Dharmottara’s Theory of Apoha

Kei KATAOKA

1 Frauwallner’s view of Dharmottara’s theory of apoha

Essentially Dharmottara has changed nothing of Dharmakīrti’s theory of apoha. This is Frauwallner’s final evaluation of Dharmottara’s theory of apoha. Dharmottara is completely dependent on Dharmakīrti. And when Dharmottara does deviate from Dharmakīrti’s position, it does not concern new ideas but remains a mere reshaping of his predecessor’s view.

Frauwallner’s view, however, seems to be incompatible with Jayanta’s understanding. Frauwallner noticed it and comments on it with a quotation of the relevant passage from the Nyāyamañjarī. There, Jayanta contrasts two theories of apoha by using Maṇḍana’s terminologies of error (vibhrama). One theory of apoha chosen by Jayanta corresponds to Dharmottara’s position, and Frauwallner’s view, however, seems to be incompatible with Jayanta’s understanding.

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Frauwallner 1937:266–267: “Im wesentlichen ist er doch vollkommen von Dharmakīrti abhängig.”

See note 2.

Frauwallner’s view is also incompatible with the perspective of Jñānāsṛimitra and Ratnakārti, who criticize Dharmottara by labeling him as sāksādpapahavādin (JNĀ 203.15) and pratisedhavādin (RNĀ 54.4). In other words, Dharmottara’s view is different from Dharmakīrti’s from the perspective of Jñānāsṛimitra and Ratnakārti. For the identification of pratisedhavādin as Dharmottara, see Akamatsu 1984, 1986.


See VV v.1: ātmakhyātir asatkhyātir akhyātīḥ khyātīḥ anyathā/ pariśākānāḥ vibhrāntau
apoḥa, according to Jayanta, is parallel to the theory of asaṭkhyāṭi and the other ātmakhyāṭi.⁸ As Frauwallner correctly assumes, the former can be ascribed to Dharmottara⁹ and the latter to Dharmakīrti,¹⁰ although Jayanta never mentions them by name. Frauwallner initially agrees that Jayanta intends to show a theoretical difference between Dharmakīrti’s and Dharmottara’s theories of apoḥa. Implicitly dismissing Jayanta’s observation, however, Frauwallner concludes that there is no difference of opinion between Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara; and that the difference lies only in the manner of understanding and the mode of expression. Again, Frauwallner finds no fundamental difference between Dharmakīrti’s and Dharmottara’s theories of apoḥa.¹¹

But is it the case that Dharmottara’s theory of apoḥa is essentially non-different from Dharmakīrti’s? Can one conclude, as Frauwallner does, that the difference is superficial, not fundamental? Is Jayanta’s observation mistaken or not to be taken seriously? In the following the present author elucidate this problem by carefully examining the models of apoḥa theory that Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara presuppose.

2 Dignāga’s theory of apoḥa

Before examining Dharmakīrti’s theory of apoḥa, we must first review Dignāga’s theory of apoḥa,¹² since Dharmakīrti’s model developed out of Dignāga’s.

Dignāga replaces universals (jāti) accepted in brahmanical schools with exclusion of others (anyāapoḥa). The word “cow” expresses “not being non-cows”, i.e. the exclusion of non-cows. Universals such as cowness do not exist at all in the external world. It is precisely the exclusion of non-cows that we conceptualize as “cow.” As Jayanta observes, Kumārila understands this exclusion to be equivalent to nonexistence (abhāva), a kind of external reality (vastu) in Kumārila’s system of ontology.¹³

Kumārila’s interpretation can be justified. According to Dignāga, “cow” denotes negation of non-cows. Therefore, the meaning of “cow” is precisely the

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⁸See §3.1 and §3.2 of the Nyāyamaṇjarī, Kataoka 2009:34–35. According to the theory of ātmakhyāṭi, it is cognition itself (ātmā) that appears (khyāṭi) as an external, real entity, whereas it is a nonexistent (asaṭ), i.e. an unreal, fabricated fiction (āropita), that appears and that is not distinguished from an external, real entity according to the theory of asaṭkhyāṭi. Dharmottara’s notion of āropita has a connotation of being unreal, fictional and fabricated. See JNĀ 230.4: āropitam ity api kalpitam evocytat. “Furthermore, when you say āropita, you refer to precisely kalpita.”

⁹This is proved by Cakradhara’s commentary NMGBh (132.24: jhānārthāḥbhāvyāḥ anya eveti dharmottaraiḥ).

¹⁰I discussed it in Kataoka 2009:9–12.

¹¹Hattori also, though admitting that Dharmottara “was an original thinker”, and “made some amendments”, maintained that he “basically followed Dharmakīrti’s views” (Hattori: 2006:68).


¹³Nyāyamaṇjarī, Kataoka 2009:26.3–4: apoḥa yady abhāvaṁ bāhir abhyupagamyate/ tato bha- vatī bhāvatāṁ vāgjālam na tv asau tathāḥ/ “If [we] accepted apoḥa to be an external negation by nature, the net of [critical] words from you would apply. But it is not so.”
nonexistence (*abhāva*) of non-cows. It can be classified as mutual nonexistence (*anyonyābāha*) among the fourfold classification of nonexistence that Kumārila presents.\(^{14}\) In this way, the nonexistence of non-cows, in place of universal cow-ness, functions as a generic property of all individual cows. As Dignāga describes, “a word denotes things exclusively as qualified by preclusion of other referents (*śabdo ’rthāñtaranivṛttiśṭan eva bhāvān āha*).”\(^{15}\)

Dignāga criticizes the Naiyāyika model of *tadvat*, “[a locus] which has that”: a word expresses individuals qualified by a universal. Dignāga’s own model, however, remains similar to the Naiyāyika model of *tadvat* as a whole. Only the role of universal is replaced by *apoha*.

### 3 Dharmakīrti’s theory of *apoha*

#### 3.1 Criticism by Kumārila

Assuming Dignāga’s *apoha* to be equivalent to nonexistence, i.e. a kind of external entity, Kumārila points out various problems with this model.\(^{16}\) As Kumārila points out in the opening verse of his criticism, negation of non-cows, “not being anything that is not a cow,” necessarily presupposes affirmation of *cowness*. “Clearly those people who postulate that [a word] expresses negation of non-cows as a common property [in fact] have referred precisely to the real entity cowness with the term ‘the exclusion of non-cows’.\(^{17}\)” Indeed double negation leads to many undesirable consequences. Not non-cows amounts to being the same as cow. These and other problems that Kumārila has pointed out in the *Ślokāvārttika* are explained in prose by Jayanta.\(^{18}\)

#### 3.2 Dharmakīrti’s strategy

Quite correctly Kumārila understands Dignāga’s theory as being essentially parallel to the Naiyāyika view of *tadvat*. In order to avoid Kumārila’s criticism, Dharmakīrti has changed the model drastically.\(^{19}\) He agrees that the Buddhist model of *apoha* would lead to problems if it were identified with the view of *tadvat*. But this is not the case, replies Dharmakīrti.\(^{20}\) Opponents misunderstand the Buddhist

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\(^{14}\) *ŚV* *abhāva*, 2cd–4.


\(^{16}\) For Kumārila’s criticism of *apoha*, see Hattori 1973, 1975.

\(^{17}\) *ŚV* *apoha*, 1: *agonivrttiḥ sāmānyam vacyam yaḥ parikalpitaṁ/ gotvaṁ vastv eva tair uktam ago’pohagirī śphutam/.*

\(^{18}\) See the synopsis of the *Nyāyamaṇjarī*, Kataoka 2008:17–18. Cf. also Hattori 2006.

\(^{19}\) For Dharmakīrti’s theory of *apoha*, see Frauwallner 1932, 1933, 1935; Vetter 1964; Dunne 2004, 2011; and Tillemans 2011.

\(^{20}\) *PV* I 64 (34.17–18): *tenānyāpohaviśaye tadvatpakṣopavāpanam/ pratyākhyātaṁ prthakte hi syād doso jāttadvatable/ “Therefore, concerning the object (i.e. locus) of exclusion of other things, the [opponent’s] explanation of the [Buddhist] view of *tadvat* (a locus qualified by *apoha*) is refuted, for if [*apoha* and its locus were] different, the problem that applies to [the non-Buddhist view of]...*
theory, which does not posit negation as a common property from the beginning. Instead, the Buddhist model, according to Dharmakīrti, starts from real entities, i.e. individuals such as cows. Individual cows cause us to erroneously cognize cowness. But cowness never exists.

The difference in the two theories can be described, as modern scholars do, in terms of “top-down” and “bottom-up.” Following Jayanta’s perspective, however, the difference can be described in terms of “external” (bahir) and “internal” (antar). The object of conceptual cognitions is essentially an external negation for Dignāga whereas for Dharmakīrti it is an internal image or aspect (ākāra, pratibhāsa, pratibimba) that appears in a cognition.

3.3 Dharmakīrti’s model of apoha

Trees, for example, produce in our mind the same image due to their nature (prakṛtyā) and to the nature of residual impressions (vāsanā). We perceive a tree and have a conceptual cognition “tree”. Because of this generic image (ākāra0), our identifying cognitions (pratyavamarśa) or recognitions (pratyabhijñāna) “tree”, which are conceptual cognitions (vikalpa) that we have on each occasion after perceiving a tree, are regarded as identical. We have one and the same identifying cognition with respect to different individual trees. Hence perceptions (darsana, dhi) that precede these conceptual cognitions and that are in fact different from each other can be regarded as being non-different (abhedini). Hence the objects such as individual trees that produce these perceptions and that are different from each other can be regarded as non-different (abhinna).

Trees are cognized generically. Different individual trees are grouped under the category “tree”. All trees accomplish the same effect (artha, kārya), i.e., the conceptual cognition “tree”, whereas water, for instance, does not have that effect.

Putting it in a negative form, it is “exclusion from those that do not have the same effect” (atatkāryaparāvyrtti) that functions as a common property universal and its locus would apply [similarly to the Buddhist view of apoha].”

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21See, for example, Tillemans 2011.
22See Kataoka 2009, in particular 2009:15–16. The following passage is most explicit. NM II 45.8–10: vyāvṛtir api bāhyā cet, tadavasthā kaumārīladiśaṃśāniḥ, antararve tu na tayā vikalpoparāgyā kartum śakhyah. nāntar na bahir iti tu bhaṅgībhahāntīmārām (bhaṅgībhahāntīmāram) em.; bhaṅtībhaṅgāmāram ed.). “Furthermore, if exclusion is external, the thunderbolt of criticism by Kumārila remains valid. If it is internal, however, it cannot color conceptual cognition. But the statement that it is neither internal nor external is a mere fraudulent talk.”
23Śākyabhuddhi makes it clear that vikalpapratibhāsa is the apoha (etymologically interpreted as apohakaraṇa) that Dharmakīrti considers as the denotation of a word. See Pramāṇavārttikaḥkā ad I 40 (Ishida 2011:198): vikalpabuddhi-pratibhāsas tu trīṭyaḥ, aryo ’pohyate ’neneti kṛtvā, yo ’yaṁ sāstrākāraṇya śabadāvyatyayābhimutah.
25PVSV 41.3–6.
26PV I 73.
of individual trees. As Dharmakīrti states, this difference (bheda) of trees from water, etc., functions as a common property (sāmānyya). Individual entities have the capacity to produce a notion of universal (sāmānyajñānanaśakti) that in fact does not exist at all in the external world. Only a certain set of external things is capable of producing the notion of “tree” whereas other things are not. There is a particular capacity in the object that guarantees the particular concept in the subject.

“As is well known, only analytical scholars discriminate in this way and not ordinary men in everyday activity.” From the perspective of analytical scholars (vyākhyaśāraḥ), what unifies individual cows is in fact the same conceptual cognition that has one form. Ultimately (paramārthena), universals do not exist (asat). From the perspective of ordinary men in everyday activity (vyavahārārah), however, an internal image and an external entity are intermingled. “They take action after mingling what is seen and what is conceptualized.” They erroneously assume an internal image to be identical with an external entity. This process of determination is called adhyavasāya.

3.4 The weakness of Dharmakīrti’s theory

As Jayanta points out in his Nyāyamañjarī (§3.4.5.3 in Kataoka 2009), internal images (ākāra) that are essentially not different from conceptual cognitions (vikalpa) are different from each other because instances of conceptual cognition are different from each other. In other words, it is not the case that ākāra is the same as Dharmakīrti suggests. Different objects (arthā and artha) produce different conceptual cognitions (vikalpa and vikalpa) that have different internal images (ākāra and ākāra). Dharmottara points out in AP 241.5-6 that internal reflections (pratibimba), because they are particulars (svaśāṣaṇa), i.e. unique, inasmuch as they are not different from cognitions, cannot be the meanings of words

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27PV I 139.
28PVSV 42.8; 68.24.
29NM II 38.15–16. See also PVSV 50.13–14: avasyam vecchatāpi sāmānyam vyaktinām ekātrayajñānanaśaktir eṣṭavya. “And necessarily you have to accept a capacity of individuals to produce one effect even though you accept a universal.”
30Dharmakīrti’s view that perceptions (darśana) and individuals (vyakti) produce the same effect, i.e. ekapratyavamarśa, is criticized by an opponent in AP 248.30–249.6. Dharmottara offers a solution quite different from Dharmakīrti’s own view. See note 40. Dharmottara is well aware that his view is different from Dharmakīrti’s. Therefore in AP 249.24–26 Dharmottara lets an opponent raise a question with regard to the difference, i.e. his deviation from Dharmakīrti’s view.
31PVSV 39.5–6: vyākhyaśāraḥ khalv evam vivecayanti na vyavahārārah.
32PV I 68: dhiyā ekārthapratibhāṣyaṇaḥ; PVSV 38.19: pratibhāṣaṃ abhinām ātmiyaṃ; PVSV 41.4: ekam ekākāraṃ prayābhijñānam.
33PV I 70.
34PVSV 39.7–8: drṣṭavikalpyaḥ arthāv ekikṣya pravartante.
35PVSV 42.18–20: tatra yo ‘rthākāraḥ pratibhāti bāhyya ivaikā ivānārthakryākṛtyāpi tatākṛtya, vyavahārhīnām tathādhyavasāya pravṛttēḥ, ...
The internal image, ākāra, that Dharmakīrti wants to have the role of the universal, cannot fulfill the task, because it is not one but remains just as plural as cognitions and objects. Dharmottara is well aware of this problem. Unlike a single universal which is common to many particulars, such as cowness common to many individual cows, internal images that we have in conceptual cognitions cannot be common with respect to different particulars and therefore cannot unify them because images remain as many. Dharmottara feels that internal images, being essentially instances of cognition, have too much solidity and fixity.

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Instead of expecting in vain internal images to be one, e.g. common with respect to individual cows, Dharmottara posits the existence of something external to conceptual cognitions. But at the same time he denies the externality of that something. It is not an existent (asat). It is a certain fabricated form (āropitam kiñcida kāramātram), which is neither internal nor external (nāntar na bahir), and which is unreal (nistattva) and false (alīka). When Dharmottara states “neither cognition nor external” in the opening verse of his Apohaprakaraṇa, which is later glossed by Jayanta as “neither internal nor external”, he most probably intends to deny Dharmakīrti’s “internal” or “cognition” view with the term “neither cognition”. Dharmottara rejects the view that the direct object of a conceptual cognition is an internal image that appears in a cognition. Dharmakīrti’s “internal” view assumes that an internal image that is not different from cognition plays an important role in the theory of apoha. Dharmottara denies this view. An internal image does not play any active role according to Dharmottara’s theory of apoha. This is Jayanta’s understanding of Dharmottara’s view. Jayanta’s perspective is indeed confirmed by Dharmottara’s own explanations. Dharmottara’s modification clearly aims at overcoming the weakness of Dharmakīrti’s theory of which Dharmottara is well aware. This is why he takes the third view of “neither external nor internal”.

The fabricated form (āropitakāra) functions as a kind of universal. Different

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36 See note 75.
38 See Ishida 2008: buddhyā kalpikāyā viviktam aparair yad rūpaṃ ullikhyate buddhir no na bahir yad eva ca vadin nistattvam āropitam/yas tattvam jagato jagātā viṣayā nibheseṣādosaśadvisam vaktāram tam tathā parnam na śrastropohah sa viṣṭārayate// “The nature which is distinct from others is drawn by the conceptual cognition, as neither the cognition nor the external (object). Paying reverence here with my head to the faultless teacher who is the conqueror and who, stating that unreal and superimposed (nature), taught people the truth, I shall explain in detail that (doctrine of) exclusion (apoha)” (Ishida’s translation). See also Jambuviṣaya 1968 (not quoted in Ishida 2008).
39 Nyāyamañjarī, Kataoka 2009:27.3.
conceptual cognitions have this common form as their objects. Therefore, the difference of conceptual cognitions does not matter in Dharmottara’s theory of apoha. They have the same object in common and therefore are regarded as one, as Dharmottara explicitly states: “We claim conceptual cognitions caused by the force of perceptions of objects to be non-different [from each other], not because the effects are non-different, but because their objects are non-different.”40 This is a clear denial of Dharmakīrti’s device of “accomplishing one effect.” Now the āroppita, a fictional object, fulfills the key role of unification. Be aware of the difference that in Dharmakīrti’s system the ākāra0 which is the direct object of a conceptual cognition is inside a cognition, whereas in Dharmottara’s system the āroppita, i.e. the fictional, fabricated form, is not inside a conceptual cognition (and at the same time it is not an external entity outside a cognition). Internal images cannot but remain many whereas the āroppita can be one and common to different conceptual cognitions.

By avoiding the problem of ontological difference among internal images, Dharmottara succeeds in reinstating Dignāga’s simple model of apoha being common to different conceptual cognitions. In other words, Dharmottara reestablishes the so-called “top-down” model.41 Dharmottara’s passage quoted above (AP 249.7-9) strongly supports that the device of “accomplishing one effect” (ekārthasādhana), which is essential for Dharmakīrti’s bottom-up model, no longer plays the primary role in Dharmottara’s model in which the āroppita functions as the cause of unifying individuals as if it were a universal. It is āroppita and not ākāra0 that is assumed as being one, i.e. being different from others.42 Of course, he does not revive it as it was, because the “external” theory has been severely criticized by Kumārila. Dharmottara explicitly denies the externality of the meaning of a word.

At the same time, he remembers to preserve (or include subserviently) Dharmakīrti’s ideas of the “bottom-up” model. It is not difficult for this fictional form to have the negative aspect of exclusion based on efficacy. What is excluded from others (anyavayāvṛtta) is fabricated.43 And its understanding consists in the conceptualization of a particular efficacy.44 When one has the same effect, i.e. conceptu-
alization of the same form, one superimposes non-difference. The ascertainment that the fictional, fabricated form is non-different is based on the same appearing form. And this superimposing cognition explains why perceptions and individual objects are regarded as being similar. Dharmottara’s *apoha*, because it is nothing concrete (*na kiñcid eva*), can absorb many characteristics required for *apoha*.

5 Dharmottara’s implicit denial of Dharmakīrti’s theory

Dharmottara is well aware that his theory of *apoha* contradicts Dharmakīrti’s view. He intends to change the “internal” model that Dharmakīrti assumes. But of course Dharmottara cannot openly criticize Dharmakīrti. He implicitly criticizes Dharmakīrti’s view. And where contradiction is so explicit that one cannot easily neglect it, Dharmottara tries to reinterpret Dharmakīrti’s passages so that they accord with his own view.

According to Dharmottara, conceptual cognitions (vikāla), when they arise, falsely determine (adhyāvasyatī) a fabricated form (āropita), which is not a unique form (svalaṅkāsa), as being a real entity. We understand conceptual cognitions as

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**Notes:**

45. As described by Jayanta in the *Nyāyamāttārī* (Katooka 2009:32) and Dharmottara in AP 246.14–17, āropita has three different aspects, namely, being common to affirmation and negation (bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇa), being understood exclusively (niyata-rāpa), and appearing as if an external object (bāhyārthāsadṛśa). For the first aspect, i.e. that āropita (or āropitasya bāhyatvam) can be connected with affirmation (vidhi) and negation (niṣedha), see note 48. Cf. also NVTT 442.14–16: tat siddham alikām bāhyatvam (bāhyatvam) J; bāhyam ed.) vīśayo vikālpānāṁ sabdānām ceti. tuc cedam anyavyāvṛttitāpam, bhāvābhāvasādhārānyāyād atyantavilakṣanānāṁ sālakṣeyyāpādānāc ca tādṛṣṭayunbhavat ca.

46. Therefore Jñānasrimitra and Ratnakīrti rejects Dharmottara’s view, saying that it is nonsense. JNĀA229.16–17: etena yat tīkākāra āropitasya bāhyatvavisaya vīdhi niṣedhāḥ ity alaukikam anāgānam atārākiyam kathayati, tad apahastitam; RNā 60.12–13: etena yad dharmottara āropitasya bāhyatvasya vīdhi niṣedhāḥ ity alaukikam anāgānam atārākiyam kathayati, tad apy apahastitam. Jñānasrimitra criticizes Dharmottara’s interpretation of Dharmakīrti’s passages that I discuss in §6.1 and §6.2. See Akamatsu 1984.

47. Strictly speaking, it is bhedānadhīvyavasāya (non-determination of a distinction [between the two]) and not abhedādhyavasāya (determination of the non-difference [of the two]) that Dharmottara
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if they ascertain real entities. But they do not. Remember that in Dharmottara’s system, it is a fabricated form (äropita) and not an internal image (grähyäkära) that is the direct object of conceptual cognitions (vikalpa). Dharmottara clarifies the potential problems of Dharmakürti’s model by introducing the terms grähyäkära and grähakäkära. The former corresponds to what Dharmakürti refers to as pratibhäsä, akära or pratibimba, and the latter vikalpa, jätäna, etc. The point is that ontologically grähyäkära and grähakäkära are identical. They are just two aspects of the same cognition. If grähakäkäras are many, corresponding grähyäkäras cannot be one but remain many. It is the grähyäkära that is the direct object of conceptual cognitions for Dharmakürti whereas for Dharmottara it is the äropita.

Dharmottara’s view of äropita is incompatible with Dharmakürti’s view in which an internal image is regarded as the object of conceptual cognitions. Therefore, an opponent naturally raises a question: “Isn’t it grähyäkära that is the object of conceptual cognitions? Why do you claim that äropita is grasped?”

Dharmottara addresses this objection saying that an internal image is the object of a self-awareness (svasamvedana) and not of a conceptual cognition (vikalpa). What is ascertained (niścïyate) is the object of conceptual cognitions (vikalpavisïaya). But an internal image is not ascertained. Therefore, it cannot be the object of a conceptual cognition. Remember that in Dharmakürti’s system an internal image, which is essentially not different from the cognition, is the object of a conceptual cognition, whereas in Dharmottara’s system a fictional form posited external to a cognition, a form which is in fact neither external nor internal, is the object of conceptual cognitions. Internal images do not function as a common property, because they are plural just as their essence, i.e. cognitions, are many and different from each other. An internal image or an aspect of a cognition, if it works, can only be the object of a cognition’s self-awareness. It does not play a decisive role in Dharmottara’s system of apoha.

In order to justify his view, Dharmottara quotes PV I 57 that seemingly sup-


50AP 237.21–24: rnam par rtog pa rnam ni sgro btags pa'i rna' brin rna' gi mtshan ñid du med pa ñid žen pa skyes pa na dnos po ñes pa ñid du skyes pa rtogs pa yin gyi de dag dnos po yod pa ñid ñes pa ni ma yin no/ Frauwallner 1937:257: “Die Vorstellungen entstehen nämlich, indem sie eine übertragene Wesenheit, welche nicht eigenes Merkmal ist, bestimmen, werden aber so aufgefaßt, wie wenn sie entstünden, indem sie die Dinge bestimmen. Sie bestimmen jedoch nichts Wirkliches.”

51AP 238.27–34.

52AP 237.27–28: gal te gzūn ba'i rnam pa rnam par rtog pa rnam s kyul yul ma yin nam/ des na ci'i phyir sgro btags pa' 'dzin par brjod ce na' / Frauwallner 1937:258: “(Einwand:) Ist nicht die erfaßte Erscheinungsform (grähyäkära) Gegenstand der Vorstellungen? Warum sagt ihr also, daß sie etwas übertragenes erfassen?”

53AP 237.28–31: gzūn ba'i rnam pa ni ra' rig pa' yul yin gyi rnam par rtog pa' ni ma yin no/ 'di ltar ga' cig 'ñes par byas pa de rnam par rtog pa' yul yin no // Frauwallner 1937:258: “(Antwort:) Die erfaßte Erscheinungsform ist Gegenstand des Bewußtseins (svasamvedana), aber nicht der Vorstellung. Denn was bestimmt wird, ist Gegenstand der Vorstellung. Die erfaßte Erscheinungsform wird aber nicht bestimmt. Wieso sollte sie also Gegenstand der Vorstellung sein?”
ports his view.\textsuperscript{54} In this way, Dharmottara tries to conceal his deviation and avoid criticizing Dharmakīrti explicitly. He implicitly criticizes Dharmakīrti and at the same time insists that his view accords with Dharmakīrti’s intention. Dharmottara’s apologetic strategy of authorizing his view all the more strengthens our impression that Dharmottara is in fact well aware of his deviation and that he intentionally changes Dharmakīrti’s system.

Despite the severe rejection by Dharmottara, the opponent still adheres to the outdated theory of internal image. Echoing Dharmakīrti’s passage in PVin II 46.7,\textsuperscript{55} the opponent suggests as follows: a conceptual cognition determines (adhyavasāya) its own appearance (svapratibhāsa), which is in fact not an external object (anartha), as an external object. Therefore this appearance is the object of a conceptual cognition.\textsuperscript{56} This view of the opponent perfectly accords to Dharmottara’s view of vikalpa.

Dharmottara enumerates four possible meanings of this “determination” (adhyavasāya) of an internal image: it is either grasping (grahaṇa), producing (karaṇa), connecting (yojanā), or superimposing (samāropa).\textsuperscript{57} The fourth is probably what Dharmottara regards as the view of his main opponent.\textsuperscript{58} Therefore Dharmottara refutes the fourth in length.\textsuperscript{59} If a conceptual cognition superimposes its own form to an external object, it needs first to perceive its own form and then superimposes it. But this process is impossible, because a cognition does not

\textsuperscript{54}PV I 59cd: yan na niścīyate rūpam tat teṣāṁ viśayāḥ katham/ Frauwallner 1937:258: “Wieso sollte eine Erscheinungsform, welche durch die bestimmende Erkenntnis nicht bestimmt wird, Gegenstand derselben sein?”
\textsuperscript{55}See note 63.
\textsuperscript{56}AP 238.6–7: gal te rnaam par rtog pa rai gi snai ba don med pa la don du lhag par žen pa ma yin nam/ de’i phyr de ni de’i yul yin no že na/ Frauwallner 1937:258: “(Einwand:) Die Vorstellung bestimmt doch ihr Erscheinungsbild, das nicht Gegenstand ist, als Gegenstand. Daher ist dieses ihr Objekt.” Cf. NVTṬ 441.8–9: svākāraṁ abāhyam bāhyam adhyavasya vikalpaṁ svākārābhāyaṁvatvavīśaya iti cet.
\textsuperscript{57}AP 238.9–10: ci ste lhag par žen pa žes bya ba/ ‘di ci yin/ ci ‘dzin pa yin nam/ ‘on te byed pa yin nam/ de ste sbyor ba yin nam/ ci ste sgrö ‘dogs pa yin/ Frauwallner 1937: 258: “(Antwort:) Was ist dieses „Bestimmen“ (adhyavasaśāya)? Ist es ein Erfassen (grahaṇam), ein Machen (karaṇam), ein Verbinden (yojanā) oder ein Übertragen (samāropaḥ)?” See NVTṬ 441.11–12: atha ko ‘yam adhyavasāyaḥ, kim grahaṇaṁ, āhosvit karaṇaṁ, uta yojanā, atha samāropaḥ. Ratnakīrti attributes this criticism to Trilocana. RNĀ 135.5–6: trilocano ’pittham adhyavasāyaṁ dāsasyati. ko ‘yam adhyavasāyaḥ, kim grahaṇaṁ, āhosvit karaṇaṁ, uta yojanā, atha samāropaḥ.
\textsuperscript{58}Śākyabuddhi, who must have been regarded as the standard interpreter of Dharmakīrti in Dharmottara’s time, explicitly interprets Dharmakīrti’s adhyavasāya as being equivalent to adhyāropa. See Śākyabuddhi’s Pramāṇavārttikā Ka 7 (Inami et al. 1992:7): ‘teṣu bhinneṣu vastuṣa svapratibhāṣasya (svapratibhāṣasya) corr.; svapratibhāṣasya ed.) bhāvatvendhīyāropaḥ. dṛṣṭayvikālabhāvah ed. aśtrthe dhītā pravrtīty iti arthaḥ. etad ukṣam bhavati—yasmād bhinnavastu- darśanaśabalenopadāya, utpannā ca (utpannā ca) corr.; utpannā ed.) svapratibhāṣasya bhinneṣu vastuṣāḥ āropya varītate . . .
\textsuperscript{59}NVTṬ 441.15: nāpi svākāram anartham artha āropayati. Akamatsu 1984, however, erroneously understands the fourth view, in particular the latter subdivision of this view that Jānāśrīmitra quotes as ullekha-nabhavasamānakālaṁ samāropaṇam (JNĀ230.1), as Dharmottara’s own. Cf. also RNĀ 135.9: na ca svākāram anartham arthaḥ āropayati.
last for two moments.\textsuperscript{60} Neither is it the case that the process takes place in one moment.\textsuperscript{61} Therefore, Dharmottara concludes, non-entity (avastu) is the object of a conceptual cognition (vikalpaviśaya). This is Dharmottara’s final view.\textsuperscript{62} Dharmottara’s discussion makes it clear that he intends to reject Dharmakṛiti’s view of “internal aspect of a cognition”. Instead he wants to posit “something” external to a cognition, which is in fact neither external nor internal.

6 Reinterpretation of Dharmakṛiti’s contradicting passages

6.1 PVin II 46.7

It has become clear from the preceding arguments that Dharmottara deviates from Dharmakṛiti’s system. Therefore an opponent raises another question concerning how to interpret Dharmakṛiti’s passage that contradicts Dharmottara’s claim. In PVin II 46.7, Dharmakṛiti clearly states that inference operates by determining its own appearance (svapratibhāsa), i.e. an internal image, that is not an object, as an object.\textsuperscript{63} Dharmakṛiti originally intends the mixing up of what is seen (drśya) and

\textsuperscript{60}AP 238.15–18: \textit{ram} pari \textit{trot} na \textit{nīn sār} raṁ gis \textit{snī} \textit{mā} yin te/\textit{dī}os po \textit{skad} gīs \textit{sdod} na \textit{nī} \textit{mā} de \textit{ji} lītar \textit{sīn} \textit{nāms} su \textit{māyō} \textit{ba}’i \textit{bdag} niṅ \textit{phīs} \textit{dōn} gīz la \textit{sgro} ’dogs \textit{par} byed/ Frauwallner 1937:258: “Daß aber die Vorstellung zuerst ihr eigenes Erscheinungsbild wahrnimmt und dann überträgt, ist nicht möglich. Denn es gibt kein Ding, das zwei Augenblicke lang dauert. Wieso kann sie also ihr Selbst zuerst wahrnehmen und dann noch auf einen andern Gegenstand übertragen?” See NVTT 441.15–18 (≈RNĀ 135.9–12): na tāvad agraññā svākāraṁ śakya āropayitum iti tadgrahanaṁ āsitaṁyām. tatra kim ēṇāvāropayati, aha yadaiva svākāraṁ ācārenāti, tadaivāropayati. na tāvat pūrvaṁ pākṣaṁ. na hi vikalpaviśāṇāṁ kṣaṇikāṁ kramavantau grahanasamāropau kartum arhati.

\textsuperscript{61}AP 238.19–21: don du \textit{sgro} ’dogs pa \textit{dā}n \textit{dus} mīmāṁ \textit{pa} yin na de lītar na \textit{nī} ’o na \textit{sān} \textit{mā} yin te/\textit{dī}os po \textit{skad} gīs \textit{sdod} na \textit{mā} de \textit{ji} lītar \textit{sīn} \textit{ba}’i \textit{bdag} niṅ \textit{phīs} \textit{dōn} gīz la \textit{sgro} ’dogs \textit{par} byed/ Frauwallner 1937:258–259: “Sollte aber die Wahrnehmung des eigenen Wesens und die Übertragung auf den Gegenstand zu gleicher Zeit stattfinden, so kann das, was gleichzeitig mit der Wahrnehmung des Erscheinungsbildes übertragen wird, nicht das Wesen des Erscheinungsbildes sein.” Quoted in JNĀ 230.1: \textit{ullekhaṁbhavasamānākālaṁ} samāropanām apratibhāsarūpāṁ eva (identified by Akamatsu 1986:89). See also NVTT 441.18–21: uttarasmīms tu kalpe ’vikalpasvaṁvedanapratyakṣād vikalpākāraṇaḥ ahaṅkāraśpadān ahaṅkāraśpadām samāropayanāṁ vikalpaṁvagocaro (vikalpaṁvagocaro) em.; vikalpo nāsvagocaro ed.) na śakyo ’bhinnāḥ pratipattum. näpi bhāṣyasvalaṅkāraṇaṅkavatena śakyaḥ pratipattum, vikalpajñāne (vikalpaṁjñāne) em.; vikalpaṁjñāneṇa ed.) svalakaṅsasya bhāṣyāśpratibhāsanāt. RNĀ 135.12–15: uttarasmīms tu kalpe ’vikalpasvaṁvedanapratyakṣād vikalpākāraṇaḥ ahaṅkāraśpadād ahaṅkāraśpadām samāropayanāṁ vikalpaṁvagocaro (vikalpaṁvagocaro) em.; vikalpaṁvagocaro ed.) na śakyo ’bhinnāḥ pratipattum. näpi bhāṣyasvalaṅkāraṇaṅkavatena (śakaṅkavatena) cor.; -nākavatena ed.) śakaṅk pratipattum, vikalpākāre svalakaṅsasya bhāṣyāśpratibhāsanād iti.

\textsuperscript{62}AP 238.21–22: \textit{dīos} po \textit{med} pa \textit{rnam} par \textit{trot} pa’i yul yin no \textit{zes} gnas pa de yai ’dod pa yin no/ Frauwallner 1937:259: “Daher steht fest, daß etwas Nichtwirkliches Gegenstand der Vorstellung ist, und das ist gerade das, was wir behaupten.” Quoted in JNĀ 230.1: \textit{avastu} vikalpavisāya iti (identified by Akamatsu 1986:89). See also NVTT 441.21–22: tasmād eṣa vikalpavisayo na jñānaṁ na jñānaṁ ni sābhayaḥ iti aikā evāstheyaḥ.

\textsuperscript{63}PVin II 46.7: svapratibhāse ’narthe ’rtīdhāyavasāyena pravartanāt.
what is conceptualized (vikalpya). In other words, what is erroneously determined as an external object is in fact an internal form that appears in a cognition. How does Dharmottara interpret this passage that is incompatible with his view?

For Dharmottara, what is determined as an external object is not an internal image but a fabricated form (āropita). Dharmottara cannot agree to the view that a grasped aspect, i.e. the internal image of a cognition, is to be determined as an external object. Therefore he presents a forced interpretation: the grasped aspect (grāhyākāra), unlike the grasping aspect (grāhaśyākāra), is not distinguished from a fabricated form (āropitasvabhāva). Therefore the grasped aspect (grāhyākāra), not being distinguished from a fabricated form (āropita), is determined as an external object. It is not the case that the grasped aspect (grāhyākāra) itself is determined as an external object such as fire.64

According to Dharmottara’s interpretation of Dharmakīrti, it is precisely the fabricated form that Dharmakīrti intends as being determined as an external object. Clearly Dharmottara twists the original meaning of Dharmakīrti’s passage. He replaces an internal form with a fabricated form that is neither external nor internal.

6.2 PV III 164ab, 165

In Dharmakīrti’s “bottom-up” theory, only trees, and not water, etc., have the capacity to produce the recognition “tree”. Therefore a single form that appears in a conceptual cognition has this difference of capacity as its object. In other words, the difference of capacity in the external world determines what kind of reflected image appears in a cognition. The correspondence between subject and object is thus guaranteed to some degree. This is why inference, though essentially an error, nonetheless works well and does not belie us in the end. Similarly, the word “tree” is connected to an internal image that is determined by the difference of capacities of external objects. This is taught by Dharmakīrti as follows:65

164ab: vikalpapratibimbeṣu tanniṣṭhaḥ nībadhyate/
[The word] is connected to a reflected image of a conceptual cognition that has the [exclusion, i.e. difference, of capacities of external entities] as its object.

Ordinary men determine this internal image as an external entity. This is why they take action, quite erroneously, toward the external world. A form of an object appears in a cognition as if it exists in the external world. But what people understand

64 AP 238.30–34: de la sgro btags kyi ra bzin las rnam pa phyed pas rnam par rtog pa ni gzun ba’i rnam pa don med pa la don du lhag par żen to żes brjod kyi rnam par rtog pa bdag ŋid kyi gzun ba’i rnam pa phyi rol gyi me yin par lhag par żen nus pa ni ma yin nos/ Frauwallner 1937:259 “Weil (die erfaßte Erscheinungsform) also von der übertragenen Wesenheit nicht unterschieden wird, ist gesagt worden, daß die Vorstellung die erfaßte Erscheinungsform, welche nicht Gegenstand ist, als Gegenstand bestimmt, es ist aber unmöglich, daß die Vorstellung ihre eigene erfaßte Erscheinungsform als äußeres Feuer bestimmt.”
from hearing a word is not an external object, but a mere image that appears in their
cognition. Their linguistic understanding is essentially an error caused by residual
impressions. Dharmakīrti explains this as follows:66

165: vyatirekīva yaj jñāne bhāty arthatibimbakam/ sābdāt tad api
nārtīhīm bhrāntih sā vāsanodbhavā/

From a word appears in a cognition a reflected image of an object as if
it were a separate [external entity], but this, too, is not the object itself.
It is an error, arising from residual impressions.

The correspondence and non-correspondence between subject and object is thus
explained by Dharmakīrti without leaving any doubt. A reflected image in a con-
ceptual cognition (vikalpaprātibimba) corresponds to the difference of capacity but
people determine it as an external entity erroneously. The nature of objects and the
nature of residual impressions determine the state of conceptualizations.

The two passages quoted above clearly contradict Dharmottara’s view. There-
fore Dharmottara presents his own interpretation again in a forced manner. The
method is the same as we have seen. An internal form (ākāra) and a fabricated
form (āropita) are understood as being one because they are not determined as be-
ing different.67 So Dharmakīrti’s statement with regard to a reflected form is to
be interpreted as referring to a fabricated form and not to an internal form. Dhar-
moottara makes this quite explicit. It is this fabricated form that is determined as an
external entity.68

7 The nature of the object of conceptual cognition

Dharmottara makes it clear that the object of conceptual cognition is a fabricated
form (āropita) and not a reflected image (pratibimba) that appears in a cognition.
But what exactly is this fabricated form that is ascertained by a conceptual cogni-
tion? An opponent raises the question: is the object ascertained by a conceptual
cognition essentially cognition (jñānatman) or something else (anyat)?69 Dhar-

67 AP 239.7–9: zes bya la sogs pa bṣad pa gañ yin pa thams cad kyai rnam pa dañ sgro btags
pa tha dud du lhag par žen pa med pa’i phyir gcig ŋid kyi tha sṇad du khas bluṅs nas bṣad par
ita’ol/ Frauwallner 1937:259: “... so ist dies alles als unter der Voraussetzung gesagt zu betrachten,
daß Erscheinungsform und Übertragenes als Einheit aufgefaßt werden, weil sie nicht als verschieden
bestimmt werden.”
68 AP 239.9–13: yañ na ni rnam pa’i lta bu’i phyogs su sgro btags ŋid la gzung brsān du brjod
pa yin gyi gzung bu’i rnam pa la ni ma yin no/ gañ gi phyir sgro btags pa la ni phyi rol du nes
par byas pa yin pa’i phyir phyi rol ’dra ba phyi rol gyi gzung brsān ŋes brjod par nus pa yin no/
das Übertragene gesagt und nicht auf die erfaßte Erscheinungsform. Denn beim Übertragen kann man,
weil es als außen bestimmt wird, wie beim Außeren von einem Spiegelbild des Ausseren sprechen.”
69 AP 239.14–15: gañ zig rnam par rtog pa rnas kyi nes pa’i don de yañ gañ yin/ ci sēs pa’i
bdag ŋud yin nam/ ’on te gzan yin že na/ Frauwallner 1937:260: “(Einwand:) Was ist also dieser
mottara’s answer is simple: it is neither of them. If the object of conceptual cognition were an internal image and therefore essentially cognition itself, it would rather become an object of self-awareness (anubhava) and not of a conceptual cognition. This point has been already made clear by Dharmottara in the previous section (AP 237.28–31) in which he explained that an internal image is the object of cognition’s self-awareness (svasamvedana). Nor is it an external object. Dharmottara quotes in AP 239.21–24 an appropriate passage from PV I that explicitly states that the object of a word does not exist in the external world.

In discussing the nature of conceptualization (vikalpa) that has the unreal (avastu) as its object, Dharmottara further clarifies his position that the object of conceptual cognition is not a grasped aspect (grāhyākāra), i.e. a reflected image in a cognition (buddhipratibimba), as some people wrongly hold. Here again he refers to the same point that a grasped aspect (grāhyākāra) is not the object of conceptual cognition (vikalpaviśaya) but rather is an object of cognition’s self-awareness (svasamvedana).

“Therefore how is [the meaning of a word] a reflected image in a cognition (buddhipratibimba)? How can a scholar (tarkavid) ... assume that a reflected image (pratibimba), although it is a particular (svalaśana) being non-different from a cognition, is to be expressed by a word (śabdabhidheya)?” Dharmottara

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Gegenstand, der durch die Vorstellungen bestimmt wird? Ist er seinem Wesen nach Erkenntnis, oder ist er etwas anderes?"  
70AP 239.15–17: cuñ zad kyañ ma yin no Ŗēs smra’ol/ ma Ŗēs pa ni Ŗēs sa myon baś grub pa Ŗēs pa Ŗēl ni ... / Frauwallner 1937:260: “(Antwort:) Wir sagen: Er ist keines von beiden. Denn die Erkenntnis wird nicht bestimmt und ist durch die Wahrnehmung erwiesen;”

71See note 53

72PV I 84: yathāprātiti kathitaḥ sabdārtha ’ṣāv asam apī/ sāmānādikaranyāṃ ca vastuny asya na saṃbhavahī/ “This meaning of a word [i.e. universal] is spoken of according to conceptual cognition, although it is also the case for ‘having the same locus.’ Both are impossible with regard to a real entity."

73AP 240.22–26: de’i phyr de ltar rnam par rtog pa rnam kyi nes par byas pa’i yul gzañ ba’i rnam pa’i bdaḥ niid ma yin pa dan/ rani gi mtshan niid du med pa’i rani bzin gyi bdaḥ niid du bsgruḥ pa na blo’i gzugs brītān niid sgra’i brjod bya yin no Ŗēs ’ṣa’i ńg rtogs pa gaa yin pa de gsal ba yin no/ Frauwallner 1937:261: “Indem wir auf diese Weise nachgewiesen haben, daß der von der Vorstellung bestimmte Gegenstand nicht das Wesen der erfänten Erscheinungsform hat und eine Beschaffenheit zum Wesen hat, welche nicht eigenes Merkmal ist, ist auch die Ansicht einiger, daß das Spiegelbild in der Erkenntnis durch die Worte ausgedrückt wird, widerlegt.”

74AP 240.26–29: gañ ṣi gma rnam par rtog pa’i yul yin pa de sgra’i yul gya/ rañ rig pa’i yul ni ma yin no // rnam par rtog pa’i yul gaa yaa ni yin pa de yin na gzañ ba’i rnam pa ni nes pa ma yin te/ ṣes pa’i cha ṣes pa’i Ŗēs sa myon ba med pa’i phyr ro/ Frauwallner 1937:261: “Gegenstand der Worte ist nämlich das, was Gegenstand der Vorstellung ist, aber nicht der Gegenstand des Bewußtseins (svasamvedanam). Und Gegenstand der Vorstellung ist das, was bestimmt wird; die erfänte Erscheinungsform wird aber nicht bestimmt, da ein Bestimmen eines Teiles der Erkenntnis nicht wahrzunehmen ist.”

75AP 241.2–7: de’i phyr ji ltar blo’i gzugs brītān yin/ rtog ge rig pa rgyu mtshan ’ṣa’i ńg las gzañ sel ba sgra’i don du btrags nas rtog pa med pa’i yul yin sgra’i don du bsag par ’zen pa Ŗēs pa dan tha mi dad pa’i phyr gzugs brītān rañ gi mtshan niid yin yan sgra’i brjod byar yonis su btrags par ji ltar ’gyur te/ Frauwallner 1937:262: “Wieso kann dies also das Spiegelbild in der Erkenntnis sein?
here points out the problem lying in Dharmakīrti’s model. As already explained, Dharmakīrti claims that individual trees produce one effect, i.e. the same judgment (pratyavamarśa, pratyabhijñā) “tree”, whereas water, etc., do not. But here is a problem. Each tree produces a particular perception (darśana), which causes, according to Dharmakīrti, a uniform judgment, i.e. a kind of conceptual cognition. The uniformity of conceptual cognitions is allegedly guaranteed by the same image (ākāra₀) in §3.3) that appears in the conceptual cognitions. Judgments, although in fact being many, are regarded as one (eka) because of the same image inside them. But is this image (ākāra) really one? No, Dharmottara says. The internal image is a svalakṣaṇa, i.e. a particular, because it is essentially not different from a conceptual cognition. Each image (ākāra₁ and ākāra₂ instead of ākāra₀) has its own existence and therefore is different from each other. They cannot be one. Therefore it can neither be the object of conceptual cognition nor the meaning of a word. Here Dharmottara clearly denies Dharmakīrti’s view. Who else could he be criticizing?

8 Back to Frauwallner’s observation

After investigating Dharmottara’s own words and intentions with the help of Frauwallner’s thorough study, i.e. an edition and a translation of Dharmottara’s AP, it is rather surprising that he misses the point that Dharmottara tries to make. In the summary of the text attached to the end of his article, Frauwallner observes as follows:

Dharmakīrti hatte gelehrt, daß das den äußeren Dingen nicht entsprechende, aber nach außen verlegte und ihnen zugeschriebene Vorstellungsbild den Gegenstand der Vorstellungen darstelle, und daran hat Dharmottara auch nichts geändert. Aber er suchte das Wesen dieses Gegenstandes schärfer zu bestimmen. (Frauwallner 1937:280)

It is true that Dharmakīrti posits an internal image (ākāra, pratibhāsa, pratibimba) as the object of a conceptual cognition (vikalpavisāya). But how about Dharmottara? Is it the case that Dharmottara has changed nothing? As we have seen, the Wieso können ferner der Logik kundige Menschen (tarkavidah), welche aus irgendeinem Grund die Sonderung von anderem als Gegenstand der Worte annehmen und sie zwar nicht als Objekt der Vorstellung, aber als Gegenstand der Worte betrachten, sich vorstellen, daß das Spiegelbild in der Erkenntnis, welches wegen seiner Nichtverschiedenheit von der Erkenntnis eigenes Merkmal ist, durch die Worte ausgedrückt wird?”

76 Or this may not be surprising, because Frauwallner thinks that Dharmakīrti is not only the climax but also the end of the development. Frauwallner 1937:287: “er [=Dharmottara] zeigt aber so recht deutlich, daß Dharmakīrti nicht nur den Höhepunkt, sondern auch das Ende einer Entwicklung bedeutete, und daß unter seinen Nachfolgern keiner fähig war, ein ebenbürtiger Fortsetzer seines Werkes zu werden.” Frauwallner was predisposed to not find anything original in Indian philosophy after the seventh century, i.e. Dharmakīrti’s period. See Stuchlik 2009:193 (I thank Harunaga Isaacson for the reference). Also see Steinkellner’s preface to the English translation of Frauwallner’s The Philosophy of Buddhism published in 2010.
main target of Dharmottara’s criticism is in fact Dharmakīrti himself.77 What Dharmottara tries to reject is Dharmakīrti’s view that an internal image is the object of conceptualization.

Frawallner’s misunderstanding seems to be caused by his ambiguous understanding of the difference between Dharmakīrti’s “internal image” and Dharmottara’s “fabricated form” (āropita).78 Frawallner’s note (quoted in note 6) indicates how Frawallner understands āropīta: it is an internal image superimposed onto an external object,79 and not a mere internal image.80 This explains why Frawallner can regard both views as basically identical. He assumes: Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara both accept that an internal image superimposed onto an external entity is the object of conceptual cognition. Only Dharmottara puts an emphasis on the difference between the internal image and the superimposed form. Therefore, for Dharmottara, the superimposed form is different from the internal image and therefore is not identical with cognition. This is why Dharmottara calls his āropita neither external nor internal. Dharmottara’s āropita is neither a cognition, i.e. not an internal image itself, nor an external entity. It is something between or mixture of them, i.e. an internal image superimposed onto an external entity.81

But, as we have already investigated, Dharmottara denies Dharmakīrti’s view. An internal image superimposed onto an external entity cannot be the object of a conceptual cognition, because the process would take two moments.82 Therefore, this view cannot be Dharmottara’s own. As Jayanta correctly grasps, Dharmottara’s intention lies elsewhere. Dharmottara rejects Dharmakīrti’s “internal” view when he states “neither cognition” in the opening verse of his Apohaprakaraṇa.

Abbreviations and Bibliography

Dharmottara’s Apohaprakaraṇa

AP See the Tibetan text edited in Frawallner 1937.

Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali


77 Or Dharmakīrti as interpreted by Śākyabuddhi, the standard commentator before Dharmottara.
78 Akamatsu 1984:80-81 misunderstands Dharmottara’s intention in a similar way as Frawallner.
79 That the meaning of Dharmottara’s āropita is not “superimposed” (adhyāropita) but rather “fabricated” (kalpita) is suggested by Jñānaśīmitra’s brief remark that Dharmottara’s āropita is precisely kalpita. JNĀ 230.4: āropitam ity api kalpitam evocytate. Jayanta’s characterization of Dharmottara’s āropita suggests the same.
80 To put it into Sanskrit, Frawallner’s understanding of āropita can be paraphrased as follows: bāhye vastuny āropitam buddhi pratibimbam vikalpaviśayah, na buddhi pratibimbam āttatram.
81 See note 6.
82 See note 60.
Nyāyamaṇjarī


Nyāyamaṇjarīgranthibhaṅga


Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā


_Pramāṇasamuccaya_(vṛtti)


_Pramāṇavārttika_

**PV** For PV I, see PVSV; for PV III, see Tosaki 1979.

_Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti_


_Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtītiṃkā_


_Pramāṇaviniścaya_


_Ratnakirtinibandhāvalī_


_Vibhramaviveka_

**VV** Vibhramaviveka. See Schmithausen 1965.
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ŚVK A manuscript preserved in the Adyar Library, Chennai, No. 38.G.5-5, 63359, TR 66-5.

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