

- 6) With twenty-one beans he approaches the head of the man. (TS 5.1.8.1 : KS 20.8)
 He deposits it near an ant-heap pierced in seven places. (TS 5.1.8.1 : KS 20.8)
 He sings the verses of Yama. (TS 5.1.8.2 : KS 20.8)
 Although the MS does not mention it, MŚS 6.1.2.24-25 describes it. For the relation between the MS and the MŚS see
 Tsuji, N. [1981] "The Agnicayana-Section of the Maitrāyaṇi-Saṃhitā with Special Reference to the Mānava-Śrautasūtra. "Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko 39, pp. 125-148. Tokyo.
 [1981] *The Relation between Brāhmaṇas and Śrautasūtras in Collected Papers* II. Kyoto.
 7) TS 5.2.8.7-5.2.9.6.5.5.3 : 5.7.10, KS20.7-8, MS3.2.7-8, CB7.5.1.25-2.37
 8) BŚS 10.33-34 : MŚS 6.1.7.23-32 : KŚS 17.5.3-23

〈Key Words〉 Agnicayana. Prajāpati. animal sacrifice. ukhā

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「Purūravas と ūrvaśī」: Vādhūla 派新資料 (Ed. Ikari) の文化史的・言語学的意義

後藤敏文 (東北大学)

MBh. XII. Rājadharmaparvan の構成について

沼田 一郎 (北海道大学)

タントラ文献に見る不可触民に関する記述

渡辺 浩希

(文化庁文化部宗務課)

Validity of Cognition and Authority of Scripture

Kei KATAOKA

Classification of cognition Adopting the framework of the vṛttikāra (Frauwallner's ed., 26.7-21.34.19-36.5), Kumārila presupposes the following classification of cognition. First it is classified into two groups, *pramāṇa* (valid cognition) and *apramāṇa*. The latter is further classified into three ¹⁾: non-cognition (*ajñāna* / *jñānābhāva* / *buddhyanutpatti*), doubt (*saṃśaya*) and error (*mithyājñāna*). ²⁾ The last, i.e. error, is identified as such and is negated (*bādhyate*) when one finds faults in its cause (*hetūtthadoṣa* / *kāraṇadoṣa*), ³⁾ or when one finds that its object does not exist in the manner that one has cognized it (*arthānyathātva* / *atathābhāva*). ⁴⁾

1. *pramāṇa* / *samyakpratyaya*

2. *apramāṇa*

a. *ajñāna* / *jñānābhāva* / *buddhyanutpatti*

b. *saṃśaya*


c. *mithyājñāna*

i. **hetūtthadoṣajñānabādhyā*


ii. **arthānyathātvaajñānabādhyā*

Mechanism of cognition Kumārila regards validity of cognition (*prāmāṇya*) as a kind of capacity (*śakti*). ⁵⁾ This identification implies that validity, for Kumārila, has various features attributed to capacity in general. ⁶⁾ Most importantly, in this context, it should innately exist in its locus. In other words, a cognition is valid from itself (*svataḥ*), not from something else (*parataḥ*) such as good qualities (*guṇa*). Therefore when a cognition arises, its validity, i.e. the capacity for a cognition to operate, arises simultaneously. ⁷⁾ Considering that a characteristic feature of a capacity (*śakti*) is that it is an *adrṣṭa* to be postulated by *arthāpatti*, one must conclude that validity is not grasped by its locus, i.e. cognition itself, but only postulated from the result of cognition. ⁸⁾ Although it exists in a cognition innately and basically (*unsargāt*), it is exceptionally (**apavādena*) cancelled when invalidity (*ap-*

rāmānya) is brought about by a bad quality (*doṣa*) of a cause of a cognition. This point, which could be one of the weakest in his *prāmānya*-theory, is not expanded on much by Kumārila. But we can guess from the general characteristics of capacity that validity at this moment only conceals itself temporarily. A bad quality is removed by means of a good quality (*guṇa*) which also belongs to the same cause of a cognition. Then invalidity disappears and innate validity is secured (v.65). But it is not the case that a good quality directly causes validity (vv.47ab, 64cd).




Methods for negating an erroneous cognition From the *ṛttikāra* onwards, the two methods mentioned above are formulated to discover and negate an error (**mithyājñāna*). When one finds a bad quality (*doṣa*) in a cause of a cognition, one can know indirectly (*arthāt*) its invalidity (*apramānya*) and negate a preceding wrong cognition (v.58). Or when one discovers that an object is otherwise than he has cognized, he directly knows the invalidity of a preceding cognition and negates it (v.57ab). These two kinds of cognitions are called “negating cognition” (*bādhakapratyaya* / *bādhakajñāna*). But following the *ṛttikāra*, it is common to use the term “negation” (*bādhā*) to refer specifically to the latter process.⁹⁾




Mechanism of validity and invalidity in verbal cognition In the context of verbal cognition, a good quality (*guṇa*) or a bad quality (*doṣa*) of a speaker (*vaktṛ*) determines a good or a bad quality of speech (*śabda*), which is in turn the direct cause of a hearer's cognition (v.62). To explain, speech ceases to be a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) when a bad quality of a speaker is transferred into it (*saṃkrānti*). Conversely, speech keeps its status as a means of valid cognition when a good quality removes a bad quality and wards off its undesirable transference (v.63ab).

The remaining mechanisms are the same as those of cognition in general. A good quality of a speaker removes a bad quality. Then speech is no longer regarded as an invalid means of knowledge (*apramāṇa*) and stands as a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*). Then invalidity of a verbal cognition is removed and innate validity stands (v.65).



As we may suppose from Kumārila's work (vv.22ab, 23, 102cd-110ab), good qualities of speech, derived from good qualities of the speaker, are of two kinds: the fact that it deals with an object that is known through another means of valid cognition (**pramāṇāntaradṛṣ-tārthaviśayatva*), and the fact that it has been uttered by an honest man (**ṛptoktatva*). The former condition guarantees the correspondence between an object and a preceding means of valid cognition, while the latter guarantees that between an acquired information and speech.¹⁰⁾

Securing validity in the case of a Vedic injunction The Vedas, being authorless, lack the only possible source of a bad quality, and therefore never themselves have a bad quality, though they do not have a good quality either.¹¹⁾ But, because there is no possible source of a bad quality, they do not require a good quality from the beginning, which in the case of worldly statements (*laukikaṃ vacanam*) is required in order to guarantee the validity of verbal cognition. In consequence, the condition of not being a means of valid cognition (*apramāṇatva*) never accrues to the Vedas, because they do not have the undesirable transference (*saṃkrānti*) of a bad quality (v.68). Thus they keep their innate characteristic, i.e. being a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇatā*). Therefore a cognition from a Vedic injunction never touches invalidity (*apramānya*) derived from a bad quality. Thus the innate characteristic of validity (*prāmānya*) remains in the cognition, without being cancelled.



Impossibility of negating a cognition from a Vedic injunction It has become clear why a cognition from a Vedic injunction is ontologically faultless. A Vedic injunction is always a means of valid cognition (**codanā pramāṇam eva*).¹²⁾ This is why eternality (*nityatā*), or not being made by sentient beings (*apauruṣeyatā*), is required for protecting the authority of the Vedas (vv.100cd-101a). However, as I mentioned above, one can deny an erroneous cognition by means of a later negating cognition (*bādhakapratyaya*), even though one could not point out a fault in its cause. For that one would need to show that a dharma, more concretely the relationship between cause and effect, e.g., *yāga* and *svarga*, is otherwise (*ata-*

thābhāva) than a Vedic injunction teaches. But the domain of dharma is specifically allowed only to the Vedas, never to be approached by human perception. For perception and Vedic injunction, the two independent, primary and direct means of valid cognition, keep separate functional divisions. With regard to a dharma only a Vedic injunction is a means of valid cognition (**codanāiva pramāṇam*) (v.4ab). This is why Kumārila (vv.110cd-155) is so eager to deny an omniscient being, who could even grasp a dharma. We human beings, according to the Mīmāṃsā system, can never obtain knowledge of a dharma without the teaching of the Vedas, just as a person blind from birth can never obtain knowledge of a particular color without the teaching of a non-blind person.¹³⁾ Therefore it is impossible to deny a Vedic teaching by means of perception. As for the dependent, secondary and indirect means of valid cognition such as inference, because these are dependent on perception (Frauwallner's ed., 24.21 : *tanmūlatvāt* : 22.19 : *prayakṣapūrvakatvāt*), they cannot overcome the limitations of perception.

*I thank Dr. E. English, Dr. H. Isaacson and Mr. A. Watson for comments.

1) *Śloka-vārttika codanā* (=ŚVc), v. 54ab. 2) As D'Sa (Francis X. D'Sa, 1980, *Śābdaprāmāṇya* in *Śābara and Kumārila*, Vienna, 181) correctly points out, each word of the *pramāṇa*-definition in verse 80 excludes a corresponding *apramāṇa*. But the text he gives (n. 1) of v.80b *nāpi saṃvādam ũchati*, most probably there following Dvārikadāsa Śāstrī's edition, should be corrected to *na viśaṃvādam ũchati*, as he correctly translates on p.180, probably there following the Madras edition (*tasmād dṛḍham yad utpannam na viśaṃvādam ũchati jñānāntareṇa vijñānam tat pramāṇam pratiyātām*!). Sucarita Miśra (*Kāśikā* 74.3-4) also enumerates two other kinds of invalid cognition, *smaraṇa* (recollection) and *saṃvāda* (later cognition which agrees with and therefore validates the preceding cognition). Kumārila, too, in the *pramāṇa*-definition in the *Bṛhaṭṭikā* (see below, note 9), in particular by the phrase *apūrvārthavijñānam*, seems to exclude these two from being kinds of *pramāṇa*. But as far as the *Śloka-vārttika* is concerned, as we may see from the *pramāṇa*-definition in verse 80 in particular, Kumārila does not presuppose these two as kinds of *apramāṇa*. 3) In Ratnakīrti's text *hetūktadoṣa* (Thakur's first edition, 105,10,106,1 : Katsumi Mimaki, 1976, *La réfutation bouddhique de la permanence des choses (Sthirasiddhidhūṣaṇa) et la preuve de la momentanéité des choses (Kṣaṇabhaṅga-*

siddhi). Paris, 84.8, 86.14) should be emended to *hetūtthadoṣa*. And Mimaki's note (n. 295) thereon, which associates *hetūktadoṣa* with the five conditions (*pañcarūpa*) of a proper reason, is irrelevant. 4) ŚVc v. 53: *tasmād bodhātmatvatena prāptā buddheḥ pramāṇatā / arthānyathātvahetūtthadoṣajñānād apodyate*! D'Sa (*op. cit.* 182) is wrong in interpreting *arthānyathātvā* as a synonym of *mithyātva*. 5) ŚVc v. 47cd. 6) For Kumārila's notion of capacity (*śakti*), see Kei Kataoka, 1999, "The Mīmāṃsā Concept of *Samskāra* and the *Samskāra* in the Process of Cognizing a Word-meaning," *Journal of the Japanese Association for South Asian Studies*, No. 11, 22 (n.32). 7) ŚVc v. 48 : *ātma-lābhe *hi bhāvānām **kāraṇāpekṣitā bhavet / labdhātmanām svakāryesu pravṛttiḥ svayam eva tu*! *hi] Madras : *ca Dvārikadāsa **kāraṇāpekṣitā* Madras : *kāraṇāpekṣatā Dvārikadāsa*. 8) Kumārila accepts that a valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) itself is apprehended only by another cognition (v.83), namely, *arthāpatti* (ŚV *sūnya*, v.182). 9) The following example of *bādha* in the *Bṛhaṭṭikā* clearly refers only to the latter process of negation. *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī* 113.10-12 : *tathā bṛhaṭṭikāpi — tatprāpūrvārthavijñānam niścitam bādhavarjitam / aduṣṭakāraṇārabadham pramāṇam lokasaṃmatam*! 10) Cf. Kei Kataoka, 2001, "Indo Seiten Kaishakugaku no Hōgenron," (in Japanese) [The Ultimate Source of Dharma in Mīmāṃsā Exegesis.] *Bukkyō Bunka Kenkyū Ronshū*, Vol. 5, 26-50. 11) ŚVc v. 63cd : **yad vā vaktur abhāvena na syur doṣa nirāśrayāḥ*! *yad vā] Madras : *yadā* Dvārikadāsa. 12) ŚVc v. 4ab. 13) *Śābarabhāṣya* ad 1.1.2 : *naivamjātyakeṣv artheṣu puruṣavacanam prāmāṇyam upaiti, jātyandhānām iva vacanam rūpaviśeṣeṣu*. Frauwallner's ed., 18.7-8.

〈Key Words〉 *prāmāṇya*, Kumārila, *pramāṇa*, *śabda*, *codanā*

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