

## Reconstructing the *Dharma-abhivvyakti-vāda* in the Mīmāṃsā Tradition\*

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This paper attempts to reconstruct the Mīmāṃsā *apūrva*-theory which I suggest might be referred to as '*dharma-abhivvyakti-vāda*'<sup>1</sup> (the theory of *dharma*-manifestation). Halbfass has pointed out that the *apūrva*-theory is refuted by Uddyotakara in *Nyāyavārttika* on *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.7,<sup>2</sup> a portion of which has been translated into Japanese and investigated further by Akamatsu.<sup>3</sup> For Akamatsu it is not clear what Uddyotakara regards as the Mīmāṃsakas' position on *apūrva*, i.e. what form of the *apūrva*-theory was dominant after Śābarasvāmin and before Kumārila. Yudhiṣṭhira Mīmāṃsaka,<sup>4</sup> with reference to the relevant portions which I will investigate below, attributes this form of *apūrva*-theory to Bhartṛhari and Bhartṛmitra, but does not clarify its content. Bronkhorst,<sup>5</sup> apparently relying on Yudhiṣṭhira Mīmāṃsaka, also refers to and translates the same passages, but he too does not comment on the theory. Ikari,<sup>6</sup> who is mainly concerned with understanding the Vedic thought-world, presents three aspects of action: a latent form of action, once made manifest through human performances, remains effective as an invisible substance. Ikari does not refer to our passages, but his exposition of this Vedic model is important for our *dharma-abhivvyakti-vāda* as providing a prototype.

### SOURCES

1 Bhartṛhari (AD 450-510)

Bhartṛhari, a grammarian who is said to have used an older Mīmāṃsā source<sup>7</sup> (probably Bhavadāsa's *vṛtti*, written in the first half of the fifth century<sup>8</sup>) than the *Śābarabhāṣya* (first half of the sixth century)<sup>9</sup>, mentions the Mīmāṃsā theory in his discussion of *dharma*.

*Svavṛtti* on *Vākyapadiya* 1.136: *tatra kecid ācāryā manyante. na*

*prakṛtyā kiñcit karma duṣṭam aduṣṭam* (ed. *drṣṭam adrṣṭam*) *vā. śāstrānuṣṭhānāt tu kevalād dharmābhivṛyaktiḥ, śāstrāntikramāc ca pratyavāyayogah. yeṣām eva hi brāhmaṇavādhādīnām viṣayāntare pātakatvam, teṣām eva viṣayāntare prakṛṣṭābhuyodayahetutvam śāstreṇa vidhiyata iti.* VP 224.5-8.

\* Following an emendation by Yudhiṣṭhira (Yudhiṣṭhira 1987: 31). cf. Vṛṣabhadeva (VP 224, n.6): *na drṣṭo nādrṣṭaḥ*] ed. ; *na drṣṭāntaduṣṭāḥ* variant

On this point some teachers think: No action is either impure or pure by nature. But dharma becomes manifest only through following scriptures, and negative consequences attach [themselves to a person] as a result of [that person's] transgressing scriptures. For scripture prescribes one and the same action of killing a Brahmin and the like (i.e. drinking wine, etc.) as a cause of downfall in one context as well as a cause of the greatest elevation [i.e. rebirth in heaven] in another context.<sup>10</sup>

The expression 'abhivṛyakti' is used to explain the phenomenon that something eternal becomes perceptible in a certain case and not in other cases.<sup>11</sup> For example, the phoneme /g/, which is considered eternal in Mīmāṃsā, manifests itself and becomes audible through actual sounds (*dhvani*, *nāda*), which in this system correspond to conjunctions and disjunctions among wind-atoms.<sup>12</sup> The eternal cow-ness (*gotva*) of individual cows becomes manifest through individuals (*vyakti*) and makes us realize: 'this is a cow'.<sup>13</sup> Likewise the eternal dharma manifests itself through each ritual performance (*karman*).

The same idea is also referred to in another work by Bhartṛhari, the *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā*, together with more details and a metaphor. The relevant portion pointed out by Yudhiṣṭhira (1984: 392; 1987: 34) is translated by Bronkhorst (1989).

*Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* : *avasthita eva dharmah. sa tv agnihotrādibhir abhivṛyayate. tatpreritas tu phalado bhavati. yathā svāmī bhṛtyaiḥ sevayāṃ preriyate phalam praty ...* MBhD 25.25-26.

Dharma remains forever. But it is manifested by an *agnihotra* offering or the like. Urged by such (*agnihotra*), however, it gives a fruit. For example, a master is urged to [give] fruit by servants when they serve.... (my translation)

This passage refers to the idea that the dharma, although eternal, urged by individual performances (*tat-prerita*) such as the *agnihotra* offering, becomes manifest (*abhivṛyayate*) and functions as a fruit-giver (*phalada*). While in the above-mentioned passage of the *Vākyapadīya*

the eternality of dharma is inferred from the expression 'abhivṛyakti', here dharma is clearly qualified as eternal and 'remains forever' (*avasthita eva*). Furthermore the *agnihotra* offering is personified as that which urges the eternal dharma. A reluctant master, urged by servants, gives them fees. Likewise the unchanging dharma, urged by daily performances of *agnihotra*, is forced to give fruits.

## 2 Bhāviveka (AD 490-570)

In the sixth century Bhāviveka criticized other schools in his *Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā*. He refers to the *dharma-abhivṛyakti-vāda* as an opponent's view in the chapter called *Mīmāṃsā-tattva-nirṇaya-avatāra*. (Edited and translated into Japanese by Kawasaki (1992: 409, 376), and into English by Lindtner (1997: 96). The answer from the Buddhist side is given in k. 55.)

*Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā* IX, k.10:

*apūrvo 'pi kriyāvyāṅgyaḥ, kriyā mokṣe 'pi sādhanam/ somapānādikā, vidvān nirjayed antakam yayā/*<sup>14</sup>

And *apūrva* is manifested by a [ritual] act. A [ritual] act such as drinking soma [=soma sacrifice], etc., is also a cause of liberation. Through that [ritual act] the wise man conquers death.

The idea is that *apūrva* or 'a new thing' is manifested (*vyāṅgya*) through ritual acts, such as drinking soma (*somapānādikā kriyā*). It should be noted that the manifested element here is called '*apūrva*' instead of dharma. In the surviving Bhāṭṭa<sup>15</sup> and Prābhākara<sup>16</sup> sources, *apūrva* is interpreted as 'new to our knowledge' or 'new information', not 'new in origination' or 'newly born'.

What then is meant by saying that *apūrva* is manifested through acts? Is it to be interpreted from the viewpoint of epistemology, in such a way that *apūrva*, which is newly cognized through the Vedas, is manifested through ritual acts? Or should we interpret it from the viewpoint of ontology, in such a way that the eternal dharma is newly manifested in this world through individual acts such as daily *agnihotras*?

## 3 Uddyotakara (first half of the seventh century)

The relevant portion of the *Nyāyavārttika* is translated into Japanese and analysed by Akamatsu (1991). Therefore in the following I pick up only the passages which are important for the reconstruction of the *dharma-*

*abhivyakti-vāda.*

Nyāyavārttika on Nyāyasūtra 1.1.7:

a. *nityam apy apūrvam yo 'bhivyanakti tasya phalam, abhivyaktyarthā ca kriyā. abhivyaktyarthatvāc ca na kriyālopa iti. yena yad abhivyajyate tasyaiva tat phalapradātṛ bhavatīti dr̥ṣṭam.* NV 55.15-17.

Although *apūrva* is [one and] eternal, [only] the person who makes [it] manifest has [its] fruit. And ritual act is [done] for the sake of manifestation. And because it is [done] for manifestation, ritual act is not left unperformed. [For] it is seen that whatever is manifested gives its fruit only to the one who manifests it.

As seen before, the eternal *apūrva* is manifested through acts (*kriyā*) and gives its fruit to humans. Eternal as it is, however, *apūrva* gives its fruit only to the particular person who made it manifest. Individual ritual acts aim at manifestation (*abhivyakty-artha*). In this way their efficacy or purposefulness is guaranteed through the following sequence: ritual acts, manifested *apūrva* and fruit. This theory avoids undesired consequences such as that ritual acts would not be performed (*kriyā-lopa*).

b. *svargāpūrvadevatādiṣūpadeśo na prāpnoti, atindriyatvāt. yadi sākṣātkaraṇam arthasyāptih, svargāpūrvadevatādin na kaścit paśyatīti tatpratipādako vyavahāro na syāt. tasmād āptaś cāsāv upadeśaś ceti yuktam, nāptasyopadeśa iti.* NV 54.17-20.

[Opponent:] [Vedic] instruction does not hold good for (*prāpnoti*) heaven, *apūrva*, deities and so forth, because they are beyond perception. If the obtaining (*āpti*) of an object is directly perceiving it [as the *Nyāyabhāṣya* interprets it], verbal usage about them would not be possible, since no one sees heaven, *apūrva*, deities and so forth. Therefore it is proper [to interpret the compound 'āpta-upadeśa'] as 'reliable instruction' [as a *karmadhāraya*], not 'instruction of the reliable' [as a *ṣaṣṭhī-tatpuruṣa*].

With regard to the compound *āpta-upadeśa* in the Sūtra, the opponent interprets it as a *karma-dhāraya* or 'reliable instruction' instead of as a *tat-puruṣa*, 'instruction of those who reached the object'.<sup>17</sup> In this interpretation the opponent presupposes that *apūrva* is imperceptible (*atindriya*), like heaven and deities (cf. *Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā* IX, k.5). Being beyond the reach of the senses, *apūrva* cannot be reached by anyone, so there is no 'person who has reached it' (*āpta*). Therefore the opponent insists that a *tat-puruṣa* interpretation is impossible.

Furthermore *apūrva*, as well as heaven and deities, is considered to be an object of Vedic instruction. As *apūrva* is regarded as imperceptible, it can be said to be qualified further as an object of Vedic instruction only.

c. *kaḥ punar atra nyāyaḥ svargādayaḥ kasyacit pratyakṣā iti. brūmah. sāmānyaviśeṣavattvāt kasyacit pratyakṣā iti. āśritatvāt. \*yad āśritam tat kasyacit pratyakṣam iti. parārthatvāt. yat parārtham tad api kasyacit pratyakṣam iti. vastutvād āgamaviśayatvāc ca. yad vastu yac ca parasya kathyate, tat kasyacit pratyakṣam dr̥ṣṭam, yathā ghaṭādaya iti. anityatvāt kasyacit pratyakṣā iti.* NV 55.3-7. \*yad] Calcutta ed. ; yad yad Thakur ed.

[Opponent:] But what is the ground for [your declaration] that heaven and so forth are visible to someone?

[Siddhāntin:] We answer. (1) [They are] visible to someone because they have certain generic properties. (a) Because of resting [in a locus]: everything that rests in a locus is visible to someone. (b) Because of being for others: everything that is for others also is visible to someone. (c) Because of being real and the object of authoritative speech: it is experienced that everything that is real and that is communicated to others, e.g. pots, etc., is visible to someone. (2) [They are] visible to someone because they are non-eternal.

In order to show that from the Nyāya point of view *apūrva* must be perceptible to someone, Uddyotakara refers to their common properties (*sāmānya*), i.e. *āśritatva*, *parārthatva* and *vastutvacumāgamaviśayatva*, together with another, *anityatva*. Besides *vastutva* and *āgamaviśayatva*, which could be admitted even by the Mīmāṃsaka, the opponent who insists that *apūrva*, etc., are imperceptible to anyone is supposed to admit the opposite properties, i.e. *an-āśritatva*, *a-parārthatva* and *nityatva*. In fact the last-mentioned property *nityatva* is admitted in the following argument by the opponent in relation to *abhivyakti*. As is seen from another and later source (Jayanta), *an-āśritatva* is also confirmed.<sup>18</sup>

d. *athāpīdam syāt. ekam apy apūrvam vyañjakabhedānurvīdhānād bhinnam iva bhavati. ... nanu ca khaḍgādibhedān mukhabhedāḥ tadanuvīdhānād dr̥ṣṭaḥ.* NV 56.7-10.

Further the following is also possible: *apūrva*, although one, takes form as if different according to the difference of its manifesters. ... [Opponent:] Due to the difference of [the reflecting surfaces], such as a sword, we find that [the appearance of the reflection of] the

face differs in accordance with that [difference of reflectors].

Uddyotakara attacks the *apūrva*-theory after first distinguishing two possibilities, i.e. whether it is one or plural. The opponent who holds that *apūrva* is one explains that the one *apūrva* appears as many, through many manifesters in the same way that one face is reflected in many surfaces. Considering this, and other examples, such as one eternal phoneme /g/ which manifests itself through many sounds, it is appropriate to assume that the eternal *apūrva* was regarded as one rather than many.

#### 4 Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (AD 600-650)

Kumārila, discussing 'what is dharma' or 'what is the referent of the word "dharma"' in his subcommentary on *Jaiminīsūtra* 1.1.2, criticizes the idea that dharma is 'something newly born (*apūrva-janman*)'.

*Śloka-vārttika codanā*, vv.195-6b:  
*antahkaraṇavṛttāu vā vāsanāyām ca cetasaḥ/  
 pudgaleṣu ca puṇyeṣu nṛguṇe 'pūrvajanmani//  
 prayogo dharmasabdasya na dr̥ṣṭo.... / SV 78.5-7.*

We do not find the word 'dharma' applied [in ordinary usage and the Vedas] to the activity of the internal organ (as in Sāṃkhya), the disposition of the mind (as in Buddhism), virtuous souls (as in Jainism), a quality of *ātman* (as for the Vaiśeṣikas) or 'something newly born' (as in Mīmāṃsā). [Therefore these are not really *dharma*.]

As already mentioned, the surviving traditions of the Bhāṭṭas and Prābhākaras interpret *apūrva* to mean 'something epistemologically new' or 'something never cognized through other means of cognition than Vedic instructions' (*mānāntarāvedya*). According to the view refuted by Kumārila in this passage, however, *apūrva* is interpreted as something ontologically new, i.e. a newly born thing. Kumārila's commentator Sucaritaśiṣya (Kāśikā 160.19-22), after identifying the opponent to be 'one group of Mīmāṃsakas' (*mīmāṃsakaikadeśināḥ*), clarifies the ontological interpretation of *apūrva*: it is that which did not exist before ritual acts (*tad dhi na karmaṇaḥ pūrvam jāyata eva*) and which is produced by them (*kṛte karmaṇi tanniṣpatteḥ*).

#### 5 Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (latter half of the ninth century)

Jayanta, commenting on *Nyāyasūtra* 1.2.57, tries to protect the authority

of the Vedas from the Nyāya position. In this context he discusses 'what dharma is'. In criticizing other schools, Jayanta presupposes Kumārila's position and gives more details. Jayanta calls the view of '*apūrva* as something newly born' (*apūrva-janman*) that of 'the old Mīmāṃsakas' (*vṛddha-mīmāṃsakāḥ*) as opposed to the views of the followers of Śābara and Prabhākara. (Part of the relevant portion was pointed out by Yudhiṣṭhira (1984: 393; 1987: 35) and translated by Bronkhorst (1989: 113).

*Nyāyamañjarī* on *Nyāyasūtra* 1.2.57: *vṛddhamīmāṃsakāḥ yāgādikarmanirvartyam apūrvam nāma dharmam abhivadanti. yāgādikarmaiva śābarā bruvate. vākyārtha eva niyogātmā apūrvavāśabdavācyaḥ, dharmasabdena ca sa evocyata iti prābhākaraḥ kathayanti....svargayāgāntarālavartinaś ca sthirasya nirādhāra-syāpūrvasya niṣpramāṇakatvāt jarajjaiminiyapra-vādo 'py apeśalah.* NM 664.6-16.

The old Mīmāṃsakas maintain that that unprecedented thing (*apūrvam nāma*) that is accomplished through acts such as sacrifice, should be [accepted as] *dharmā*. Those who follow Śābara maintain that dharma is only ritual action such as sacrifice itself. The Prabhākara school says that what is denoted by the word '*apūrva*' is nothing but the sentence-meaning which is a command, which again is denoted by the word '*dharma*'. ... And the [so-called] *apūrva* which exists between sacrifice and heaven, remains for some time and is without locus, lacks any proof of its existence. Therefore the statement of the old Mīmāṃsakas is either not correct. (my translation)

Jayanta explains the *apūrva-janman* mentioned by Kumārila as 'that unprecedented thing that is accomplished through acts such as sacrifice' (*yāgādikarmanirvartyam apūrvam nāma*). In other words, Jayanta explains *janman* as accomplishment by sacrifice, etc. Jayanta confirms that the *apūrva* mentioned by Kumārila is ontologically, not epistemologically new. Furthermore, the view which Jayanta identifies as that of 'the old Mīmāṃsakas (*vṛddha-mīmāṃsaka*, *jaraj-jaiminiya*)' seems, or at least is believed by him, to precede Śābara and Prabhākara, in view of the order in which he mentions the three positions.

This *apūrva* or 'new thing' stands between (or connects) sacrifice and heaven (*svarga-yāga-antarālavartin*) and remains for some time (*sthira*). In other words, it is grasped as that which is accomplished through sacrifice, remains for some time and gives its fruit to the agent. The Bhāṭṭas<sup>19</sup> and Prābhākaras<sup>20</sup> also accept this character of *apūrva*

positing it as a connector which guarantees the efficacy of ritual acts. But the *apūrva* which Jayanta mentions here does not have a locus (*nirādhāra*). It is different from Kumārila's *apūrva* which is 'just a latent force of sacrifice' (*yāgādeḥ śaktimātrakam*) or 'just a latent force of an animal or the like' (*paśvāder [śaktimātrakam]*) and from the *ātmaśakti* usually accepted by the Bhāṭṭas.<sup>21</sup> This quality of 'having no locus' was already suggested by Uddyotakara.

One still hesitates, however, to understand *apūrva-janman* as simply 'something newly manifested', because in some cases 'production' (*janman, niṣpatti, nirvṛtti*) is contrasted with 'manifestation' (*abhivṛtya*).<sup>22</sup> To recapitulate:

- i. According to the 'old Mīmāṃsakas' who preceded the followers of Śābara and Prabhākara, dharma is not sacrifice, etc., themselves, but a new thing which is accomplished through them.
- ii. Although it remains for some time as a fruit-giver after sacrifice, it does not have any locus such as the *ātman* or sacrifice.

#### 6. *Simhasūrigaṇi*

*Simhasūrigaṇi*, a commentator on the *Nayacakra* of Mallavādin, refers to a Mīmāṃsā view as that of an opponent. He paraphrases *apūrva* as 'different from the seen' (*adrṣṭa*) and a 'particular dharma' (*dharma-viśeṣa*). Furthermore, he records the view of 'some Mīmāṃsakas' that dharma is nothing but ritual acts themselves, which is in fact identical with Śābara's position.

*Nyāyāgamānusāriṇi* on *Dvādaśāraṇa Nayacakram*, vidhividhyāra:  
a. *na pūrvo 'pūrvo, 'drṣṭo dharmaviśeṣaḥ.... viśeṣaśabdāt parasparaviśiṣṭābhir yajñasaṃsthābhir agniṣṭomādibhir iṣṭibhiś cā-bhivṛtyāvyā apūrvā (-vyā apūrvā) em.; -vyāpūrvā ed.) api viśeṣyante dravyamantradevatādiviśiṣṭābhiḥ.* NC 140.23-141.5.

*Apūrva* is what was not before, i.e. a specific dharma which is different from the seen. ... By the word 'specific' [in Mallavādin's *apūrva-viśeṣa*] is intended the following: the *apūrvas* manifested through sacrifice-types, i.e. *agniṣṭoma*, etc., and *iṣṭis*, which are qualified mutually by each other, are themselves qualified by those [sacrifice-types] which are [again] qualified by [their respective] material, mantras, deities and so forth.

In this passage, *apūrva* is paraphrased as 'different from the precedent' (*na pūrvah*) and further explained as 'a particular dharma which is different from the seen' (*adrṣṭo dharmaviśeṣaḥ*). Although this *apūrva*

looks at first glance like 'an epistemologically new thing', i.e. 'a new thing cognized only through the Vedas', it can be interpreted as an 'ontologically a new thing' if one considers the meaning of 'a particular dharma' (*dharmaviśeṣa*): a dharma, which is qualified through ritual acts which are again qualified variously through their materials and mantras, becomes a particular dharma different from the seen, and is called *adrṣṭa*. It is not new in the sense that it is cognized only through the Vedas, but new and different from the seen in the sense that it is a particular thing newly manifested in a certain situation.

The description here seems to be parallel to the structure of the relationship between *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa* and *vyakti*.<sup>23</sup> The eternal dharma could be regarded as *sāmānya*, a particular dharma which manifests itself being qualified in a certain situation as *viśeṣa*, and the individual situations which qualify one *sāmānya* as *vyakti*. In other words, the one eternal dharma, when manifested through individual acts that are qualified by each other as well as by their materials, mantras and deities, is at the same time qualified by those same individual acts. One eternal universal 'cow-ness', when manifested through individual cows, is qualified by individual cows which consist of various parts.<sup>24</sup> In the same way, one eternal dharma, when it is manifested through individual ritual acts and appears as a particular, is qualified through the ritual acts which consist of various elements. The way in which dharma is qualified is similar to that of *bhāvanā*, as posited by Śābara and the Bhāṭṭas, which functions as a core element in ritualanalysis and is regarded as qualified by various elements in the way that a white canvas may be qualified.<sup>25</sup> That is to say, the role of *bhāvanā* as a core element in the *bhāvanā*-theory of Śābara and his followers is replaced by *apūrva* (or dharma) in the *dharma-abhivṛtya-vāda*.

b. *mā bhūd yajñasaṃjñāyāḥ kriyāyā eva dharmatvaṃ, yathā kaiścin mīmāṃsakair evaṃ vyākhyāyate 'yajñena yajñam ayajanta devās, tāni dharmāni prathamāny āsan' (Rgveda 1.164.50; 10.90.16) iti. kiṃ kārāṇam. tasmīn arthe pratyakṣata evānityāyāḥ kriyāyā anantaram phalasambandhādarśanāt kriyāvaiphalya-doṣaprasaṅgāc ca.* NC 141.5-7.

One should not say that it is an act that is called 'sacrifice' which is dharma, in the way that [is held by] those Mīmāṃsakas who interpret in this way the sentence 'The gods sacrificed sacrifice through sacrifice. Those were the first dharmas'. Why? Because if that is the meaning [of 'dharma'], its connection with the fruit is not seen immediately after the act, which is visibly transient, and because of the undesirable consequence that the act may lack fruit

[and therefore becomes useless].

Furthermore, if one identified dharma with ritual acts, as Śābara did, the direct connection between dharma and its fruit would become impossible, because dharma, being transient, cannot remain until the arising of the fruit. Consequently it would become useless to perform ritual acts, because they would not be the means of attaining their fruit. On the other hand, if one follows the *dharma-abhivṛtya-vāda*, dharma is able to bring its fruit directly when it is manifested through individual acts and becomes 'a new thing'. In this way the direct connection between dharma and its fruit is guaranteed.

Simhasūri also refers to the exegesis of Vedic passages in accordance with the *dharma-abhivṛtya-vāda*.

c. *agnihotraṃ iti dharmāḥ kriyābhivṛtyaṅgya ucyate. kārye kārā-nopacārād agnihotrābhivṛtyaṅgyo 'gnihotraṃ iti. tataḥ 'agnihotraṃ dharmāḥ, juhuyāt bhāvayet, svargakāmaḥ' ity eṣa vākyārtho nirdoṣa iti.* NC 141.7-9.

The word 'agnihotra' refers to *dharma* manifested through act. What is manifested through *agnihotra* is called 'agnihotra' through the secondary application to the result of [a word which strictly speaking refers to] the cause. Then the meaning of the sentence 'agnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ' could be interpreted without any faults as 'One who wishes heaven should realize *dharma*' (*dharmāḥ bhāvayet svargakāmaḥ*).

To sum up,

- i. The Vedic passage 'agnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ.' can be paraphrased: 'one who wishes heaven should realize *dharma*, which is manifested through the *agnihotra* offering'.
- ii. This interpretation enables one to interpret the expression *svargakāmaḥ* and the accusative in *agnihotraṃ* naturally; unlike Śābara who analysed it in an unnatural way.
- iii. It shows clearly the position that *dharma*, not heaven, is the purpose (*karman*) of the principal ritual action, and the thing to be accomplished (*sādhyā*).

It may be noted that *apūrva* as a particular *dharma* manifested through acts is called a *kārya* and can be the object of 'bhāvayet'. It is possible, therefore, to construe the *apūrva-janman* mentioned by Kumārila as equivalent with 'a newly manifested thing'. That is to say, *janman* could be interpreted as manifestation and not production in a strict sense.

Furthermore, Simhasūri presents the *dharma-abhivṛtya-vāda* as his main *pūrva-pakṣa*, though he is also aware of Śābara's opposing 'yāgādi=dharma' theory. We may assume then that the *dharma-abhivṛtya-vāda* was the mainstream theory in the Mīmāṃsā tradition at that time.

## CONCLUSION

**Chronology:** This theory must go back to the latter half of the fifth century, since Bhartṛhari knew it. The way in which it was referred to by Bhāvivēka and Simhasūrigaṇi allows us to conjecture that it was dominant in the Mīmāṃsā tradition in their time. We may be justified in concluding from Kumārila's criticism that its dominance was not surpassed even in his day. Jayanta's expressions 'jaraj-jaiminiya' and 'vṛddha-mīmāṃsaka', in contrast with 'śābara' and 'prābhākara', suggest that he believed that it predated Śābarasvāmin.

**Content:** The eternal *dharma* which is always there (*avasthita eva*) becomes manifest (*abhivṛtya*) through actual ritual performance (*kriyā, karman*) such as *agnihotra-homa* and *soma-yāga*. Instead of 'dharma-abhivṛtya' we also find the expression 'apūrva-abhivṛtya'. Kumārila and Jayanta use instead of *abhivṛtya* the words *janman* and *nir-√vrt* respectively. With the help of Simhasūrigaṇi we can construe 'newly-born' (*apūrva-janman*) as meaning a certain special *dharma* yet unseen (*adṛṣṭo dharmaviśeṣaḥ*), which, in being manifested by the actual performances, is also qualified by them. Uddyotakara sums it up thus: 'apūrva, although one, takes form as if different, according to the difference of its manifesters' (*ekam apy apūrvaṃ vyañjakabhedā-nuvidhānād bhinnam iva bhavati*).

From the ontological point of view, the eternal *dharma* corresponds to *sāmānya*; the actual performances, which function as manifesters, correspond to *vyakti*; and the manifested *dharma* or *apūrva* to *viśeṣa*. Man is also seen as a manifesters, according to Uddyotakara. From the point of view of Vedic exegesis, the passage 'agnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ' might be paraphrased thus: 'One who wishes heaven should realize *dharma*, which is manifested through *agnihotra-homa*'. This manifested *apūrva* is without locus (*nirādhāra*), remains for some time (*sthira*) and brings fruit (*phalada*). Although it is one and eternal, and so might be expected to be common to all people, it brings its fruit only to specific persons because it is they who manifest it.

Relationship with the System: If one admits, like Śabara, that dharma is nothing but ritual acts such as sacrifices, dharma would be transient and non-eternal. In the *dharma-abhivyakti-vāda*, on the other hand, the eternity of dharma is not compromised. This enables one to explain easily the eternity of the three concepts referred to in the second sūtra, i.e. *codanā* (Vedic instructions), *dharma* and the relationship between them (*codanā*→*lakṣyalakṣaṇasambandha*→*dharma*). This is important for the *tarkapāda* section, the aim of which is to show that dharma is cognized through the Vedas in a way that is without faults. For the three items are all eternal and lack human agents that might introduce error. Furthermore, unlike Śabara's theory, according to which *apūrva* intervenes between dharma (=ritual acts) and its fruit, the *dharma-abhivyakti-vāda* guarantees the direct causal relation between dharma and its fruit.

Thus *abhivyakti-vāda*, which is resorted to to explain why the eternal thing works at some particular time and not at another, functions as a device which guarantees the eternity of dharma as well as its causal character. Two direct relations, between *codanā* and dharma and between dharma and *phala*, are stressed in this theory, so that the second sūtra may be interpreted straightforwardly: '*codanā-lakṣaṇo 'rtho dharmah*' states that Vedic instructions are the means to cognize dharma, which in turn is a direct cause of the good (*śreyaskara*) and thus becomes a desirable thing (*artha*). As a topic of discussion, it may have developed from commenting on the second sūtra, since Kumārila criticized it while expounding the second sūtra.

In Vedic exegesis the *dharma-abhivyakti-vāda* allows more natural interpretations than those of Śabara. Two specific features can be pointed out in particular: first that it interprets dharma as an aim of action (*karman*) as indicated by the accusative in '*agnihotram*', and secondly that it allows natural analysis of *svargakāmaḥ*, instead of interpreting the word as expressing that *svarga* is an aim of *bhāvanā*.

#### TEXT AND ABBREVIATIONS

- A: *Mīmāṃsādarśanam*, Subbhāṣāstrī ed., Poona, 1929-34.  
 F: E. Frauwallner, *Materialien zur ältesten Erkenntnislehre der Karma-mīmāṃsā*, Graz-Wien-Köln, 1968.  
 Kāśikā: *Mīmāṃsā Slokavārtika with the Commentary Kasika of Sucaritamiśra*, K. Sāmbaśiva Sāstrī ed., Trivandrum, 1990.  
 MBhD: *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā of Bhartṛhari*, Fascicle IV, Āhnika I, J. Bronkhorst ed., Poona, 1987.

#### Reconstructing the Dharma-abhivyakti-vāda

- NC: *Dvādaśāraṇa Nayacakram*, Part I, Muni Jambūvijayaḥ ed., Bhāvnagar, 1966.  
 NM: *Nyāyamañjarī of Jayantabhaṭṭa*, Vol. I, K.S.Varadacharya ed., Mysore, 1969.  
 NV: *Nyāyabhāṣyavārtika of Bhāradvāja Uddyotakara*, Anantalal Thakur ed., New Delhi, 1997.  
 PP: *Prakaraṇa Pañcikā of Sri Śālikanātha Miśra with Nyāya-siddhi*, A. Subrahmanya Sastri ed., Varanasi, 1961.  
 SV: *Ślokavārttikam*, Dvārikādāsa Śāstrī ed., Varanasi, 1978.  
 VP: *Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari*, K.A. S. Iyer ed., Poona, 1966.  
 YD: *Yuktidīpikā*, Vol. I, A. Wezler and S. Motegi ed., Stuttgart, 1998.

#### NOTES

- \* This paper was presented on 4 November 1998 at Wolfson College, Oxford, at the seminar 'Body, Mind and Religion in India', while I was there as Michael Coulson Junior Research Fellow.  
 1 This word '*dharma-abhivyakti-vāda*' is not found in the original Sanskrit texts.  
 2 W. Halbfass, 'Karma, *Apūrva*, and "Natural" Causes', *Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions*, Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty ed., Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, 1980, p. 282: 'a pre-Kumārila version of the theory of *apūrva*, basically amounting to the idea of a substrateless and impersonal power which is invoked and manifested by the sacrificial performance, was already discussed and refuted by Uddyotakara in his *Nyāyavārttika* on Sūtra 1.1.7.'  
 3 A. Akamatsu, 'Uddyotakara no Shiso — NV Kenkyū (2), *Apūrva wo Megutte* —' [A study of the *Nyāyavārttika* (2), Uddyotakara on *apūrva*], *Ihara Shōren Hakushi Koki Kinen Ronbun shū*, 1991, pp. 377-98.  
 4 Yudhiṣṭhira Mīmāṃsaka, *Samskṛta Vyākaraṇa-sāstra kā Itihāsa*, Bhāga I, Bahālgarh, 1984; 'Śāstrāvātāra-mīmāṃsā', *Mīmāṃsā-śābara-bhāṣyam*, Yudhiṣṭhira Mīmāṃsaka ed., Prathamā Bhāgaḥ, Bahālgarh, 1987.  
 5 J. Bronkhorst, 'Studies on Bhartṛhari, 2, Bhartṛhari and Mīmāṃsā', *Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik*, Vol. 15, 1989, pp. 101-17.  
 6 Y. Ikari, 'Rinne to Gō' [*Samsāra* and *karman*], *Iwanami Kōza, Tōyō Shisō Dai Rokkan, Indo Shisō* 2, Tokyo, 1988, p. 298.  
 7 J. Bronkhorst, 'Studies on Bhartṛhari', p. 114.  
 8 F 101; E. Franco and K. Preisendanz, 'Bhavadāsa's Interpretation of Mīmāṃsā-sūtra 1.1.4 and the Date of the *Nyāyabhāṣya*', *Berliner Indologische Studien*, vol. 8, 1995.  
 9 E. Frauwallner, *Geschichte der indischen Philosophie*, II, Salzburg, 1956, p. 23; H. Nakamura, *Shōki Vedānta Tetsugaku shi* [The early history of Vedānta philosophy], Vols. 1-4, Tokyo, 1981, pp. 189-90.  
 10 Cf. A. Akamatsu, *Koten Indo no Gengo Tetsugaku* [An annotated Japanese translation of the *Brahmakāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya*], Vol. I, Tokyo, 1998, p. 226.  
 11 Cf. *Śābarabhāṣya* on *Jaiminiśūtra* 1.1.13: *atrāpi yadi śakṣyāmo nityatām asya viśpaṣṭam vaktum tato nityapratyayasūmarthyūṭ kadācid upalam-*

- bhaṃ kadācid anupalambhaṃ dr̥ṣtvā kimcid upalambhasya nimittam kalpayiṣyāmaḥ. tac ca saṃyogavibhāgasadbhāve sati bhavātīti saṃyogavibhāgān evābhivyāñjakān iti vakṣyāmaḥ.* 'In this case too, if we can clearly show its (=śabda's) eternality, then because of the fact that we cognize [it as] eternal, after experiencing that [it is] perceived at some time and not perceived at another time, we assume some cause of perception. And on the basis that [perception] arises when there are conjunction and disjunction, we can say that it is conjunction and disjunction which make [śabda] manifest.'
- 12 Cf. *Śābarabhāṣya* on *Jaiminīsūtra* 1.1.13: *vāyaviyāḥ saṃyogavibhāgā vāyāvāśritatvād....* 'Conjunctions and disjunctions of winds, because they are located in winds....' A 78.4-5.
  - 13 A. Akamatsu, 'Kotoba wa Eien na Mono ka Tsukuri dasareta Mono ka — Bhartṛhari no Baai (2)' [Are śabdas eternal or artificial? — A case study of Bhartṛhari (2)], *Tetsugaku Nenpō* (Kyūdai Bungaku bu), Vol. 55, 1996, pp. 10-11.
  - 14 C. Lindtner, 'Bhavya on Mīmāṃsā', *Studia Indologica*, Vol. 4, 1997, p. 96.
  - 15 Even Śābara is aware of an interpretation according to which *apūrva* is something epistemologically new. *Śābarabhāṣya* on *Jaiminīsūtra* 9.1.3: *tad api hy apūrvam śabdād evāvagamyate. astīti na prāk śabdād anyena pramāṇenopasaṃkhyāyate.* A 1646.11-13. 'For that *apūrva* also is understood only through speech. It is not shown that it exists by other means of knowledge before speech.' Kumārila begins the opponent's view in the *apūrva-adhikaraṇa* presupposing the interpretation that *apūrva* is something epistemologically new or not known before. *Tantravārttika* on *Jaiminīsūtra* 2.1.5: *tasmāt sarvapramāṇāpūrvatvād anvarthanāmaivāsadrūpam apūrvam pratipattavyam.* A 390.13-14. 'Therefore, *apūrva*, which is indeed appropriately named, should be construed [literally] as non-existence, because it is *apūrva* or unknown to all [other] means of knowledge.'
  - 16 *Prakaraṇapañcikā vākyārthamātrkā* II, v. 25: *kriyādhinnaṃ yat kāryam vedyam mānāntarair na tat/ ato mānāntarāpūrvam apūrvam iti gīyate//* PP 441. 3-4. 'The *kārya* or what should be done, which is different from acts, etc., is not known through other means of knowledge [than the Vedas]. Therefore it is called *apūrva*, because it is unknown to other means of knowledge [than the Vedas].'
  - 17 It might be improper to attribute this view only to Mīmāṃsā, because the *karmadhāraya*-interpretation is also seen in one of the traditional interpretations on *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 5 'āptaśrutir āptavacanan tu'. *Yuktidīpikā* on *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 5d: *āptā cāsau śrutiś ca āptaśrutih.* YD 87.5.
  - 18 As for *a-parārthatva* (not being for others), in other words, *pradhānatva* (being primary), which is supposed to be related with the *śeṣa* or subsidiary element defined as *parārtha* in *Jaiminīsūtra* 3.1.2, the present article will not discuss it because it is not crucial for the reconstruction of the *dharma-abhivyakti-vāda*.
  - 19 Kumārila, however, emphasizes that *apūrva* or latent force is not a separate entity from its locus, namely the sacrifices or their fruit, considering the

- position of *śakti* in his ontology and the relation between sacrifice and its fruit. *Śloka-vārttika codanā*, v. 199: *tasmāt phale pravṛttasya yāgādeḥ śaktimātrakam/ utpattau vāpi paśvūder apūrvam na tataḥ prthak//* 'Therefore *apūrva* is just a latent force of, for example, sacrifices, which act towards the attainment of their fruit, or [just a latent force] of an animal or the like, which [acts] towards the attainment of its birth; it is not separate from them.' *Tantravārttika* on *Jaiminīsūtra* 2.1.5: *yāgād eva phalam tad dhi śaktidvāreṇa sidhyati/ sūkṣmaśaktyātmakam vā tat phalam evopajāyate//* A 395.11-12. 'For the fruit which [arises] only from sacrifice is realized through power [of sacrifice]. Or that which has a subtle power as its nature comes to arise as nothing but the fruit.'
- 20 *Prakaraṇapañcikā vākyārthamātrkā* II, v. 24ab: *tad dhi kālāntarasthānāc chaktam svargādisiddhaye/* PP 440.22. 'For it (=kārya) is capable of accomplishing heaven and so forth because it remains until the time [of its fruit].'
  - 21 *Tantravārttika* on *Jaiminīsūtra* 2.1.5: *saiva ca puruṣagatā kratugatā vā yogyatā śāstre 'sminn apūrvam ity apadiśyate.* A 394.10-11. 'And the same compatibility, whether it lies in person or ritual, is called *apūrva* in this system [i.e. Mīmāṃsā].'
  - 22 Cf. *Śābarabhāṣya* on *Jaiminīsūtra* 1.1.12, A 75.11-76.3.
  - 23 Cf. A. Akamatsu, 'Uddyotakara no Shiso', p. 386.
  - 24 Cf. *Śābarabhāṣya* on *Jaiminīsūtra* 1.1.3-5, *vṛttikāra*: *atha gaur ity asya śabdasya ko 'rthah. sāsnaḍivīṣṭākṛtir iti brūmah.* F 40.13-14. '[Question:] Then what is the referent of the word 'cow'? [Answer:] We answer that [it is] the *ākṛti* or general form, qualified by the dewlaps and so forth.'
  - 25 Cf. K. Kataoka, 'Naraseru no Kaishaku gaku' [Mīmāṃsā theory of causal action: Śābara's concept of *bhāva*, *kriyā* and *bhāvanā*.], *Indo Tetsugaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū*, Vol. 3, 1996, pp. 47-60.



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