Kumārila first analyses through sāmānādhi-karāṇya the general structure of actions denoted by finite verbs, especially transitive ones, e.g. paccati, gacchati and so on, which denote kriyā, the meaning of a representative transitive karoti (A 376.25-26). Kriyā, the action of making, necessarily requires a kriyā-vāṇa, an object to be made, which is nothing but the agent of bhāva, the thing that becomes (i.e. arises). Thus he shows the general structure of transitive verbs to be: "The agent of becoming becomes the object of making" (A 377.9-10; kartt → kriyā → karmān=kartt → bhāva). For further clarification he defines in contrast the two, bhāva and kriyā: bhāva he defines as "an action of the agent merely acquiring its own body [i.e. coming into existence]" (A 376.27-28); kriyā he defines as "an action of an agent which has [already] acquired [its own] body [i.e. existence]" and as "an action which aims at another [thing] acquiring [its] body [i.e. which aims at another thing's coming into existence]" (A 377.7; A 376.28-29).

"Discovering" the universal structure of causal-action: pravyojaka-yāpāra and pravyojavyāpāra He next identifies this kriyā-structure as being nothing but causal. We can see this as an upgrading of kriyā to bhāvanā. The pravyojaka, the agent of a causal action (hetu in the grammatical tradition), causes the pravyojaya, the object of the causal action, to become, i.e. makes it an agent of becoming (A 377.24-25; pravyojaka → vyāpāra → pravyojaya → vyāpāra). He defines bhāvanā as an action of the causal agent, which has as its subsidiary element 'the action of the caused object', which is mentioned by a part of the same [causative] word [e.g. bhāvayati and vikledevati] (A 378.5-6; A 378.9). In this way Kumārila establishes causal actions as denoted by finite verbs, especially transitive ones. As he summarises himself, "Thus, through kriyā, bhāvanā is established in all finite verbs" (A 378.15).

General structure of causal-action Kumārila further proceeds to demonstrate, through the application of this kriyā-structure, that even intransitives and kṛdantās essentially have a causal sense (A 381.10; A 379.28). Thus, according to him, we can analyse any action as essentially causal.

Application of arthāntikā bhāvanā to sabdāntikā bhāvanā: Analysis of vidhi-structure Analysing the organic structure of Vedic rituals, Śabara developed his ideas about action and probably invented the concept of bhāvanā. Kumārila continues from Śabara’s idea and abstracts a universal causal-structure from all actions, not
only Vedic but also worldly, with the device of *pravojakavyāpāra and pravojavyavy-
āpāra. The universal structure of causal-action, not restricted by Kumārila to Vedic
ritual actions, becomes ready to be applied to all kinds of actions, not only physical
but also verbal, injunction (*vidhi) in particular, which we can easily see to be rele-
vant to ritual actions. This is evident in the same sūtra, Jaiminiśāstra 2.1.1, *esa
hy artho vidihiyate. Also the word codanā, which is a synonym of *vidhi and
upadesā for Kumārila (*Ślokavārttika upatattika, v. 11ed), has a causative form,
as shown e.g. by Śabara: *acēvyaconditah karomi (Frauwaller ed., 16.9-10). Kumārila
labelled the verbal action, i.e. the injunction, as *sadbāmikā bhāvanā, in contrast
with which he named the physical (and mental) action *arthāmikā bhāvanā (A 114.14-15;
A 378.20-21). Being a bhāvanā, an injunction is analyzed with a *pravojaka-
pravojya-formulation. Scriptural passages, *linādis in particular, cause men to take
actions (*linādi → bhāvanā → purusa → bhāvanā).

Connecting *sadbāmikā and *arthāmikā bhāvanā As *arthāmikā bhāvanā com-
prises three elements (aṁśas), *sadbāmikā bhāvanā too requires three: the *sādhyya is
*puruṣapratīti, i.e. *arthāmikā bhāvanā (*Ślokavārttika vikya, v. 275; A 114.17-18;
A 389.24); the *sādhanā is *vidhijnāna (A 114.22-23); the *itiṣṭhāvajātā is *praśast-
avajñāna (A 114.23-24). To explain, Vedic injunctions, *linādis in particular, accomplish
men’s taking action (*arthāmikā bhāvanā) through *vidhijnāna. For no one follows an
injunction without recognizing it to be an injunction. The *vidhiśakti, though sufficient
by itself to prompt men, is further supported by the knowledge of a praiseworthy
ness (*praśastavajñāna), which is understood from the arthāvāda-portion. In this manner,
Kumārila succeeds in connecting two causal actions: *linādis make men take action,
which in turn causes heaven to arise (*linādi → bhāvanā → purusa → bhāvanā → svarga → bhāva).

Analysis and connection of *adhyayanavidhi *Arthāmikā bhāvanā is verbalized as
*yāgena svargam bhāvayaḥ, which is a gloss of a Vedic injunction svargakāma vajeya.
The agent of this command is the *linādis, the bhāvanā of which can be also verbalized
as *vidhijnānena puruṣapratītanām bhāvayaḥ (= puruṣaṁ pravartanayet). But if the
*linādis are the agent of the commands to men to perform (ritual) actions, is it
that commands them in turn to perform the action of commanding men? Kumārila
appoints the *adhyayanavidhi, i.e. *svādhyaśe *dhṛtyavah, to take this role of

1) *Śabarbhaṣya ad 2.1.1: tathā yujetā yathā kinced bhavati. *Ānandāśrama first ed. (=A),
375.3. *Maṇḍana Miśra (*Bhāvanāvivēka 23.1,166.3-167.2 in Ramaswami ed.) clearly presupposes
the reading *yose not *yojeta. I also accept his yat, though there is a variant which omits it.
Their witnesses too support the accepted readings, namely the *Bhadāti and the *Ṛjumāṇā. 2) *For
further clarification of *Śabara’s usage and intention, see K. KATAOKA "Nāreru no Kaishaku
gaku", Indo Tetsugaku Bukkyō gaku Kenkyū, 3,1995,47-60. 3) *Maṇḍakaśya ad 1.3.1: *kim
4) *Kumārila explains the content of *eso... arthah as *kuruṣad yajīn svargam (A 375.25).
5) *Tantavārttika ad 1.27, A 114.25: *nayaḥ dhrista†aṅ (śa-kārya) Oxford ms., according to K.
HARIKAI: *Koten Indo Seiten Kaishaku gaku Kenkyū, Fukuoka, 1990,493, *śiva-kārya†a *avasthitā,
tām prāṣastavajñānaṁ uttāhantī. 6) A 114.17-20, HARIKAI (op. cit. 119) takes *pravartanam
as intrasitive, as if a synonym of *pravṛtti, but Kumārila seems to intend a causative, for he
could have used *pravṛtti instead of *pravartana if he had intended an intrasitive sense. But I
agree that it is confusing, for logically we expect *pravṛtti here, not *pravartana, as a *sādhyya.
7) A 114.16-17: *svadhyāyaḥ dharaṇavidhinetare savrve *vidhiyākāḥ svadhītyāpadaṣṭātī cātmā
mīyajate bhāvayed iha. HARIKAI (op. cit. 119) takes *ātmā as equivalent to *purusa (probably
following G. Jhā’s translation), but this is clearly not intended. See e.g. *Nyāyaśuddhā, p.32;
Ajitā, p. 29 in Allahabad ed., part 2, pp. 7-8 in HARIKAI’s ed.

(Key Words) *Śabara, *Kumārila, *pravijaya, bhāvanā, *adhyanavidhi

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