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■ Article ■

The Mīmāṃsā Concept of *saṃskāra* and
the *saṃskāra* in the Process of Cognizing
a Word-Meaning: *pūrva-varṇa-janita-saṃskāra**



Kei Kataoka

I. Introduction

In the Mīmāṃsā system of Vedic exegesis, speech (*śabda*) is not word (*pada*) but phoneme (*varṇa*, *akṣara*).¹⁾ So even the so-called word (*pada*) is regarded as being in reality phonemes (*varṇas*).²⁾ This frame limits the Mīmāṃsakas' options for explaining the process of cognizing a word-meaning (*padārtha-pratyaya*, *-pratipatti*), because it is more natural to say that a word-meaning is cognized directly through a word, rather than through phonemes. For example, cowness (*gotva*) is ordinarily considered to be cognized through the word "cow" (*"gauḥ"*), not through the phonemes /k//a//u/ (/g//au//ḥ/), as is clearly shown in our usage "word-meaning".

To escape this dilemma between the theory of **varṇaśabdavāda* and the observed fact of *padārthapratyaya*, the Vṛttikāra, whose explanation of *Jaiminiśūtra* 1.1.3-5 is introduced in the *Śābarabhāṣya*, adopts the theory of **antyavarṇakaraṇavāda*. According to this, a word-meaning is

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By contrast *pradhānakarman* is defined in *Jaiminīsūtra* 2.1.7 as that which has the accomplishment of the act itself (*karmanirvṛtti*) as its aim (*īpśitatama*).⁹⁾

pradhānakarman : *dravya* → *karman*
guṇakarman (= *saṃskāra*) : *karman* → *dravya*

3. The Definition of *saṃskāra* as a *śeṣa*

Śābarabhāṣya ad 3.1.3 defines *saṃskāra* as a *śeṣa* or an element subservient to *pradhānakarman*. *Saṃskāra* produces in an element (*padārtha*), i.e. material (*dravya*), a capacity (*sāmarthyā*) or suitability (*yogyatā*) for a certain purpose (*prayojana*, *artha*).

Śābarabhāṣya ad 3.1.3: *saṃskāro nāma sa bhavati yasmiñ jāte padārtho bhavati yogyaḥ kasyacid arthasya. tenāpi kriyāyām kartavyāyām prayojanam iti so 'pi parārthaḥ*. A 660.9–11.

The *saṃskāra* is that, by the arising of which an element becomes suitable for a certain purpose. It also has a purpose regarding the action to be made. Therefore it also exists for the other [and fulfills the definition of *śeṣa*].

Śābarabhāṣya ad 3.7.6: *yat tasya saṃskartavyasya prayojanam tatra sāmarthyam janayanti*. A 1078.4–5.

[*Saṃskāra* is said to be “that which arranges (*saṃskaroti*)”.] For it produces a capacity for the purpose of that which is to be arranged (*saṃskartavya*).

In this way, *saṃskāra*, like other elements, such as *dravya* and *guṇa*, assists *pradhānakarman* and thus fulfills the *śeṣa*’s definition of “*parārthatva*” or “being for the other”. Thus *saṃskāra* could be labelled **arthayogyatāpādaka* (that which brings about a suitability for a certain purpose) or **prayojanasāmarthyajanaka* (that which produces capacity).

sāmarthyā
saṃskāra → *dravya* → *prayojana*

4. “Purpose” (*prayojana*, *artha*) of the *saṃskāra*

Śābarabhāṣya ad 3.6.11–13 discusses the relationship of *guṇapradhānakarman*, *śeṣaśeṣabhāva* between a ritual fire (*agni*) and *pavamāneṣṭis*

(sacrifices for the *pavamāna*[-*agni*]), which are performed after setting up three or five fires (*agnyādheya*, *agnyādhāna*). The opponent holds that a ritual fire, which is already set up before the *pavamāneṣṭis*, serves the *pavamāneṣṭis* in accordance with the maxim *bhūtaṃ bhavyāyopadiśyate* (The produced is prescribed for the sake of what should be produced).¹⁰⁾ So the produced (*bhūta*) fire is regarded as subservient to the *pavamāneṣṭis* which should be produced (*bhāvayitavya*). Opposing this view, the Siddhāntin answers that the *pavamāneṣṭis* should be regarded as subservient to the ritual fire (*pavamāneṣṭayo hy agnyarthāḥ*), because if the *pavamāneṣṭis*, as the opponent holds, were served by a ritual fire, they would be useless and so would the setting up of fire (*agnyādheya*), which serves the *pavamāneṣṭis* through a ritual fire. For the *pavamāneṣṭis* do not have any fruit (*niṣphalās tv iṣṭayaḥ*). But if the ritual fire is primary, though it is a produced element (*bhūta*), after being purified by the future *pavamāneṣṭis*, it will serve other rituals, such as the *agnihotra*, *darśapūrṇamāsa*, etc., and thereby become useful (*prayojanavattvāc cāgnīnām*).¹¹⁾

pūrvapakṣa : *agni* → *pavamāneṣṭi* → ? (*niṣprayojana*)
siddhānta : *pavamāneṣṭi* → *agni* → *prayojana*

Here the opponent takes the *pavamāneṣṭis* as *pradhānakarman*. The Siddhāntin, however, concludes that they are *guṇakarman* (= *saṃskāra*) because of their contribution to other rituals through ritual fires. If we apply the above-mentioned definitions of *saṃskāra*, i.e. “*dravyapradhāna*” and “**prayojanasāmarthyajanaka*” or “**arthayogyatāpādaka*”, the Siddhāntin’s intention becomes clearer: the subordinate *saṃskāra*’s, i.e. *pavamāneṣṭis*, give to the primary element (*pradhāna*), i.e. ritual fires, a suitability (*yogyatā*) for a certain purpose (*artha*, *prayojana*), such as to assist *agnihotra* etc.

5. The Unseen Effect (*adṛṣṭa*) of the *saṃskāra*

Śābarabhāṣya ad 3.1.22, dealing with the same topic, expands further on the nature of “purpose” (*prayojana*, *phala*). The opponent, who holds that the *pavamāneṣṭis* are *pradhānakarman* as before, apparently suggests relying on the *viśvajinnyāya*, viz. that one can assume a fruit of the *pavamāneṣṭis* (*kalpyam phalam*) if they do not have any fruit taught in the scripture.¹²⁾ The Siddhāntin, who holds that *pavamāneṣṭis* are

*saṃskāra*karman and their fruit is the purification of the fire (*agnisaṃskāra*), rejects the opponent's view, appealing to the principle of "*adr̥ṣṭakalpanālpīyasī nyāyyā*" or "the least assumption of the unseen entities is right".¹³⁾ Following the opponent's view, one has to assume two unseen effects, i.e. that of *svarga* as a result of *homa* and that of unseen purification (*adr̥ṣṭaḥ saṃskāra*) of the *pavamāneṣṭis* through the *āhavanīya*. In contrast, the Siddhāntin assumes only one, i.e. unseen purificatory effect upon the *āhavanīya* through the *pavamāneṣṭis*.¹⁴⁾

To summarize, the procedure described here runs as follows: first each element such as *saṃskāra*karman, *dravya* and *prayojana*, is posited according to the definition of *pradhānakarman* and *saṃskāra*karman. The opponent holds that *āhavanīya* is for the sake of the *pavamāneṣṭis* and the *pavamāneṣṭis* are for the sake of *svarga*, which is assumed lest they should become purposeless. The Siddhāntin, considering *pavamāneṣṭis* to be a *saṃskāra*karman, holds that *pavamāneṣṭis* are for the sake of *āhavanīya*, and *āhavanīya* is for the sake of other rituals such as the *agnihotra* etc. Up to this stage one cannot decide which view is preferable, because both processes have purpose enough. Then the number of unseen effects is counted, so that the "light hypothesis" or simple model may be adopted in accordance with the maxim *adr̥ṣṭakalpanālpīyasī nyāyyā*.

	<i>saṃskāra</i> (<i>adr̥ṣṭa</i>)
<i>pūrvapakṣa</i> : <i>agni</i>	→ <i>pavamāneṣṭi</i> → <i>svarga</i> (<i>adr̥ṣṭa</i>)
	<i>saṃskāra</i> (<i>adr̥ṣṭa</i>)
<i>siddhānta</i> : <i>pavamāneṣṭi</i>	→ <i>agni</i> → <i>prayojana</i> (<i>adr̥ṣṭa</i>)

6. The Seen Effect (*dr̥ṣṭa*) of the *saṃskāra*karman

Śābarabhāṣya ad 11.1.27 deals with *saṃskāra*karman, such as threshing (*avahanana*) and grinding (*peṣaṇa*), which have seen effects. Here the question is whether they should be performed until some seen effects are accomplished or not. The Siddhāntin concludes that they should, in accordance with the maxim *dr̥ṣṭe saty* (or *sambhavaty*) *adr̥ṣṭakalpanānyāyyā* (If the seen is possible, assumption of the unseen is not right). Here the act of threshing or grinding has a visible (*pratyakṣa*, *dr̥ṣṭa*) fruit, such as *tanḍula* (threshed rice) or *piṣṭa* (ground rice).¹⁵⁾ If we gave up the performance in the middle, we would be forced to rely on the assumption of an

unseen effect, which is not acceptable when the seen effect is possible. Here the purpose (*artha*, *phala*) is divided into two: the seen and the unseen, out of which the former is preferred.¹⁶⁾

III. The Characteristic Features of *saṃskāra*karman

1. *saṃskāra*karman has a material as its primary element (*dravya-pradhāna*).
2. *saṃskāra*karman gives to the material a capacity (*sāmarthyā*) or suitability (*yogyatā*) for a particular purpose (*artha*, *prayojana*).
3. *saṃskāra*karman is a subservient element (*śeṣa*, *parārtha*) that, through a material (*dravya*), serves *pradhānakarman* (a primary act), which is also qualified as a purpose (*artha*, *prayojana*).
4. The fruit (*phala*, *artha*) given by *saṃskāra*karman in a material (*dravya*) is either seen (*dr̥ṣṭa*, *pratyakṣa*) or unseen (*adr̥ṣṭa*, *kalpya*). The latter is also called *saṃskāra*. This assumed unseen entity (*adr̥ṣṭa*, *kalpyam phalam*) should be avoided or reduced if possible.

IV. An Examination of the *saṃskāra* in the Discussion of **padārthapratyaya*

The following examines the notion of *saṃskāra* which appears in the discussion of the process of cognizing a word-meaning (*padārthapratyaya*), in order to show that the *saṃskāra* here is not the **smṛti*hetusaṃskāra, as it is usually interpreted, but the unseen purificatory effect of *saṃskāra*karman. The synopsis of the so-called *sphoṭavāda* in the *Śābarabhāṣya* (strictly speaking, in the explanation by the Vṛttikāra), which deals with the process of cognizing the object of a word (*padārthapratyaya*), is as follows:

0. Presupposition: a meaning (*artha*) is cognized through speech (*śabda*).¹⁷⁾
1. Speech (*śabda*) is nothing but phonemes (*varṇa*).¹⁸⁾ (⇒ Fact: *artha* is cognized through *varṇas*.) F 38. 3–5
2. The direct connection between *varṇas* and *padārthapratyaya* is denied, leading to *anupapatti*.¹⁹⁾ F 38. 6
 - a. Denial of two possibilities²⁰⁾ F 38. 6–9
 - b. Explanation by **sphoṭa*²¹⁾ F 38. 9–10
 - c. Denial of *smaraṇa*-process²²⁾ F 38.11–12

3. *Adṛṣṭakalpanā*: *artha* is cognized from *varṇas* through the unseen medium of *saṃskāra*.²³⁾ F 38. 13
 - a. *laukikavacana*, which seems to conflict with the *siddhānta*²⁴⁾ F 38.14–20
 - b. *śāstravacana*, which seems to conflict with the *siddhānta*²⁵⁾ F 38.20–24
 - c. Solution of the *laukikavacana*²⁶⁾ F 40. 1–7
 - d. Solution of the *śāstravacana*²⁷⁾ F 40. 7–10
4. Denial of **sphoṭavāda* by the number of unseen effects (*adṛṣṭa*).²⁸⁾ F 40.11–12

In composing this section, the Vṛttikāra most probably presupposes the process of *arthāpatti* (cf. [Kataoka 1998]), which is also shown explicitly in the two *śloka*s quoted in the *Śābarabhāṣya* ad 2.2.1.²⁹⁾ First the seen fact (*drṣṭa*) of *padārthapratyaya* is shown. Second, it is shown that there exists inexplicability (*anupapatti*) in this fact, *padārthapratyaya*, so long as we confine ourselves to the seen world. To keep this condition of *anupapatti* (or *anyathānupapatti*), which is the main cause for *arthāpatti* to function, all possible doctrines which explain the fact only with the seen are denied. Thirdly, the unseen (*adṛṣṭa*) is assumed and *saṃskāra* is posited as a medium between *varṇas* and *padārthapratyaya* so as to solve the *anupapatti*. This is the stage where the doctrine of **antyavarnakaraṇa-vāda* is given. Fourthly, due to the smaller number of *adṛṣṭas*, the Mīmāṃsaka's position is preferred to that of the Vaiyākaraṇas, who hold the **sphoṭavāda* which involves two unseen effects: one is **sphoṭa* itself and the other is *saṃskāra* for **sphoṭapratyaya*, which corresponds to that for *padārthapratyaya* in the Mīmāṃsā view.

Problems in the previous interpretation If one follows the previous interpretation that the *saṃskāra* in the Vṛttikāra's definition is nothing but a mental trace, which functions as a cause of recollection (*smṛtihetu*), the following problems arise: First, besides his own position, the Vṛttikāra (in 2c above), speaking through the *Sphoṭavādins*, mentions one model to be denied, according to which the phenomenon of cognizing a word-meaning is to be explained as a recollection process.

antarhite 'pi śabde smaraṇād arthapratyaya iti cen na. F 38.11

[Question:] Although the speech has disappeared, one cognizes the object by recollection. [Answer:] No.

If we accept that the *saṃskāra* is the cause of recollection, and so regard the process as including recollection, the Vṛttikāra's negative statement would be inappropriate.³⁰⁾ Secondly, the context of the relevant portion, which apparently follows the procedure of *arthāpatti*, shows that the Vṛttikāra intends the recollection model as that which can explain the phenomenon of the *padārthapratyaya* within our familiar "seen (*drṣṭa*)" domain, without relying on any unseen effects (*adṛṣṭa*). It follows consequentially that the mental trace, which is always entailed by the recollection, is to be included for the Vṛttikāra in the "seen" domain. The *saṃskāra* in the *siddhānta*, on the other hand, is explicitly stated as an unseen effect (*adṛṣṭa*) which should be postulated. If we took the *saṃskāra* to be the cause of recollection (**smṛtihetusaṃskāra*), we would encounter the dilemma that the *saṃskāra* is regarded by the same author as "seen" as well as "unseen". Thirdly, **smṛtihetusaṃskāra*, which belongs to the *ātman*, does not fit by its definition with the *saṃskāra* mentioned here, which accompanies the last phoneme.

Suitability of the new interpretation The *saṃskāra* mentioned here is equipped with those features suitable to the unseen effect (*adṛṣṭa*) of *saṃskārakarman*. As pointed out before, the *saṃskārakarman* is regarded as *dravyapradhāna*, which has a material as its primary elements, in which it gives a capacity for a certain purpose. Likewise here the process (suggested rather weakly by the expression of "*janita*") is a *saṃskārakarman*, which has the last phoneme (*antyo varṇa*) as its primary element, in which it gives a capacity for *padārthapratyaya*. Here the produced capacity is labelled as "*saṃskāra*" (a purificatory effect) and is qualified as "unseen" (*adṛṣṭa*), as is seen in *Śābarabhāṣya* ad 3.1.22, where particular fruits are labeled as "*saṃskāra*" and "*adṛṣṭaḥ saṃskāra*".

saṃskāra (adṛṣṭa)

pūrvavarṇa → *saṃskāra* → *antyavarṇa* → *padārthapratyaya*

As is shown before in the case of the *saṃskārakarman*, it is a common procedure in the *Śābarabhāṣya* (and to all Mīmāṃsakas) to examine the nature of acts' fruit and count the number of the *adṛṣṭas* in order to show the superiority of the Siddhāntin's view. The similarity in the procedure of both discussions, i.e. one on the unseen purificatory effect of *saṃskārakarman* and the other on the process of *padārthapratyaya*, leads one to think that both *saṃskāras* are of the same nature.

V. A Parallel Discussion by Bhartṛhari

The following points out the fact that Bhartṛhari uses the terminology of “*saṃskāra*” to denote the *saṃskāra*karman and regards it as a device to explain the process of *śabdābhivyakti or the manifestation of speech. This fact implies that the concept of *saṃskāra* current in linguistic debate around AD 500, is not *smṛtihetusaṃskāra but *saṃskāra*karman or its unseen effect. (Kumārila, too, discussing śabdābhivyakti in the *Śloka-vārttika śabdānityatā* vv. 51c–87b, accepts this character of *saṃskāra* and establishes the Mīmāṃsā position of the *śrotrasaṃskāra*.)

Mahābhāṣyadīpikā prathamāhnikā 8.1: *sa ca nādaḥ śrotrasyānugrahe vartate. tadanugrhitam śrotram śabdopalabdhau samartham bhavati, . . . ity eke. apare śabdasyaiva. . . ubhayor ity apare.* MBhD I. 17.15–17.

And this sound functions to help the ear. The ear helped by this [sound] becomes capable of the perception of speech. . . . So say some. Others say that it is the speech [which is helped by this sound]. . . . Others say that it is both [i.e. ear and speech, which are helped by this sound].

Vākyapadīya I. v. 80 (VP 44.25–26):

*indriyasyaiva saṃskāraḥ śabdasyaivobhayasya vā/
kriyate dhvanibhir, vādās trayo 'bhivyaktivādinām||*

Sounds produce *saṃskāra* (arrangement) either in the organ [of hearing], speech or both. [There are] three doctrines held by those who maintain that [speech is] manifested.

The *saṃskāra* mentioned here has the features of the *saṃskāra*karman as *dravyapradhāna* and **prayojanasāmarthyajanaka*. The expression “*śrotrasyānugraha*” shows the *dravyapradhāna*-aspect of the *saṃskāra*karman. Further, “*śabdopalabdhau samartham bhavati*” reminds us of Śābarasvāmin’s description of *saṃskāra*karman, i.e. “*padārtho bhavati yogyaḥ kasyacid arthasya*” and “*tatra (= prayojane) sāmarthyam janayan-ti*”.

VI. The Intention of Kumārila

In the following I shall examine the motivation of Kumārila, who

admits that the *saṃskāra* here is *vāsanā* or a mental trace, in order to show that his interpretation does not contradict our conclusion but in fact supports it if we understand his intention properly. In the *Śloka-vārttika sphoṭavāda*, he introduces three interpretations of this *saṃskāra*. (The following synopsis of the *Śloka-vārttika* is based on [Omae 1998a], with a slight modification by the present author. Maṇḍana’s *Sphoṭasiddhi* offers us a good survey of Kumārila’s three positions (1, 3i, 3ii below), which correspond to the *pūrvapakṣas* of v. 5, vv. 6–7, v. 8 in the *Sphoṭasiddhi* [Iyer 1966: 13, 16–17, 20]. An English summary is available in Iyer’s introduction. Vācaspati, applying Maṇḍana’s criticism about the cause of cognizing a word-meaning (*padārtha*) to that of a sentence-meaning (*vākyārtha*), also explains (and criticizes) three positions in his *Tattvabindu*. 1 = TB 25.13–26.13; 3i = TB 26.14–28.7; 3ii = TB 29.1–33.6.)

1 *saṃskāra*kalpanā vv. 74–90

2 *anugraha* (*adrṣṭakalpanānirāsa*) vv. 95–98

3 *saṃskāra* = *vāsanā* vv. 99–112

i *saṃskāra* = *vāsanā* (*smṛti*hetu + *arthapratyaya*hetu) vv. 99–104

ii *saṃskāra* = *vāsanā* (*smṛti*hetu) vv. 109–112

a *citrabuddhi* (*pūrvavarṇasmṛti* + *antyavarṇapratyakṣa*) v. 111

b *samuccaya*jñāna (*samastavarṇasmṛti*) v. 112

1. Postulation of the *saṃskāra* (*saṃskāra*kalpanā)

The first position interprets the *saṃskāra* in the *Śābarabhāṣya* by appealing to the analogy with “various subtle functions” (v. 76c: *sūkṣmā vyāpārabhedāḥ*) in ritual, which are postulated in order to connect theoretically each temporary ritual act so that one can explain their efficacy. The unseen subtle functions which Kumārila mentions correspond in the ritual context to the unseen effects (*adrṣṭa*) such as *apūrva* and purification. This position, therefore, is to be understood as that which takes the *saṃskāra* to be an unseen effect. (A summary in Japanese is given in [Omae 1998b: 468].)

2. Refutation of postulating unseen effects (*adrṣṭakalpanānirāsa*)

The second position intends to explain the phenomenon of cognizing a word-meaning without a postulation of any unseen effects. (A summary is given in [Omae 1998b: 468].)

Śloka-vārttika sphoṭa, v. 97:

vinā saṃskāra-kalpena tadanantaravṛttitah|

kṛtānugrahasāmarthyā varṇo 'ntyah pratipādakah|| SV 378.14–15

Without postulating the [unseen] *saṃskāra*, the last phoneme, due to functioning immediately after them [i.e. preceding phonemes], helped and given [by them] the capacity [to let one cognize a word-meaning], can be a communicator.

This position, presupposing the same structure of the *saṃskāra-karman* as in the previous position, regards the capacity (*sāmarthyā*) or the effect produced through the assistance (*anugraha*) as a seen object (*adrṣṭa*), unlike the previous position, which takes it as an unseen object. It is, however, theoretically impossible in this case, as Kumārila points out,³¹⁾ to posit an *anugraha-phala* or *sāmarthyā* within the domain of the “seen” world, without having recourse to something which fills the time gap between the preceding phonemes and the last phoneme.

3. *saṃskāra* as a mental trace (*saṃskāra* = *vāsanā*)

The final interpretation is the one which was to define his followers’ orthodox interpretation. Kumārila pays attention to the fact that this particular *saṃskāra* requires a different capacity from the common *saṃskāra*, which functions as a cause of recollection (*smṛti-hetu*).

Śloka-vārttika sphoṭa, v. 102:

yady api smṛti-hetutvaṃ saṃskārasya vyavasthitam|

kāryāntareṣu sāmarthyam na tasya pratiśidhyate|| SV 379.9–10

Although the *saṃskāra* is already posited separately as a cause of recollection, its capacity for other effects is not denied.

In this way, Kumārila, after identifying Śabara’s *saṃskāra* as the well-known cause of recollection, i.e. a mental trace (*bhāvanā*, *vāsanā*), postulates on to this “seen” locus a new “unseen” property, i.e. the capacity (*sāmarthyā*) of being a cause to cognize a word-meaning (*arthabuddhi-hetutva*). (A summary is given in [Omae 1998b: 468–467])

Śloka-vārttika sphoṭa, v. 103:

tena saṃskārasadbhāvo nānenaivaṃ prakalpyate|

tasyārthabuddhi-hetutvaṃ adrṣṭam kevalam kṛtam|| SV 379.13–14

Therefore it is not the existence of *saṃskāra* that is thus postulat-

ed by this [author, i.e. Śabara]. Only its being the cause to cognize an object is postulated as an unseen object.

This idea apparently assumes the maxim which is formulated later as “*dharmikalpanātaḥ dharmakalpanā laghīyasī*” (To assume the property is lighter than to assume the locus.). To explain, Kumārila intends to reduce the assumption so that he could show the superiority of the Mīmāṃsā theory over the *sphoṭa* theory. By postulating a mere property (*dharmakalpanā*), he makes the presumption even lighter than that of Śabara, who postulates the locus itself (*dharmikalpanā*) in Kumārila’s eyes.³²⁾ Our assumption is confirmed by a parallel discussion by Kumārila in the *Śloka-vārttika śūnyavāda*, where a Buddhist opponent, using the Mīmāṃsakas’ own idea, applies this general rule to attack their position that an external object (*artha*) is postulated.

Śloka-vārttika śūnya, v. 18:

anekakalpanāyās ca jyāyasī hy ekakalpanā|

śaktimātrasya bhedas ca vastubhedād viśiṣyate|| SV 194.26–28

For [,in general,] it is better to postulate one thing than to postulate many. And [when it is inevitable to postulate one thing,] the separation [and postulation] of a mere capacity is superior to the separation [and postulation] of an entity. (It is better to postulate a *vāsanā*, i.e. the capacity of a cognition, than to postulate an external object, in order to explain the fact that we grasp blue etc.)

The Buddhist regards the *vāsanā* as a capacity (*śakti*) of a cognition (*jñāna*), the postulation of which is less and better than postulating an entirely separate entity, i.e. an external object (*artha*). In the same manner but on a different level, Kumārila, in our relevant portion of the *sphoṭavāda*, considers the *arthabuddhi-hetutva* to be a capacity (*sāmarthyā*) of a well-known cause of a recollection, i.e. *saṃskāra* as equivalent to *vāsanā* (v. 103: *tasya [saṃskārasya] arthabuddhi-hetutvaṃ*; v. 102: *sāmarthyam . . . tasya [saṃskārasya]*). In consequence we can assume that Kumārila intends this position, which postulates only an unseen capacity “*arthabuddhi-hetutva*” in the well-known *saṃskāra* (= *vāsanā*, mental trace), to be better than the first interpretation, which postulates an entirely separate entity “*saṃskāra*” (an unseen effect of a preparation-act).³³⁾

This attitude of reduction leads him to the further step that one does not need to postulate at all a new capacity, i.e. *arthabuddhihetutva*. For, so long as one can get the same result with this *saṃskāra*, it is better to depend on its well-known character, i.e. *smṛtihetutva*, without postulating a new capacity. (Summary is given in [Omae 1998b: 467].)

Ślokaavārttika sphoṭa, v. 109:

*yad vā pratyakṣataḥ pūrvam kramajñāneṣu yat param/
samastavarṇavijñānam tad arthajñānakāraṇam*|| SV 380.14–15

Or, first cognizing sequentially [the individual phonemes] by perceptions, one cognizes afterwards all the phonemes. This cognition is the cause of cognizing a [word-]meaning.

Kumārila shows two further possible models. In both cases recollection (*smaraṇa*) plays a key role as a “time-gap-filler”: 1. a variegated single cognition which has access to both present and past phonemes (v. 111: *citrarūpām . . . buddhiṃ sadasadvārṇagocarām*), i.e. a cognition which consists of the perception of the last phoneme and the recollections of the preceding phonemes, becomes the cause of cognizing a word-meaning; 2. a single recollection of all phonemes (v. 112: *smaraṇam . . . sarveṣu*), including the last phoneme, is the cause of cognizing a word-meaning. (Cf. [Omae 1998b: 467].)

This idea presupposes the maxim “*dṛṣṭe saty adṛṣṭakalpanānyāyā*”. In this way, Kumārila, excluding a postulation of an unseen effect (*adṛṣṭakalpanā*), finally develops the Mīmāṃsā theory that it is possible to cognize a word-meaning from the last phoneme simply through recollecting the (preceding or all) phonemes.

As mentioned before, the superiority of the Mīmāṃsā theory to the *sphoṭavāda* depends on the smaller number of unseen objects postulated. Kumārila, starting from the position that the *saṃskāra* is an unseen effect, intends to reduce the weight of postulation as far as possible: first he halves the postulation, i.e. he postulates only a new capacity, i.e. *arthabuddhihetutva*, through the identification of the *saṃskāra* as the well-known cause of a recollection (*vāsanā*); then he goes further and finally succeeds in completely avoiding any new postulation, by utilizing the well-known character of the *vāsanā*, i.e. *smṛtihetutva*. It can be observed that Kumārila tries to add his own contribution, while being fully aware of the previous idea that one has to postulate the unseen locus

itself.

dharmikalpanā → *dharmakalpanā* → *kalpanā-abhāva* (*saṃskāra* = *vāsanā*)

Regarding his intention to contribute to the Mīmāṃsā theory through reducing postulation, one can see that Kumārila's interpretation that the *saṃskāra* is nothing but a *vāsanā* rather supports our conclusion that there existed the position that the *saṃskāra* was an unseen effect.

VII. Conclusion

1. The *saṃskāra* mentioned in the *Śābarabhāṣya* is not related with *smaraṇa* and therefore different from **smṛtihetusaṃskāra*, because the Vṛttikāra mentions *smaraṇa* besides the **antyavarṇakaraṇavāda*.
2. The *saṃskāra* mentioned here is regarded by the Vṛttikāra as *adṛṣṭa* while the process of *smaraṇa* is shown in this context as devoid of any *adṛṣṭa*. So *saṃskāra* here is different from **smṛtihetusaṃskāra*.
3. **Smṛtihetusaṃskāra* belongs to the *ātman*, according to its definition, while the *saṃskāra* mentioned here does not belong to the *ātman* but to the last phoneme. So these two are different.
4. The structure of *saṃskārakarman* and **saṃskārakārya* (= *adṛṣṭaḥ saṃskāra*) is consistent with that of this *saṃskāra*.
5. The way to decide the preferable view, based on choosing that which has the smaller number of the unseen effects, is common to both.
6. The parallel discussion by Bhartṛhari supports this interpretation.
7. Kumārila's commentary, which mentions the same interpretation as ours and is motivated by a particular intention to go two steps beyond it, supports rather than opposes our interpretation, considering his special motivation.

Abbreviations and Texts

- A *Mīmāṃsādarsānam*. Ānandāśramasaṃskṛtagranthāvalī, 97. Poona, Ānandāśrama, 1929–35.
- BhP *Byhatī of Prabhākara Miśra with the Bhāṣyapariśiṣṭa of Śālikanātha*. Ed. S. K. Ramanatha Sastri. Madras, University of Madras, 1936.

- F *Materialien Zur Ältesten Erkenntnislehre der Karma-mīmāṃsā*. Erich Frauwallner. Graz-Wien-Köln, Hermann Böhlaus Nachf., 1968.
- MBhD *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā of Bhartṛhari*. Fascicule 4. Āhnika 1. Edited and Translated by Johannes Bronkhorst. Poona, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1987.
- P *Word Index to the Prasastapādabhāṣya*. Johannes Bronkhorst & Yves Ramseier. Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1994.
- PrP *Prakaraṇa Pañcikā of Śrī Śalikanātha Miśra with Nyāya-siddhi*. Ed. A. Subrahmanya Sastri. Varanasi, Banaras Hindu University, 1961.
- SS *The Sphoṭasiddhi of Ācārya Maṇḍanamīśra with the Gopālikā of Rṣiputra Paramēśvara*. Ed. S. K. Rāmanātha Śastrī. Madras, University of Madras, 1931.
- SV *Śloka-vārttika of Śrī Kumārila Bhaṭṭa*. Ed. Svāmī Dvārikādāsa Śastrī. Varanasi, Tara Publications, 1978.
- TB *Tattvabindu by Vācaspatimiśra with Tattvavibhāvanā by Rṣiputra Paramēśvara*. Ed. V. A. Ramaswami Sastri. Annamalai University, 1936.
- VP *Bhartṛharis Vākyapadīya*. Ed. Wilhelm Rau. Wiesbaden, Steiner, 1977.
- VS *Vaiśeṣikasūtram of Kaṇāda with the Commentary of Candrānanda*. Ed. Muni Śrī Jambuvijayaji. Baroda, Oriental Institute, 1982.

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Notes

- * I thank Dr. James Benson, Prof. Shingo Einoo, Dr. Dominic Goodall, Dr. Harunaga Isaacson and Mr. Alex Watson for comments.
- 1) According to the Mīmāṃsā siddhānta, *śabda* is defined as the object which is grasped by the organ of hearing (cf. *śrotagrahaṇe hy arthe* . . . F 38.4). So those eternal sounds which are made manifest by human beings as well as by drums are equally regarded as *śabda*. Therefore it is too narrow to translate *śabda* as 'speech'. The relevant portion of the *Śābarabhāṣya*, however, which mainly deals with the argument with the so-called *sphoṭavādins*, has nothing to do with drum sounds. What the Vṛttikāra intends as *śabda* here is that which communicates a word-meaning, i.e. either *varṇa* or *sphoṭa*. So it is 'meaningless' to translate *śabda* as 'sound'. Furthermore, it might cause an unnecessary confusion to translate *śabda* as 'sound', since 'sound' includes *dhvani* (or *nāda*), which Mīmāṃsakas clearly distinguish from the eternal *śabda*. For these reasons I translate here *śabda* as 'speech'.
- 2) *Śābarabhāṣya* ad 1.1.3–5, Vṛttikāra: *tasmād gaur iti gākārādi visarjanīyāntaṃ padaṃ akṣarāṇy eva, na tebhya vyatiriktaṃ anyat padaṃ nāma iti*. F 40.9–10. "Therefore the word 'gauḥ', which begins with /g/ and ends with /h/, is nothing but phonemes. It is not a distinct thing beyond these [phonemes] called 'word'."
- 3) "Erinnerung" [Strauss 1932: 17]; "impression" [Jha 1973: 19]; "Śābara says that the meaning is conveyed by the last letter aided by the impressions produced in the mind by the preceding letters. . . . The impressions or *saṃskāra*-s are the traces left on the mind by experience and can produce the recollection, when needed, of what has been experienced." [Raja 1969: 111]; "Der letzte Laut zusammen mit dem

durch die früheren Laute erzeugten Eindruck bringt (den Gegenstand) zur Kenntniss." F 39; "impressions" [D'Sa 1980: 78]; "The invisible binder between phonemes are "mental dispositions" (*saṃskāra*) only, imprinted by previous phonemes. The last phoneme associated with mental impressions produced by previous ones, is that which makes us know (the object). Thus, in case of audition and comprehension of a language, *saṃskāras* work like a sort of immediate memory." [Kapani 1992-93: 22-23]

- 4) *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 9.22: *ātmamanasoḥ saṃyogaviśeṣāt saṃskārāc ca smṛtiḥ*. VS 70.11. "Recollection [arises] from a particular conjunction between *ātman* and *manas* and from *saṃskāra*."
- 5) *Daśapadārthī* 53 (Reconstructed Sanskrit): *smṛtihetur iti ya ātmasamaveta ekadravyo dṛṣṭanumānājñānasamskārajanyo bhāvanāviśeṣaḥ sa eva smṛtihetur ity ucyate*. "Cause of recollection: That which is inherent in soul, has one substance [as its locus], is produced by direct or inferential cognition or impression, and which is a particular mental act, is called cause of recollection." [Miyamoto 1996: 175]
- 6) *Prāśastapādabhāṣya* 304: *bhāvanāsaṃjñakas tv ātmagūṇo dṛṣṭasrutānubhūteṣu artheṣu smṛtipratyabhijñānahetur bhavati*. P 62.6-7. "Besides, that [*saṃskāra*] called "*bhāvanā*" is a quality of the *ātman* and becomes the cause for recollection and recognition of objects experienced, either seen or heard."
- 7) *Ślokaṇvārttika sphoṭa*, v. 99: *atha vā vāsanaivāstu saṃskāraḥ sarva eva hi | dṛḍhajñānagrhitē 'rthe saṃskāro 'stīti manvate ||* SV 378. 24-28. "Or, the *saṃskāra* [mentioned in the *Śābarabhāṣya*] can be [interpreted as] nothing but a mental trace. Because each and every [expounder] admits that there is a *saṃskāra* after an object is grasped by a firm cognition."
- 8) According to the *Prakaranapañcikā* (PrP 457-458), *saṃskārakarmans* are divided into four, i.e. *āpti* (to get), *utpatti* (= *utpādana*, to generate), *vikṛti* (to deform), and *saṃskṛti* (to purify). Among them, only the *saṃskṛti* (also called *saṃskāra*) has an unseen effect (also called *saṃskāra*). Kumārila already presupposes this classification. *Tantravārttika* ad 1.3.24: *ko vā saṃskāraḥ utpattiḥ prāptivikāpūrvvasādhanaśamarthyādhānānām kriyāta iti*. A 270. 21-22.
- 9) *Śābarabhāṣya* ad 2.1.7: *dravyaṃ hi guṇabhūtam, karmanirvṛtter īpsitatamatvāt*. A 406.10-11. "For the material is subordinate, since the accomplishment of the act [itself] is the thing that is most desired to be reached [in this act]."
- 10) Cf. *Śābarabhāṣya* ad 2.1.4: *bhavyārthās te bhūtārthaiḥ samuccaritāḥ. bhūtasya bhavyārthatāyām dṛṣṭarthatā. bhavyārthasya prayojanavata utpattir arthavatī, sā ca bhūtena kriyāta iti dṛṣṭo 'rthaḥ. bhavyasya punar bhūtārthatāyām na kiñcid dṛśyate, kalpyate cādṛṣṭam*. A 388. 12-15. "Those [words], which denote the [objects] which should be produced, are pronounced together with those denoting the produced [objects]. If the produced [object] is for the sake of the [object] which should be produced, it has a seen purpose. The production of the object which should be produced, which has its [own] purpose, is useful. And that [production of the object to be produced] is made by the produced [object]. Thus the purpose is seen. By contrast, if [the object] to be produced is for the sake of the produced [object], no [purpose] is seen and [so] an unseen [effect] is [to be] assumed."
- 11) *Śābarabhāṣya* ad 3.6.12: *na vā tāsām tadarthatvād (Jaiminīsūtra 3.6.12). pavamāneṣṭayo*

hy agnyarthāḥ. yady agnir iṣṭyarthāḥ syāt tatas tadarthatam agnyādheyam iṣṭīnām upakuryāt. niṣphalāḥ tv iṣṭayaḥ. tadarthatam agnyādheyam api niṣphalaṃ syāt. katham punar agnyarthatā pavamāneṣṭīnām. niṣprayojanatvād eva prayojanavattvāc cāgnīnām. bhāvayitavyā apīṣṭayo bhūtānām agnīnām arthena kriyeran. tasmād agnyādheyam na pavamāneṣṭyartham. A 1038. 2-6. "However [it is] not [so]. Because those [*pavamāneṣṭis*] aim for that [ritual fire]. For *pavamāneṣṭis* are for the sake of the ritual fire. If the ritual fire is for the sake of sacrifices, then setting up of fire, which aims for that [fire], would assist sacrifices. But the sacrifices lack purpose. The setting up of fire too, which is for the sake of those [sacrifices], would lack purpose. [Opponent:] How then are the *pavamāneṣṭis* for the sake of the fire? [Siddhāntin:] Only because [*pavamāneṣṭis* would become] purposeless [according to your view]. And because [according to our view] fires have purpose. The sacrifices, though [they are] to be produced, should be done for fires, which are [already] produced. (= The maxim "*bhūtaṃ bhavyāyopadiśyate*" is not applied to this case.) Therefore the setting up of the fires is not for the sake of the *pavamāneṣṭis*."

- 12) *Śābarabhāṣya* ad 4.3.15.
- 13) *Śābarabhāṣya* ad 2.1.7: *alpīyasya adṛṣṭakalpanā nyāyyā*. A 406.7; *Śābarabhāṣya* ad 2.2.1: *adṛṣṭārthānām upakārakalpanālpīyasī nyāyyā*. A 462.1-2.
- 14) *Śābarabhāṣya* ad 3.1.22: *nanv āhavanīyo 'tra yāgyādhikaraṇatvena guṇabhūtaḥ śrūyate. satyam. adhikaranam āhavanīyah. tathāpi tv āhavanīyārtha eva yāgaḥ. prayojanavattvād āhavanīyasya, niṣprayojanatvāt pavamānahaviṣām. katham eṣām niṣprayojanatā. phalāśravaṇāt. kalpyaṃ phalam iti cet, satyam kalpyam. agnisamskāras tu tatphalam, na svargaḥ. svarge kalpyamāne dvir adṛṣṭam kalpyeta, homāc ca svargo bhavati, tasya cāhavanīyenāparo 'dṛṣṭaḥ saṃskāra iti. tasmād agnyarthatā pavamānahaviṣām*. A 737. 11-738.1. "[Opponent:] Here [in this passage], the offering fire is taught [by the locative-ending] to be the subservient element, in as much as it is the locus of the sacrifice. [Siddhāntin:] True, the offering fire is the locus. But even though [it is] so, the sacrifice is only for the offering fire. Because the offering fire has a purpose but the *pavamāneṣṭis* lack a purpose. [Opponent:] Why do they (= *pavamāneṣṭis*) lack a purpose? [Siddhāntin:] Because [their] fruit is not [explicitly] taught. [Opponent:] [Their] fruit is to be assumed. [Siddhāntin:] True, [it is] to be assumed. But their fruit is purification of the fire, not heaven. If heaven is assumed, then something unseen would be assumed twice: heaven arises from the offering and another unseen, i.e. purification of the offering, [arises] by the offering fire. Therefore the *pavamāneṣṭis* are for the fire."
- 15) Strictly speaking, the fruit is not *tanḍula* itself but the *tanḍula*'s suitability (*yogyatā*) for *puroḍāśa* produced in the *vṛthi*. The same is so of *piṣṭa*.
- 16) *Śābarabhāṣya* ad 11.1.27: *vṛthīm avahanti tanḍulān pīṣṭi ityevamādīnām dṛṣṭaprayojanānām kriyānām ā tanḍulanirvṛtteḥ prayogaḥ syāt. kutaḥ. etāsām prayoge pratyakṣo 'rtho nirvartyate. tanḍulāḥ piṣṭāni ca. taiś ceha prayojanam, puroḍāśasya kāryatvāt. tasmād etāsām tadartha eva prayogo vijñāyate. yadi sakṛd eva musalasyodyamananipātane kṛtvotsrjyeta upalāyā vā prakarṣaṇāpakarṣaṇe, yad eṣām kāryaṃ tan naiva nirvartyeta. ata āsām tannirvṛttyāpavargāḥ syāt. ā tanḍulanirvṛtter ā ca piṣṭanirvṛtter abhyāsa iti*. A 2115 [misprinted as 3015]. "Those acts which have a seen purpose [prescribed as] e.g. "One threshes rice." and "One grinds rice." etc.

are performed until the threshed rice [or the ground rice] is accomplished. [Opponent:] Why? [Siddhāntin:] Because in performing these [acts], a visible purpose is accomplished: threshed rice and ground rice. And these are useful in this [sacrifice], because a rice-cake is to be made [from them]. Therefore performing these [acts] are known to be for that [rice-cake] only. If one gives up after only a single [performance of] raising and pounding the pestle or pushing and pulling the millstone, their result to be made (= rice-cake) would be never accomplished. Therefore [one should know that] they are completed by accomplishing that (= threshed rice, ground rice). That means [one should] repeat [the action] up to the accomplishment of threshed rice and the accomplishment of ground rice."

- 17) *śabde cen nimittabhūte svayam avabudhyate*. F 34.21. "If, when speech is present as a cause [for the cognition of an object], one cognizes [the object] oneself, [then] . . ."
- 18) *atha gaur ity atra kaḥ śabdaḥ. gākāraukāraṇīyā iti bhagavān upavarṣaḥ. śrotragrahaṇe hy arthe loke śabdaśabdaḥ prasiddhaḥ. te ca śrotragrahaṇāḥ*. "Then what is the speech in this 'gauḥ'? The reverend Upavarṣa [says], [Pratijñā:] "[The phonemes] /g/ /au/ /ḥ/ [are speech]." [Udāharaṇa:] Because the expression "speech" is universally known in this world as referring to the object grasped by the organ of hearing. [Upanaya:] And they [/g/ /au/ /ḥ/] are grasped by the organ of hearing."
- 19) *yady evam arthapratyayo nopapadyate. katham?* "[Opponent (= Sphoṭavādīn):] If so, the cognition of an object is inexplicable. [Question:] Why?"
- 20) *1. ekaikākṣaraviññāne (hy) 'rtho nopalabhyate. 2. na cākṣaravyatirikto 'nyaḥ kaścid asti samudāyo nāma yato 'rthapratipattiḥ syāt. yadā (hi) gākāro na tadā aukāraṇīyau. yadā aukāraṇīyau na tadā gākārah*. "[Opponent:] In cognizing each phoneme, the object is not apprehended. And there is nothing distinct beyond the phonemes, a so-called whole (= /gauḥ/), through which the object is cognized. When /g/ is [there], /au/ and /ḥ/ are not. When /au/ and /ḥ/ are [there], /g/ is not."
- 21) *ato gākārādīvyatirikto 'nyo gośabda 'sti yato 'rthapratipattiḥ syāt*. "Therefore there is a distinct speech 'gauḥ' beyond phonemes such as /g/ etc. through which one cognizes the object."
- 22) *antarhite ('pi) śabde smaraṇād arthapratyaya iti cet. na. smṛter api kṣaṇikatvād akṣarais tulyatā*. "[Question:] Although the speech has disappeared, one cognizes the object by recollection. [Opponent:] No. [For] the recollection, since it also is momentary, is similar to phonemes."
- 23) *pūrvavarṇajanitasamśkārasahito 'ntyo varṇaḥ pratyāyaka ity adoṣaḥ*. "[Siddhāntin:] The last phoneme accompanied by a *samśkāra*, which is born out of the preceding phonemes, makes [one] cognize [the object of a word]. So there is no problem."
- 24) *nanv evam (api) śabdād artham pratipadyāmaha iti laukikaṃ vacanam anupapannaṃ syāt. ucyate. yadi nopapadyate anupapannaṃ nāma. na hi laukikaṃ vacanam anupapannaṃ ity etāvāt pratyakṣādibhir anavagamyamāno 'rthaḥ śakyo 'bhyupagantum. laukikāni vacanāny upapannānānāny anupapannānānāni ca dṛśyante. yathā devadatta gām abhyāja ityevamādīni. daśa dāḍimāniśaḍ apūpā ity evamādīni ca*. "[Opponent:] Then the worldly usage "We understand an object through a word." would become inexplicable. [Siddhāntin:] We answer. If [it would become] inexplicable, let it be inexplicable. For we can not accept an object that is not apprehended by perception

etc. by the mere reason that worldly usage would be inexplicable. Among worldly usages, [both] are seen, [i.e.] those which have explicable objects such as "Devadatta, drive the cow near." and those which have inexplicable objects such as "Ten pomegranate fruits, six cakes of flour." (Cf. *Mahābhāṣya* 1.2.45, Kielhorn ed. I. 217.12-13.)"

- 25) *nanu ca śāstrakārā apy evam āhuḥ, pūrvāparibhūtaṃ bhāvam ākhyātenācāṣṭe vrajati pacati ity upakramaprabhytyapavargaparyantam iti yathā. na śāstrakāravacanam apy alam imam artham apramāṇakam upapādayitum*. "[Opponent:] Moreover the revered author of the *Śāstra* (= *Nirukta* 1.1) also states as follows: One denotes by a verb an action which is sequential (*pūrvāparibhūta*). For instance [one denotes with the verb forms] 'he goes' 'he cooks' [an action] which starts with the undertaking and ends with the completion. [Siddhāntin:] Even the statement by the author of the *Śāstra* cannot make explicable such an object that lacks means of being known."
- 26) *api ca naivaitad anupapannārtham. akṣarebhyaḥ samśkāraḥ, samśkārad arthapratipattiḥ ity bhavanti arthapratipattāv akṣarāṇi nimittam. gauṇa eṣa śabda iti cet. 1. na gauṇo 'kṣareṣu nimittabhāvaḥ. tadbhāve bhāvāt tadabhāve cābhāvāt. 2. athāpi gauṇaḥ syāt. na gauṇaḥ śabda mā bhūd ity etāvāt pratyakṣādibhir anavagamyamāno 'rthaḥ śakyaḥ parikalpayitum. na hy agnir mānavaka ity ukte agniśabdo gauṇo mā bhūd iti jvalana eva mānavaka ity adhyavasiyate*. "Moreover, this [laukikavacana] does not have an inappropriate object. For the phonemes do become a cause for cognizing an object in this way: From phonemes [arises] a *samśkāra*, from the *samśkāra* [arises] a cognition of an object. [Opponent:] This speech (= phonemes) is secondary [as a cause for the cognition of an object]. [Siddhāntin:] The character of the phonemes as a cause is not secondary. Because if they (= phonemes) exist [the cognition] arises, and if they do not exist [the cognition does] not arise. Or [it] may be secondary. We cannot posit such an object that is not apprehended by perception etc. by the mere reason that the speech should not become secondary. For, when it is said, "The boy is a fire", it is not determined, "The boy is an actual fire.", by the [mere] reason that the speech "fire" should not become secondary."
- 27) *na ca pratyakṣo gākārādībhyo 'nyo gośabda iti. bhedadarśanābhāvād abhedadarśanāc ca. gākārādīni hi pratyakṣāni, tasmād gaur ity gākārādī viśarjanīyāntaṃ padam akṣarāṇy eva, na tebhyo vyatiriktaṃ anyat padam nāma iti*. "And the speech 'gauḥ' distinct from [phonemes such as] /g/ etc. is not visible. Because [its] distinction [from phonemes] is not seen and [its] non-distinction [from phonemes] is seen: For [only] phonemes /g/ etc. are visible [i.e. "gauḥ" is not seen as distinct] and therefore the word "gauḥ" which starts with /g/ and ends with /ḥ/ is only phonemes, not the so-called word, which is distinct and beyond those [phonemes] [i.e. "gauḥ" is seen as non-distinct]."
- 28) *nanu samśkāraḥ kalpanāyām apy adṛṣṭakalpanā. ucyate. śabdakalpanāyām s ca, śabdakalpanā ca. tasmād akṣarāṇy eva padam*. "[Opponent:] Also when a *samśkāra* is assumed, [you] are assuming something unseen. [Siddhāntin:] In [your case of] assuming the speech (= a whole *pada* "gauḥ"), [there exists] that [assumption of the *samśkāra*] and the assumption of the speech. Therefore a word is nothing but phonemes."
- 29) *adṛṣṭo yo 'śruto vārthaḥ sa nāstīty avagamyate/ tasmīn asati dṛṣṭaś cec chruto vā na*

viruddhyate|| viruddhyamāne kalpyaḥ syād jāyate tena so 'rthavān| viśeṣaś cen na gamyeta tato naiko 'pi kalpyate|| A 462.3–6. “The object which is unseen or unheard is understood as non-existent, so far as the [object] seen or heard is not contradicted in case it (= the unseen or unheard) does not exist. If [it is] contradicted, it (= the unseen or unheard) is to be assumed, through which that (= the seen or heard) become purposeful. If the difference is not understood [between assuming less and more], one should not assume even one [additional unseen or unheard object] more than that [which is already assumed].”

- 30) Śālikanātha noticed this problem. *yadī bhāvanātmakaḥ tadā tasya varṇasmṛtimā-trahetutvād . . . antarhite śabda ity ato na viśeṣaḥ*. BhP 36.14–37.2. “If [the *saṃskāra* mentioned in the *Śābarabhāṣya* is] a mental trace in nature, then, since it [i.e. *saṃskāra*] is a cause of a mere recollection of [each] phoneme, . . . [this opinion is] not different from that which is proclaimed as ‘*antarhite śabde . . .*’.”
- 31) *Śloka-vārttika sphoṭa*, v. 101: *saṃskāre niṣpramāṇe tu pūrvavṛttatvakalpanam | niṣpramāṇakam eveti nānugrahaphalam bhavet||* SV 379. 4–5. “On the other hand, if the *saṃskāra* lacks its evidence [i.e. if you do not accept the existence of *saṃskāra*], there is no evidence to assume [those preceding phonemes] having functioned before [the last phoneme, since the *pūrvavṛttatva* lacks its locus.]. Therefore the effect of assistance [by preceding phonemes] would be impossible.”
- 32) One should not forget that Kumārila has his own well-defined notion of capacity (*śakti*, *sāmarthyā*) and that he uses the term consistently. I can point out at least three dimensions of Kumārila's concept of a capacity: 1. ontologically, a capacity belongs to an entity, e.g. *jñānaśakti* to *ātman* (*ātma*, vv. 72c–73), *bodhakaśamarthyā* to *śabda* (*arthāpatti*, v. 5), *dahanaśaktatā* to *vahni* (*arthāpatti*, v. 3), **vahanaśakti* to *ratha* (*sphoṭa*, vv. 86, 89) and so forth. It is subsidiary to its locus (*āśraya*, *ādhāra*) and so it should disappear if its locus is destroyed (*nirālambana*, vv. 194–196b). It is *atīndriya* (*upamāna*, v. 14; *śabdāmityatā* v. 45), innate (*codanā*, v. 47cd), therefore unquestionable (*ākṛti*, v. 28cd: *na ca paryanuyogo 'sti vastuśakteḥ kadācana*). It is made manifest by *vyañjaka*, functions as a cause (*kāraṇa*) of its own particular result (*sūnya*, v. 253) and therefore does not bring about other result (*sambandhākṣepa*, v. 33cd: *gavāder nābhidhānaśaktir devadattapade yathā*); 2. epistemologically it is an “unseen” (*adṛṣṭa*) object which should be postulated from a seen result (*kārya*) through the *arthāpatti-pramāṇa*, which functions so long as there remains an *anyathānupapatti*. Once the *anyathānupapatti* is solved, there is no justification to postulate any more (*sambandhākṣepaparihāra*, v. 29: *anyathānupapattya ca śaktisadbhāvakaḥ kalpanam | na caikayaiva siddhe 'rthe bahvīnām kalpaneṣyate||*). Since a capacity functions as a cause and is postulated based on a visible *kārya*, it is sometimes called *kāryānumeya* (*ākṛti*, v. 26cd; *śabdāmityatā*, v. 44ab). But, strictly speaking, *arthāpatti* is different from *anumāna*, as is established in the *arthāpattipariccheda* (*arthāpatti*, v. 85cd: *bhedābhede viśamvādaḥ kṛtas tatra ca nirṇayaḥ*); 3. exegetically, in conformity with the rule that less postulation is better (because the *arthāpatti* does not function any more once the trouble of *anyathānupapatti* is solved), a capacity, being an unseen object, should be reduced if possible (*sūnya*, v. 18ab; *vākya* vv. 121–122b). If a postulation is inevitable, the postulation of a capacity is regarded as better than that of a whole entity (*sūnya*, v. 18cd), considering the ontological weight

of a capacity as subsidiary and “lighter” than that of its locus. In the present context, Kumārila equates the *arthabuddhihetutva* to a capacity (*sāmarthyā*) and clearly says that one can fulfill the job by postulating only the *arthabuddhihetutva* as an unseen object (v. 103cd: *tasyārthabuddhihetutvam adṛṣṭam kevalam kṛtam*). Therefore it is not inappropriate to assume that Kumārila has in his mind the distinction between *dharma* and *dharmin*. One might argue that since Kumārila does not explicitly use the terms *dharma* or *dharmin*, it is totally irrelevant to apply the general rule here. But the reason why he does not mention it, I think, is rather that such a way of analysis is so familiar and automatic that he, as a Mīmāṃsaka, does not need to proclaim “I am applying such and such a rule”, not that he does not presuppose such an idea. One of the famous Mīmāṃsā traditions in Kerala, in fact, supports my view. Rṣiputra Parameśvara, in his *Gopālikā* commentary on Maṇḍana's *Sphoṭasiddhi* passage (SS 48.4–5: *tasmāt kāryāntaraparikalpitasattākasya saṃskārasyaiva śaktyantaraparikalpanāmātram astu*), mentions that the relevant position of the *vāsanāpakṣa* is intended to avoid the postulation of a locus, “*mātraśabdena dharmikalpanām vyāvartayati*” (SS 51.17). He further explains that the problem in the first interpretation “*saṃskāraḥ kalpanā*” is the postulation of a locus (*dharmikalpanā*), “*nanv eṣa saṃskāraḥ smṛtiheṭuḥ, anyo vā. tatra smṛtiheṭoḥ śakteḥ śaktyantarāyogaḥ ityādīr eva dūṣaṇam, anyatve dharmikalpanaiva doṣa iti*” (SS 86.9–10). (cf. *Tattvavibhāvanā*, a commentary on the *Tattvabindu* by the same author: *smṛtibhje hi dharmamātram kalpyam. adṛṣṭāntare tu dharmy api*. TB 28.11–12.) After regarding Parameśvara's explanation, we can see that it is not only relevant to bear in mind the general idea, but essential in order to understand Kumārila's intention in this context.

- 33) On the contrary, if one does not accept that Kumārila bears this maxim in mind, we would not be able to explain his statements which contrast the opposite characters of the two things: *saṃskāra* (= *vāsanā*), the existence of which becomes the locus of the capacity *arthabuddhihetutva*, is well accepted by everyone (i.e. *dṛṣṭa*), while the *arthabuddhihetutva*, which is the capacity (*sāmarthyā*) of the *saṃskāra*, is not well established and therefore is to be newly posited as an unseen object (*adṛṣṭa*). Furthermore, we also would not be able to explain why this interpretation is preferable for Kumārila to the first if we assume that Kumārila is unaware of the different “heaviness” of *dharmin* and *dharma*, since the number of postulations is the same in both cases, i.e. *saṃskāraḥ kalpanā* and *arthabuddhihetutvakalpanā*, and therefore there would be no criterion to judge the latter better.

In the context of Vedic exegesis, Mīmāṃsā explicitly uses its view of the different “weight” of an entity and its property in discussing *padārthas* (ritual elements) and their *krama* (sequence). Ritual elements such as sipping (*ācamana*) and so forth, even though they are taught in *smṛti*-texts, have privilege over the sequence taught in *śruti*-texts. Therefore the act of sipping can enter between the *vedakaraṇa* and *vedīkaraṇa* and split them, even though these two elements are taught to be immediate neighbors in sequence (*vedaṃ kṛtvā vedīm kuryāt*). For it is inappropriate to cancel *padārthas* in favor of *krama*, which is a subsidiary element (*guṇa*) of *padārthas*. (*Śābarabhāṣya* ad 1.3.7: *ācamanaṃ padārthaḥ, padārthānām ca guṇaḥ kramaḥ. na ca guṇānurodhena padārtho na kartavyo bhavati*. A 198.5–199.2.) Kumārila mentions

the general idea behind this discussion: "*dharmadharmivirodhe ca dharmiṇo balavattarāḥ*||" A 196.25. (And when there is a contradiction between a locus and its property, the locus is stronger [than the property].) The basic idea which supports the above argumentation is consistently seen in our relevant discussion of the "heaviness" of postulation.

■ Article ■

Play and Eros: Girls' Swing Play and Swing Songs in Orissa, India

●
Yumiko Tokita-Tanabe

Introduction

This paper deals with a hitherto downplayed aspect of femininity in India that is related to a value found in some of the ritual play among unmarried girls in Orissa and in the discourse of nostalgia among married women regarding their childhood. Fieldwork on which this paper is based was conducted in Garh Manitri, Khurda district, Orissa, from April 1991 to November 1992, in Puri and Bhubaneswar from December 1995 to December 1997 and during subsequent visits to Puri and Bhubaneswar. It is my contention that one aspect of "play" of unmarried girls suggests their erotic pursuit of link with the realm of the sacred and the transcendental through their femininity.¹⁾ In this paper, I would like to pay attention to elements of transcendental eros²⁾ and existential aspiration implicated in the value of femininity in India. It involves the freedom of the self/soul from the limitations and constraints imposed by the body and from the social ties that bind the living being to this world.³⁾

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