Reconstructing the *Dharma-abhivyakti-vāda* in the Mimāṃsā Tradition

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This paper attempts to reconstruct the Mimāṃsā *apūrva*-theory which I suggest might be referred to as ‘*dharma-abhivyakti-vāda*’ (the theory of dharma-manifestation). Halbfass has pointed out that the *apūrva*-theory is refuted by Uddyotakara in *Nyāyavārttika* on *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.7, a portion of which has been translated into Japanese and investigated further by Akamatsu. For Akamatsu it is not clear what Uddyotakara regards as the Mimāṃsakas’ position on *apūrva*, i.e. what form of the *apūrva*-theory was dominant after Śabaravāmin and before Kumārila. Yudhiṣṭhira Mimāṃsaka, with reference to the relevant portions which I will investigate below, attributes this form of *apūrva*-theory to Bhartṛhari and Bhartṛmitra, but does not clarify its content. Bronkhorst, apparently relying on Yudhiṣṭhira Mimāṃsaka, also refers to and translates the same passages, but he too does not comment on the theory. Ikari, who is mainly concerned with understanding the Vedic thought-world, presents three aspects of action: a latent form of action, once made manifest through human performances, remains effective as an invisible substance. Ikari does not refer to our passages, but his exposition of this Vedic model is important for our *dharma-abhivyakti-vāda* as providing a prototype.

**SOURCES**

1 Bhartṛhari (AD 450-510)
Bhartṛhari, a grammarian who is said to have used an older Mimāṃsā source (probably Bhavadāsa’s *vrūti*, written in the first half of the fifth century) than the *Śabarabhāṣya* (first half of the sixth century), mentions the Mimāṃsā theory in his discussion of dharma.

*Svārūṭi* on *Vākyapādiya* 1.136: *tatra kecid ācāryā manyante. na*
The expression 'abhivyakti' is used to explain the phenomenon that something eternal becomes perceptible in a certain case and not in other cases. For example, the phoneme /g/ is considered eternal in Māṇipura, manifests itself and becomes audible through actual sounds (dvani, nāda), which in this system correspond to conjunctions and disjunctions among word-atoms. The eternal cow-nest (gotva) of individual cows becomes manifest through individuals (vyakti) and makes us realize: 'this is a cow'. Likewise the eternal dharma manifests itself through each ritual performance (karma).

The same idea is also referred to in another work by Bhartṛhari, the Mahābhāsyadipikā, together with more details and a metaphor. The relevant portion pointed out by Yudhīśhṭhira (1984: 392; 1987: 34) is translated by Bronkrhorst (1989).

Mahābhāṣya-dipika : avasthitā eva dharmah. sa tāgvinārāddhitāv abhivyayate. taptārtritas tu phalado bhavati. yathā śvāmi bhrtyah svayāṃ pratyay phalam praty ... MBhD 25.25-26.

Dharma remains forever. But it is manifested by an agnihoṭra offering or the like. Urged by such an agnihoṭra, however, it gives a fruit. For example, a master is urged to [give] fruit by servants when they serve.... (my translation)

This passage refers to the idea that the dharma, although eternal, urged by individual performances (tatt-prerita) such as the agnihoṭra offering, becomes manifest (abhivyayate) and functions as a fruit-giver (phalada). While in the above-mentioned passage of the Vākyapadiya

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the eternality of dharma is inferred from the expression ‘abhivyakti’, here dharma is clearly qualified as eternal and ‘remains forever’ (avasthitā eva). Furthermore the agnihoṭra offering is personified as that which urges the eternal dharma. A reluctant master, urged by servants, gives them fees. Likewise the unchanging dharma, urged by daily performances of agnihoṭra, is forced to give fruits.

2 Bhāviveka (AD 490-570)
In the sixth century Bhāviveka criticized other schools in his Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā. He refers to the dharma-abhvivakti-vāda as an opponent’s view in the chapter called Mīmāṁsā-tattva-nirṇaya-avaiśā. (Edited and translated into Japanese by Kawasaki (1992: 409, 376), and into English by Lindner (1997: 96). The answer from the Buddhist side is given in k. 55.)

Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā 1X, k.10: apūrva ‘pi kriyāvāngyaḥ, kriyā mokṣe ‘pi sādhanam| somapāṇādiṁ, vidvān nirjayaṁ antakam yataḥ

And apūrva is manifested by a [ritual] act. A [ritual] act such as drinking soma [=soma sacrifice], etc., is also a cause of liberation. Through that [ritual act] the wise man conquers death.

The idea is that apūrva or ‘a new thing’ is manifested (vyangya) through ritual acts, such as drinking soma (somapāṇādiṁ kriyā). It should be noted that the manifested element here is called ‘apūrva’ instead of dharma. In the surviving Bhāṭṭa15 and Prābhākara16 sources, apūrva is interpreted as ‘new to our knowledge’ or ‘new information’, not ‘new in origination’ or ‘newly born’.

What then is meant by saying that apūrva is manifested through acts? Is it to be interpreted from the viewpoint of epistemology, in such a way that apūrva, which is newly cognized through the Vedas, is manifested through ritual acts? Or should we interpret it from the viewpoint of ontology, in such a way that the eternal dharma is newly manifested in this world through individual acts such as daily agnihoṭras?

3 Uddyotakara (first half of the seventh century)
The relevant portion of the Nyāyavārttika is translated into Japanese and analysed by Akamatsu (1991). Therefore in the following I pick up only the passages which are important for the reconstruction of the dharma-
Furthermore *apūrva*, as well as heaven and deities, is considered to be an object of Vedic instruction. As *apūrva* is regarded as imperceptible, it can be said to be qualified further as an object of Vedic instruction only.

c. *kah punar atra nyāya svagādayah kasyacit pratyakṣā iti. brūmah, sāmānyavīkṣaya-vat kasyacit pratyakṣā iti. āśrīvatvāya, *yad āśrītām tat kasyacit pratyakṣam iti. parārthāvatvāy yat parārtham tad api kasyacit pratyakṣam iti. vastutvād āgamyavīkṣaya-vat ca. *yad vastu yac ca parasya kathaye, tat kasyacit pratyakṣam dṛṣṭaṃ, yathā ghaṭādaya iti. antīyatvā kasyacit pratyakṣā iti. NV 55.3-7. *yad* Calcutta ed.; *yad* Yad Thakur ed.

[Opponent:] But what is the ground for [your declaration] that heaven and so forth are visible to someone?

[Siddhāntin:] We answer. (1) [They are] visible to someone because they have certain generic properties. (a) Because of resting [in a locus]: everything that rests in a locus is visible to someone. (b) Because of being for others: everything that is for others also is visible to someone. (c) Because of being real and the object of authoritative speech: it is experienced that everything that is real and that is communicated to others, e.g., pots, etc., is visible to someone. (2) [They are] visible to someone because they are non-external.

In order to show that from the Nyāya point of view *apūrva* must be perceptible to someone, Uddyotakara refers to their common properties (sāmānya), i.e. āśrītvā, parārthtvā and vastutvā. Besides vastutvā and āgamyavīkṣaya, which could be admitted even by the Mimamsaka, the opponent who insists that *apūrva*, etc., are imperceptible to anyone is supposed to admit the opposite properties, i.e. an-āśrītvā, a-parārthtvā and nityatvā. In fact the last-mentioned property nityatvā is admitted in the following argument by the opponent in relation to abhiivyakti. As is seen from another and later source (Jayanta), an-āśrītvā is also confirmed.18

d. *athāpādām svāt. ekam apy apūrvam vyanjakaḥḥedānusvīdān dhīnām iva bhavati. ... nanu ca kho dhagādhhadān mukhabhedā tadanusvīdān dṛṣṭaḥ. NV 56.7-10.

Further the following is also possible: *apūrva*, although one, takes form as if different according to the difference of its manifesters. ... [Opponent:] Due to the difference of [the reflecting surfaces], such as a sword, we find that [the appearance of the reflection of the
Uddyotakara attacks the apūrva-theory after first distinguishing two possibilities, i.e. whether it is one or plural. The opponent who holds that apūrva is one explains that the one apūrva appears as many, through many manifesters in the same way that one face is reflected in many surfaces. Considering this, and other examples, such as one eternal phoneme /g/ which manifests itself through many sounds, it is appropriate to assume that the eternal apūrva was regarded as one rather than many.

4 Kumārila Bhāṭṭa (AD 600-650)
Kumārila, discussing ‘what is dharma’ or ‘what is the referent of the word “dharma”’ in his subcommentary on Ījāminīsūtra 1.1.2, criticizes the idea that dharma is ‘something newly born (apūrva-janman)’.

Ślokavārttika codanā, vv.195-6b; antakaranavruttaṃ va vīśanayanam ca cetasaḥ/ pūdgalesu ca punyasaṇaye punyaṃ pūrva-janmanāḥ/ prayogo dharmaśabdasaya na drṣṭaḥ... / SV 78.5-7.

We do not find the word ‘dharma’ applied [in ordinary usage and the Vedas] to the activity of the internal organ (as in Sāṃkhya), the disposition of the mind (as in Buddhism), virtuous souls (as in Jainism), a quality of āman (as for the Vaiśeṣikas) or ‘something newly born’ (as in Mīmāṁsā). [Therefore these are not really dharma.]

As already mentioned, the surviving traditions of the Bhāṭṭas and Prabhākaras interpret apūrva to mean ‘something epistemologically new’ or ‘something never cognized through other means of cognition than Vedic instructions’ (māṇḍantārāvṛtya). According to the view refuted by Kumārila in this passage, however, apūrva is interpreted as something ontologically new, i.e. a newly born thing. Kumārila’s commentator Sucasriamitra (Kāśikā 160.19-22), after identifying the opponent to be ‘one group of Mīmāṁsakas’ (mīmāṁsakaikadesināḥ), clarifies the ontological interpretation of apūrva: it is that which did not exist before ritual acts (tad dhi na karmāṇaḥ pūrvaṃ jāyata eva) and which is produced by them (kṛte karmāṇi tannispaṭeh).

5 Jayanta Bhāṭṭa (latter half of the ninth century)
Jayanta, commenting on Nyāyasiṣṭha 1.2.57, tries to protect the authority of the Vedas from the Nyāya position. In this context he discusses ‘what dharma is’. In criticizing other schools, Jayanta presupposes Kumārila’s position and gives more details. Jayanta calls the view of ‘apūrva as something newly born’ (apūrva-janman) that of ‘the old Mīmāṁsakas’ (vyrdha-mīmāṁsakāḥ) as opposed to the views of the followers of Śābara and Prabhākara. (Part of the relevant portion was pointed out by Yudhiṣṭhira (1984: 393; 1987: 35) and translated by Bronkhorst (1989: 113).

Nyāyamaṇjarī on Nyāyasūtra 1.2.57: vyṛddhamīmāṁsakāḥ yāgā-dikarmanirvartyaṃ apūrvaṃ nāma dharmaṃ abhivadanti. yāgā-dikarmanā sāhāraḥ bruvate. vāyārtha eva ninyogāmā apīrvaśabda-viṣayāḥ, dharmaśabdena ca sa evacyata iti prabhākarāḥ kathayante...svargāyogāntarālava-vartinaḥ ca sthirasya nīrūdhāra- svāpūrvasya nyāprasāyakatvā jayajaiminiyāpra-vādo ‘py ape-śaḥ. NM 664.6-16.

The old Mīmāṁsakas maintain that that unprecedented thing (apūrvaṃ nāma) that is accomplished through acts such as sacrifice, should be [accepted as] dharma. Those who follow Śābara maintain that dharma is only ritual action such as sacrifice itself. The Prabhākara school says that what is denoted by the word ‘apūrva’ is nothing but the sentence-meaning which is a command, which again is denoted by the word ‘dharma’. ... And the [so-called] apūrva which exists between sacrifice and heaven, remains for some time and is without locus, lacks any proof of its existence. Therefore the statement of the old Mīmāṁsakas is either not correct. (my translation)

Jayanta explains the apūrva-janman mentioned by Kumārila as ‘that unprecedented thing that is accomplished through acts such as sacrifice’ (yāgā-dikarmanirvartyaṃ apūrvaṃ nāma). In other words, Jayanta explains janman as accomplishment by sacrifice, etc. Jayanta confirms that the apūrva mentioned by Kumārila is ontologically, not epistemologically new. Furthermore, the view which Jayanta identifies as that of ‘the old Mīmāṁsakas (vyṛddha-mīmāṁsaka, jayajaiminiyā)’ seems, or at least is believed by him, to precede Śābara and Prabhākara, in view of the order in which he mentions the three positions.

This apūrva or ‘new thing’ stands between (or connects) sacrifice and heaven (svarga-yāga-antarālavartī) and remains for some time (shīra). In other words, it is grasped as that which is accomplished through sacrifice, remains for some time and gives its fruit to the agent. The Bhāṭṭas20 and Prabhākaras20 also accept this character of apūrva...
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Positioning it as a connector which guarantees the efficacy of ritual acts. But the apūrva which Jayanta mentions here does not have a locus (nirūdhāra). It is different from Kumārila’s apūrva which is ‘just a latent force of sacrifice’ (yogadeḥ saktimārakam) or ‘just a latent force of an animal or the like’ (pavāder [saktimārakam]) and from the ātmasākta usually accepted by the Bhāttas. This quality of ‘having no locus’ was already suggested by Uddyotakara.

One still hesitates, however, to understand apūrva-janman as simply something newly manifested, because in some cases ‘production’ (janman, nispati, nirvṛtti) is contrasted with ‘manifestation’ (abhivyakti). To recapitulate:

i. According to the ‘old Mīmāṃsakas’ who preceded the followers of Sābara and Prabhākara, dharma is not sacrifice, etc., themselves, but a new thing which is accomplished through them.

ii. Although it remains for some time as a fruit-giver after sacrifice, it does not have any locus such as the ātman or sacrifice.

6 Simhasūrīgani

Simhasūrīgani, a commentator on the Nayacakra of Mallāvādin, refers to a Mīmāṃsā view as that of an opponent. He paraphrases apūrva as ‘different from the seen’ (adrṣṭa) and a ‘particular dharma’ (dharma-viśeṣa). Furthermore, he records the view of ‘some Mīmāṃsakas’ that dharma is nothing but ritual acts themselves, which is in fact identical with Sābara’s position.

Nyāyāgamānusārini on Dvādaśāram Nayacakram, vidhividyhara: a. na pūrṇo 'pūrṇo, 'dṛṣṭo dharma-viśeṣaḥ... viśeṣabhadā paraparastroviśeṣāh boyajñasamsabhāh agnismomūdabhāh iṣṭabhiḥ ca-bhivyaktaṁ apūrvaḥ (-yāt apūrvaḥ) em. -vyāpūrva ed. api viśeṣyante dravyamamtravādevatvaśviśeṣāh. NC 140.23-141.5.

Apūrva is what was not before, i.e. a specific dharma which is different from the seen. ... By the word ‘specific’ [in Mallāvādin’s apūrva-viśeṣa] is intended the following: the apūrvas is manifested through sacrifice-types, i.e. agnismata, etc., and iṣṭiḥ, which are qualified mutually by each other, are themselves qualified by those [sacrifice-types] which are [again] qualified by [their respective] material, mantras, deities and so forth.

In this passage, apūrva is paraphrased as ‘different from the precedent’ (na pūrṇah) and further explained as ‘a particular dharma which is different from the seen’ (adrṣṭo dharma-viśeṣaḥ). Although this apūrva looks at first glance like ‘an epistemologically new thing’, i.e. ‘a new thing cognized only through the Vedas’, it can be interpreted as an ontologically new thing if one considers the meaning of ‘a particular dharma’ (dharma-viśeṣa): a dharma, which is qualified through ritual acts which are again qualified variously through their materials and mantras, becomes a particular dharma different from the seen, and is called adṛṣṭa. It is not new in the sense that it is cognized only through the Vedas, but new and different from the seen in the sense that it is a particular thing newly manifested in a certain situation.

The description here seems to be parallel to the structure of the relationship between sāmānyava, viśeṣa and vyakti.23 The eternal dharma could be regarded as sāmānyava, a particular dharma which manifests itself being qualified in a certain situation as viśeṣa, and the individual situations which qualify one sāmānyava as vyakti. In other words, the one eternal dharma, when manifested through individual acts that are qualified by each other as well as by their materials, mantras and deities, is at the same time qualified by those same individual acts. One eternal universal ‘cow-ness’, when manifested through individual cows, is qualified by individual cows which consist of various parts.24 In the same way, one eternal dharma, when it is manifested through individual ritual acts and appears as a particular, is qualified through the ritual acts which consist of various elements. The way in which dharma is qualified is similar to that of bhāvanā, as posited by Sābara and the Bhāttas, which functions as a core element in ritual analysis and is regarded as qualified by various elements in the way that a white canvas may be qualified.25 That is to say, the role of bhāvanā as a core element in the bhāva-śāstya of Sābara and his followers is replaced by apūrva (or dharma) in the dharma-abhivyakti-vāda.

b. mā bhād yajñaśamjñāyāh kriyāyā eva dharma-tvaṁ, yatāh kaitścin mīmāṃsakair evam yākhyāte ‘yajñena yajñaṁ avajant’ devaṁ, tāṁ dharmāṁ prathamāṁ āsena (Bṛgveda 1.164.50; 10.90.16) iti. kim kāraṇam, tasmāṁ arthe pratyakṣa evaṁviśeṣāyāh kriyāyā anantaṁ phalasambandhādātārānāt kriyāvaiśpalya-dosaprasādāt ca. NC 141.5-7.

One should not say that it is an act that is called ‘sacrifice’ which is dharma, in the way that [is held by] those Mīmāṃsakas who interpret in this way the sentence ‘The gods sacrifices sacrifice’ through sacrifice. Those were the first dharmas. Why? Because if that is the meaning of ‘dharma’, its connection with the fruit is not seen immediately after the act, which is visibly transient, and because of the undesirable consequence that the act may lack fruit
Furthermore, if one identified dharma with ritual acts, as Śābara did, the direct connection between dharma and its fruit would become impossible, because dharma, being transient, cannot remain until the arises of the fruit. Consequently it would become useless to perform ritual acts, because they would not be the means of attaining their fruit. On the other hand, if one follows the dharma-abhiyakti-vāda, dharma is able to bring its fruit directly when it is manifested through individual acts and becomes ‘a new thing’. In this way the direct connection between dharma and its fruit is guaranteed.

Śīnhasūri also refers to the exegesis of Vedic passages in accordance with the dharma-abhiyakti-vāda.

c. agnihotram iti dharman kriyābhivyāngaḥ ucye. kārya kāra-nopacārad agnihotraḥbhivyāngaḥ ‘agnihotram iti. tataḥ ‘agnihotram dharman, juhuyād bhāvayet, svargakāmāh’ ity eṣa vākyārtho nirdoṣa iti. NC 141.7-9.

The word ‘agnihotra’ refers to dharma manifested through act. What is manifested through agnihotra is called ‘agnihotra’ through the secondary application to the result of [a word which strictly speaking refers to] the cause. Then the meaning of the sentence ‘agnihotram juhuyād svargakāmāh’ could be interpreted without any faults as ‘One who wishes heaven should realize dharma’ (dharman bhāvayet svargakāmāh).

To sum up,

i. The Vedic passage ‘agnihotram juhuyād svargakāmāh.’ can be paraphrased; ‘one who wishes heaven should realize dharma, which is manifested through the agnihotra offering’.

ii. This interpretation enables one to interpret the expression svargakāmā and the accusative in agnihotram naturally; unlike Śābara who analysed it in an unnatural way.

iii. It shows clearly the position that dharma, not heaven, is the purpose (karman) of the principal ritual action, and the thing to be accomplished (śādhyā).

It may be noted that apiṣva as a particular dharma manifested through acts is called a kārya and can be the object of ‘bhāvayet’. It is possible, therefore, to construe the apiṣva-janman mentioned by Kumārila as equivalent with ‘a newly manifested thing’. That is to say, janman could be interpreted as manifestation and not production in a strict sense.

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Furthermore, Śīnhasūri presents the dharma-abhiyakti-vāda as his main pūrvā-pakṣa, though he is also aware of Śābara’s opposing ‘yūγdād=dharma’ theory. We may assume then that the dharma-abhiyakti-vāda was the mainstream theory in the Mīmāṃsā tradition at that time.

CONCLUSION

Chronology: This theory must go back to the latter half of the fifth century, since Ṣhrīṭhārya knew it. The way in which it was referred to by Bhāviveka and Śīnhasūriṇī allows us to conjecture that it was dominant in the Mīmāṃsā tradition in their time. We may be justified in concluding from Kumārila’s criticism that its dominance was not surpassed even in his day. Jayanta’s expressions ‘jaraj-jauminīya’ and ‘vṛddha-mīmāṃsaka’, in contrast with ‘Śābara’ and ‘prābhākara’, suggest that he believed that it predated Śābarasvāmin.

Content: The eternal dharma which is always there (avasthitā eva) becomes manifest (abhiyaktā) through actual ritual performance (kriyā, karman) such as agnihotra-homa and soma-yōga. Instead of ‘dharma-abhiyakti’ we also find the expression ‘apiṣvā-abhiyakti’. Kumārila and Jayanta use instead of abhiyakti the words janman and nir-vṛt respectively. With the help of Śīnhasūriṇī we can construe ‘newly-born’ (apiṣvā-janman) as meaning a certain special dharma yet unseen (adyānta dharmaviśeṣāḥ), which, in being manifested by the actual performances, is also qualified by them. Uddyotakara sums it up thus: ‘apiṣvā, although one, takes form as if different, according to the difference of its manifesters’ (ekam apy apiṣvam vyayajakahadbhā-nuvidyāṇāḥ bhinnam iva bhavati).

From the ontological point of view, the eternal dharma corresponds to sāmānyā; the actual performances, which function as manifesters, correspond to vyakti; and the manifested dharma or apiṣvā to viśeṣa. Man is also seen as a manifestor, according to Uddyotakara. From the point of view of Vedic exegesis, the passage ‘agnihotram juhuyād svargakāmāh’ might be paraphrased thus: ‘One who wishes heaven should realize dharma, which is manifested through agnihotra-homa’. This manifested apiṣvā is without locus (nirādhāra), remains for some time (ṣhīra) and brings fruit (phaṭadā). Although it is one and eternal, and so might be expected to be common to all people, it brings its fruit only to specific persons because it is they who manifest it.
Relationship with the System: If one admits, like Śābara, that dharma is nothing but ritual acts such as sacrifices, dharma would be transient and non-eternal. In the dharma-abhivyakti-vāda, on the other hand, the eternality of dharma is not compromised. This enables one to explain easily the eternality of the three concepts referred to in the second sūtra, i.e. codanā (Vedic instructions), dharma and the relationship between them (codanā → lakṣyalakṣanasambandha → dharma). This is important for the tarkapāda section, the aim of which is to show that dharma is cognized through the Vedas in a way that is without faults. For the three items are all eternal and lack human agents that might introduce error. Furthermore, unlike Śābara’s theory, according to which apūrva intervenes between dharma (=ritual acts) and its fruit, the dharma- 
abhivyakti-vāda guarantees the direct causal relation between dharma and its fruit.

Thus abhivyakti-vāda, which is resorted to explain why the eternal thing works at some particular time and not at another, functions as a device which guarantees the eternality of dharma as well as its causal character. Two direct relations, between codanā and dharma and between dharma and phala, are stressed in this theory, so that the second sūtra may be interpreted straightforwardly: ‘codanā-lakṣaṇa ‘rī ḍharmaḥ’ states that Vedic instructions are the means to cognize dharma, which in turn is a direct cause of the good (śreyāskara) and thus becomes a desirable thing (artha). As a topic of discussion, it may have developed from commenting on the second sūtra, since Kumārila criticized it while expounding the second sūtra.

In Vedic exegesis the dharma-abhivyakti-vāda allows more natural interpretations than those of Śābara. Two specific features can be pointed out in particular: first that it interprets dharma as an act of action (karma) as indicated by the accusative in ‘agnihotram’, and secondly that it allows natural analysis of svargakāmaḥ, instead of interpreting the word as expressing that svarga is an aim of bīhāvānā.

TEXT AND ABBREVIATIONS

F: E. Frauwaldner, Materialien zur ältesten Erkenntnislehre der Karma-

NOTES

1 This word ‘dharma-abhivyakti-vāda’ is not found in the original Sanskrit texts.
2 W. Halbfass, ‘Karma, Apūrva, and “Natural” Causes’, Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions, Wendy Doniger O’Flaherty ed., Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, 1980, p. 282: ‘a pre-Kumārila version of the theory of apūrva, basically amounting to the idea of a substrateless and impersonal power which is invoked and manifested by the sacrificial performance, was already discussed and refuted by Uddyotakara in his Nyāya-vārttika on Sūtra 1.1.7.’
11 Cf. Śāhāpyakṣa on Jaiminśītā 1.1.13: atri yadi sakyāmya nityātan asya vishāpatam vakta tato nityapsrayayāśāmāthāyā kādācid upalam-
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position of śakti in his ontology and the relation between sacrifice and its fruit. Ślokavārttika codanā, v. 199: tamāte phale pravṛttiṣyate yēgūde śāktimārakam/ utpattau vāpi paśvāde apīrūma na tatāh prabhau/ 'Therefore apīrūma is just a latent force of, for example, sacrifices, which act towards the attainment of their fruit, or [just a latent force] of an animal or the like, which [acts] towards the attainment of its birth; it is not separate from them.' Tantravārttika on Jaiminisūtra 2.1.5: yēgūd eva phalam tad dhi śaktiśvāreṇa siddhyatī/sākṣamāśaktiśāmakam vā tatt phalam evopajīvate// A 395.11-12. 'For the fruit which [arises] only from sacrifice is realized by power of [sacrifice]. Or that which has a subtle power as its nature comes to as arise as nothing but the fruit.'

Prakaranapāṇhāki vihārātmārakī II, v. 24ab: tad dhi kālintarashīnāc chēkṣām svargudīsidhāney/ PP 440.22. 'For it (=kāryā) is capable of accomplishing heaven and so forth because it remains until the time [of its fruit.]

Tāntvavārttika on Jaiminisūtra 2.1.5: saiva ca puruṣāgati kṛtuvagati vā yogyātā sāstre 'smiṁn apīrūma ity apadiśyate. A 394.10-11. 'And the same compatibility, whether it lies in person or ritual, is called apīrūma in this system [i.e. Mimāṃsā.]

Cf. Śārabhāṣya on Jaiminisūtra 1.11.2, A 75.11-76.3.

Cf. A. Akamatsu, 'Ūdvyotakara no Shiso', p. 386.

Cf. Śārabhāṣya on Jaiminisūtra 1.13.5, svṛtiśāka: atha gaṇe ity asya śabdasya ko 'rthāh. sūktādīvigatātāh iti brūmā. F 40.13-14. '[Question:] Then what is the referent of the word ‘cow’? [Answer:] We answer that [it is] the ākṛti or general form, qualified by the deities and so forth.'

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