig las gžan sel ba sgra'i don du brtags nas rtog pa med pa'i yul yañ sgra'i don du lhag par źen pa źes pa dañ tha mi dad pa'i phyir gzugs brñan rañ gi mtshan ñid yin yañ sgra'i brjod byar yoñs su brtags par ji ltar 'gyur te/* Frauwallner 1937:262: “Wieso kann dies also das Spiegelbild in der Erkenntnis sein?”

here points out the problem lying in Dharmakīrti's model. As already explained, Dharmakīrti claims that individual trees produce one effect, i.e. the same judgment (*pratyavamarśa*, *pratyabhijñā*) "tree", whereas water, etc., do not. But here is a problem. Each tree produces a particular perception (*darśana*), which causes, according to Dharmakīrti, a uniform judgment, i.e. a kind of conceptual cognition. The uniformity of conceptual cognitions is allegedly guaranteed by the same image (*ākāra<sub>0</sub>* in §3.3) that appears in the conceptual cognitions. Judgments, although in fact being many, are regarded as one (*eka*) because of the same image inside them. But is this image (*ākāra*) really one? No, Dharmottara says. The internal image is a *svalakṣaṇa*, i.e. a particular, because it is essentially not different from a conceptual cognition. Each image (*ākāra<sub>1</sub>* and *ākāra<sub>2</sub>* instead of *ākāra<sub>0</sub>*) has its own existence and therefore is different from each other. They cannot be one. Therefore it can neither be the object of conceptual cognition nor the meaning of a word. Here Dharmottara clearly denies Dharmakīrti's view. Who else could he be criticizing?

## 8 Back to Frauwallner's observation

After investigating Dharmottara's own words and intentions with the help of Frauwallner's thorough study, i.e. an edition and a translation of Dharmottara's AP, it is rather surprising that he misses the point that Dharmottara tries to make.<sup>76</sup> In the summary of the text attached to the end of his article, Frauwallner observes as follows:

Dharmakīrti hatte gelehrt, daß das den äußeren Dingen nicht entsprechende, aber nach außen verlegte und ihnen zugeschriebene Vorstellungsbild den Gegenstand der Vorstellungen darstelle, und daran hat Dharmottara auch nichts geändert. Aber er suchte das Wesen dieses Gegenstandes schärfer zu bestimmen. (Frauwallner 1937:280)

It is true that Dharmakīrti posits an internal image (*ākāra*, *pratibhāsa*, *pratibimba*) as the object of a conceptual cognition (*vikalpaviśaya*). But how about Dharmottara? Is it the case that Dharmottara has changed nothing? As we have seen, the

Wieso können ferner der Logik kundige Menschen (*tarkavidah*), welche aus irgendeinem Grund die Sonderung von anderem als Gegenstand der Worte annehmen und sie zwar nicht als Objekt der Vorstellung, aber als Gegenstand der Worte betrachten, sich vorstellen, daß das Spiegelbild in der Erkenntnis, welches wegen seiner Nichtverschiedenheit von der Erkenntnis eigenes Merkmal ist, durch die Worte ausgedrückt wird?"

<sup>76</sup>Or this may not be surprising, because Frauwallner thinks that Dharmakīrti is not only the climax but also the end of the development. Frauwallner 1937:287: "er [=Dharmottara] zeigt aber so recht deutlich, daß Dharmakīrti nicht nur den Höhepunkt, sondern auch das Ende einer Entwicklung bedeutete, und daß unter seinen Nachfolgern keiner fähig war, ein ebenbürtiger Fortsetzer seines Werkes zu werden." Frauwallner was predisposed to not find anything original in Indian philosophy after the seventh century, i.e. Dharmakīrti's period. See Stuchlik 2009:193 (I thank Harunaga Isaacson for the reference). Also see Steinkellner's preface to the English translation of Frauwallner's *The Philosophy of Buddhism* published in 2010.

main target of Dharmottara's criticism is in fact Dharmakīrti himself.<sup>77</sup> What Dharmottara tries to reject is Dharmakīrti's view that an internal image is the object of conceptualization.

Frauwallner's misunderstanding seems to be caused by his ambiguous understanding of the difference between Dharmakīrti's "internal image" and Dharmottara's "fabricated form" (*āropita*).<sup>78</sup> Frauwallner's note (quoted in note 6) indicates how Frauwallner understands *āropita*: it is an internal image superimposed onto an external object,<sup>79</sup> and not a mere internal image.<sup>80</sup> This explains why Frauwallner can regard both views as basically identical. He assumes: Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara both accept that an internal image superimposed onto an external entity is the object of conceptual cognition. Only Dharmottara puts an emphasis on the difference between the internal image and the superimposed form. Therefore, for Dharmottara, the superimposed form is different from the internal image and therefore is not identical with cognition. This is why Dharmottara calls his *āropita* neither external nor internal. Dharmottara's *āropita* is neither a cognition, i.e. not an internal image itself, nor an external entity. It is something between or mixture of them, i.e. an internal image superimposed onto an external entity.<sup>81</sup>

But, as we have already investigated, Dharmottara denies Dharmakīrti's view. An internal image superimposed onto an external entity cannot be the object of a conceptual cognition, because the process would take two moments.<sup>82</sup> Therefore, this view cannot be Dharmottara's own. As Jayanta correctly grasps, Dharmottara's intention lies elsewhere. Dharmottara rejects Dharmakīrti's "internal" view when he states "neither cognition" in the opening verse of his *Apoḥaprakaraṇa*.

## Abbreviations and Bibliography

Dharmottara's *Apoḥaprakaraṇa*

AP See the Tibetan text edited in Frauwallner 1937.

*Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali*

JNĀ *Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali*. Ed. Anantalal Thakur. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1987.

<sup>77</sup>Or Dharmakīrti as interpreted by Śākyabuddhi, the standard commentator before Dharmottara.

<sup>78</sup>Akamatsu 1984:80-81 misunderstands Dharmottara's intention in a similar way as Frauwallner.

<sup>79</sup>That the meaning of Dharmottara's *āropita* is not "superimposed" (*adhyāropita*) but rather "fabricated" (*kalpita*) is suggested by Jñānaśrīmitra's brief remark that Dharmottara's *āropita* is precisely *kalpita*. JNĀ 230.4: *āropitam ity api kalpitam evocyate*. Jayanta's characterization of Dharmottara's *āropita* suggests the same.

<sup>80</sup>To put it into Sanskrit, Frauwallner's understanding of *āropita* can be paraphrased as follows: *bāhye vastuṇy āropitaṃ buddhipratibimbaṃ vikalpaviśayaḥ, na buddhipratibimbamātram*.

<sup>81</sup>See note 6.

<sup>82</sup>See note 60.

*Nyāyamañjarī*

NM *Nyāyamañjarī of Jayantabhaṭṭa with Ṭippaṇi – Nyāyasaurabha by the Editor.* Ed. K.S. Varadācārya. 2 vols. Mysore: Oriental Research Institute, 1969, 1983.

*Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga*

NMGBh *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga.* Ed. Nagin J. Shah. Ahmedabad: L.D. Institute of Indology, 1972.

*Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā*

NVTṬ *Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā of Vācaspatimiśra.* Ed. Anantlal Thakur. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1996.

*Pramāṇasamuccaya(vṛtti)*

PS(V) *Pramāṇasamuccaya(vṛtti).* See Pind 2009.

*Pramāṇavārttika*

PV For PV I, see PVSV; for PV III, see Tosaki 1979.

*Pramāṇavārttikasavvṛtti*

PVSV *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti: the First Chapter with the Autocommentary.* Ed. Raniero Gnoli. Roma: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1960.

*Pramāṇavārttikasavvṛtṭikā*

PVSVṬ *Ācārya-Dharmakīrteḥ Pramāṇavārttikam (Svārthānumānaparicchedaḥ) Svopajñāvṛtṭyā Karṇakagomi-viracitayā Taṭṭikayā ca sahitam.* Ed. Rāhula Sāṅkrṭyāyana. Allahabad, 1943.

*Pramāṇaviniścaya*

PVin *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścaya, Chapters 1 and 2.* Ed. Ernst Steinkellner. Beijing–Vienna: China Tibetology Publishing House/Austrian Academy of Sciences Press, 2007.

*Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī*

RNĀ *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī.* Ed. Anantlal Thakur. Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1957.

*Vibhramaviveka*

VV *Vibhramaviveka.* See Schmithausen 1965.

*Ślokavārttika*

ŚV *Ślokavārttikavyākhyā Tātparyaṭīkā of Umveka Bhaṭṭa.* Ed. S.K. Rāmanātha Śāstrī. Rev. K. Kunjuni Raja & R. Thangaswamy. Madras: University of Madras, 1971.

Sucaritamīśra's *Ślokavārttikakāśikā*

ŚVK A manuscript preserved in the Adyar Library, Chennai, No. 38.G.5-5, 63359, TR 66-5.

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