Kumārila’s Critique of Omniscience*

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Theoretical background of Kumārila’s critique of omniscience

Kumārila is a sub-commentator in the Mīmāṃsā tradition: he comments on the Śābaraḥṣaṭya, which is the oldest extant commentary on the Jainaśīlastra. Three different but serial works are attributed to him: Ślokavārttika (ad 1.1.1–1.1.32), Tantreṇa-vārttika (ad 1.2.1–3.8.44) and Tuptikā (ad 4.1.1–12.4.47). He is also known to have written another but now lost work, the Bṛhatṭikā, fragments of which were gathered from the Tattvasāṅgara and other works.1 The Ślokavārttika (and the Bṛhatṭikā) deal(s) with philosophical ideas which provide the theoretical basis for the following arguments about the exegesis of the Vedas and their rituals. One of them is his cri-

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1In the third All-India Oriental Conference held in Madras in 1924, Kuppināṇa Śaṭāri [1925] pointed out for the first time that a now lost work of Kumārila called Bṛhaṭṭikā must have existed. His disciple K.S. Ramavatāni Śaṭāri [1925] [1928] gathered fragments of the Bṛhaṭṭikā from various sources and further confirmed that there must have existed a work of Kumārila called Bṛhaṭṭikā other than the extant Ślokavārttika. Frauwaller [1902] investigated chapters of āsattvāprāṇapravahyāparikśa and ātmadurgatvabhadārprakhyā of the Tattvasāṅgara, a work by a Buddhist monk Śaṭārakshita (A.D. 725–788), which summarizes various philosophical views current in his time, and concluded that the verses quoted from an opponent Mīmāṃsaka must be quotations from Kumārila’s lost work Bṛhaṭṭikā. He also pointed out that Kumārila’s notion of epist, i.e. logical invalid proposition which enables inference, had developed from the Ślokavārttika to the Bṛhaṭṭikā most probably due to the influence of Dharmakīrti, in particular, his first work *Hetuprakaraṇa (which was later incorporated as the first chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika with the auto-commentary), and determined the sequential order of Kumārila’s two works as well as the date of Kumārila, who must be a contemporary of Dharmakīrti. Against Frauwaller, however, Taber [1992] suggested a possibility of the contrary sequence from the Bṛhaṭṭikā to the Ślokavārttika. (Taber [2001], making a bit of concession, did not draw back his main line.) Steinkeiner [1997], replying to Taber’s critique, supported Frauwaller’s view. The same is the case with Kellner [1997] and Krauser [1999]. Krauser [2001:194, n.75], taking into consideration the mutual influence of Kumārila and Dharmakīrti, pointed out the possibility that the sequence of their works is Ślokavārttika—*Hetuprakaraṇa (=Pramāṇavārttika I with the auto-commentary)—Bṛhaṭṭikā—Pramāṇavārttika II-IV.
tique of omniscience,² which Kumārinī himself calls sarvaśajjānīda,¹ a discussion which takes place in commenting the ādantā-sūtra (1.1.2), in other words, in the context of protecting the authority of Vedic scripture. But why does he have to deny the possibility of omniscient beings? I shall try to elucidate briefly the theoretical background of his critique.

Kumārinī, who played an important part in developing the Mimāṃsā theory of truth,¹ holds that validity (or absence of invalidity) of Vedic scripture is guaranteed by two conditions: The first is aparānasanyata, i.e. not being composed by a human being. This property theoretically makes it possible that the Vedas are absolutely free from human faults. A fraud may tell a lie out of greed, but the Vedas never do because they are free from such bad qualities (doṣa). The second is bādābhāvam, i.e. not being denied later. It is theoretically impossible for us human beings to insist, e.g. “I have not attained heaven, though I did Vedic rituals”. Because what the Vedas tell us in connection with a future fruit is beyond our perception, we cannot test them and disprove what they teach. This property makes it possible for the Vedas to keep their unique domain never to be invaded by other pramāṇas. Thus the validity (pramāṇya) of the Vedas is protected, because it is never touched by the two invalidating factors, i.e. fault of causes (kāramadaṣa) and subsequent denial (bāḍaṇa).

But omniscient beings such as the Buddha and the Jina may pose a threat to the Vedas because they can invade and access the territory monopolized by the Vedas, i.e. the domain of dharmas. The Buddha in meditation and the Jina in the kṣaṇa-staṭe free from larma may “see” imperceptible dharmas and find out that Vedic teachings are false. Therefore it is necessary for Mimāṃśikas to make clear the different domains of different means of valid cognition (pramāṇa).³

²For Kumārinī’s critique of omniscience, there are a Japanese translation of the relevant portions of the Ślokavārttika by Haribā [1965] and one for the Tattvasaṅgahra by Kasaωa [1992]. For the background and secondary literature with regard to Indian, in particular, Buddhist concept of omniscience in general, see Kasaωa [1992]. Pujonā [2001], which deals mainly with the Jain concept of omniscience, is also helpful for our present concern especially in giving a brief survey of previous studies. With regard to Kumārinī’s critique of omniscience in particular, Pathak [1934] undertook the task of comparing the two works (see Pujonā [2001:5–6] for a critical evaluation of Pathak’s work). Kasaωa [1992:202–209] makes “a chart of comparison” to show verse-numbers of the Tattvasaṅgahra corresponding to those of the Ślokavārttika for the relevant portions with brief summaries of each verse-group of the Ślokavārttika.
³Tattvasaṅgahra ad 1.3.1, A 163.27.
⁴For Kumārinī’s theory of truth, see Hattori [1992] (in Japanese) and Kataωa [2002], as well as secondary literature referred to therein.
⁵For the original context of this portion of the Śāhārahāvīya and the concept of the different domains of different pramāṇas, see Kataωa [2001] [2003b].

Śāhārahāvīya ad 1.1.2: asākyam hi tat puruṣeṣa jiñātān pte varmāt. (Frawallner [1968:18.5–6])

For a human being is unable to recognize that (beween arises from an agrni-hotra offering etc.) without a [Vedic] statement.

Here Śāhara, commenting on the second sūtra, denies that human beings are able to perceive a dharma, primarily following the original idea of the fourth and fifth sūtras, where Jainī compares perception (punyākṣa) and Vedic teaching (upadāsa).

Kumārinī, on the other hand, further develops Śāhara’s idea, taking account of its implication, and starts his critique of omniscient beings. Thus this single line of the Śāhārahāvīya leads Kumārinī to write in total 45.5 verses in the Ślokavārttika (and at least 110 verses in the Bṛhaṭṭikā as counted in the Tattvasaṅgahra vs. 3127–3245).

Purpose, procedure and limitation of this article

This article aims at clarifying Kumārinī’s intention and way (or pattern) of thought presupposed either consciously or unconsciously in his critique of omniscience. For the sake of this goal, I first compare the textual structure of the relevant portions of his Ślokavārttika and Bṛhaṭṭikā (fragments gathered from the Tattvasaṅgahra), that is to say, put side by side two synopses of the texts and see what corresponds and what does not. As we will see, the two texts have similar structures in their contextual frameworks as a whole.

On the basis of this structural agreement at a superficial level, I infer the author’s intention behind it, elucidating what Kumārinī has in mind in composing his critique of omniscience. Then I investigate his manner of critique in each argument, paying attention also to the non-corresponding portions inasmuch as they occupy important positions in the whole context. It is clear already from the big difference in the number of their verses that the Bṛhaṭṭikā, which has at least 119 verses counted from the Tattvasaṅgahra, has more detailed arguments than the Ślokavārttika, which has only 45.5 verses. Therefore I do not go into each detail of the Bṛhaṭṭikā in the lower hierarchy of the contextual structure. Instead I concentrate on the upper hierarchy, aiming to find significant differences of the relevant portions.

I also refrain from discussing in a general and thorough fashion some problems which are connected but secondary for our present concern (though they are important for the history of Indian philosophy in general), i.e. the sequence of the Ślokavārttika and
the Bhaṭṭikā and the relationship of Kumārila and Dhammakīrti. I touch on these problems when it is necessary and relevant to do so, but only in minimum. Therefore what I suggest in the following with regard to these problems are mere suppositions which are of course based on my investigation of a limited number of sources, i.e. the relevant portions of Kumārila’s critique of omniscience.

**Textual structure of Kumārila’s critique of omniscience**

The following is the synopsis of the text, compared side by side, of the relevant portions of the Śākavārttikā (codanā, vv. 110cd-155) and the Bhaṭṭikā (gathered from Tattvasaṅgraha vv. 3127-3245). Numbers in parentheses following verse-numbers show the total numbers of the relevant verses.

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The two texts agree in assuming someone’s (uis) understanding that both the Buddhist and the Mīmāṃsakā theories are equally defective in postulating something unseen (adyaśa): Buddhists insist that the Buddha, though a human being, is omniscient, and Mīmāṃsakas insist that the Vedas, though a mere collection of sentences, are postulated as being omniscient.6

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6According to Raisākikā (R 27.10), the verses beginning with v. 3185 (which should deal with the argument of absence of verbal testimony) are counted as 47 (cf. Kawasaki [1992:302]). Section 6 criticizes the Jaina, who claim that the Jina in the state of kṣaṇažāra is omniscient (see, e.g. Fujisaka [2001]). The opponents criticized in section 7, according to Usuba, are Vedāntas. But Kumārila himself seems to presuppose Buddhists and Vedāntas as his opponents. Tattvasaṅgraha ad 1.3.11. A 210.11-17: śākyādya ‘pi hi evam avidyāt eva yadya utpada eva tathāpaṃśalam anupradhāt vā atihāsikyaṃ dharmamārgaṇa—iti. tataḥ eva vedānāṃ nityaśca ‘pi ced āyana naḥsadvadabbhāsāṃ suddhākaraṇaḥ ‘pi prasanntaḥ// ad 1.3.12. A 235.22-23: yada mandūryaśaṅkarātthā śākyādyaśaṅkarātthā śākyādyaśaṅkarātthā nityaśaṅkarātthā śākyādyaśaṅkarātthā vaddhā śākyādyaśaṅkarātthā_.

7For the relationship of Kumārila and Dhammakīrti concerning the Buddha’s authority and compassion, see Katnoka [2003] (in Japanese).
are authorless and eternal. Thus both of them postulate something supernatural, i.e. something unseen in this world, and therefore equally defective. But in fact, as will be shown by Kumārila in the concluding section 8 atulyatvopasamāhāraḥ, Buddhists postulate more than Mīmāṃsakas, and therefore the latter can finally win the competition of reducing postulation of unseen things under the Mīmāṃsā exegetical rule (ṇyāya) that less postulation is better. In this manner Kumārila shows the "difference" (proclaimed in v. 3184) and solves the problem.

The other main parts of the texts, too, are similar in both the Ślokavārttika and the Bhṛṣṭṭikā. In section 1 bhāsyavākyānam Kumārila comments briefly on the original sentence of the Śābarahāṣya. Then in section 2 sarvam jñāntī ayuktam he shows that it is impossible to cognize everything, in particular, appealing to the different domains of different types of means of valid cognition. Section 3, which I explained above, is followed by section 4 sarvajñāta[ma]-abhāsaḥ, in which Kumārila shows that an omniscient being or omniscience cannot be cognized by any type of means of valid cognition. Similarly section 5 sarvajñāprapñitotvamāramāyaḥ, in which Kumārila shows that it is impossible for an omniscient being to teach, is found in both of his works. Thus the main frameworks of the textual structures agree in both texts. Those discussions which appear only in the Bhṛṣṭṭikā, such as 1.1, 1.2, 2.1.2, 4.4 and 4.5, are subordinate to the main arguments and therefore do not change the textual framework as a whole.

Kumārila’s intention behind the structure

What then exactly is consistent in structure in the two texts, and what is Kumārila’s intention behind it? There is a hint in section 3 mentioned above, where Kumārila compares two positions: The opponent, most representative Buddhists, proclaim omniscience of the Buddha or others and Mīmāṃsakas proclaim the Vedas’ being authorless. The latter property aparujeyata is usually given in Mīmāṃsā to show that the Vedas are authoritative, and this is the main theme in the present codanā-chapter. Therefore the Mīmāṃsakas’ proposition and reason must be: “The Veda is valid, because it is authorless (*codanā pramāṇam, aparujeyatvāt).” Similarly the Buddhists’ are assumed to be: “The scripture (or the Buddha’s teaching) is valid, because it is taught by the omniscient Buddha (*āgamaḥ or buddhayuvanam) pramāṇam, sarvajñabdha-prapñitatvāt.” This assumption is supported by the following verses of the concluding section 8.

Ślokavārttika codanā, vv. 152–153ab:
 evam ca kalpanty anye yāyaj agamaviddhayē/
tāsanu na kalpanty, etat samastam jainimēh parah//
na hi deśādikānaṃ kṣeṣā prāmāṇe tena kalpate/

And thus [as shown above] he (Jainini) does not postulate as much as others do in order to establish [the validity] of scripture. Such is the similarity of Jainini with others! For he [i.e. Jainini] postulates nothing more than seen things for the sake of validity.

Postulation of omniscience and postulation of being authorless are “for establishing the scripture (āgamaṃvidhyē)” and “for the sake of validity” (prāmāṇe). In other words, these two properties are given as reasons to show that their scriptures (or cognition obtained from their scriptures) are valid.

Mīmāṃsā *codanā pramāṇam, aparujeyatvāt
Buddhism *āgamaḥ pramāṇam, sarvajñabdha-prapñitatvāt

Viewing again the whole structure while keeping in mind the present context of “establishing authority of scripture”, it is likely that Kumārila, assuming the Buddhists’ reason “because it is taught by the omniscient Buddha” (*sarva-jīa-buddha-prapñitatvāt), examines the meaning of each component word of this reason. This is clearer in the Bhṛṣṭṭikā than in the Ślokavārttika. He extracts five parts from this reason and discusses each of its words: 1. omni- (sarva); 2. -science (jīa); 4. omniscient (sarvajña); 4’. the omniscient Buddha (sarvajñabdha); 5. being taught (prapñita).

sarva-jīa-buddha-prapñitatvāt
1 sarva
2 sarva-jīa
4 sarvajña
4’ sarvajñabdha
5 sarvajñabdha-prapñita
From these parts the division of the corresponding Ślokavārttika can be guessed. The Ślokavārttika seems to assume a slightly simpler reason “because it is taught by an omniscient being” (sarvañjñapraṇītavatā) and discusses: 2. omni-scient or cognizing everything; 4. an omniscient being; 5. being taught. But the other items “omni” and “the omniscient Buddha” are not clear. We can see that the division of the Bṛhaṭṭikā is more detailed. In the following I shall examine each of these items and Kumārila’s discussions of them.

Comparison of the opening verses

As I briefly mentioned above, the different domains of different means of valid cognition (prāmaṇa) are intended when Śābara says, “For a human being is unable to cognize that without a [Vedic] statement”. In the beginning of both the Ślokavārttika and the Bṛhaṭṭikā in the present context, Kumārila interprets this original statement of the Śābarabhaṣya, which is the target of his whole critique of omniscience in these sub-commentaries.

Ślokavārttika codana, vv. 110cd–111:

nānetra vacaneneha
sarvañjñatvacarūkriyā//
varcād iva ity evam
apaścād hi sañjñātah/
yadi sadbhāh pramāṇaḥ svat
sarvañjñatvenīvidhaḥ cet
kevalo ‘trpaññajñate/

Here, with this statement, Śābara does not [intend to] deny [the possibility of] “being omniscient”. For Śābara, saying “without a [Vedic] statement”, relies on an exception [and allows in general an omniscient being who knows a dharma from a Vedic statement]. If [a person is] omniscient through six means of valid cognitions, who destroys him?

Tattvasaṅgraha v. 3127:

{
| dharmajñatevenīvidhaḥ cet |
| kevalo ‘trpaññajñate/ |
|

If denial of being a person who cognizes dharmas alone is useful here, who denies a person who cognizes everything else [other than dharmas]?

11 3127a-ā ceto BGP 2; -ś tu R; e vijñāṇamāḥ) BGP 2; vijñānaṁ tu R

What Kumārila assumes here is the division of domains of the perceptible and the dharmic, which is a traditional contrast found already in Jaiminiśūtra 1.1.4 (pratypakṣa-sûtra) and 1.1.5 (outpattika-sûtra): Perception deals with the perceptible world, while Vedic injunction deals with imperceptible dharmas. In this way each of these means of valid cognition (pramaṇa) have their own distinct fields and function separately without crossing each other. Therefore it is impossible for a human being to know dharmas without relying on the Vedas. In other words, one can have access to dharmas only through the intermediation of the Vedas. The Ślokavārttika refers to this division of domains with a straightforward interpretation of Śābara’s phrase “without a [Vedic] statement” (ṛte vacanāt).

In the Bṛhaṭṭikā, however, Kumārila refers to the same division but with a focus on the scope of “everything” (sarva) to be cognized by an omniscient being (sarvañjñā). If an omniscient being cognized everything and thus invaded the domain of dharmas, he would be harmful for Mīmāṃsā. For he steps in the Vedas’ distinct and unique domain of dharmas and thus transgresses against the division of perception (etc.) and the Vedas. According to Mīmāṃsākās, dharmas should not be included in “everything” to be cognized by an omniscient being. But if “everything” does not include dharmas, there is no harm for Mīmāṃsā.

Awareness of the scope of “everything”

While the Ślokavārttikā immediately moves to the next topic, section 2, after the opening verse of interpretation just looked at, the Bṛhaṭṭikā deals in detail with the problem of the scope of “everything” (sarva) as a connected and subordinate part of the beginning interpretation of section 1. Kumārila examines all the possible objects of “everything” in 1.1 sarvasūdārthabh and points out problems in cognizing “everything” in 1.2 sarvasāṃjñātī pāde doṣāḥ. Thus it is clear that he is conscious of the problem with regard to the scope of “everything” which should not include dharmas. In the following I briefly look at these discussions without going into details.

First, in 1.1 sarvasūdārthabh, Kumārila questions what is intended by the word “everything” (sarva) and enumerates various possibilities. For example, if “everything” is “everything” limited in a particular context, as when we say “he knows everything about it”, such a cognizer of “everything” is not harmful for Mīmāṃsā, because “everything” does not include dharmas (v. 3128). Similar is the case with a person who...
This different attitude leads us to suppose that Kumārila in the Ślokavārttikā was not aware of the problem of the scope of “everything” to be cognized by an omniscient being, simply presupposing a literal omniscient being, while in the Brhaṭṭikā he has become aware of the problem and makes clear his intention to deny dharmajñā instead of sarvajñā. It seems difficult to suppose the contrary sequence that the Brhaṭṭikā precedes the Ślokavārttikā, because Kumārila develops his idea in the Brhaṭṭikā in comparison to the Ślokavārttikā.

If my argument is correct, I can conclude that Kumārila in the Brhaṭṭikā that follows the Ślokavārttikā develops his idea from sarvajñā to dharmajñā, and that he expresses in the Brhaṭṭikā this change of his attitude. A similar attitude is also found in Dharmakirti,11 who asserts that what he is proving is the existence of a person who teaches the four truths, not an omniscient being. This parallelism between Kumārila and Dharmakirti will be one of the important points to be considered when one discusses their relationship.11 I point out here only the possibility.

**Impossibility of “cognizing everything”**

In interpreting the Śabaraśāstra passage mentioned above, Kumārila assumes the functional division of perception (etc.) and Vedic injunction in accordance with the original idea seen from the Jaiminīśātra that a human being does not have direct access to dharmas that are unique objects of the Vedas. This idea of the different domains of different pramāṇas is fully explained in the next section 2, “Impossibility to cognize everything”. The following verses are almost the same in both the Ślokavārttikā and the Brhaṭṭikā and have no significant difference in meaning.

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11Pramāṇavārttikā II (pramanasiddhi), v. 34 (Dvarikadāsa, ed.): hegopadeśatattvanā sābhāgasāyana saṃgītyā / pah pramāṇāc ca nā cā rājan eva ca nātā / dharmajñā / “A person who communic-ates what is to be abandoned [i.e. sahā-ṣaṭya] and taken [i.e. saīṛā-ṣaṭya] together with their respective means [i.e. samudaya-ṣaṭya and mārga-ṣaṭya respectively] is regarded as an authority, not a person who communicates everything.”

12Dharmakirti’s attitude which is found in Pramāṇavārttikā II is already hinted at in his earlier work Prakāśavārttikā I.

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12This is further confirmed by verses 121–132, where Kumārila criticizes the notion of an omniscient being who provides truthfully with regard not only to dharmas but to both domains: the visible/worldly (v. 12: ab: indrāvyāksectaśabdhaśaṃśa; 125a: adraśādhyārthā; 127a: dharmādharmaśārthikī ’rthe) and the invisible/religious (v. 121b: śūrddheṣa ’rthe; 128a: alaksākārthā).
It is impossible to cognize tastes with eyes. In other words, there is a clear division of function among different sense-faculties of seeing and tasting etc. with regard to their objects. Kumārila applies this division of sense-faculties in a general way to that of pramāṇas, and thus tries to reject the idea of Buddhists and others that the Buddha etc. can cognize dharmas through perception, and more typically, that they can directly see dharmas. In the following verses he shows, taking into consideration the development of cognitive capacity, that the division of domains of different pramāṇas, like that of sense-faculties, is to be kept unbroken. (Each word of Ślokavarttikā codana v. 114 is divided into three verses in the Bhāṭṭikā, namely, Tattvasaṅgraha v. 3150-61. I show corresponding phrases with underlines. I also show Tattvasaṅgraha v. 3.73 though it is not consecutive, because it corresponds to Ślokavarttikā codana v. 1:5.)

Even when a superiority [of a sense-faculty and the like] is seen, it [i.e. superiority] should stay in the functional domain of perceiving those things which are remote, subtle and so on, because it [cannot transgress the] i.e. the sense-faculties' own objects. An ear [for example] does not function towards a color.

\[r^13150d \text{to} \ BGP \cdot \text{te} \ R \ -nāt} BGP \cdot \text{nah} R
\[r^13160a \text{hi} \ BGP \cdot \text{ca} \ R \ d narāja} BGP \cdot \text{api R}
\[r^13161b \text{-hāḥ} BGP \cdot \text{-tāḥ R}
For even a wise person, though able to see subtle things, surpasses other persons without transgressing the respective category [i.e. limitation of the various kinds of objects].

We see that people [can] excel, with regard to sounds which are grasped by the faculty of hearing, by grasping [sounds which are] remote [or] subtle, not because they grasp color etc. [by means of the faculty of hearing].

Ślokavārttika codanā, v. 115:

bhaṅgyati na deśaṇ ca

pratyakṣasya manāg api/
sāmarthyam, nānumānād

śāntāmukhī pramāṇād nāṃ
dharmāna māṇaḥ

Anc it is never seen that a perception has even a bit of capacity with regard to a future thing; [It is] never [seen that] an inference and so on [have a capacity] in lack of an [informing] mark and so on.

A human being, however eminent he is, cannot cognize dharmas without relying on the Vedas, because he cannot transgress the different domains of different pramāṇas. What Kumārila emphasizes here is that one should keep “horizontal division”, in other words, that one should not invade one’s neighbor’s garden. This idea is seen both in the Ślokavārttika and the Bhāṣṭṭikā. The Bhāṣṭṭikā adds other instances such as that one cannot know astrology though he has mastered grammar (v. 3164). These exemplify the same “horizontal division”.

- In both the Ślokavārttika and the Bhāṣṭṭikā, Kumārila shows generally the different domains of different pramāṇas through the example of sense-faculties, and thus shows the impossibility of cognizing dharmas directly, as that would transgress the horizontal functional division of pramāṇas.

- What Kumārila presupposes as an omniscient being is a person who cognizes everything with one pramāṇa and thus cognizes dharmas.

- As we see in the concluding verse v. 115, Kumārila describes generally without specifying what “one pramāṇa” is and does not say whether it is perception or inference. But he seems to presuppose as a typical omniscient being a person who “sees” everything, as is hinted by the expression atūrṇāya dharmāntā (v. 3159d) and the sarcastic expression “a man understands with an eye everything such as taste” (v. 112cd)

Limitation of developing capacity

While the Ślokavārttika ends the present topic “Impossibility to cognize everything” with the discussion that we have just considered, the Bhāṣṭṭikā continues the same topic but from a different viewpoint, namely that of “vertical limitation” instead of “horizontal division”. Kumārila emphasizes here that a human being, whatever efforts he makes, cannot go beyond his given limitation.

Tattvasaṅgraha vv. 3167-68:

duṣṭāḥstāntarṇam vyomano yo nāmatpahytā garbhati/
na yojanam asa gaṇumā sākṣa bhāyāsaśatār api/

tasmād atiśāyayānāṁ atādāravatār api/

kimcīd evaśākṣatī jñātām sākṣate na tu atūrṇāntā/

[Even] a person who jumps and goes ten hastas (about 180 inches) long [in the sky] cannot go one yojana (8 or 9 miles), even after hundreds of repeated exercises.

Therefore preeminent cognition, though it goes very far, is capable of cognizing only a bit more; not an invisible thing.

Instead of denying “horizontal” domain-division of pramāṇas, Kumārila shows here “vertical” limitation of the development of human cognitive capacity. Human capacity for cognition does not develop infinitely.

As was pointed out already by Īnami [1986], Kumārila’s verse v. 3167, which denies infinite development of human capacity, suggests his “close relationship” with Dharmakīrti, who holds that the Buddha’s compassion grows infinitely through practice, and refers to an opponent who claims that our capacity is limited with the same
example of jump as in the verse v. 3167. Furthermore Dharmakīrti adds another example of water’s heat, which never goes beyond its limited temperature.\(^\text{18}\)

As we saw, the idea of vertical limitation is found only in the Bṛhaṭṭikā, not in the Ślokavārttikā. The simplest possible scenario is that Dharmakīrti criticizes Kumārila’s idea of vertical limitation found in the Bṛhaṭṭikā and insists that the Buddha’s compassion develops infinitely. It is difficult, however, to suppose the opposite scenario that Kumārila adopts as his own proposition the idea of the opponent postulated by Dharmakīrti.

**“Seeing” and “hearing”**

Whether in the first argument of horizontal domain-division of different pramāṇas found in both the Ślokavārttikā and the Bṛhaṭṭikā, or in the second argument of vertical limitation of human capacity found only in the Bṛhaṭṭikā, what matters is impossibility of cognizing everything. Kumārila particularly tried to refute the possibility of someone “cognizing everything” (omni-scient), i.e. a part of the opponents’ whole reason “because it is taught by the omniscient [Buddha]”. This intention is clear in both the Ślokavārttikā and the Bṛhaṭṭikā.

And what Kumārila assumes a typical omniscient being to be is, as we normally assume of the Buddha etc., a person who cognizes through perception (v. 3166d: pratyākṣaśkāraṇa), more typically, a person who sees imperceptible objects (v. 3159d: atiśrayadārśana) and who sees directly (v. 3174b: sāksāt draṣṭā). This is further supported by the following Bṛhaṭṭikā verse, which contrasts a person who cognizes by seeing and one who cognizes by hearing.

Tattvasaṅgraha v. 3174:

tasmād atiśrayadārśanāṃ sāksāt draṣṭā na vidyate/
vacanena tu nityena yaḥ paśyati sa paśyati////////

Therefore there is no such person that sees directly imperceptible objects.

But a person who sees by the eternal statement [i.e. the Veda] [really] sees [imperceptible objects].

It is confirmed by the expression sāksāt draṣṭā of the pādaus ab, which, starting with the word tasmā, sums up preceding discussions. That section 2.1 aims at denying

\(^{18}\)Pramāṇavārttikā I (pramāṇasiddhā) v. 122: abhyasena viśeṣa ‘pi labhayuddhakārgapati/ vajhādiśerūno mā hūd iti cet. ... // “If [an opponent] says that, although [Buddha’s compassion attains] excellence by means of practice, there should not be transgression of one’s own nature as [in the case of] a jump and the heating of water...”

“cognizing everything by seeing”. By contrast the pādaus cd discuss a person who cognizes everything by hearing, and the following portions of the Bṛhaṭṭikā similarly deny cognizing through human statements, i.e. statements other than the eternal Vedas. Thus it is likely that Kumārila in 2.1 and 2.2 in the Bṛhaṭṭikā presupposes a contradistinction between “seeing” and “hearing”.

**Denial of an omniscient being**

In section 3 Kumārila raises a question with regard to “comparison of sarvajñatā and apauruṣeyatā” with one verse that we looked at before, and then in section 4 denies an omniscient being (sarvajña) or omniscience (sarvajñatā) both in the Ślokavārttikā and the Bṛhaṭṭikā by means of examining perception, inference and verbal testimony which may establish an omniscient being or omniscience. Thus he examines each means of valid cognition (pramāṇa) in order to deny the opponent’s proposition.

“There exists an omniscient being” or “[He] is an omniscient being”. What he intends here is to criticize “an omniscient being”, a portion of the opponent’s whole reason “because it is taught by an omniscient being”.

Both the Ślokavārttikā and the Bṛhaṭṭikā have only one verse for denying both perception and inference altogether, while there are more verses composed for examining in detail verbal testimony. In the following I show only the main arguments without going into details which are subordinate to the main portion of denying verbal testimony.

Ślokavārttikā cūdānā, vv. 117-119ab:
sarvajño dṛṣṭate tāvam
nirākaraṇavac chakṣaḥ
na cāsīd iti kalpaṇam/\(^{19}\)
na cāgamaṇa sarvajñas
nadīyeṣa jñānānaśānyayāt
na nāmnātprapātyasya
prāmāṇyam gamyate katham////

Tattvasaṅgraha v. 3185-87:
sarvajño dṛṣṭate tāvam
nirākaraṇa asanmādāhī/
dṛṣṭo na ca kāraṇeṣa ‘sti
na cāsīd iti kalpaṇam/\(^{19}\)
na cāgamaṇa hūrdīv beguna
nityaḥ sarvaciṣṭvedahakāb/ kuryārtha tu nityena
sa kathāḥ pratiṣeṣyate/\(^{20}\)

\(^{19}\)117ab Cf. Madhyamakabhāṣyakāra 11.15ab (Kawasaki [1992:411])
\(^{20}\)3185b niyab] P² R : niyab- BG, P² c tv asā- CP₃ , as as- R
na sāpy evaṃparo nityāḥ
śākyo labdhāṁ uḥgamaṁ/

atha tadaaavacaitava
sarvasājī vṛnāḥ pratiyate
prakalpeta kāthāṁ siddhir
anyonyāravyaṁ taḥaṁ//

[Perception:] First [ordinary] people like us do not see now an omniscient being.

[Inference:] And postulation that there was [an omniscient being] is impossible unlike denial [thereof].

21 3187c prakalpetā em. (Tib: ri ga po yin) ; prakalpyeta BGP.

22 The term “vṛṇāḥ” ekakēta comes from the definition of inference by the vṛttikāra. Sāṅgītakāyōn ṣa 1.1.3-5 (vṛttikāra): anumāṇam pādaāayam bhūyākakāvadatānāv svapadeśāvam 'svaśāntī tathā ācārayo' (Faure 1988:30.18). “Inference is a cognition of another portion, an object which is not connected [i.e. which is not known by other means of valid cognition], by means of seeing one portion of other pādaāayam.” (Kumārila, in Ślokavārttikā anumāṇo 2.2-3, interprets pādaāayam bhūyā in four ways, namely, pumātāv, ekakēta, pādaāayam, pādaāayam and pādaāayam bhūyā.

The reading ṣa is a bit disturbing, because otherwise one can interpret the verse quite straightforwardly, as e.g. Kumārila does: “And there is no seen portion as an inferential mark which could make us infer an omniscient being.” But ṣa seems quite secure, though it is not supported by the Tibetan translation, because the verse appears in the same form also in the Ratnakirtinibandhavat and the Pramanāyāśākalaśāntāya.

Kramālīśa explains the verse as follows neglecting (or not knowing) ṣa: tasmādviva pujādhiśo

The time being, suggest the possibility that Kumārila uses dvīpaḥ ekakēta from the viewpoint of Mūnīpālaṇas, and śāyāḥ mainly from that of Buddhists: “We do not perceive now, as shown in the previous half-verse, any ekakēta which makes us infer an omniscient being. And even regardless of the present situation which is bad for you, there is theoretically no inferential mark which could allow you to infer an omniscient being. For there is neither svapadeśāvam nor kāñcāyaḥ for inferring an omniscient being.

Comparing the two verses in the Ślokavārttika and the Bhṛṣṭikā, we can observe that the latter is much more carefully composed in several points. The verse in the Ślokavārttika presupposes a simple analogy: “there is no omniscient being at present, therefore there must have been one in the past, either.” And this verse, using the terminology kāhoṇā, does not clearly show itself as a denial of inference, though it is clear from the context what Kumārila intends.

The verse in the Bhṛṣṭikā, on the contrary, clearly shows itself as a denial of inference by using familiar terms such as ekakēta, śāyāḥ and anyonyāravyaṁ. Furthermore, instead of relying on a mere analogy with the present situation, the verse more carefully denies the inference of an omniscient being. By following the definition of inference: According to the Mūnīpālaṇa definition of inference, inference functions on the basis of at least two conditions, namely pādaāayam bhūyā and pādaāayam bhūyā. First the relationship or invariable concomitance (yugpīta) between a reason and an omniscient being should be known beforehand in the same manner that that of smoke and

[Verbal testimony:] And an omniscient being cannot [be postulated] on the ground of a scripture. For his [own scripture] would have the [undesirable consequence of] mutual dependence [with an omniscient being]. How is it understood that a text written by others is a means of valid cognition [while the author is not omniscient]? Also it is impossible in this world to find an eternal scripture which intends that [i.e., to teach the temporary existence of an omniscient being].

Both the Ślokavārttika and the Bhṛṣṭikā have exactly the same half-verse for denying perception, and examine inference very briefly with only a half-verse. As for verbal testimony, Kumārila in both works assumes the same three possibilities, i.e., an eternal (i.e. non-artificial) scripture like the Vedas and two types of artificial verbal testimony which are either taught by an omniscient being himself or the other non-omniscient beings. Though the sequence of presentation of these three types of verbal testimonies is different, Kumārila points out the same faults in both works. Thus we can see that in both of his works Kumārila denies in a very similar way the possibility of three means of valid cognition communicating the existence of an omniscient being.

The Bhṛṣṭikā adds to these three means of valid cognition upamāna and artavṛti, which communicate either, “An omniscient being is similar to this” or “What the Buddha teaches is impossible unless he is omniscient.” In this way the Bhṛṣṭikā deems each of five possible means of valid cognition for cognizing existence (bhūva) and therefore establishes non-existence (abhāva) of an omniscient being, in accordance with the Mūnīpālaṇa theory of etymology which enumerates in total six means of

fire is known well. This requires one to perceive beforehand the related items, i.e. a reason and an omniscient being. But the latter, as shown in verse 3185ab, is not seen at present. Therefore the first condition pādaāayam bhūyā is not fulfilled. Nor is the second condition ekakēta fulfilled, as shown in verse 3185ce dvīpaḥ na ekakētha.

Thus the verse in the Bhṛṣṭikā is not only richer in contents than that of the Ślokavārttika as a denial of inference, but also fits the context, namely, it is well connected with the former half-verse 3185ab.
valid cognition by adding "non-existence" (abhava) (of the preceding five means). Thus we can confirm that the Brhatstika is more systematic and well-arranged than the Slokaavarti.

Denial of "the omniscient Buddha"

Even though it is proved that an omniscient being exists or might exist, this does not mean that the Buddha is omniscient, and therefore the authority of his teachings is not established. In the Brhatstika Kumara raises doubt that it is irrelevant to their purpose for the opponents to make efforts to prove an omniscient being in general and thus denies the Buddhists' claim that "the Buddha is omniscient". This discussion is not found in the Slokaavarti.

Tattvasastra v. 3229-3232:
naraha ko 'py asti sarvajnas tata sarvajnatvam ity api/
siddhanam yat prajnya prajnya rajan eva tat/
svadhiyastu yo 'rthah so 'naya nabhidhikate/
yat tucyate na tata siddhau kimcis asti prajnanam/
yadityaanuktavatasi madyaiva sarvajнатocyatane/
na sā sarvajnaksamyadnasya siddhãnâtreṇa labhyate/
yând buddha na sarvajnas tāvat tadvacananm nriyâ/
that kauçana sarvajne siddhe tatrasyâ kuteh//

Also a proof [employed to establish that] "there exists some omniscient being" [un] "that [certain person] has omniscience" is only [a type of wrong proof, namely] "devoid of omniscience".

The import ["The Buddha is omniscient"] which [you] wish to prove is not stated by this [proposition shown above]. On the other hand it is of no use to establish what is stated [above].

For the sake of establishing truthfulness of scripture of a particular person [his] omniscience is claimed. [But] this [establishment] is not attained merely by establishing [the existence of] an omniscient being in general.

As long as the Buddha is not omniscient, his teaching is false. How [does it follow] that that [teaching of the Buddha] is true if some [person] or other [in general] is proved to be omniscient?

This section 4, which is found only in the Brhatstika, can be regarded as that which criticizes "the omniscient Buddha" in the whole reason, "It is taught by the omniscient Buddha". This indicates, on the other hand, that the Slokaavarti assumes a more general reason in the form "because it is taught by an omniscient being". As I showed before with regard to the arguments concerning the pramanaas, this section strengthens our impression that the Brhatstika has more elaborate discussions than the Slokaavarti. And as indicated in the present expression, "As long as the Buddha is not omniscient, his teaching is false" (v. 3232ab), the Brhatstika is more eager to criticize in particular the Buddha instead of an omniscient being in general. This seems to be another reason why Kumara throws the item "the omniscient Buddha" into the whole reason to be denied.

Denial of "being taught by an omniscient being"

In section 5 Kumara raises questions about the action of teaching by an omniscient being and shows its impossibility. I quote in the following all the passages in this section of the Slokaavarti and the Brhatstika putting the corresponding verses side by side. While the latter halves of this section correspond closely in the two works, the first halves show difference in meaning, though the main target, i.e. denial of the teaching-action of an omniscient being, is common to both of his works. I quote verses continuously dividing them into two halves.

Slokaavarti, v. 137:
ragu drihite cāsin

Tattvasastra v. 3237 39:
dahāhīmegata cāsan
sarvajñasamjñayate/

arjavāpaṇīṣyate/

ādhihih kimcī ciṣān

syād tve pratyavakeśoḍa/
dhānāpanāt ca sarvārthā-

vaiṣāyam dhrāmaṇam dudhate/
tathā vyāptas ca sarvārthoṣh

saktā naiṣāpadēśāme/\(^3^3\)

[^3]: 3238a - panna6i BOP\(\text{P}^\text{w}\); -yatata6 \(\text{P}^\text{w}\)
And when he is established to have no action because he lacks desire and so on, [his] teaching must have been nothing but taught by others without any investigation.  

Ślokavarttika codana, vv. 138–140:

candiyāmātratastya
puṇyaś cintāmaṇer iva/
niḥsaranāt yathākāmāṃ
kudādhibhū po deśānāḥ/25

Tattvasāgrahīn vv. 3240–45:

tasmin dhīnāsāmanāpya
 cintāratauad āśīthe/
niścāranā tathākāmāṃ
kudādhibhū po deśānāḥ/25

And he, after attaining the ten levels, when all of [his] desire etc. are completely destroyed, cognizes everything with a cognition similar to a pure crystal.

And he, after obtaining [the state of] meditation, keeps concentration which aims at everything as its object, but is never able to teach being filled with everything in this way.

And if he, like an ordinary speaker, taught one thing, what [he teaches] would be that which is uttered by a cognizer of [only] one thing (ekadesaṣṭa), not uttered by a cognizer of everything (saraṇaṇa).

kīṁ nu buddhapaṁśuḥ syuh
kim u kāścīd dvārtabhaḥ/
adyāpy arpaṇābhāsaṃ
pīśācādibhū ēśitäḥ/21

tābhīś jyotiṣṭhān arthān
sarvān jānanti mānavaḥ/
hitāni ca yathābhavat
yṣyate aśadaṇgaṃ te/27

ityādī kāryānām tu
śrutadānānāṃ sōbate/
kuḍādhiṇāṅkṣṭaś ca
nāśvāso deśānāsā naḥ/28

kuḍādhiṇāṅkṣṭānāṃ ca
na sājy āpūropadēśātā/
vīśvāsā ca na tāsā sāyā
dinēmā kārtītā iśi/29

kīṁ nu buddhapaṁśuḥ syuh
kim u brāhmaṇapriccāsāh/
krīḍādibhā padapācāy
āśūrasthāpatīcādaśāh/30

kīṁ vā kuṭāśātāśātāgūra
avyāstā ca kārtītāh/
tasmāṇ na tām vīśvāsa
kartavyāḥ pratiṣṭhānāhīḥ/31

24 Prof. K. Yoshimizu, in the conference held at Kyoto University on Dec. 14th, 2002, kindly pointed out to me that Sucarita connects pañca d (rite prāṇaṅkṣānti) with pādaś a-h and thus interprets the subject of pratyavāsana (saraṇākṣā type of thinking) as “the Buddha” himself, not “others”. For Sucarita (SVK 133.9: na ca saṅga aṣṭaṁ ānudaḥsanā sambhavati abhīṣcāraṇāḥ — rājārī) understands pāda d “because the Buddha in meditation does not have conceptualization”. But it is more natural to connect pāda d with c, as Umbeka (K 78.27) does. And there is a clear motive for Sucarita to prefer this forced interpretation: he tries to read here what Kumāraṇa will teach in the Bhūrīṣṭhi, i.e. comparison of meditation and out-of-meditation. This impression is further strengthened by his preceding explanation (SVK 132.23 27), again clearly forced, where Sucarita says that the state of being without activity (nirvāpaṇa) (in pāda b) is preceded by the state of non-conceptualization (nirvāpi), instead of connecting it with absence of desire etc. mentioned in pāda a (śadāśūrānta).

25 1338a niḥs.- DI1; niśa- M ; niśa- R

26 3240a -panne] BGP₁; -dhishe R ; d kuṭy-] R ; kuṭy- BGP₃

27 3241c -bhaṇyan] BGP₄; -yojana R

28 1339a tuj] DMI₁; hi R e- ac tuj] DMI₁; -it tu R

29 3242a -naye] BGP₁; -nase R d -dhite] BGP₁; -it te- R

30 3243a kuḍyā] R ; kuṭy- BGP₁; d -nemāḥ] BGP₁; -naitāḥ R

31 140b kūm a] DMI₁; kīṁ vā R

32 3244b mu] BGP₁; vā R

33 3245b - eva kārtītā] BGP₁; -b parikalpītāḥ R
Kumārila’s Critique of Omniscience (Kataoka)

Buddhists: “The teachings of the man flowed out of even a wall etc. as he wished because of his mere presence, in the same manner as [everything wished for appears from the presence] of a cintāmaṇi.”

Buddhists: “When he attains [the state of] meditation and [even] stays motionless like a cintāmaṇi, [his] teachings come out of even a wall etc. as he wished [in the same manner as everything wished for appears from the presence of a cintāmaṇi].” By means of these [teachings] people know all things which they wish to know and they accordingly accomplish good [results] immediately.

Siddhānta: But such things which [you] teach seem attractive [only] for a devotee. And we do not trust the teachings [precisely] because they have flowed out of a wall etc.:

“[Are they] taught by the Buddha himself? Or [are they] uttered by someone evil-minded such as a ghost and the like, who is invisible, in order to deceive [us]?”

“[Are they] taught by the Buddha himself? Or [are they] taught by those who are playing to deceive brāhmīns by means of distant echoes?

Or [are they] stated by an evil-minded ghost and the like without [their] being visible?” Therefore those who regard themselves as wise men should not trust these [teachings].

Kumārila in the first halves denies the possibility of the Buddha’s teaching, assuming a normal action of teaching, i.e. teaching with his mouth moving. In the second halves, on the contrary, he denies the possibility of superhuman forms of teaching without physical action, e.g. the supernatural phenomenon of the Buddha’s effortless teaching which in accordance with his will flows out of even a wall etc. just by his mere presence. Thus he assumes here two different forms of teaching, normal and supernatural.

First I briefly examine the latter halves, which, not only in their meanings but also in their styles, show a clear correspondence between the Ślokavārttika and the Bṛhaṭṭikā. Because the normal form of teaching is denied in the first halves due to the impossibility that an omniscient being cannot perform the physical action of teaching, the opponent in the latter halves proposes a superhuman form of teaching and insists that the Buddha’s teaching flows at will out of a wall etc. without his making efforts to move his mouth. However, this kind of supernatural phenomenon is believed only by devotees, never by outsiders. Furthermore, because this is a teaching of a wall etc., it does not fulfill the condition of “being taught by a reliable person” (āptopadisṭata) and therefore cannot be valid. And it is possible as well that the teaching might be done by invisible ghosts etc. Thus we can see that the main points of the second-half argument beginning with “a teaching of a wall etc.” are common in both the Ślokavārttika and the Bṛhaṭṭikā.

In the first halves, on the contrary, Kumārila assumes a normal action of teaching and shows that an omniscient being is not able to teach. This goal itself is common in both the Ślokavārttika and the Bṛhaṭṭikā. Thus section 5 as a whole, consistently in the first and the second halves, can be regarded as a portion which aims at denying “being taught [by an omniscient being]” of the whole reason “because it is taught by an omniscient being”.

Comparison of the manner of denial of an action of an omniscient being

As I showed, both the Ślokavārttika and the Bṛhaṭṭikā, in the first halves, too, have the same goal of denying “being taught by an omniscient being”, but they deny it in different ways. In the following I compare the two ways of denial in the first halves, i.e. Ślokavārttika codanā, v. 137 and Tattva-mārga v. 3237–3239.

As for the process of an action, it is generally accepted in Indian philosophy that activity (uṣṇā) is necessarily preceded by desire (vāga or icchā). Therefore activity

34 In Indian philosophy, as shown, e.g., in the Nyāya-sūtra 1.1.2 (dāhaka-gana-pratytya-dosa-mahāpājanānāṃ uttātāntarānyāne tadanvāntāhāvād apan āsānu), an undertaking of an action is regarded as having the following process: ignorance — desire etc. — undertaking — rebirth — pain.
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is impossible without desire. But the omniscient Buddha is regarded as a vitarāka, a person free from desire. Therefore he should have no desire and consequently no action. What is called the Buddha’s teaching, therefore, cannot be the teaching of the omniscient Buddha, but of someone else. This is the manner of critique in the Ślokavārttikā. Kumārila here presupposes the usual causal link: desire leads to an action of teaching. In other words he implies a critique, “The Buddha is not omniscient, because he taught”, on the ground of the Buddhists’ own reason “because it is taught by the Buddha”.

In the Bṛhatottāka, on the other hand, Kumārila points out the gap between the state of meditation and that of teaching. To explain, the Buddha in meditation cannot teach, even though he cognizes everything. But once he comes out of meditation and teaches, what he tells us is only limited and does not differ from words of ordinary people. Kumārila’s critique here relies on the contradiction between the state of meditation and that of teaching, in other words, the state of an omniscient being (svarajña) and the state of a person who cognizes only a part (ekadēṣa-jña). Thus this contradiction could be formalized: “In the state of meditation, he cannot teach. But if he teaches, he cannot be omniscient.” Instead of inferring a desire hidden in the mind, Kumārila focuses here on the actual scene of teaching and points out the gap between infinite knowledge and finite speech.

Dharmakīrti’s reply

I showed the difference between the Ślokavārttikā and the Bṛhatottāka in the first halves of Kumārila’s critiques of the teaching-action of an omniscient being. To each of these critiques there are apparently corresponding replies from Dharmakīrti. In Pramaṇavārttikā I v. 12 with the auto-commentary, assuming an opponent who proposes “The Buddha is not omniscient, because he taught”, Dharmakīrti shows that the reason “because he taught” is inconclusive.35 This responds to Kumārila’s critique in Ślokavārttikā v. 137, which focuses on the causal relationship between desire and teaching. In Pramaṇavārttikā III vv. 92–94, on the other hand, assuming an opponent who denies an omniscient being on the ground of the contradiction between omniscience and teaching-action, Dharmakīrti proves that the contradiction is not logically established.36 This reply to the Bṛhatottāka (i.e. Tattvavāsnīkā), which denies Kumārila’s experimental attitude as shown in, e.g. Ślokavārttikā anumāna v. 12ab. bhūpa-darśana. See Steinkellner [1997] for this sanjñha-dikā.)

36: na dharmakīrti, which denies Kumārila’s experimental attitude as shown in, e.g. Ślokavārttikā anumāna v. 12ab. bhūpa-darśana. See Steinkellner [1997] for this sanjñha-dikā.

Pramaṇavārttikā I (suvratanaṁ) v. 12:

vyaktaye dhyaṇamatraṁ kāryapakṣadhyāyati/khetajānāṁ pramāṇādhīkāṁ vacāntād rūpāntānām// (I) Gohi 9.1–2

“It is pseudo-pramāna to cognize [by inference a particular] cause due to observing a general result [common to other causes] by means of a mere non-observation in a dissimilar case, in the same manner as [inferring the Buddha’s] having desire because of [his action of teaching].”

What Dharmakīrti attacks here is the same syllogism implied by Kumārila: “The Buddha is not omniscient, because he taught”. The problem, according to Dharmakīrti, is that the validity of an inference is not necessarily secured “by means of a mere non-observation in a dissimilar case” (vyaktaye dhyaṇamatraṁ), i.e. that one cannot hope that an inference will be valid again in the future just because one has not seen so far a counter-example. Numbers of positive experiences do not guarantee a future success. This critique can be applied to Kumārila’s inference as follows: It is accepted from our limited experiences so far that a person devoid of desire never teaches. In other words there is a positive co-occurrence (samsāra) that whoever teaches has a desire. But, because there are two types of desire, either good or bad, one can never decide from a general result, i.e. a mere teaching-action, whether its cause is a good desire, i.e. compassion, or a bad one, i.e. greed. Thus Dharmakīrti says, “A person devoid of greed, too, [does speak] in the same manner that a person with greed speaks. Therefore [it is not understood on the ground of a mere speech-action].” (I) Gohi 9.7–8: atma gatha rakta tatha vācaka ‘pits vacanamāram apyappithitaḥ. As shown in Dharmakīrti’s irony “if you infer it i.e. greed etc.” in other [people] because you have seen greed in yourself whenever you speak, there would be an undesirable consequence of over-extension” (I) Gohi 9.20–21: vakṣāy atmam rūpāntānādhyājātmakāṁ tadābhannataye [vyaktaye, nāmācārān]. The logical reason “teaching-action” deviates from greed, i.e. a bad type of desire. In other words the Buddha’s action of teaching itself does not necessarily prove that he had greed. One can never deny the possibility that he may have taught because of compassion.


Pramaṇavārttikā III (pratikhyā) vv. 92–94:

utpalyate tattvavāsā prabhāvatvārthānām rūpāntānām atrodyāṇāṁ arthāṇāṁ virodhiṣno prasiddhi-bhavatvāh// baddhābhūdha-dikāya dhvajyāyānī bhrātyo jāna eva-kṣaṇantya-vad/

dharmakīrti’s prasiddhi-bhavatvāh// baddhābhūdha-dikāya dhvajyāyānī bhrātyo jāna eva-kṣaṇantya-vad/

For example [there is a case where one] denies an omniscient being or [the soul’s] existence after death etc. on the ground of an action of speaking [or being a human being] etc. For [imperceptible] objects beyond sense-faculties [such as an omniscient being or soul’s existence after death] are not established to be contradictory [with an action of speaking or a human being].
3239), where Kumārila focuses on the contradiction between the state of meditation (i.e., that of being omniscient) and that of teaching.

Mutual relationship with regard to the Buddha’s teaching

As far as Kumārila’s critiques of teaching-action and Dharmakīrti’s corresponding defences are concerned, it is likely that the argument of the Ślokavārttika is criticized by Pramāṇavārttika I, and that of the Brhaṭṭikā is criticized by Pramāṇavārttika III. Taking into consideration the sequence of Dharmakīrti’s works supposed by Franwaller [1954], the whole sequence can be postulated as: Ślokavārttika → Pramāṇavārttika I → Brhaṭṭikā → Pramāṇavārttika III”. If this assumption is correct, it is possible to say that Kumārila has changed his manner of critique in the

If an action of speaking and a cognition coexist, is the contradiction [between an action of speaking and an omniscient being etc.]?  [Opponent:] Because non-perception of this kind [of a human being who speaks being omniscient]. [Reply:] If you say so, you should speak of it [i.e., non-perception] as a reason.

But non-perception of this kind [of imperceptible object] is taught as non-decisive. Therefore there is no determining of either the existence or the non-existence of [imperceptible] objects which are absolutely beyond sense-facilities. (Cf. Japanese translation of Tomoki [1979:105–109])

The opponent here presupposes contradiction between an action of speaking (udkī) and an omniscient being (svarnā). This is corresponding to Kumārila’s view of contradiction that one cannot be omniscient if he speaks and that an omniscient being cannot speak. To this Dharmakīrti replies, on the ground that an omniscient being is absolutely imperceptible, that there is no contradiction between two of them (v. 92bb). The opponent must show, using non-perception as his reason, that one never perceives a person who is a speaker as well as an omniscient being (v. 93). As Dharmakīrti replies, however, this non-perception does not make a logical reason (v. 94a). For an omniscient being (or omniscience), like the soul’s existence after death, is absolutely imperceptible. One cannot perceive the omniscience of another’s mind. As a result non-perception of an omniscient being (or omniscience) is classified as “non-perception of what is not perceptible” (adrṣṭāyakaprajñādhī), not “non-perception of what is perceptible” (drṣṭaiprajñādhī), and therefore does not prove the non-existence of an omniscient being (v. 94bb). With regard to an omniscient being, because he (or his omniscience) is absolutely imperceptible, though one does not perceive him, one cannot conclude his non-existence and therefore his contradiction with an action of speaking. Therefore, according to Dharmakīrti, it is wrong to rely on reasoning as seen in the Brhaṭṭikā that concludes, by means of the contradiction between an action of speaking and omniscience, that the Buddha is not omniscient on the ground of his action of speaking.

By the way, with regard to the basic rule that one should show non-perception as a reason in order to show contradiction, Dharmakīrti, already in his earliest work Pramāṇavārttika I with the auto-commentary, says, “With regard to a contradicting thing, too, if there is no non-perception [of it], [its] contradiction is not understood.” (Gnoli 5.12–13: evadābhyutantā prabhāvabhāvanā eva dveṣātātānānātā). And he shows that the state of being devoid of desire (avairgata) is an unseen thing (adṛṣṭa) and that it is impossible to establish contradiction (abhūdabuḥabhyutā) by means of an unseen thing (Gnoli 5.23–25). However there is no discussion of the contradiction between an action of speaking and omniscience as in the Brhaṭṭikā and Pramāṇavārttika III. This may suggest that Dharmakīrti in Pramāṇavārttika I was not aware of Kumārila’s critique of contradiction found in the Brhaṭṭikā.

Brhaṭṭikā, taking into consideration Dharmakīrti’s reply in Pramāṇavārttika I against the Ślokavārttika. Thus Dharmakīrti’s reply in Pramāṇavārttika I which possibly motivates Kumārila to change his manner of critique, explains well why there is a difference in manner of critique between corresponding verses of the Ślokavārttika (v. 137) and the Brhaṭṭikā (v. 3237–3239).

Conclusion

In the above I compared Kumārila’s two works, Ślokavārttika and Brhaṭṭikā, with regard to his critique of omniscience and investigated in particular sections 1–5, which showed correspondence in form when I compared their synopses, taking note of similarity of verses and contextual structure. I also tested my hypothesis that Kumārila constructed the contextual framework of his arguments assuming opponents, in particular Buddhists, who claim, “Scripture (Buddha’s teaching) is valid, because it is taught by the omniscient (Buddha etc.)”. With regard to the whole framework of contextual structure, my conclusions are as follows:

- The Ślokavārttika, in criticizing omniscience, assumes opponents who claim, “Scripture (Buddha’s teaching etc.)” is valid, because it is taught by an omniscient being ("āpunāḥ pravāja, sarvasajnapravarṣṭatāt"). divides the reason into three parts, examines each, i.e., “cognizing everything” ("sarvaṃ jñātāt"), “an omniscient being” ("sarvajña") and “being taught by an omniscient being” ("sarvajnapravrṣṭa"). and denies each of them in sections 4, 2 and 5.

- The Brhaṭṭikā, on the other hand, assumes “Scripture (Buddha’s teaching etc.)” is valid, because it is taught by the omniscient Buddha (etc.)” ("āpunāḥ pravāja, sarvasajnapravarṣṭatāt") and divides the reason into five parts. i.e. “everything” ("sarva", “cognizing everything” ("sarvaṃ jñātāt"), omniscient” ("sarvajña") “the omniscient Buddha” ("sarvajnapravarṣṭa") and “being taught by the omniscient Buddha” ("sarvajnapravarṣṭa"). which are denied in sections 1, 2, 4, 1, 5.

It is clear that Kumārila, in both the Ślokavārttika and the Brhaṭṭikā, constructs the contextual framework with a consistent intention to deny the reason proposed by opponents who claim validity of scripture taught by the Buddha etc. This is Kumārila’s intention behind the contextual framework suggested by correspondence
between the Ślokavārttika and the Brhaṭṭikā. The non-corresponding arguments, on
the other hand, in particular found only in the Brhaṭṭikā, suggest the following:

- Only the Brhaṭṭikā has arguments in sections 1.1 and 1.2 which deal in detail
  with the scope of “everything”. This suggests that Kumārila is increasingly
  sensitive about the question whether “everything” includes dharmas and that he
distinguishes between svarajña and dharmanajña.

- The argument “limitation of developing capacity”, is found only in the Brhaṭṭikā
  in section 2.1.2. This suggests that Kumārila pays attention not only to a hor-
  izontal functional division of pramāṇas but also a vertical limitation of human
  cognitive capacity.

- Among the arguments subordinate to section 4, which denies valid means of
cognizing an omniscient being or omniscience, denials of upamāna and arthaśāttī
dominated in the Brhaṭṭikā. This suggests Kumārila’s intention to deny all the
  possible pramāṇas for the sake of thorough argument.

- Only the Brhaṭṭikā has the argument which denies “the omniscient Buddha”
  (4’). This suggests again Kumārila’s intention to make his argument thorough
  enough. Furthermore this makes clear that Kumārila intends to deny the Bud-
dha in particular instead of denying an omniscient being in general.

The following is suggested by the portions in the Ślokavārttika and the Brhaṭṭikā
which have different emphases or points of argument, although they correspond closely
regarding the form of the verses and location in the whole structure.

- In the opening section 1, interpreting the original passage of the Śāhārabhūṣya,
  the Ślokavārttika simply assumes a literally “omniscient being” who cognizès
  everything, but the Brhaṭṭikā, being sensitive about the scope of “everything”,
  indicates Kumārila’s concern that “everything” should not include dharmas and
  that a dharmanajña is to be denied.

- In denying “being taught by the omniscient (Buddha)” in section 5, the Ślokava-
  rttika attacks the causal relationship between desire and teaching-action, but the
  Brhaṭṭikā points out the contradiction between the state of meditation (be-
  ing omniscient) and that of teaching. Thus the two works criticize the same
  matter, i.e. the teaching-action of the Buddha, in different ways.

In this way I examined three types of texts regarding the main points of Kumārila’s
critique of omniscience in the Ślokavārttika and the Brhaṭṭikā, namely, those por-
tions which correspond to each other in both works, those which do not, and those
which show superficial correspondence but differ in signifiance. The second non-
corresponding portions of the Brhaṭṭikā, in particular, suggest that Kumārila intends
to make his argument thorough and that his view is more developed and deepened
than in the Ślokavārttika. Therefore it is likely that the Ślokavārttika is followed by
the Brhaṭṭikā, at least from my limited investigation. And there are some traces
which indicate the relationship between Kumārila and Dharmakirti. These sources
examined and combined together in the most straightforward way suggest the follow-
  ing sequence: Ślokavārttika → Pramāṇavārttika I → Brhaṭṭikā → Pramāṇavārttika
II, III. But this matter is to be further considered, taking into account various sources
including portions other than Kumārila’s critique of omniscience.

Abbreviations and Bibliography

Tattvsamgraha


P
   A manuscript preserved in Pātaṇa Jain Bhaṇḍāras, No. 6679. See Cata-
   logue of the Manuscripts of Pātaṇa Jain Bhaṇḍāras. Part III. Ed by Muni
   Jambuvijaya ji. (P\textsuperscript{a}: Readings of the manuscript before altera-
   tion; P\textsuperscript{b}: Those as altered.)

Tattvamgrahaprapajña

TSP  See B.

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Ratnakūrīnibandhāvali


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ŚVK Mīmāṃsāsādakavārttikāṃ. Ed. K. Śambhaśīva Śāstrī (Part I, II). Trivand-

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