The Mīmāṃsā Concept of sanskāra and the sanskāra in the Process of Cognizing a Word-Meaning: pūrva-varṇa-janita-sanskāra*

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I. Introduction

In the Mīmāṃsā system of Vedic exegesis, speech (śabda) is not word (pada) but phoneme (varṇa, aksara). So even the so-called word (pada) is regarded as being in reality phonemes (varṇas). This frame limits the Mīmāṃsakas’ options for explaining the process of cognizing a word-meaning (padārtha-pratyaya, -pratipatti), because it is more natural to say that a word-meaning is cognized directly through a word, rather than through phonemes. For example, cowness (goṭov) is ordinarily considered to be cognized through the word “cow” (“gauh”), not through the phonemes /k/ /a/ /u/ (jī /j/ /au/ /h/), as is clearly shown in our usage “word-meaning”.

To escape this dilemma between the theory of *varnasāhabhāvāda and the observed fact of padārtha-pratyaya, the Vṛttikāra, whose explanation of Jaminiśītra 1.1.3–5 is introduced in the Śāharabhāsya, adopts the theory of *antyavarnakaraṇavāda. According to this, a word-meaning is

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By contrast *pradhānakarman* is defined in *Jaiminisūtra* 2.1.7 as that which has the accomplishment of the act itself (*karmanirūttri*) as its aim (*ipstitatama*).9

*pradhānakarman* : *dravya → karman*

*gunakarman (= samskāra) : karman → dravya*

3. The Definition of *samskāarakarman* as a *śeṣa*

Śābarabhāṣya ad 3.1.3 defines *samskāra* as a *śeṣa* or an element subservient to *pradhānakarman*. *Samskāra* produces in an element (*padarthā),* i.e. material (*dravya*), a capacity (*sāmarthya*) or suitability (*yogatā*) for a certain purpose (*prayojana, artha*).

Śābarabhāṣya ad 3.1.3: *samskāro nāma sa bhavati yasmiṁ jāte padartho bhavati yogayāḥ kasyaad arthasya, tenapi kriyāyāṁ kartavyāyām prayojanan iti so 'pi parārthāḥ.* A 660.9–11.

The *samskāra* is that, by the arising of which an element becomes suitable for a certain purpose. It also has a purpose regarding the action to be made. Therefore it also exists for the other [and fulfills the definition of *śeṣa*].

Śābarabhāṣya ad 3.7.6: yat tasya samkaravasya prayojanam tatra sāmarthyaṁ janayatūti. A 1078.4–5.

[*Samskāra* is said to be “that which arranges (*samkaroti*)”] For it produces a capacity for the purpose of that which is to be arranged (*samkaravaya*).

In this way, *samskāra*, like other elements, such as *dravya* and *guna*, assists *pradhānakarman* and thus fulfills the *śeṣa*’s definition of “*parārthatva*” or “being for the other”. Thus *samskāarakarman* could be labelled *arthayogatāpada* (that which brings about a suitability for a certain purpose) or *prayojanasāmartthyajanaka* (that which produces capacity).

*sāmarthya*

*samskāra → dravya → prayojana*

4. “Purpose” (*prayojana, artha*) of the *samskāarakarman*

Śābarabhāṣya ad 3.6.11–13 discusses the relationship of *guṇapradhānabhaśa, śesāśeṣabhāṣa* between a ritual fire (*agni*) and *pavamāneśṭi* (sacrifices for the *pavamāna*[*-agni*]), which are performed after setting up three or five fires (*agnyādheya, agnyādhanā*). The opponent holds that a ritual fire, which is already set up before the *pavamāneśṭi*, serves the *pavamāneśṭi* in accordance with the maxim *bhūtām bhavyāyopadīṣyate* (The produced is prescribed for the sake of what should be produced).10 So the *bhūta* fire is regarded as subservient to the *pavamāneśṭi* which should be produced (*bhūrayutaya*). Opposing this view, the Siddhāntin answers that the *pavamāneśṭi* should be regarded as subservient to the ritual fire (*pavamāneśṭayaḥ *ah *agryarthāḥ*), because if the *pavamāneśṭi*, as the opponent holds, was served by a ritual fire, they would be useless and so would the setting up of fire (*agnyādheya*), which serves the *pavamāneśṭi* through a ritual fire. For the *pavamāneśṭi* do not have any fruit (*niṣphalas tu istayah*). But if the ritual fire is primary, though it is a produced element (*bhūta*), after being purified by the future *pavamāneśṭi*, it will serve other rituals, such as the *agnihotra, dāraṇāpanamāsa, etc.*, and thereby become useful (*prayojanaavattva cāgīnam*).11

*pavamāneśṭi : agni → pavamāneśṭi → ? (niṣprajyojana)*

*siddhānta : pavamāneśṭi → agni → prayojana*

Here the opponent takes the *pavamāneśṭi* as *pradhānakarman*. The Siddhāntin, however, concludes that they are *guṇakarman (= samskārakarman)* because of their contribution to other rituals through ritual fires. If we apply the above-mentioned definitions of *samskāra*, i.e. “*dravyapradhāna*” and “*prayojanasāmartthyajanaka*” or “*arthayogatāpada*”, the Siddhāntin’s intention becomes clearer: the subordinate *samskāarakarman*, i.e. *pavamāneśṭi*, give to the primary element (*pradhāna*), i.e. ritual fires, a suitability (*yogatā*) for a certain purpose (*artha, prayojana*), such as to assist *agnihotra* etc.

5. The Unseen Effect (*adṛśta*) of the *samskāarakarman*

Śābarabhāṣya ad 3.1.22, dealing with the same topic, expands further on the nature of “purpose” (*prayojana, phala*). The opponent, who holds that the *pavamāneśṭi* are *pradhānakarman* as before, apparently suggests relying on the *vishajajmyāya*, viz. that one can assume a fruit of the *pavamāneśṭi* (*kalpyam phalam*) if they do not have any fruit taught in the scripture.12 The Siddhāntin, who holds that *pavamāneśṭi* are
sanskārakarman and their fruit is the purification of the fire (agnisamskāra), rejects the opponent’s view, appealing to the principle of “adṛśakalpanālpiyasi nyāyayā” or “the least assumption of the unseen entities is right”.

Following the opponent’s view, one has to assume two unseen effects, i.e. that of svarga as a result of home and that of unseen purification (adṛśa samskāra) of the pavamāneṣṭis through the āhavanīya. In contrast, the Siddhāntin assumes only one, i.e. unseen purificatory effect upon the āhavanīya through the pavamāneṣṭis.

To summarize, the procedure described here runs as follows: first each element such as samskārakarman, drayya and prayojana, is posited according to the definition of pradhānakarman and samskārakarman. The opponent holds that āhavanīya is for the sake of the pavamāneṣṭis and the pavamāneṣṭis are for the sake of svarga, which is assumed lest they should become purposeless. The Siddhāntin, considering pavamāneṣṭis to be a samskārakarman, holds that pavamāneṣṭis are for the sake of āhavanīya, and āhavanīya is for the sake of other rituals such as the agnihotra etc. Up to this stage one cannot decide which view is preferable, because both processes have purpose enough. Then the number of unseen effects is counted, so that the “light hypothesis” or simple model may be adopted in accordance with the maxim adṛśakalpanālpiyasi nyāyayā.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{samskāra (adṛśa)} \\
\text{pārvapakṣa : agni} \\
\rightarrow \text{pavamāneṣṭi} \rightarrow \text{svarga (adṛśa)} \\
\text{siddhānta : pavamāneṣṭi} \rightarrow \text{agni} \rightarrow \text{prayojana (adṛśa)}
\end{align*}
\]

6. The Seen Effect (dṛśta) of the samskārakarman

Śābarabhāṣya ad 11.1.27 deals with samskārakarman, such as threshing (avahanana) and grinding (peṣana), which have seen effects. Here the question is whether they should be performed until some seen effects are accomplished or not. The Siddhāntin concludes that they should, in accordance with the maxim dṛśte satya (or sambhavatya) adṛśakalpanānyāyayā (If the seen is possible, assumption of the unseen is not right). Here the act of threshing or grinding has a visible (prayakṣa, dṛśta) fruit, such as tandula (threshed rice) or pīṣta (ground rice). If we gave up the performance in the middle, we would be forced to rely on the assumption of an unseen effect, which is not acceptable when the seen effect is possible. Here the purpose (artha, phala) is divided into two: the seen and the unseen, out of which the former is preferred.

III. The Characteristic Features of samskārakarman

1. samskārakarman has a material as its primary element (drayya-pradhāna).
2. samskārakarman gives to the material a capacity (śāmartya) or suitability (yogatā) for a particular purpose (artha, prayojana).
3. samskārakarman is a subservient element (śeṣa, parārtha) that, through a material (drayya), serves pradhānakarman (a primary act), which is also qualified as a purpose (artha, prayojana).
4. The fruit (phala, artha) given by samskārakarman in a material (drayya) is either seen (dṛśta, prayakṣa) or unseen (adṛśa, kalpya).

IV. An Examination of the samskāra in the Discussion of *padārthapratyaya

The following examines the notion of samskāra which appears in the discussion of the process of cognizing a word-meaning (padārthapratyaya), in order to show that the samskāra here is not the *śmrthetuṣamskāra, as it is usually interpreted, but the unseen purificatory effect of sanskārakarman. The synopsis of the so-called spovaśāda in the Śābarabhāṣya (strictly speaking, in the explanation by the Vṛtikāra), which deals with the process of cognizing the object of a word (padārthapratyaya), is as follows:

0. Presupposition: a meaning (artha) is cognized through speech (jabda).
1. Speech (jabda) is nothing but phonemes (varṇa), (= Fact: artha is cognized through varṇas.)
2. The direct connection between varṇas and padārthapratyaya is denied, leading to amapatti.
   a. Denial of two possibilities
   b. Explanation by *spovaśāda
   c. Denial of smarana-process
3. Adṛṣṭakalpanā: artha is cognized from varṇas through the unseen medium of samśkāra.38
   a. laukikavacana, which seems to conflict with the siddhānta39
      F 38.14–20
   b. īśāra-vacana, which seems to conflict with the siddhānta35
      F 38.20–24
   c. Solution of the laukikavacana26
      F 40. 1–7
   d. Solution of the īśāra-vacana27
      F 40. 7–10
4. Denial of *sphoṭavāda by the number of unseen effects (adṛṣṭa).20
   F 40.11–12

In composing this section, the Vṛttikāra most probably presupposes the process of arthāpatti (cf. [Kataoka 1998]), which is also shown explicitly in the two slokas quoted in the Śābarabhāṣya ad 2.2.1.29 First the seen fact (ṛṣṭita) of padārthapratyaya is shown. Second, it is shown that there exists inexplicability (amapappati) in this fact, padārthapratyaya, so long as we confine ourselves to the seen world. To keep this condition of amapappati (or anyathāmupapatti), which is the main cause for arthāpatti to function, all possible doctrines which explain the fact only with the seen are denied. Thirdly, the unseen (adṛṣṭa) is assumed and samśkāra is posited as a medium between varṇas and padārthapratyaya so as to solve the amapappati. This is the stage where the doctrine of *antyavarṇanakarana-vāda is given. Fourthly, due to the smaller number of adṛṣṭas, the Mīmāṃsaka’s position is preferred to that of the Vaiyākaraṇa, who hold the *sphoṭavāda which involves two unseen effects: one is *sphoṭa and the other is samśkāra for *sphoṭapratyaya, which corresponds to that for padārthapratyaya in the Mīmāṃsā view.

Problems in the previous interpretation If one follows the previous interpretation that the samśkāra in the Vṛttikāra’s definition is nothing but a mental trace, which functions as a cause of recollection (smythihutva), the following problems arise: First, besides his own position, the Vṛttikāra (in 2c above), speaking through the Sphoṭavādins, mentions one model to be denied, according to which the phenomenon of cognizing a word-meaning is to be explained as a recollection process.

antarhite ‘pi śābe smaranād arthapratyaya iti cen na. F 38.11
[Question:] Although the speech has disappeared, one cognizes the object by recollection. [Answer:] No.

If we accept that the samśkāra is the cause of recollection, and so regard the process as including recollection, the Vṛttikāra’s negative statement would be inappropriate.30 Secondly, the context of the relevant portion, which apparently follows the procedure of arthāpatti, shows that the Vṛttikāra intends the recollection model as that which can explain the phenomenon of the padārthapratyaya within our familiar “seen (dṛṣṭa)” domain, without relying on any unseen effects (adṛṣṭa). It follows consequentially that the mental trace, which is always entailed by the recollection, is to be included for the Vṛttikāra in the “seen” domain. The samśkāra in the siddhānta, on the other hand, is explicitly stated as an unseen effect (adṛṣṭa) which should be postulated. If we took the samśkāra to be the cause of recollection (*smythetusamśkāra), we would encounter the dilemma that the samśkāra is regarded by the same author as “seen” as well as “unseen”. Thirdly, *smythetusamśkāra, which belongs to the ātman, does not fit by its definition with the samśkāra mentioned here, which accompanies the last phoneme.

Suitability of the new interpretation The samśkāra mentioned here is equipped with those features suitable to the unseen effect (adṛṣṭa) of samśkārabaran. As pointed out before, the samśkārabaraam is regarded as dṛṣṭānubuddha, which has a material as its primary elements, in which it gives a capacity for a certain purpose. Likewise here the process (suggested rather weakly by the expression of “janita”) is a samśkārabaraam, which has the last phoneme (antya varna) as its primary element, in which it gives a capacity for padārthapratyaya. Here the produced capacity is labelled as “samśkāra” (a purificatory effect) and is qualified as “unseen” (adṛṣṭa), as is seen in Śābarabhāṣya ad 3.1.22, where particular fruits are labelled as “samśkāra” and “adṛṣṭah samśkāra”.

samśkāra (adṛṣṭa)

pūrvavarna → samśkāra → antyavarṇa → padārthapratyaya

As is shown before in the case of the samśkārabaran, it is a common procedure in the Śābarabhāṣya (and to all Mīmāṃsakas) to examine the nature of acts’ fruit and count the number of the adṛṣṭas in order to show the superiority of the Siddhāntin’s view. The similarity in the procedure of both discussions, i.e. one on the unseen purificatory effect of samśkārabaran and the other on the process of padārthapratyaya, leads one to think that both samśkāras are of the same nature.
V. A Parallel Discussion by Bhartrhari

The following points out the fact that Bhartrhari uses the terminology of "samskāra" to denote the samskāra-karanan and regards it as a device to explain the process of śabdābhiyavakti or the manifestation of speech. This fact implies that the concept of samskāra current in linguistic debate around AD 500, is not śmrīthetusamskāra but samskārakaranan or its unseen effect. (Kumārila, too, discussing śabdābhiyavakti in the Ślokavārttika śabdāmityāt v. 51c–87b, accepts this character of samskāra and establishes the Māṁśāta position of the śrotasamskāra.)

Mahābhāṣyadipikā prathamānikha 8.1: sa ca nādāḥ śrotasyāmyugrahe vartate. taddarśhitēḥ śrotām śabdopalabdhau samarthan bhavati, ity eke. apare śabdasyaiva. . . ubhayor ity apare. MBhD I.17.15–17.

And this sound functions to help the ear. The ear helped by this [sound] becomes capable of the perception of speech. . . So say some. Others say that it is the speech [which is helped by this sound] . . . Others say that it is both [i.e. ear and speech, which are helped by this sound].

Vākyapādiya 1. v. 80 (VP 44.25–26):
indriyasyaiva samskāraḥ śabdasyaivabhāsaya vā/ kriyate dhvanibhar, svādās tvayo 'bhityaktivādīnām'![

Sounds produce samskāra (arrangement) either in the organ [of hearing], speech or both. (There are) three doctrines held by those who maintain that [speech is] manifested.

The samskāra mentioned here has the features of the samskārakaranan as dṛvayapradhāna and *prayojanaśāmartyajanāka. The expression "śrotasyāmyugraha" shows the dṛvayapradhāna-aspect of the samskārakanan. Further, "śabdopalabdhau samarthaṃ bhavati" reminds us of Śābārasvāmi’s description of samskārakaranan, i.e. "padārtho bhavati yogyāḥ kasyacid arthasya" and "tatra (=prayojane) sāmarthaṃ janayan- ti".

VI. The Intention of Kumārila

In the following I shall examine the motivation of Kumārila, who admits that the samskāra here is vāsanā or a mental trace, in order to show that his interpretation does not contradict our conclusion but in fact supports it if we understand his intention properly. In the Ślokavārttika sphaṭavāda, he introduces three interpretations of this samskāra. (The following synopsis of the Ślokavārttika is based on [Omae 1998a], with a slight modification by the present author. Maṇḍana’s Sphoṭasiddhi offers us a good survey of Kumārila’s three positions (1, 3i, 3ii below), which correspond to the pūrvaopakṣas of v. 5, vv. 6–7, v. 8 in the Sphoṭasiddhi [Iyer 1966: 13, 16–17, 20]. An English summary is available in Iyer’s introduction. Vācaspati, applying Maṇḍana’s criticism about the cause of cognizing a word-meaning (padārtha) to that of a sentence-meaning (tūkārtha), also explains (and criticizes) three positions in his Tattvacintā. 1 = TB 25.13–26.13; 3i = TB 26.14–28.7; 3ii = TB 29.1–33.6.)

1. Postulation of the samskāra (samskārakalpana)

The first position interprets the samskāra in the Śābaraśāstīya by appealing to the analogy with “various subtle functions” (v. 76c: sākṣmā vyāprabhadṛhtt in ritual, which are postulated in order to connect theoretically each temporary ritual act so that one can explain their efficacy. The unseen subtle functions which Kumārila mentions correspond in the ritual context to the unseen effects (adṛṣṭa) such as apiṣva and purificaction. This position, therefore, is to be understood as that which takes the samskāra to be an unseen effect. (A summary in Japanese is given in [Omae 1998b: 468].)

2. Refutation of postulating unseen effects (adṛṣṭakalpanānirāsa)

The second position intends to explain the phenomenon of cognizing a word-meaning without a postulation of any unseen effects. (A summary is given in [Omae 1998b: 468].)
Ślokavārttikā sphota, v. 97:
vīnā samskāra-kalpena tadanantaravātītah
kṛtyānugrahabhāmrtyya varṇo 'ntyah pratīdākakaḥ]\ SV 378.14–15
Without postulating the [unseen] sāṁskāra, the last phoneme, due to functioning immediately after them [i.e. preceding phonemes], helped and given [by them] the capacity [to let one cognize a word-meaning], can be a communicator.

This position, presupposing the same structure of the sāṁskāra-karman as in the previous position, regards the capacity (sāmarthya) or the effect produced through the assistance (āmugraḥa) as a seen object (ādṛṣṭa), unlike the previous position, which takes it as an unseen object. It is, however, theoretically impossible in this case, as Kumārila points out,11 to posit an āmugraḥa-phala or sāmarthya within the domain of the “seen” world, without having recourse to something which fills the time gap between the preceding phonemes and the last phoneme.

3. sāṁskāra as a mental trace (sāṁskāra = vāsanā)

The final interpretation is the one which was to define his followers' orthodox interpretation. Kumārila pays attention to the fact that this particular sāṁskāra requires a different capacity from the common sāṁskāra, which functions as a cause of recollection (smṛtiḥetu).

Ślokavārttikā sphota, v. 102:
yady api smṛtiḥetutvam svāmārāṣṭya vyavasthitam
kāryāntareṣu sāmarthyaḥ na tasya pratiṣṭhitaye]\ SV 379.9–10
Although the sāṁskāra is already posited separately as a cause of recollection, its capacity for other effects is not denied.

In this way, Kumārila, after identifying Šabara’s sāṁskāra as the well-known cause of recollection, i.e. a mental trace (bhāvanā, vāsanā), postulates on to this “seen” locus a new “unseen” property, i.e. the capacity (sāmarthya) of being a cause to cognize a word-meaning (artha-buddhihetuva). (A summary is given in [Omae 1998b: 468–467])

Ślokavārttikā sphota, v. 103:
tena sāṁskārasya-mābhavo nāme naivam prakālayate
 tasyārtha-buddhihetuvaḥ ādṛṣṭaṁ kevalam kṛtam]\ SV 379.13–14
Therefore it is not the existence of sāṁskāra that is thus postulated by this [author, i.e. Šabara]. Only its being the cause to cognize an object is postulated as an unseen object.

This idea apparently assumes the maxim which is formulated later as “dharma-kalpanāḥ dharmalpanā laghiyāṁ” (To assume the property is lighter than to assume the locus.). To explain, Kumārila intends to reduce the assumption so that he could show the superiority of the Mīmāṃsā theory over the sphota theory. By postulating a mere property (dharma-kalpana), he makes the presumption even lighter than that of Šabara, who postulates the locus itself (dharma-kalpana) in Kumārila’s eyes.20 Our assumption is confirmed by a parallel discussion by Kumārila in the Ślokavārttikā śūnyavāda, where a Buddhist opponent, using the Mīmāṃsakas’ own idea, applies this general rule to attack their position that an external object (artha) is postulated.

Ślokavārttikā śūnya, v. 18:
aṇekalpasya k ca jñānyat ca ekalpaḥ
śaktimātrasya bheda ca vastubhedād visesate]\ SV 194.26–28
For [in general,] it is better to postulate one thing than to postulate many. And [when it is inevitable to postulate one thing,] the separation [and postulation] of a mere capacity is superior to the separation [and postulation] of an entity. (It is better to postulate a vāsanā, i.e. the capacity of a cognition, than to postulate an external object, in order to explain the fact that we grasp blue etc.)

The Buddhist regards the vāsanā as a capacity (śakti) of a cognition (jñāna), the postulation of which is less and better than postulating an entirely separate entity, i.e. an external object (artha). In the same manner but on a different level, Kumārila, in our relevant portion of the sphota-vāda, considers the artha-buddhihetuva to be a capacity (sāmarthya) of a well-known cause of a recollection, i.e. sāṁskāra as equivalent to vāsanā (v. 103: tasya [sāṁskārasya] artha-buddhihetuvaṁ; v. 102: sāmarthyaṁ . . . tasya [sāṁskārasya]). In consequence we can assume that Kumārila intends this position, which postulates only an unseen capacity “artha-buddhihetuva” in the well-known sāṁskāra (= vāsanā, mental trace), to be better than the first interpretation, which postulates an entirely separate entity “sāṁskāra” (an unseen effect of a preparation-act).31
This attitude of reduction leads him to the further step that one does not need to postulate at all a new capacity, i.e. arthabuddhīhetutva. For, so long as one can get the same result with this samskāra, it is better to depend on its well-known character, i.e. smṛtiḥetutva, without postulating a new capacity. (Summary is given in [Omae 1998b: 467].)

Ślokavārttika sphaṭa, v. 109:
yad vai pratyakṣaṁ tah pūrvar krama-jñānesu yat param,
samastavaṁnatvajñānam tad arthaḥkāraṇānam|| SV 380.14–15

Or, first cognizing sequentially [the individual phonemes] by perceptions, one cognizes afterwards all the phonemes. This cognition is the cause of cognizing a [word]-meaning.

Kumārila shows two further possible models. In both cases recollection (smarana) plays a key role as a “time-gap-filler”: 1. a variegated single cognition which has access to both present and past phonemes (v. 111: citaraṇāḥ . . . buddhiḥ sadaśadvarṇavācārāḥ, i.e. a cognition which consists of the perception of the last phoneme and the recollections of the preceding phonemes, becomes the cause of cognizing a word-meaning; 2. a single recollection of all phonemes (v. 112: smaranaṁ . . . sarveṣu), including the last phoneme, is the cause of cognizing a word-meaning. (Cf. [Omae 1998b: 467].)

This idea presupposes the maxim “dṛśte saty adṛśṭakalpanānyāya”. In this way, Kumārila, excluding a postulation of an unseen effect (adṛśṭakalpanā), finally develops the Mīmāṃśa theory that it is possible to cognize a word-meaning from the last phoneme simply through recollecting the (preceding or all) phonemes.

As mentioned before, the superiority of the Mīmāṃśa theory to the sphaṭavāda depends on the smaller number of unseen objects postulated. Kumārila, starting from the position that the samskāra is an unseen effect, intends to reduce the weight of postulation as far as possible: first he halves the postulation, i.e. he postulates only a new capacity, i.e. arthabuddhīhetutva, through the identification of the samskāra as the well-known cause of a recollection (vāsanā); then he goes further and finally succeeds in completely avoiding any new postulation, by utilizing the well-known character of the vāsanā, i.e. smṛtiḥetutva. It can be observed that Kumārila tries to add his own contribution, while being fully aware of the previous idea that one has to postulate the unseen locus itself.

dharmikāpanā → dharmakālanā → kalpanā-abhāva (samskāra = vāsanā)

Regarding his intention to contribute to the Mīmāṃśa theory through reducing postulation, one can see that Kumārila’s interpretation that the samskāra is nothing but a vāsanā rather supports our conclusion that there existed the position that the samskāra was an unseen effect.

VII. Conclusion

1. The samskāra mentioned in the Śābarabhāṣya is not related with smarana and therefore different from *smṛtiḥetuḥ-samskāra, because the Vṛttikāra mentions smarana besides the *antyavyavānaka-śāstra.

2. The samskāra mentioned here is regarded by the Vṛttikāra as adṛśta while the process of smarana is shown in this context as devoid of any adṛśta. So samskāra here is different from *smṛtiḥetuḥ-samskāra.

3. *Smṛtiḥetuḥ-samskāra belongs to the ātman, according to its definition, while the samskāra mentioned here does not belong to the ātman but to the last phoneme. So these two are different.

4. The structure of samskāra-karman and *samskāra-kārya (= adṛśtaḥ samskāra) is consistent with that of this samskāra.

5. The way to decide the preferable view, based on choosing that which has the smaller number of the unseen effects, is common to both.

6. The parallel discussion by Bhartrihari supports this interpretation.

7. Kumārila’s commentary, which mentions the same interpretation as ours and is motivated by a particular intention to go two steps beyond it, supports rather than opposes our interpretation, considering his special motivation.

Abbreviations and Texts


Secondary Sources


Notes

1) According to the Mīmāṃsā śiddhānta, śabda is defined as the object which is grasped by the organ of hearing (cf. śrāvraghapah as in artha ... F 38.4). So those eternal sounds which are made manifest by human beings as well as by drums are equally regarded as śabda. Therefore it is too narrow to translate śabda as 'speech'. The relevant portion of the Śāharaśāhṛṣya, however, which mainly deals with the argument with the so-called sphiṭakādīn, has nothing to do with drum sounds. What the Vṛttikāra intends as śabda here is that which communicates a word-meaning, i.e. either varna or sphiṭa. So it is 'meaningless' to translate śabda as 'sound'. Furthermore, it might cause an unnecessary confusion to translate śabda as 'sound', since 'sound' includes dhvani (or nāda), which Mīmāṃsakas clearly distinguish from the eternal śabda. For these reasons I translate here śabda as 'speech'.

2) Śāharaśāhṛṣya ad 1.1.3–5, Vṛttikāra: tasmād gaur iś gkhrād vivarjāyānām podam akārād eva, na tebya vyottkritam anayam podam nāme iti. F 40.9–10. "Therefore the word "gaur", which begins with [g] and ends with [h], is nothing but phonemes. It is not a distinct thing beyond these [phonemes] called "word"."

3) "Erinnerung" [Strauss 1932: 17]; "impression" [Jha 1973: 19]; "Śabha says that the meaning is conveyed by the last letter aided by the impressions produced in the mind by the preceding letters. ... The impressions or sanskāra-s are the traces left on the mind by experience and can produce the recollection, when needed, of what has been experienced." [Raja 1969: 111]; “Der letzte Laut zusammen mit dem
The Mīmāṃsā Concept of samskāra

hy agnyarthāḥ, yady agnir īṣṭarthāḥ syāt tatas tadartham agniyādeham itiṣṭham upahṛtyā. nīpahālī tu īṣṭayaḥ. tadartham agniyādeham api niṣṭhām syāt. katham pūrṇa agnyarthāḥ pāvamāneṣṭinām, niṣprajnottātā eva prajnottātāc ca gānāṁ. bhūvyātāvāpi apiṣṭayo bhūtyām agnir ādṛthaḥ kriyora. tasmād agniyādeham na pāvamāneṣṭhām. A 1038. 2-6. "However [it is] not [so]. Because those [pāvamāneṣṭin] ait for that [ritual fire]. For pāvamāneṣṭin are for the sake of the ritual fire. If the ritual fire is for the sake of sacrifices, then setting up of fire, which aims for that [fire], would assist sacrifices. But the sacrifices lack purpose. The setting up of fire too, which is for the sake of those [sacrifices], would lack purpose. [Opponent:] How then are the pāvamāneṣṭin for the sake of the fire? [Siddhāntin:] Only because [pāvamāneṣṭin would become] purposeless [according to our view]. And because [according to our view] fires have purpose. The sacrifices, though [they are] to be produced, should be done for fires, which are [already] produced. (= The maxim "bhūtām bhūryōdopādiṣyate" is not applied to this case.) Therefore the setting up of the fires is not for the sake of the pāvamāneṣṭin."

Sābaraḥādyāya ad 4.3.15.

Sābaraḥādyāya ad 2.1.7: alāpyaya adṛṣṭakalpanaṁ nyāyā. A 406.7; Sābaraḥādyāya ad 2.2.1: adṛṣṭādṛṣṭhinām upakārakalpanaṁ pārjyāyā nyāyā. A 462.1-2.

Sābaraḥādyāya ad 3.1.22: wavā āhavanyayā 'ra yāgyādyāhārākhumāvaṃ gunābhātitaḥ īr碘ate, satyam, adikāraṇam āhavaniyah, tathāpi tu āhavaniyārya eva yagāñ bhajanaḥ prajnottātā bhūvyātāvāpi. kalyoṃ phalena iti cet, satyaṃ kalyoṃ. agnir samārthaṃ tu tatbhakṣaṃ na svaghaḥ. svaghaḥ kalyoṃānum dād adyaṃ kalyoṃa, hama ca svagha bhavaḥ, tasya cādām yādhanaḥpāde "ṛṣṭyaḥ samārthaḥ iti. tasmād agnyarthāḥ pāvamāneṣṭhām. A 737. 11-738.1. ["[Opponent:] Here [in this passage], the offering fire is [by the locative-ending] to be the subservient element, in as much as it is the locus of the sacrifice. [Siddhāntin:] True, the offering fire is the locus. But even though [it is so], the sacrifice is only for the offering fire. Because the offering fire has a purpose but the pāvamāneṣṭin lack a purpose. [Opponent] Why do they (= pāvamāneṣṭin) lack a purpose? [Siddhāntin:] Because [their] fruit is not [explicitly] taught. [Opponent] [Their] fruit is to be assumed. [Siddhāntin:] True, [it is] to be assumed. But their fruit is purification of the fire, not heaven. If heaven is assumed, then something unseen would be assumed twice: heaven arises from the offering and another unseen, i.e. purification of the offering, [arises] by the offering fire. Therefore the pāvamāneṣṭin are for the fire."

Strictly speaking, the fruit is not tadvad itself but the tadvad's suitability (yogatā) for purodāsa produced in the śvādhi. The same is so of pīṭha.

Sābaraḥādyāya ad 11.1.27: vrīdhin avahantā tadvadān pinasī āṣṭrayāmādāmāṃ śvādoṣyaḥ sāvāmāntyātmyavatṛgye nāpi sāvāmāntyātmyaḥ svāhā. hataḥ, etāṁ prapya pratyakṣa ‘ṛsto niṣṭhāyate. tadvadāḥ piṣṭami ca. tāt trə niṣṭhāya, pūrdoṣya kāryātā. tasmād etāmāṃ tadvārā eva prapya vajāyate. yadi sakrṛ eva mulaśāstavyādāntumāṃ śvādaṣṭṛtyaḥ upālīyāḥ, apiṣṭyaḥ prakārayābhāsyaḥ, etām mā kāryām tān niṣṭhāyate. atātām tadvadāntyātmyavatṛgyaḥ sāvāmāntyātmyaḥ svāhā. tadvadāntyātmyaḥ sā vā niṣṭhāyate. A 2113 [misprinted as 3015]. "Those acts which have a seen purpose [prescribed as] e.g. "One thresches rice." "And one grinds rice. etc."
are performed until the threshed rice [or the ground rice] is accomplished. [Opponent:] Why? [Siddhāntin:] Because in performing these [acts], a visible purpose is accomplished: threshed rice and ground rice. And these are useful in this [sacrifice], because a rice-cake is to be made [from them]. Therefore performing these [acts] are known to be for that [rice-cake] only. If one gives up after only a single [performance of] raising and pounding the pestle or pushing and pulling the millstone, their result to be made (= rice-cake) would be never accomplished. Therefore [one should know that] they are completed by accomplishing that (= threshed rice, ground rice). That means [one should] repeat [the action] up to the accomplishment of threshed rice and the accomplishment of ground rice.

17) InBackground

18) 'aha gaur ity atara hah sabbha, gakara-jivikarasiyam āti bhagavat parivaara, śrōtvagahane hy arthe loke sabbha sabbhadh prasiddham te ca śrōtvagahānāḥ. "Then what is the speech in this "gauḥ?" The reverend Upavāsa [says], [Pratijñā]: ["The phonemes"] |g| / |au| / |h| [are speech]." [Uddāharana:] Because the expression "speech" is universally known in this world as referring to the object grasped by the organ of hearing. [Utpayana:] And they are (|g| / |au| / |h|) are grasped by the organ of hearing.

19) yady evam artha-pratipatto nayopadaye kathām? ["Opponent = (Sphotaśādikā): If so, the cognition of an object is inexplicable. [Question:] Why?"

20) 1. chakkaśaikaravāsī (he) |vṛc| nopaścabhavye. 2. na cakṣuṣaya-unikriyā |vṛc| kaśiā ātti samudaya nāma yato "rtha-pratipattī syat. yaddh (he) gakara na tadā anvārayata, yaddh ukaraviyam, yaddh gakara. ["Opponent:] In cognizing each phoneme, the object is not apprehended. And there is nothing distinct to the phonemes, a so-called whole (= |gauha|), through which the object is cognized. When |g| is [there], |au| and |h| are not. When |au| and |h| are [there], |g| is not.

21) ato gakara-dānayativāto "nyo gośādu |vṛc| yato "rtha-pratipattī syat." "Therefore there is a distinct speech 'gauḥ' beyond phonemes such as |g| etc. through which one cognizes the object."

22) antaṁśe (his) |vṛc| sādhu maraṇād artha-pratipaya iti cet. na śrīmātanapi na parvātāh āsārāh tulyatā. ["Question:] Although the speech has disappeared, one cognizes the object by recollection. [Opponent:] No. [For] the recollection, since it also is momentary, is similar to phonemes.

23) pūraṇavarnajamukhrasamāsitra "ntyo varṇaḥ pratipāyaka ity adhoṣā. [Siddhāntin:] The last phoneme accompanied by a samśāra, which is born out of the preceding phonemes, makes [one] cognize [the object of a word]. So there is no problem.

24) namo evam (after) |vṛc| sābhād artha-pratipādya-mahā iti laukikām vacanam anupapamam syat. ucyate. yaddh nopaścaya anupapamam nāma, na hi laukikā vacanam anupaścaya ity etatāt pratijñādhiḥ anuvarta-gamaṁ āttha śakya bhyaṇa-patantam. laukikā vacanān anupapamārthān anupapamārthāni ca dihyante, yatā devadatta gām abhayāja ity evamādī. daśā dādiṁśa dāpār ity evamādī ca. ["Opponent:] Then the worldly usage "We understand an object through a word," would become inexplicable. [Siddhāntin:] We answer. If [it would become] inexplicable, let it be inexplicable. For we can not accept an object that is not apprehended by perception etc. by the mere reason that worldly usage would be inexplicable. Among worldly usages, [both] are seen. [i.e.] those which have explicit objects such as "Devadatta, drive the cow near," and those which have inexplicable objects such as "Ten pomegranate fruits, six cakes of flour." (Cf. Mahābhāṣya 1.2.45, Kiethorn ed. I. 217.12-13.)"
of a capacity as subsidiary and "lighter" than that of its locus. In the present context, Kumārila equates the arthaabhūdhihetvata to a capacity (śamārtha) and clearly says that one can fulfill the job by postulating only the arthaabhūdhihetvata as an unseen object (v. 103dc: tasyārthabhūdhihetvam adṛṣṭa kevalam kṛtam). Therefore it is not inappropriate to assume that Kumārila has in his mind the distinction between dharma and dharmin. One might argue that since Kumārila does not explicitly use the terms dharmā or dharmin, it is totally irrelevant to apply the general rule here. But the reason why he does not mention it, I think, is rather that such a way of analysis is so familiar and automatic that he, as a Mīmāṃsaka, does not need to proclaim "I am applying such and such a rule", not that he does not presuppose such an idea. One of the famous Mīmāṃsā traditions in Kerala, in fact, supports my view. Ṛṣiputra Parameswara, in his Gopālīka commentary on Maṇḍana's Sphoṭasiddhi passage (SS 48.4–5: tasmāt kāyāntaraparikalpitsatābhāvyaṃ sāmāryaṃ sakhantaratparikapālapannam ato), mentions that the relevant position of the vāsanāpaka is intended to avoid the postulation of a locus, "nāṭrāśabda dharmanāmī tvāvartatatīpi" (SS 51.17). It further explains that the problem in the first interpretation "sāmārthaḥ pañcaḥ" is the postulation of a locus (dharmanakapān), "nara eva sāmārthā śṛṇuḥṣṭetah, anyo vā tatra śṛṇuḥṣṭetā śakte śāktyāntaryaśūrya ityādv eva dāśām, anyata dharmanalpavatā dharma at" (SS 86.9–10). (cf. Tatvottādbhāva, a commentary on the Tattvabindu by the same author: śṛṇuḥṣṭe ki dharmāntaram kalpaṃ. adṛṣṭam āra dharmy ārṇi TB 28.11–12.) After reading Parameswara’s explanation, we can see that it is not only relevant to bear in mind the general idea, but essential in understanding Kumārila’s intention in this context.

On the contrary, if one does not accept that Kumārila bears this maxim in mind, we would not be able to explain his statements which contrast the opposite characters of the two things: sāmārtha (= tattvārtha), the existence of which becomes the locus of the capacity arthaabhūdhihetvata, is well accepted by everyone (i.e. artha), while the arthaabhūdhihetvata, which is the capacity (śamārtha) of the sāmārtha, is not well established and therefore is to be newly posited as an unseen object (adṛṣṭa). Furthermore, we also would not be able to explain why this interpretation is preferable for Kumārila to the first if we assume that Kumārila is unaware of the different "heaviness" of dharman and dharmin, since the number of postulations is the same in both cases, i.e. sāmārthaḥ, and arthaabhūdhihetvataḥ, and therefore there would be no criterion to judge the latter better.

In the context of Vedic exegesis, Mīmāṃsā explicitly uses its view of the different "weight" of an entity and its property in discussing padārtha (ritual elements) and their krama (sequence). Ritual elements such as sippa (ācāra) and so forth, even though they are taught in śrutī-texts, have privilege over the sequence taught in śrutī-texts. Therefore the act of sippa can enter between the vedāharaṇa and vedāharaṇa and split them, even though these two elements are taught to be immediate neighbors in sequence (vedām kṣṛtved vēdīṃ harīt). For it is inappropriate to cancel padārtha in favor of krama, which is a subsidiary element (guṇa) of padārthas. (Śākaraḥ 1.1.37: acācaraṃ padārthāḥ, padārthānāṃ ca gahāh kramaḥ. na ca guṇamūrdhena padārthāna ca kartavyo bhavati. A 198.5–199.2.) Kumārila mentions
the general idea behind this discussion: "dharmadharminsvirode ca dharmino balaavattarâh!" A 196.25. (And when there is a contradiction between a locus and its property, the locus is stronger [than the property].) The basic idea which supports the above argumentation is consistently seen in our relevant discussion of the "heaviness" of postulation.

- Article -

Play and Eros: Girls’ Swing Play and Swing Songs in Orissa, India

Yumiko Tokita-Tanabe

Introduction

This paper deals with a hitherto downplayed aspect of femininity in India that is related to a value found in some of the ritual play among unmarried girls in Orissa and in the discourse of nostalgia among married women regarding their childhood. Fieldwork on which this paper is based was conducted in Garh Mantri, Khurda district, Orissa, from April 1991 to November 1992, in Puri and Bhubaneswar from December 1993 to December 1997 and during subsequent visits to Puri and Bhubaneswar. It is my contention that one aspect of “play” of unmarried girls suggests their erotic pursuit of link with the realm of the sacred and the transcendental through their femininity. In this paper, I would like to pay attention to elements of transcendental eros and existential aspiration implicated in the value of femininity in India. It involves the freedom of the self/soul from the limitations and constraints imposed by the body and from the social ties that bind the living being to this world.

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