INTRODUCTION: Vedapramāṇya according to Jayanta

1. Vedapramāṇya in the Āgamaḍambara

The ninth century Kashmirian author Bhaṭṭa Jayanta, a Naiyāyika famous for his magnum opus Nyāyamanjari, wrote a play Āgamaḍambara, in which a young Mimāmsaka named Saṅkaraṣaṇa takes a major role. Saṅkaraṣaṇa appears in this way:

Āgamaḍambara, 1st anka:
svādhīyāh paṁtī yathāvidhi paramṛṣṭāni cāṅgāni saṅ
mimāmsāpi nirūpiteti vihitam karma dvijanmocitam/
niśyāḍhūtakutarkadāhīsaragirām yāvat tu vedaviṣām
nyakāro na kṛṭaḥ kṛtārtha iva me tāvan na vidyāśramaḥ//
agryāṣ caite vedaviplavakṛtam kubuddhayah sauddhodaniśyakāh. tad enān
eva stenān iva tāvan nighṛṇimah. Adbh 52.3-12 (9.22-10.4)
I learned my Veda according to the rule, reflected upon six Vedāṅgas and mastered Mimāmsā, too. In this way, I completed the duty expected of a Brahmin. It is, however, as if [all] the trouble [I took] to study (vidyāśrama)3 has not achieved its goal until I humiliate the enemies of the

* This paper was first read at the Indological Research Seminar, All Souls College, Oxford, 1999. I thank Prof. A. Sanderson for providing me with the chance. A part of this paper was published, with many typographical errors that emerged in the course of the printing process at the press, in the Journal of the Ganga Nath Jha Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha, Allahabad, 56 (2003), 249-276. I thank Dr. Elizabeth English, Prof. Harunaga Isaacson, Dr. Somdev Vasudeva and Dr. Alex Watson for comments.

1 Hegde [1983:15] “Thus the date of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta falls, beyond any doubt, between 820 A. D. and 900 A. D.”

2 He calls himself Bhaṭṭajayanta instead of Jayantabhaṭṭa. Āgamaḍambara 1st anka: śaiśava eva vyākaranaṇavivaranaṇakaranād vṛttikāra iti prathitāparanāmno bhaṭṭajayantasya ... Adbh 32.13-15 (2.22-23).

3 Dr. V. Raghavan (in his introduction to the edition of the Āgamaḍambara, x) seems to interpret this compound as “vidyā-aśramaḥ” (period for study). “[H]e feels his duty is not yet fully discharged.” Jayanta, however, implies here that Saṅkaraṣaṇa’s learning (śruta), i.e. effort for knowledge (vidyā-śrama), would be useless if he does not defeat his opponents and effect a change in the social
Vedas, those who always agitate their voice made dusty by their bad speculation. And the foremost among those who destroy the Vedas are these stupid [Buddhists], pupils of [the Buddha,] son of Śuddhodana. 4 Therefore, I will punish them first of all like thieves.

What makes this snātaka angry is the transgression of Vedic dharmas and the refutation of the Vedas’ authoritatively by nāstikas, against whom he starts a campaign to protect the Vedas and defeats a Buddhist teacher Dharmottara and a Jain teacher Jinarakṣīta. Succeeding in convincing the king to ban one of the most corrupt sects, the Nilāmbaras,5 he is appointed to a government post for religious affairs. The play ends in a long lecture by a Naiyāyika chairman named Dhairyarāṣi, who tries to establish the authoritativeness of the Vedas (vedaprāmāṇya) as well as that of all āgamas (sarvāgamaprāmāṇya).

b Vedaprāmāṇya in the Nyāyamaṇjarī: vedarakṣā as śāstraprayojana

In the Āgamaḍambara Jayanta tries to establish the authoritativeness of all āgamas mainly by applying an argument similar to that applied to the Vedas.6 The same is

situation. Cf. Āgamaḍambara, 4th anka: sarva eva hi yathāsthitā ime. snātakasya dhig apārthakam śrutam. AŚ 192.9-10 (74.10-11). “For all of these [sects] without exception remains the same. What a pity! The snātaka’s learning (śrūta) is useless.” Cf. also verse 1064 inserted after Mahābhārata 8.65.30 (MBh Vol. 10, 568b): nāsatyadasrātrisutodbhavādyair aṣṭāṅgavidyāṣramam udvahadbhiḥ/ ābaddhapatīto vranalāgahavena yathā sureśo ditiyaiḥ kṣatāngaḥ// (I thank Prof. H. Isaacson for this reference.)

4 Jayanta seems intentionally to use the expression sauddhodani, implying that the Buddha is just a human being. Cf. Nyāyamaṇjarī, 4th āṅhika: nanu buddhah sūdhodanasya rājñīḥ ‘patyam sa katham iśvāro bhavet. Kataoka [2004:185.5] (NM I 644.10). “[Opponent:] The Buddha is a son of King Śuddhodana. How can he be God?”


6 Āgamaḍambara 4th anka: evam tāvād vedam āptapraṇītaṁ ye manvānās tatpramāṇatvatvam āhuh/ sa prayekam pañcarātrādiśāstrapraṇītye ‘pi nyāyamārgah samānaḥ// ... na pramāṇyat sarvathā tatprāṇāṁ graththā ete vedavat pratyaśetāḥ// yadi vānādayo vedāḥ svata eva pramāṇatām/ yāntu, kāmām tathāvaitāḥ pañcarātrādiśāstrānāḥ// AŚ 232.3-12 (90.12-91.2). “Thus, first of all, if they insist that the Veda is valid by accepting that it is composed by a reliable person [i.e. God], this way of reasoning (nyāyamārga) is similar [and applicable] to the validity of each and every teaching, e.g. of Pañcarātra. ... These compositions, [since they] are composed by them [i.e. reliable persons], would never fall from validity as the
true of the *Nyāyamañjarī*, where the Vedas' authoritativeness is a central concern. Indeed, Jayanta states in the beginning of the book that it is Nyāya's purpose to protect the Vedas' authoritativeness (*vedaprāmānyaarakṣā*).⁷ And this attitude penetrates the whole *Nyāyamañjarī*, in particular the most important section *śabda-pariksā* (3-6 āhnikas), which covers more than one third of the text (554 pages of 1419 in the Mysore edition), as is clearly shown by Jayanta himself when he summarizes its various subordinate arguments which aim at a single goal of proving the Veda as authoritative (NM I 412.11-415.3).

c Problems and questions

With regard to the Nyāya tradition, however, it seems that Jayanta's statement not only deviates from it but also contradicts the orthodoxy, which officially claims that Nyāya gives us knowledge of the true nature (*tattvajñāna*) of, in particular, the twelve prameyas, which leads us to liberation directly, i.e. without depending on the Vedas.⁸

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Veda [never does]. Or if [they accept that] the Vedas have no beginning and therefore become intrinsically valid, [they may as well accept that] those teachings e.g. of Pañcarātra [become intrinsically valid too] in the same manner."

Cf. *Nyāyakalikā*: tatra [*vaidikeśu racaneśu*] svātantryam īśvarasyeti tatpranītavāna vedāḥ pramāṇam iti. vedavad āgamāntarāṇy api tamūlātvād āptapraniṭavād vā pramāṇam iti veditavyāni. NK 4.11-14. "God is the author of those [Vedic scriptures]. Therefore the Vedas are means of valid cognition because they are composed by Him. In the same manner as the Vedas, other scriptures too should be understood as means of valid cognition because they are Veda-based or composed by reliable persons." *Nyāyamañjarī*, 4th āhnikā: anye sarvāgamānaṃ tu prāmāṇyaṃ pratipedire/ ... sarvatra vedavat kartur āptasya parikalpanāḥ/ Kataoka [2004:193.3-5] (NM I 640.6-8). "Others however understand that all scriptures are valid. ... For in all cases [of scriptures] reliable authors are postulated as in the case of the Vedas."

⁷ *Nyāyamañjarī*, 1st āhnikā: nyāyavistara tu mūlastambhahūtah sarvavidyānām, vedaprāmāṇya-∗rakṣā-ḥetuvāt. NM I 7.7-8. (*-rakṣā-*) M; omits. MkhaG₁

"Nyāyavistara, on the other hand, is the basic trunk of all sciences, because it is a means for protecting the Vedas' authoritativeness." *nanu vedaprāmāṇyanirnaya-prayojanaḥ* cēn nyāyavistarah. ... NM I 10.2. "If Nyāyavistara aims at ascertaining the Vedas' authoritativeness, ..." yasya hi vedaprāmāṇye samśayāṇā viparyastā vā matis tam prati śāstrārmbahāḥ. NM I 11.10-11. "For [Aṣṭapāda] commences [this Nyāya] teaching for those whose mind is doubting or wrong with regard to the Vedas' authoritativeness."

⁸ Jayanta does not feel it to be a big problem to accept the traditional view that
How, then, should we place Jayanta’s view in the Nyāya tradition? Why does he need to bring in an apparently new idea, instead of repeating the old one? Are there any problems in the orthodox view? How does he describe the purpose of Nyāya? What is the place of Nyāya in the large picture of the various branches of learning? How does he think Nyāya protects the authoritativeness of the Vedas? Are Mimāmsakas unable to do so?

In order to answer these questions, first we shall look at a model description by Patañjali of śāstra-prayojana, then the Nyāya orthodoxy, and finally investigate Jayanta’s own description and discussion.

2 Patañjali on śāstraprayojana: five Veda-oriented purposes of grammar

Patañjali starts his Mahābhāṣya by enumerating five purposes of grammar, all of which are in various ways connected with the Vedas: 

a. rakṣā: protects the Vedas, viz. preserves it correctly.

b. āha: changes mantras in proper forms when they are applied.

c. āgama: an unquestionable injunction to study the Veda also implies that grammar should necessarily be studied, since it is the main (pradhāna) of all six Vedāṅgas.

d. laghu: grammar is the easiest way to know language, i.e. the Vedas and so on.

e. asamdeha: grammar removes doubts (and makes one certain) about the Vedas.

By applying Patañjali’s terminology to Mimāmsā, one could say that the latter has two combined purposes as its aim, i.e. āgama and asamdeha: the injunction to study the Veda “svādyāya dhetyavyah”, also implies Mimāmsā study, because hermeneutics is necessary to make sense of the Vedas, i.e. to remove doubts and bring about determinate knowledge about the meaning of the Vedas.

Nyāya aims at liberation (NM II 264.19: niḥśreyasārthatvāc chāstrasya). He can accept that prameyatattvajñāna leads one to liberation directly (NM II 264.20-265.1: prameyajñānasya pramāṇajñānavad anyajñānopayogitām antarefa svata eva mithyājñānanirvṛtttyādikramenāppavargahetuvapratijñānāi). But he does not accept Nyāya’s independence of the Vedas, because the Vedas are the original sole provider of ātmajñāna and Ākṣapāda bases himself on the Vedas when he teaches that ātmajñāna is a means for liberation (NM II 461.9-12. See my later discussion 4c, “Jayanta’s deviation from the Nyāya orthodoxy”). I thank Dr. Alex Watson for reminding me of Jayanta’s relevant passage in the ātmavāda.

9 Mahābhāṣya, paspaśāhnika, VMBh I 1.14-2.2. Jayanta (in the pūrvapakṣa) mentions these five purposes in NM II 233.
Among the remaining possibilities, Jayanta can be regarded as having chosen raksi, with a modification of Patañjali’s meaning: he says that Nyāya protects the Vedas from enemies. The orthodox Nyāya view, however, seems different. Nyāya does not feel it essential or necessary, even as an excuse, to present itself as connected with the Vedas. For Nyāya is an independent method for acquiring the knowledge which leads one to liberation. Let us look at the orthodox view about the purpose of Nyāya described in the Nyāyasūtra and the Nyāyabhāṣya.

3 The Nyāya orthodoxy on śāstraprayojana
a The purpose of Nyāya described in the Nyāyasūtra: tattvajñānān niḥśreyasāḍhigamah

Nyāyasūtra 1.1.1, enumerating sixteen padārthas which will be discussed later, states the purpose of this science (*śāstra-prayojana).

Nyāyasūtra 1.1.1: pramāṇaprameyasamśayaprayojanadṛṣṭānta-siddhāntavayavatarkanirnayavadajalpavitanḍāhetvābhāsa-cchalajātinigrahasthānānāṃ tattvajñānān niḥśreyasāḍhigamah

One obtains final beatitude from the knowledge of the true nature of pramāṇa, prameya, samśaya, prayojana, dṛṣṭānta, siddhānta, avayava, tarka, nirṇaya, vāda, jalpa, vitanḍā, hetvābhāsa, chala, jāti and nigrahasthāna.

Nyāya gives us the knowledge of the true nature of these sixteen principles, which leads us to final beatitude (niḥśreyasa).10

10 The relationship between niḥśreyasa and apavarga is problematic and therefore some scholars have tried to clarify it. Cf. ‘Sekundärliteratur’ given in Slaje [1986].

According to the Nyāyabhāṣya, niḥśreyasa is a general term for the good which includes various fruits of each science. Therefore we can postulate a fruit proper for each science (ND, 5.17: tad idam tattvajñānam niḥśreyasāḍhigamasya ca yathāvidyām veditavyam). Thus apavarga which Nyāya gives is one of possible niḥśrayasas (ND, 5.17-19: iha tv adhyātmavidyāyām ... niḥśreyasāḍhigamo pavaŋgarpaṛptiḥ).

The Nyāyavārttika divides niḥśreyasa into two, visible and invisible (ND, 13.14: niḥśreyasam punar dṛṣṭādṛṣṭabhedād āvedhā bhavati). The visible niḥśreyasa is that which arises from pramāṇādittattvajñāna (ND, 13.14-15: tatra pramāṇādipadārthatattvajñānād dṛṣṭāṃ niḥśreyasam) as is shown in the Nyāyasūtra 1.1.1. The invisible niḥśreyasa is that which arises from prameyatattvajñāna (ND, 13.16-17: paraṃ tu niḥśreyasam ātmadeḥ prameyasya tattvajñānād bhavati) as is shown in the Nyāyasūtra 1.1.2. The former niḥśreyasa, which corresponds to (or includes?) jīvanmukti (ND, 152.8), arises directly (ND, 152.6-7: yat tāvad apraṃ
The following sūtra 1.1.2 shows the process to reach liberation (apavarga) through the knowledge of the true nature (tattvajñāna).

Nyāyasūtra 1.1.2: duḥkhajanamaprayṛttidōsamithyājñānānām uttarottarāpāye tadanantarāpāyād\(^1\) apavargah\(/\)

\(^1\)-pāyād] ND₂ Ch, Slaje [1986: 164, n.7] ; -bhāvād ND₁

Among pain, [re]birth, undertaking, evil qualities and false knowledge, when each following item perishes, each preceding item perishes [respectively]. From that arises liberation.

\[ ni[h]sreyasam tat tattvajñānānāntaram eva bhavati, \]

while the latter does indirectly (ND₁ 152.9: param tu niḥśreyasam tattvajñānāt krameṇa bhavati). According to Uddyotakara, therefore, niḥśreyasa in the first sūtra is visible lower fruit (drṣṭa, aparā), while the apavarga in the second sūtra is invisible higher fruit (adrṣṭa, para). Cf. Slaje [1986:174]: "Und so hat Vācaspati wie Uddyotakara die Aussage von NSū 1.1.1 unter dem Aspekt der Lebenderlösung gedeutet, und diese Form einer „niedrigeren Erlösung“ in den Kontext der „endgültigen Erlösung“ von NSū 1.1.2 als Vorstufe integriert."

Therefore there lies a possible contradiction with Vātsyāyana, who interprets niḥśreyasa in the first sūtra as general and apavarga in the second sūtra as particular for Nyāya and thus the former includes the latter. For these two are different for Uddyotakara. I would like to point out two odd attitudes of Uddyotakara: first he keeps silent about the purpose of the Upaniṣads, while he mentions swargaprāpti as a purpose of the three Vedas (ND₁ 21.10-12). Uddyotakara, as a vārttikakāra, should have explained that the purpose of the pūrvakāṇḍa is swargaṇḍi and that of the uttarakāṇḍa is mokṣa. But he avoids it. He might have hesitated to say explicitly that the niḥśreyasa in the first sūtra includes mokṣa, because mokṣa (except for jīvanmukti) corresponds to the apavarga in the second sūtra; second he skips commenting on the Nyāyabhāṣya (ND₁ 5.17-19=ND₁ 21.16-17: iha tv adhyātmavidyāyām ... niḥśreyasādhiṣṭān 'pavargaprāptiḥ') which clearly states that apavarga in the second sūtra is one of the niḥśreyasas in the first sūtra.

With regard to the first sūtra, Jayanta’s understanding of the tradition seems to be based on the Bhāṣya. For he accepts that liberation is brought about by the knowledge of the sixteen principles. Nyāyamaṇḍari, Iṣṭāḥnika: ity esa śoḍaśapadārthaṁ bandhanena niḥśreyasasya muninā niradeśi panthāḥ/ anyas tu sann api padārthagaṇo 'pavargamārgopayogavirahāḥ iha nopadīṣṭah// NM I 29.1-4. “Thus the sage [Aksapāda] taught this path for final beatitude by the composition of the sixteen principles. As for other groups of things, although they exist, he did not teach them here because they do not contribute to the path for liberation.”
It is likely that the *Nyāyasūtra*, at least as an official view, presents itself as an independent means for liberation, i.e. independent of the Vedas.

b  The fourfold division of sciences in the *Nyāyabhāṣya: caturvidyāsthānāḥ*

*Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.1 does not mention other sciences. Vātsyāyana, in *Nyāyabhāṣya* ad 1.1.1, takes a wider view in order to show the place of Nyāya among other sciences. He mentions a categorization of science into four kinds,\(^1\) one of which is identified as Nyāya.

*Nyāyabhāṣya* ad 1.1.1: *imās tu catasro vidyāḥ prthakprasthānāḥ prāṇabhṛtām anugrahāyopadiśyante, yāsām caturthiyam ānvikṣikī nyāyavidyā. ND\(_1\) 2.15-16, ND\(_2\) 2.18-20*

But these four sciences, each of which has its individual topic, are taught in order to help living beings. Among them, the fourth is this ānvikṣikī, i.e. Nyāya-science.

Each science has its own independent information (*abhidheya) and purpose (*prayojana). Vātsyāyana expresses this independence with the term ‘having individual topics’ (*prthakprasthānāḥ). Thus four sciences, i.e. *trayī, vārtā, daṇḍaniitī* and ānvikṣikī, are not mutually connected. Using the terminology *tattvajñāna* and *nihṣreyasa* of the Sūtra, Vātsyāyana clarifies that each science has its own way.

*Nyāyabhāṣya* ad 1.1.1: *tad idam tattvajñānam nihṣreyasādhigamaś\(^1\) ca yathāvidyam veditavyam. iha tv adhyātmavidyāyām ātmādiśīnānam\(^2\) tattvajñānam, nihṣreyasādhigama *pavargapraśītī iti*\(^3\). ND\(_1\) 5.17-19, ND\(_2\) 6.2-3

1) -dhi gamaś ca] ND\(_1\)ND\(_2\); -dhigamārthaṃ Ch 2) ātmādiśīnānam] ND\(_1\)ND\(_2\); ātmādītattvajñānam Ch 3) -gaprāptī iti] ND\(_1\)ND\(_2\); -gaprāptīḥ Ch

The above-mentioned knowledge of the true nature and the attainment of final beatitude should be understood according to [each] science. As for this case, i.e. in the science of ātman, it is the knowledge of ātman and so on that

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\(^1\) Cf. *Kauṭiliyaśāstra*, 1.2, vidyāsamuddeśa: ānvikṣikī trayī vārtā daṇḍaniitī ceti vidyāḥ/1/ ... catasra eva vidyā iti kauṭilyaḥ/8/ ... balābale caitāsām [trayādānām] hetubhir ānvikṣamānā lokasyopakaroṭi/11/ pradīpah sarvavidyānāṃ upāyaḥ sarvakarmanāṃ/ āśrayaḥ sarvadharmānāṃ śaśvad ānvikṣikī matā/12// AS 4.3-14.
is the knowledge of the true nature, and the obtaining of liberation that is the attainment of final beatitude.

With the help of the Nyāyavārttika,¹² we can make a diagram as follows.

| trayī | dhārma (ātman) | nihśreyasa | svargādi (apavarga) |
| vārtā | bhūmyādi | sasya |
| daṇḍaniti | sāmādi | prthivi |
| ānvikṣikī (nyāya) | ātmādi | apavarga |

The three Vedas (trayī) teach dhārma and ātman, the knowledge of which leads one to heaven etc. and liberation respectively. (The Nyāyavārttika does not mention ātman and liberation, perhaps intentionally.) The science of agriculture (vārtā) teaches proper ground and so on (bhūmyādi), through which one get grains (sasyādhigama). Politics teaches conciliation (sāman) and so forth, which leads one to attain kingship over the world (prthivivijaya). The last science, i.e. ānvikṣikī, teaches sixteen principles, especially those prameyas relevant for liberation such as ātman. This science of ātman (adhyātmavidyā) leads one to liberation. We can say that Vātsyāyana introduces the fourfold division in order to show Nyāya’s unique position among branches of science.

c The task of Nyāya in general and in particular: pramāṇa, prameya and samśayādi

The Nyāyasūtra, although it explains the process of how to attain liberation through tattvajñāna in Sūtra 1.1.2, does not bother to explain how each of the sixteen padārthas leads one to final beatitude. The Nyāyabhāṣya, on the other hand, shows it by dividing possible cases into three, viz. pramāṇa, prameya and samśayādi.

Pramāṇa Vātsyāyana explains in general how pramāṇa leads one to a fruit and establishes that pramāṇa grasps an object (pramāṇam arthavat) and therefore is valid.¹³ He attributes to pramāṇa a wider role, i.e. the means to get any kind of fruits through supplying cognition of objects.

In this way, all activities, so long as they are intended to have a secured fruit, require a means of valid cognition (pramāṇa). Thus Nyāya can give us a secure ground for all kinds of activity.

Vātsyāyana identifies Nyāya with the process of examination of an object

¹² Nyāyavārttika ad 1.1.1, ND₁ 21.9-17.
¹³ Nyāyabhāṣya ad 1.1.1, ND₁ 1.1-7, ND₂ 1.6-11.
through pramāṇas (pramāṇair arthaparikṣaṇam nyāyāḥ), mainly bearing in mind the logical proof which consists of five component parts (pañcāvayavāḥ).

The last of the four branches of science (catusro vidyāḥ) is called ānvikṣikī, which Vātsyāyana identifies with Nyāya (caturthīyam ānvikṣiki nyāyavidyā). According to him, the supreme Nyāya (paramo nyāyah) is nothing but syllogism (pañcāvayavāḥ) in the sense that Nyāya operates by means of inference, which relies on perception and verbal testimony (pratyakṣāgamāśritam cānumānam sānvikṣā).

By means of this identification of Nyāya as ānvikṣikī, i.e. examination of an object in the form of inference with the help of perception and verbal testimony, Vātsyāyana succeeds in showing the wider contribution of Nyāya-teaching, besides its particular job for liberation. The following statement shows well the aspect of Nyāya in the wider context.

Nyāyabhāṣya ad 1.1.1: seyam ānvikṣikī pramāṇādibhiḥ padarthaḥ

14 Nyāyabhāṣya ad 1.1.1: kaḥ punar ayam nyāyah. pramāṇair arthaparikṣaṇam
dūtyo bhūyām iksitasyānvikṣanam anvikṣā. tayā pravartata ity ānvikṣikī nyāyavidyā nyāyāsastram. ND1 3.5-8, ND2 3.11-13
1) -parikṣaṇam] ND1ND2 ; -parikṣaṇam nyāyah Ch 2) cānumānam] ND1ND2 ;
anumānam Ch.

"[Q:] But what is this Nyāya? [A:] [It is] an examination of an object through means of valid cognition. And inference, which is based on perception and verbal testimony, is [nothing but] ānvikṣā. The ānv-ikṣā is a following observation (ānv-ikṣana) of a thing which has been observed by perception and verbal testimony. That which acts with this [ānvikṣā] is ānvikṣikī, i.e. Nyāya-science, Nyāya-teaching."

15 Nyāyabhāṣya ad 1.1.1: teṣu [pañcāvayaveṣu] pramāṇasamavāyāḥ. 1. āgamah
pratiṣṭā. 2. hetur anumānam. 3. udāharaṇam pratyakṣam. 4. upamānam upanayāḥ
5. sarvēṣām ekārthasamavāye sāmarthyapradarśanam nigamanam iti. so 'yam
paramo nyāya iti.
1) upamānam upanayāḥ] ND1ND2 ; upanayanam upamānam Ch. 2) iti] ND1Ch ;
omits ND2

"Means of valid cognition enter together into these [five component parts of
syllogism in this way]: 1. The proposition is verbal testimony. 2. The logical reason
is inference. 3. The illustration is perception. 4. The application is the comparative
identification. 5. It is the conclusion to show that all [four] are capable of entering
together into one object. And these [five component parts] are called 'the supreme
logic'."

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vibhajyamāṇā
pradīpam sarvavidyānām upāyah sarvakarmaṇām/
aśrayah sarvadharmānāṃ vidyoddeśe pariśītī/*// ND₁ 5.13-15, ND₂ 5.18-20

*parsiśītī* J (in the footnote of ND₁), NM ; prakīrītī ND₁ND₂Ch
This ānvikṣiki, which is divided by principles such as pramāṇas, is examined [and established] in the enumeration of sciences (i.e. Kauṭilyārthaśāstra 1.2.12, AS 4.13-14, pāda d: śaśvad ānvikṣikī matā) as a light of all sciences, means of all actions, [and] substratum of all dharmas.

Only Nyāya can help actions and support dharmas. Nyāya is a single light of all other sciences. Thus Nyāya has not only its own fruit, i.e. liberation, but also contributes to others, mainly through inference. We can see here Vātsyāyana's intention to show that Nyāya has general and particular contributions.

Prameya There are twelve prameyas, which begin with ātman and end with apavarga.16 Although there exist in our world endless objects of pramāṇas (ND₁ 1.6: pramāṇārtha 'parisamkhyeyāh'),17 the tattvajñāna of them does not necessarily lead one to liberation.18 What the Sūtra teaches, at least according to the Bhāṣya, is the least necessary list of those objects (prameyas) which one should know to destroy his false knowledge (mithyājñāna) for the sake of liberation.

Nyāyabhāṣya ad 1.1.1: ātmādeḥ khalu prameyasya tattvajñānān

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16 Nyāyasūtra 1.1.9: ātmāsarīrendriyārthabuddhimanahpravṛttiidoṣapretyabhāva-phaladukkhāpavargaṁ tu prameyam/"On the other hand, the object of valid cognition is the following: ātman, body, sense-organs, the objects of sense-organs, cognition, internal organ, undertaking, evil qualities, rebirth, fruit, pain and liberation."

17 Uddyotakara interprets "pramāṇa-artha" as "a purpose (prayojana) of each pramāṇa" (ND₁ 11.11: arthaśabdasya prayojanavācītvā) because arthas are only fourfold (sukha, sukhahetu, duḥkha, duḥkhahetu) and therefore not countless (ND₁ 11.8-9: etāvān ayaṁ pramāṇārtho yad uta sukhadukkhē taddhetuṣ ceti). In fact Vātsyāyana seems to accept of artha two aspects, i.e. from the viewpoint of epistemology ('object') and that of value ('purpose').

18 Cf. Nyāyamañjari, 7th āhnika: āhitam samyag asamyag vā yan mokṣāya bhavāya vā/ tat prameyam ihābhiṣṭam na pramāṇārthamātrakam// NM II 264.14-15. "Here [in the sūtra 1.1.2, Akṣapāda] accepts as prameya [only that which leads one] to liberation [if one] knows [it] correctly or [that which binds one] to this world [if one] knows [it] incorrectly, and not objects of pramāṇas in general."
Vātsyāyana shows how each knowledge of twelve items leads one to liberation. First we have various kinds of false knowledge regarding prameyas, e.g. “There is no ātman”, “Liberation is terrible.” The knowledge of the true nature destroys this sort of false knowledge and through various steps one reaches final goal, i.e. liberation.

19 The fourfold set is clearly absorbed from the Buddhist catvāry āryasatyāni, i.e. duḥkha, samudaya, nīrodha and mārga. But the Nyāyavrātika (ad 1.1.1, ND 1 8.1-4) distorts it and enumerates instead heya (duḥkha, duḥkkhahetu), hāna (tattvajñāna), upāya (śāstra) and adhigantavya (apavarga).

20 Nyāyabhāṣya ad 1.1.2: tatrātmādyapavargaparyante) prameye mithyājñānam anekaprakārakam vartate, ātmani tāvat “nāstī” iti, anātmani “ātmā” iti. ... apavarge “bhiṣmah khalv ayam sarvakāryoparamah, sarvaviprayoge ‘pavarge bahu bhadrakam lupyata iti katham buddhimān sarvasukhocchedam acaitanyam amum apavargam rocayer” iti. ND 1 150.5-15, ND 2 6.9-18

1) -paryante] ND 1, ND 2.] -paryantam Ch

“As for those prameyas, which start with ātman and end with liberation, there are various kinds of false knowledge: first as for ātman “It does not exist”, and as for non-ātman ‘[This is] ātman’; ... and as for liberation ‘Terrible indeed is this cessation of all results. In the [state of] liberation, which is disconnection from everything, many good things get lost (bahu bhadrakam lupyate). Therefore how could a wise man be pleased with this insentient liberation (acaitanyam amum apavargam) which is a cutting off of every pleasure (sarvasukhocchedam).’”

21 Nyāyabhāṣya ad 1.1.2: yadā tu tattvajñānānān mithyājñānam apaiti taddā mithyājñānāpāye dosā apayanti, dosāpaye pravṛttir apaiti, pravṛttyapāye janmāpaiti, janmāpāye duḥkhām apaiti, duḥkkhāpāye cātyantiko ‘pavargo nīṣreyasam iti. ND 1 151.6-8, ND 2 7.12-14. “But when the false knowledge vanishes by means of the knowledge of the true nature, the evil qualities vanish since the false knowledge vanished; when the evil qualities vanish, the undertaking vanishes; when the undertaking vanishes, the [re]birth vanishes; when the [re]birth vanishes, the pain vanishes; when the pain vanishes, there is a final beatitude, i.e. ultimate liberation.”
Although Vātsyāyana explains that the *tattvajñāna* of each of the twelve items is equally relevant to liberation, it is clear from the order of enumeration that *ātmajñāna* is the main means and the rest are subordinate. This observation is in fact confirmed by the fact that Vātsyāyana explicitly states that Nyāya is an *adhyātmavidya* (ND₁ 5.18).

In comparison with *pramāna*, which has a wide scope of contribution to all actions and all sciences, the *prameya-tattvajñāna* is more specific, being the direct knowledge leading to liberation.

Therefore, when the tradition says that Nyāya offers the *tattvajñāna* which leads one to liberation, it means mainly the *prameya-tattvajñāna*, more specifically *adhyātmavidya*, as is revealed by Vātsyāyana.

### Samśayādi

It is not surprising to find the possibility of Nyāya being reduced to *adhyātmavidya*, because Nyāya, like many other systems, aims at the liberation of *ātman*. Our assumption is already expressed by Jayanta.²²

But this reduction would cause a problem, so Vātsyāyana fears: if Nyāya was reduced to *adhyātmavidya*, it would become non-different from Upaniṣadic teachings and therefore lose its unique position among the four branches of science, which validates the Naiyāyika insistence that one should start learning Nyāya. In order to solve this problem, Vātsyāyana picks up the remaining items, i.e. *samśayādi*, which can be reduced to *pramāṇa* or *prameya*.

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²² *Nyāyamañjari*, 4th āhnika: *kim cāgamānām virodho 'pi nātiva vidyate. pradhāne puruṣārthe sarvesām avivādāt. ... tathā hy apavarga upeyaḥ sarvasāstresu nirdīṣyate. tadupāyaḥ sarvatra jñānam upadiṣyate. jñānaviṣaye tu vivadante. tatrāpi prāyaṣa ātmaviṣayatāyām bhūnām avipratipattih.* Kataoka [2004:192.4-191.4] (NM 1 640.18-641.4). “Furthermore there are not many contradictions either among scriptures, because no one disputes the main aim of human beings. ... To explain, liberation is taught as a goal in all teachings. Knowledge is taught as its means everywhere. But they dispute the object of knowledge. Even on that point, in most cases, many agree that *ātman* is the object.”

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Nyāyabhāṣya ad 1.1.1: *tasyāḥ prthak prasthānam*¹⁶ *samśayādayah padārthāḥ. teśām prthagvacanam antarenādhyātmavidyāyātām iyām syād yathopanisadah. tasmāt samśayādibhiḥ padārthaḥ prthak prasthāpyate. ND₁ 2.16-18, ND₂ 2.20-3.2

¹⁶) *prasthānam*] emendation (Cf. *Nyāyavārttika* ad 1.1.1: *tasyāḥ samśayādiprasthānam antareṇa ... ND₁ 14.9); -prasthānāh ND₁ND₂Ch

Of this [nyāyavidyā, only] the principles beginning with doubt are the specific topic. Without a separate statement of these [principles] this
[\textit{nyāyavidyā}] would be a mere science of ātman like the Upaniṣads. Therefore [the \textit{nyāyavidyā}] is established separately by means of principles such as doubt.

In this way, Vātsyāyana succeeds in recycling the superfluous item, i.e. changing it into a good excuse for the uniqueness of Nyāya.

d Some problems left unsolved in the Nyāya-tradition
The traditional view on the purpose of Nyāya can be summed up as follows:

i) General aspect: the general aspect of Nyāya which examines the object through \textit{pramāṇas} has wide scope, supporting all actions and helping all sciences as a light.

ii) Specific aspect: the \textit{prameya-tattvajñāna} is a direct means to liberation. In order to distinguish Nyāya from Upaniṣad, which can also teach ātman, Nyāya teaches \textit{samśayādi}.

If we consider the context of \textit{Nyāyasūtra} 1.1.1, where the author should convince readers to start reading the text, the traditional view looks weak, especially on its uniqueness distinguished from any other science. They first insist that their branch can offer good means to achieve liberation, which in fact is available in another branch, also. Then they provide the excuse that although it is available in another branch, they can offer really unique knowledge, i.e. \textit{samśayādi-tattvajñāna}, which can in fact be reduced to the other two, either \textit{pramāṇa-} or \textit{prameya-tattvajñāna}, as they admit.\textsuperscript{23} What then do they give us as their specialty?

4 Jayanta’s view on śāstraprayojana

a The fourteen-fold division of sciences: \textit{caturdaśavidyāsthānāḥ}

While the \textit{Nyāyasūtra} did not pay attention to other sciences, the \textit{Nyāyahāṣya} introduced a fourfold division in order to show that Nyāya has a unique and independent place among all sciences. Jayanta, however, substitutes the fourfold with a fourteen-fold division.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Nyāyahāṣya} ad 1.1.1: \textit{tatra samśayādināṃ prthagvacanam anarthakam, samśayādayo hi yathāsambhavāṃ pramāṇeṣu prameyeyeṣu cāntarbhavanto na vyatiricyanta iti. satyam evam etat. ND1 2.13-14, ND2 2.17-18.} \textit{[Q:] Among them the separate reference to doubt etc. is pointless, because doubt etc., being included in \textit{pramāṇa} and \textit{prameya} accordingly, are not different [from them]. [A:] It is true.}

\textsuperscript{24} Jayanta himself gives two scriptural evidences for the fourteen-fold division, the \textit{Yājñavalkyasmṛti} 1.3 and an unknown source. \textit{Nyāyamañjarī}, 1st āhnikā: \textit{yathoktam.
First of all, he limits the scope of all sciences (śāstra, vidyāsthāna) to the transcendental world (adrṣṭa) which people except for yogins can never experience directly. For there is no use for us to be taught about observable matters, e.g. “The person who is dirty should bathe” or “The person who is hungry should eat”.  

Second, in the hierarchy of all sciences which deal with unobservable matters (adrṣṭa), he places the four Vedas on the top, followed by ten other sciences. The

purāṇatarkamimāṃsādharmaśāstrāngamīśritāḥ/ vedāḥ sthānāni vidyānāṃ
dharmasya ca caturdāsa/ (Yājñavalkya, 1.3) iti. anyatṝpy uktaṃ. angāni vedāś
catvāro mimāṃsā nyāyavistarāh/ purāṇaṃ dharmaśāstrāṃ ca vidyā hy etāś
caturdāsa/ (?) iti. NM I 8.4-9. Both are quoted again with other sources in NM I 618-619. The latter is quoted again in NM II 258.8-9.

25 Nyāyamañjarī, 1st āhikā: drṣṭādrṣṭabhedena ca dvividhāḥ puruṣārthasya
danthā. tatra2) drṣṭe viṣaye ... bhojanādāv anapekṣītaśāstrasayaiva bhavati
pravṛttih. na hi “malināḥ snāyāt” “hubhukṣito” 3) ’śnīyāt’ iti śāstram upayuyjate.
adṛṣṭe tu svargāpavargamārga3) ... lokasya śāstram eva prakāsah. tad eva
sakalasadupāyadarśane divyam caṇsūr asmadādeḥ ... tasmād asmadādibhiḥ4)
śāstram evādhitavayam5). NM I 4.10-19
1) puruṣārthasya] MG1 ; puruṣasya Mvar 2) tatra] M ; tasya MkhG1 3)
hubhukṣito] Mvar. ; hubhukṣito vā MG1 3) -mārge] Mvar. ; -māre MG1 4)
-smadādibhiḥ] emendation ; -smadādeḥ MG1 5) evādhitavayam] M ;
evāvagantavyam G1

“And the path to the goal of human beings is of two kinds according to the distinction between what is observed and what is not observed. Of these two, as for an observed matter such as eating, ... one undertakes [it] without relying on a teaching. For a teaching, “The person who is dirty should bathe” [or] “The person who is hungry should eat”, is not useful. On the other hand, as for an unobserved matter such as the path to heaven or liberation, ... teaching alone is a light for people. And it alone is a divine eye for people like us to see all correct means. ... Therefore it is a teaching that people like us should obtain.”

26 Nyāyamañjarī, 1st āhikā: tac ca caturdāsavidham yāni vidvāmsa śāstrāsa
vidyāsthānāny ācakṣate. tatra vedāḥ catvāraḥ. ... ta ete1) catvāro vedās tāvat2)
sākṣād eva puruṣārthādhanopadeśasvabhāvāḥ, “agnihotrom juhuyāt
svargakāmāḥ” “ātmā jñātavayāḥ” ityādīsrutah. NM I 5.2-8
1) ta ete] Mvar ; ete MG1 2) tāvat] Mvar ; omits MG1

“And the [śāstras] are of fourteen kinds. They are termed by scholars ‘the fourteen branches of science’. Among them the Vedas are four. ... First of all, these four Vedas by nature [can] teach means for the aims of human beings in a direct way [i.e. without depending on other authorities]. For there are śrutis ‘One who wishes heaven should perform an agnihotra-offering’, ‘One should know the
first three groups, i.e. the four Vedas which begin with the Atharvaveda. Smritis and Itihāsas-Purāṇas, can tell us invisible things directly by themselves (svata eva), i.e. from their own mouth.

Nyāyamañjarī, 1st āhniκa: tad evaṃ vedapurāṇadharmāśāstraḥ svata eva puruṣārthasādhanopadesās vahāvatvād vidyāsthānavam. NM I 6.6-7.

In the above-mentioned way, the Vedas, Purāṇas and Dharmashastra are [fit to be counted as] branches of science, because it is their nature to teach, by themselves, means for the aims of human beings.

The four Vedas teach us the methods to attain liberation, heaven and so on. Smritis can also teach us dharmas by themselves. Purāṇas and the Itihāsas do the same, by telling stories. The last group, i.e. the six Vedāngas, Mimāmsā and Nyāya, does not tell us about the invisible world by itself, but only helps the former, especially the four Vedas. The six Vedāngas help the Vedas as shown by their name “Veda-auxiliaries”. Mimāmsā helps us to understand the Vedas, i.e. to be certain ātman’ and so on.”

27 Jayanta regards the Atharvaveda as the foremost among the four Vedas (NM I 5.5: prathamo ‘tharvavedaḥ). He spends many pages to establish its authoritativeness. The opponent thinks that it does not contribute to the dharmas taught in the three Vedas and it is outside of the three (NM I 614.7-9: atharvavedasya tu trayāyāmānātadharmopayogānupalabdhes trayīḥāhyatvena na tatsamānayogakṣematvam). First Jayanta shows the equality of the four Vedas with regard to validity, name and contribution (NM I 626.11-12: tena pramāṇatāyam vedasvādhyaśabdavācyatve puruṣārthasādhanavidhāv api catvārah samā vedāḥ). Then he tries to show that the Atharvaveda is the first of all four (NM I 626.14-15: atharvaveda eva prathamāḥ). We can see another reason that Jayanta prefers a fourteen-fold to fourfold division of sciences, which refers to the Vedas as trayi instead of catvāro vedāḥ.

28 Nyāyamañjarī, 1st āhniκa: smṛtiśāstram api manvādyupanibaddham aṣṭakāśikhamaprapāpravartanādipuruṣārthasādhanopadeṣy eva drśyate. NM I 5.10-11. “A Smṛti-teaching composed by Manu or other [teachers] is also seen to teach [people] means for the aims of human beings, such as Aṣṭakā, keeping a tuft of hair, and promoting drinking booths.”

29 Nyāyamañjarī, 1st āhniκa: itihāsapurāṇāhhyām apy upākhyaṇādivarananena vaidika evārthaḥ prāyena (prāyena) Mkhag1; prāyaḥ M) pratanyate. NM I 6.2-3. “The same content of the Veda is in most cases expanded by the Itihāsas and Purāṇas too, by telling tales and so on.”

30 Nyāyamañjarī, 1st āhniκa: aṅgāni vyākaraṇaḥkalpajyotiḥśikṣāchandoniruktāni
about Vedic passages and their meanings. Nyāya protects the authoritativeness of the Vedas, as we will see later in some depth.

Nyāya, 1st āhnika: vicāram antareṇāvyavasthitavedavyārthānāvadhāraṇān mimāṃsā vedavyārthāvasthiśārvāmarāmābhāvāyasya karaṇasya (vedākhyasya karaṇasya) G1; vedākarasya M) itikartavyatāram anubhavantī vidyāsthānatāṃ pratipadyante. tathā ca hāṭṭah --- dharme prāmiyāme tu vedena karaṇātmanā/itikartavyatāhāgam mimāṃsā pūrayisyati// (Bṛhaṭṭīkā; cf. PrP 404.15-16) iti. ata eva saptamam angam iti na ganyate mimāṃsā. pratyāsannatvena vedākadesahhūtatvāt. vicārasahāyo hi śabdāḥ svārthāṃ nirākāṅkṣam prabodhayitum kṣamah. NM 1 6.13-7.5. “Because without investigation one can not ascertain an undetermined meaning of a Vedic sentence, Mimāṃsā, which is essentially an investigation of meanings of Vedic passages, becomes a branch of science by taking the form of itikartavyatā (subordinate means for activity) of the Veda, which corresponds to karaṇa (means for activity). And this is taught by Kumārila [as follows]: ‘But when one cognizes a dharma through the Veda which corresponds to karaṇa, it is Mimāṃsā which can fulfill the role of itikartavyatā.’ That is the very reason why Mimāṃsā is not counted as the seventh auxiliary. For it is a part of the Veda as being close [to it]. For speech can communicate its meaning without further expectation [only] when it is helped by an investigation.”

The same scheme is repeated again with a clearer division of sāksātpuruṣārthasādhana-padesī and tadupayogī. Nyāya, 4th āhnika: sarvathā tavad vedās catvārah purāṇam smṛtir iti śad imāni vidyāsthānāni sāksātpuruṣārthasādhana-padesī pūrvoktāryā pramāṇam. vyākaraṇādini tu śad angāny aṅgatvenaiva tadupayogī, na sāksādharma-padesī. ... mimāṃsā vedākhyārthāvasthiśārvāmarāmābhāvāyasya karaṇasya (vedākhyasya karaṇasya) G1; vedākarasya M) itikartavyatāram anubhavantī vidyāsthānatāṃ pratipadyante. tathā ca hāṭṭah --- dharme prāmiyāme tu vedena karaṇātmanā/itikartavyatāhāgam mimāṃsā pūrayisyati// (Bṛhaṭṭīkā; cf. PrP 404.15-16) iti. ata eva saptamam angam iti na ganyate mimāṃsā. pratyāsannatvena vedākadesahhūtatvāt. vicārasahāyo hi śabdāḥ svārthāṃ nirākāṅkṣam prabodhayitum kṣamah. NM 1 6.13-7.5. “Because without investigation one can not ascertain an undetermined meaning of a Vedic sentence, Mimāṃsā, which is essentially an investigation of meanings of Vedic passages, becomes a branch of science by taking the form of itikartavyatā (subordinate means for activity) of the Veda, which corresponds to karaṇa (means for activity). And this is taught by Kumārila [as follows]: ‘But when one cognizes a dharma through the Veda which corresponds to karaṇa, it is Mimāṃsā which can fulfill the role of itikartavyatā.’ That is the very reason why Mimāṃsā is not counted as the seventh auxiliary. For it is a part of the Veda as being close [to it]. For speech can communicate its meaning without further expectation [only] when it is helped by an investigation.”
Thus the fourteen-fold division enables Jayanta to bring together the goals of all sciences into a single, invisible fruit, either liberation or heaven and so on, the foremost teacher of which is the Veda. We can see the advantage of introducing a new division: it functions as a map of branches of science which is more Veda-oriented than the old one. While in the old scheme Nyāya is an independent branch leading to liberation, the new one makes it subordinate to the Vedas. In order to keep this characteristic feature of being Veda-oriented, the new division excludes politics and agriculture, i.e. branches of science which concern the visible world, and thereby secures their independence from the Vedas.  

b The purpose of Nyāya described in the Nyāyamañjari

We have seen the place of Nyāya among branches of science according to the fourteen-fold division, which Jayanta introduces with the intention of showing a Veda-oriented map of science. Now let us look closely at the role of Nyāya. According to the tradition, Nyāya aims in particular at liberation, for which Nyāya gives us tattvajñāna, mainly prameya-tattvajñāna, while pramāṇa contributes in general for all activities and sciences. Jayanta, however, explicitly defines Nyāya as a science which aims to protect the authoritativeness of the Vedas.

\[ Nyāyamañjari, \text{ I st āhnika: nyāyavistarās tu mūlastambhahhūtah sarvavidyānām, vedaprāmāṇya-∗rakṣa-hetutvāt. NM I 7.7-8.} \]
\[ ∗-rakṣa-] M ; omits MkhaG1 \]

Nyāyavistara [taught by Aksapāda], on the other hand, is the basic trunk of sentences. Nyāyavistara is a cause of ascertaining the authoritativeness of the Vedas. This is [already] taught in the very beginning [of this book]. Therefore these fourteen branches of science are means of valid cognition. Some teach directly [and] some contribute to the former. —This is established.”

Jayanta himself tries to solve a possible contradiction with the old view of fourfold division. Nyāyamañjari, 1st āhnika: nanu catasraś ced vidyās tat katham caturdaśa darśitāḥ. naiśa virodhāḥ. vārtādandanītyor drśtaikaprayojanatvena sarvapurūṣarthopadeśivyāvargre gaṇanānarhatvāt trayyānvikṣikyoś ca tatra nirdeśāt tāṣ 1) caturdaśaiva vidyāḥ. NM I 9.12-14.

1) nirdeśāt tāṣ G1 ; nirdeśāc M

“[Q:] If sciences are four, why [did you] show fourteen [sciences]? [A:] This is not a contradiction. Sciences of agriculture and politics, because they aim at only observed [results] (drśta), cannot be enumerated in the group of sciences which teach [means for] the aims of human beings in general; and the three Vedas (trāyī) and ānvikṣiki are shown in that [fourteen-fold list]. Therefore those fourteen [branches] alone are sciences.”

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all branches of science, because it is a means for protecting the Vedas’ authoritateness.

As we have seen in the Āgadāmbara, Buddhists and other heretics attack the Veda, which is now almost falling to the ground unless someone protects it.

Nyāyamañjarī, 1st āhnikā: vedēṣu hi tārkika1-racitatukaravipakāvyapramāṇyāṣu śīthilitāsthāh katham iva bahuvittavyāyāsādisādhyām vedārthānusāthānam ādriyertān sādhavaḥ. NM I 7.8-10.
1) tārkika-] G1; austārkika- M

For, when their confidence in the Vedas becomes shaky because their validity is destroyed by the bad speculation of philosophers, then how can good people care about the performance of the objects of the Vedas which is accomplished through spending a lot of money, energy and so on?

Śrītis, Purāṇas and the Itihāsas are independent subbranches and are too far away from the main branch to protect it. Six Vedāṅgas and Mīmāṃsā are, as it were, busy with their own work, i.e. to help their boss in his office. They are not strong enough to save the Veda in a fight with heretics. Only Nyāya can do it.

Nyāyamañjarī, 1st āhnikā: kim vā tadānīm1 svāmini parimālā śīthilāmahānāparijēna kṛtyam iti. NM I 7.10-11.
1) tadānīm] G1; omits M

Or, at that time [when good people’s faith in the Vedas has become shaky], since the master has become faint, what is the use of the attendants, i.e. branches of science such as Mīmāṃsā, who follow that [master]?

Protecting the Veda is a unique job suitable only for Nyāya, which in fact contributes to the other sciences through saving their so-called master (svāmin). In this sense Nyāya can be a science with a wide scope.

Nyāyamañjarī, 1st āhnikā: tasām adṣesaduṣṭatārākṣopadāvărakrādydhara-ravedpramāṇyāpratayādāhāhīnyāyopadeśaksamam aksapādopadiṣṭam idam nyāyavistārākhyānāṃ śāstrāṃ śāstrapratiṣṭhānani bandhanam iti dhuryam vidyāsthānam. NM I 7.11-14.

Therefore this teaching called Nyāyavistara taught by Aksapāda, which is capable of teaching logic that provides a firmer faith in the authoritateness of the Vedas through crushing all bad philosophers, is the base for establishing [all] teachings; thus it is the most responsible branch of science.

Nyāya contributes particularly to save the Veda and through this unique job makes
some more general contributions.

Thus the principal task of Nyāya is to establish the authoritativeness of the Vedas. Jayanta in fact spends hundreds of pages proving the Vedas’ authoritativeness. The chapters of śabda-parikṣā consist of more than one third of the whole Nyāyamañjarī. And the elaborate arguments expounded in these chapters are, as Jayanta states in the beginning, intended to establish the Vedas’ authoritativeness. Consistent with this is his unique interpretation of Nyāyasūtra 1.1.7, “ātopadesaḥ śabdaḥ”. This sūtra proves the authoritativeness of verbal testimony in general on the ground that it is speech by a reliable person (āpta). The tradition puts effort into defining conditions for “being reliable” (āptatva). After showing this orthodox interpretation, Jayanta suggests an alternative one.

Nyāyamañjarī. 3rd āhnika: atha vā vedaprāmāṇyasiddhyarthatvāc chāstrasya tātraparavatvā pratyakṣasvarṣasya yathāṣrutam evem laksanam. sa śāktasūrtadharma eva, dharmaśyeṣvarapratyakṣasagocaratvāt. NM I 401.1-3.

Or because the [Nyāya] teaching is for the sake of establishing the Vedas’ authoritativeness, this definition [can be interpreted] literally as referring to God, i.e. the reliable author of those [Vedas]. He is one who has perceived [and therefore reached] dharma directly [i.e. fulfils the definition of an āpta], because dharma is an object of God’s perception.

Thus, according to Jayanta, we can say that the essence of this huge Nyāya-tree lies in this proof. (My own reconstruction which I would like to name paramaparamo nyāyah.)

vedāḥ pramāṇam
āptahūtasarvajñāparameṣvarapraniṣāt
yat yat āptotam tat tat pramāṇam yathāyurvedah
vedā āptotīh
tasād vedāḥ pramāṇam

c Jayanta’s deviation from the Nyāya orthodoxy

It is clear that Jayanta deviates from the tradition. What, then, does he have to say to reconcile his own view with the orthodoxy? His view is given in his interpretation of Nyāyasūtra 1.1.1, where he himself puts forward a question about the conflict between the two.

Nyāyamañjarī, 1st āhnika: nanu sōdaśapadārthataśvajñānasya katham nīḥśreyasādhiḥgamahetutvam iti vaktavyam. vedaprāmāṇyasiddhyartham idam1) śāstram iti tāvanātram eva vyutpādyatām, kim sōdaśapadārthakaanthāgranthanena. NM I 22.2-4

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Jayanta, following the three divisions of sixteen *padārthas* introduced by Vātsyāyana, accepts the tradition that the *prameya-tattvajñāna* leads one directly to liberation. But he deviates from the tradition when he says that we are informed of the causal relationship between ātmādi and liberation only by the Upaniṣads. Vātsyāyana indeed feared this kind of reductionism which might destroy Nyāya’s independence. But Jayanta simply admits it and makes consistent his view that Nyāya is for the sake of the Veda.

As for the knowledge of the twelve kinds of *prameyas* which start with ātman and end with liberation, we will state that it is a cause of accomplishing liberation directly without being at all a means for other knowledge. But [our] knowledge that [the knowledge of] those *prameyas* such as ātman is a means for liberation is solely based on the [Vedic] scripture.

Thus the Veda enjoys the status of being the sole provider of the causal knowledge.

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34 Jayanta regards liberation as the highest goal of Nyāya-teaching. Nyāyamañjarī, 9th āhnikā: evaṁ śarīrādau duhkhapsaryante hēye prameya nirṇīte yadarthā etadupadesāḥ, yat param upādeyam prameyam, yadarthāḥ śāstrāraṃbhāḥ, tam apavargam lakṣayitum āha. NM II 430.3-4. “Thus we ascertained [ten] *prameyas*, i.e. beginning with body and ending with pain, which should be avoided (heya). [Now Aksapāda] teaches [sūtra 1.1.22] to define liberation, for which he taught these [ten *prameyas*], which is a supreme *prameya* to be obtained, and for which [Nyāya]-science starts.”

35 Strictly speaking, the subject to be informed should be understood as ordinary people like us, who are not yogins, as Jayanta noted in NM 4.18 (… asmadādeḥ, na yoginām iva …).
for liberation, and also for heaven and so on.\textsuperscript{36} In order to determine this scriptural authoritiveness through other pramāṇas, mainly through anumāna, give us confidence in it and protect its authoritiveness from enemies, Nyāya supplies us with good instruments, i.e. pramāṇas with the help of doubt and so on (samśayādi).\textsuperscript{37}

d Jayanta’s uniqueness on śāstraprayojana as seen in the Nyāya tradition

\textsuperscript{36} Therefore Aksapāda, when he teaches the causal relationship between ātmajñāna and liberation, repeats what the Vedas said. Nyāyamañjari, 9th āhnikā: yat tu kutas tasya niḥśreyasasādhanatvam avagatam iti. aksapādavacanād iti brūmah. aksapādas tāvad evam upadīṣṭavān ‘ātmajñānāni niḥśreyasādhitgamah’ iti. na ca nispramāṇakam artham esa ṛṣir upādiṣad iti bhavitavyam atra pramāṇena. tat tu vaidikam vidhīvākyam ātmā jñātavya iti. NM II 461.9-12. “With regard to the question how we know that this [ātmajñāna] is a means of final beatitude, we reply: [we know it] from the statement of Aksapāda. First Aksapāda taught that one obtains final beatitude through the knowledge of ātman. And there must be some source (pramāṇa) of this because this sage could not have taught a thing without any source. And (tu) that [source] is a Vedic injunctive sentence ‘One should know the ātman’.”

\textsuperscript{37} Nyāyamañjari, 1st āhnikā: tasya [āgamasya] prāmāṇyanirṇītir anumānanibandhanaḥ/ āptoktatvam ca talingam avinābhāvi vakṣyate/ pratibandhagrahe tasya prayākṣam upayujyate/ ... upamānām tu kvacit karmanī sopolvamam ... samsayaḍayas tu padārthā yathāsambhavam pramāṇeṣu prameyēṣu cantarbhavarto 'pi nyāyapravṛtti hetutvāt prthag upadiśyante. nyāyaḥ ca vedaprāmāṇya-pratiṣṭhāpana*,-pūrvvaktavena puruṣārthapayogitvam upayātītī darśitam. NM I 22.11-23.3. (*-pratiṣṭhāpana-\textsuperscript{M} ; -pratiṣṭhā-\textsuperscript{G1}) “To ascertain that it (āgama) is valid is based on inference. And being spoken by a reliable person (āptoktatva) will be stated later as its (=prāmāṇya’s) inferential mark as being invariably concomitant [with it]. Perception is useful to grasp the essential connection of that [āptoktatva with prāmāṇya]. ... As for comparison, it is useful for a certain ritual. ... As for the principles such as doubt, although they are accordingly included [under the category of] pramāṇas and prameyas, they are taught separately because they are the cause for Nyāya to operate. And it is already taught that Nyāya becomes contributive to the aim of human beings through establishing the authoritiveness of the Vedas.” Nyāyamañjari, 1st āhnikā: tad evam upadeśavāyāḥ padārthāḥ samśayādayah/ tanmūlaṁyāyanirneyayavedaprāmāṇya- siddhaye// NM I 28.9-10. “In this way, therefore, the principles such as doubt should be taught so that the authoritiveness of the Vedas, which is to be ascertained by logic based on these [doubt etc.], will be established.”

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The Nyāya tradition regards itself as an independent science for liberation. That is why Vātsyāyana introduces a fourfold division of branches of science. The main cause of achieving liberation is prameya-tattvajñāna, which becomes possible through pramāṇas. According to Vātsyāyana, pramāṇa has wider scope: it supports all actions and shines as a single light for all sciences. On the contrary, prameya-tattvajñāna is for liberation in particular. But there is an unfavorable possibility that Nyāya might be dissolved into Upaniṣadic teachings, because both give ātmajñāna for the sake of liberation. In order to avoid this undesirable consequence, Vātsyāyana puts forward samśayādi as Nyāya’s distinguishing mark.

Deviating from the tradition, Jayanta insists that Nyāya aims to protect the authoritateness of the Vedas. That is the reason why he introduces the fourteen-fold division of branches of science instead of the fourfold. He accepts that the direct cause of liberation is prameya-tattvajñāna. But the most important knowledge for liberation, i.e. cognition of the causal relationship between ātmādi and liberation, is originally given by the Upaniṣads and not by Nyāya. Therefore Nyāya’s main job is not concerned with prameya as the tradition intends, but rather with pramāṇa. Jayanta interprets the old metaphor of Nyāya as “support” and “light” in a specific context that Nyāya helps other colleagues, too, through protecting their boss, i.e. the Veda.

Nyāyamañjarī, 1st āhnika:

tenāgamapramāṇatadvārākhalaphalapradā/
iyam ānvikṣikī vidyā vidyāsthāneṣu ganyate//
āha ca bhāsyakāraḥ

pradipah sarvavidyānām upāyah sarvakarmanām/
āśrayah sarvadharmānām vidyoddeṣe parikṣitā*// NM 1 28.11-15.

*parikṣitā | MG1, J (variant given in ND1’s footnote) | prakṛitiḥ ND1ND2Ch

Therefore this science ānvikṣikī is counted as an [individual] science among branches of science, because it gives every fruit through [establishing] the authoritateness of the scripture. And the author of the Bhāṣya says, “[This ānvikṣikī] is examined [and established] in the enumeration of sciences as a light of all sciences, means of all actions, [and] substratum of all dharmaṃs.

Jayanta’s uniqueness lies in the fact that he consistently regards Nyāya as Veda-oriented. And this attitude becomes manifest as a shift of emphasis from prameya to pramāṇa.

5 Nyāya’s Unique Job, heavy for Mimāmsā

a Mimāmsā’s contribution to the Vedas: vedavākyārthavicāra as śāstraprayojana

Jayanta thinks that it is the unique job of Nyāya to protect the authoritateness of
the Vedas. But this raises a question. It is possible for Nyāya’s colleague, Mimāṃsā, to do it. So could Nyāya be dismissed altogether?

Nyāyamañjarī. 1st āhnika: nanu vedapramāṇanyanirnayaprayojanaś cen
nyāyavistarāḥ, kṛtam anena, mimāṃsāta eva tatsiddheḥ. tatra hy
arthavicāravat prāmāṇyavicāro ’pi kṛta eva. NM I 10.2-4.

[Q:] If the Nyāyavistara [taught by Akṣapāda] aims to determine the validity of
the Vedas, it (Nyāyavistara) is not necessary [at all], because that
(vedapramāṇanyanirṇaya) is established just by Mimāṃsā. For that examines
the validity of the Vedas as well as their meanings.

Jayanta tries to avoid making Nyāya redundant on two grounds: it is not
Mimāṃsā’s main job to protect the Vedas’ authoritativeness, because it has its own
job; furthermore Mimāṃsā is in fact unable to protect the Vedas’ authoritativeness.

In order to clear the way for his first reason, he defined in advance the purpose
of Mimāṃsā, faithfully following Kumārila.

Nyāyamañjarī. 1st āhnika: satyam. sa tv ānuṣaṅgikaḥ. tatra mukhyas tv
arthavicāra eva. prthakprasthānā himā vidyāḥ. sā ca vākyārthavidyā, na
pramāṇavidyeti. NM I 10.4-6.

True! But that (prāmāṇyavicāra) is secondary. What is primary there is only
to examine [the Vedas’] meanings. For these sciences have individual topics.
And that (Mimāṃsā) is a science for examining the meaning of sentences
and not a science of pramāṇas.

Thus, following Mimāṃsā’s own self-reflection, Jayanta succeeds in restricting
Mimāṃsā to her secretarial role, i.e. the examination of meanings of Vedic
sentences (vedavākyārthavicāra), which helps her boss to communicate to us
dharmas (and ātman in the case of Uttaramāṃsā).

b Incompetence of Mimāṃsā for protecting the Vedas: svatahprāmāṇya and
paratahprāmāṇya

But there is the possibility that Mimāṃsā could actually invade Nyāya’s territory,
although it has its own job. And this anxiety is real, for in fact Kumārila tries to
protect the Vedas’ authoritativeness based on the svatahprāmāṇya theory. But
Jayanta states that it is not only a secondary (ānuṣaṅgika) but also an unachievable
job for Mimāṃsā.

Nyāyamañjarī. 1st āhnika: na ca mimāṃsakāḥ samyagvedapramāṇanyarakṣaṇa-
ksamām saranīm avalokayitum ksamāḥ. kutarkaṇṭhakanikaraniruddha-
saṅcāramārgābhāsaparibhrāntāḥ khalu ta iti vakṣyāmaḥ. NM I 10.6-8.

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And Mimāmsakas are not able to find a path which makes it possible to protect well the validity of the Vedas. As we will state later, they are indeed wandering on the wrong path, a narrow road obstructed by a mass of thorns of bad speculation.

Jayanta intends that the theory of svatahprāmāṇya is not competent enough to protect the authoritiveness of the Vedas and that the theory of paratahprāmāṇya alone can do it. In the third āhnikā of the Nyāyamaṇjarī, Jayanta discusses in detail validity (prāmāṇya) of cognition in general, first describing Kumārila's view and then refuting it.

According to the Mimāmsā theory of svatahprāmāṇya, cognition has validity by nature, automatically illuminates objects as they are, and does not require external confirmation.38 Cognition is exceptionally invalidated only when there is a problem:39 when there is a problem in the cognizing process (kāraṇadosa) or when there arises a counter-cognition (bādhakapratyaya) subsequently. Thus cognition is in principle reliable.40 Therefore it is not only unnecessary but destructive to have

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38 Nyāyamaṇjarī, 3rd āhnikā: ataś cotpattau svakāryakaraṇe svaprāmāṇyanīścaye ca nirapekṣatvād apekṣātryarhatavāt svatahprāmāṇyam iti siddham. tad uktam (Ślokavārttika, codanā v. 47) --- svatah sarvaprāmāṇāṁ prāmāṇya iti grhyatām/ na hi svato 'sati śaktih kartum anyena pāryate// NM I 431.8-12. “And therefore, it is established that [a pramāṇa] is intrinsically valid because it is free from three kinds of dependence: because it does not require [something external] in order to arise [as a valid cognition], in order to accomplish its own task, and in order to determine its validity. This is taught [by Kumārila]: ‘One should know that all pramāṇas are valid by themselves. For an external thing cannot produce a capacity if it does not exist innately’.”

39 Nyāyamaṇjarī, 3rd āhnikā: sthitte cātvam autsargike prāmānye, yatra tasyāpavādah kvacid bhavati tatrāprāmāṇyam. NM I 431.10-11. “And in this way once it is established that validity is innate, [only] that is invalid which, [only] in some cases, has an exceptional rejection (apavāda).”

40 Nyāyamaṇjarī, 3rd āhnikā: dvividha evāpavādah: bādhakapratyayah kāraṇadosajñānām ca. tad uktam bhāsyakṛtā---yatra duṣṭam kāraṇaṃ yatra ca mithyeti pratyayah, sa evāsamicinah pratyayah nānya (Śārabhadhāsa ad 1.1.3-5, vṛttikāra, Frauwallner [1968:26.20-21] (yasya ca duṣṭaṃ)) iti. vṛttikakāro 'py āha---tasmād bodhātmakatvena prāptaḥ buddheḥ pramāṇatā/ arthānyathāvahetūdhadosajñānād apodyate// (Ślokavārttika, codanā v. 53) iti. NM I 431.13-18. “Exceptional rejection (apavāda) is only of two kinds: a counter-cognition (bādhakapratyaya) and a cognition of defects in causes
excessive doubts about its validity.

Nyāyamaṇjarī, 3rd āhnika:

 hình bupādyamānas tu hinasti sakalāh kriyāḥ/
 svabhāryaparirāṃbhe ‘pi bhaven mātari samśayah// NM I 433.1-2.

But [a doubt] which is forcibly made to arise destroys all activities. Even when one embraces his wife, he would have a doubt ‘Is she Mother?’.

Jayanta, refuting each point made by Kumārila, establishes paratahpramāṇya. The main point can be summarized as follows: Kumārila too admits that there are two kinds of cognition, valid and invalid. In consequence we always have doubts about the validity of cognition whether it is true or not. In order to remove this doubt, we need confirmation. Thus cognition depends on other cognition. So the paratahpramāṇya-theory is established.41 Bearing in mind this argument, Jayanta rejects Mimāmsā’s invasion of the territory of Nyāya.

Nyāyamaṇjarī, 1st āhnika: na hi pramāṇantarasaṃvādaśadārghhyam antareṇa
 pratyaśādīny api pramāṇabhāvaṃ bhajante, kim uta tadadhīnavṛttir eṣa

(kāraṇadosajhāna). Thus taught the author of the Bhāṣya: When it has a defective cause, and when it has a [counter-]cognition that it is wrong, only that is wrong cognition. The author of the Vārttika too says: Therefore the validity of a cognition, which has resulted [merely] by its being cognition in nature, is exceptionally canceled by [invalidating] cognition that the object is otherwise or by cognition of defects in causes.”

41 This is pointed out by a Prabhākara opponent in the beginning of the argument about khyāti. Nyāyamaṇjarī, 3rd āhnika: viparītakhyātāv abhyupagamyamānāyām
 bādhayobhasandarbhhasubhikṣe sati tattādharmyād anutpannahādake ‘pi bodhe
duspariharah samśayah. samāyate ca samvādaśyanveśaṇam api dhruvam avataraśīti
paratahprāmāṇyam anivāryam. NM I 452.2-5. “Once you accept [as a doctrine of
error] ‘the cognition of a wrong object’, there is an abundant supply [of the
possibility] that a deniable cognition is interwoven. Therefore due to the common
property [of being cognition] it is difficult to avoid a doubt about cognition
although it does not have a counter-cognition already arisen. And when there is a
doubt, there necessarily occurs a seeking for confirmation etc., too, and thus
extrinsic validity is inevitable.” The Siddhāntin also summarizes the point in
the same manner. Nyāyamaṇjarī, 3rd āhnika: buddhivativedhyadarśanāti/ samāyate sati
samvādasāpeṣatvam tathaiva tat// NM I 480.14-15. “Because we experience that
there are two kinds of cognition [i.e. true and false], we [necessarily] have a doubt.
Therefore it is left unsolved that cognition requires confirmation etc.”
Jayanta thinks that the passive way of Mīmāṃsā is weak. Mīmāṃsakas only repeat that cognition which arises from the Vedas is valid because we have not found any problem.

Nyāya, on the contrary, has a positive way of demonstrating a good reason for the validity of the Vedas. The Vedas are valid because they are composed by God, who creates and knows everything. In this sense, Jayanta regards Nyāya as strong enough to protect the authoritativeness of the Vedas.

6 Conclusion

The Nyāya orthodoxy on śāstraprayojana The Nyāya tradition claims that a means of liberation is the knowledge of the true nature (tattvajñāna) of, especially, the twelve prameyas which begin with ātman. Thus Vātsyāyana calls Nyāya adhyātmavidyā. But the identification of Nyāya as adhyātmavidyā causes a problem that Nyāya could be dissolved into Upaniṣadic teachings. In order to avoid this reduction, Vātsyāyana puts forward samśayādi as a distinguishing mark of Nyāya, which should have a separate topic (prthakprasthāna) from other sciences, especially the Upaniṣads, in a map of the four branches of science (caturvidyāsthāna). While prameyatattvajñāna aims at liberation in particular, pramāṇa contributes in general to all activities and all sciences.

Jayanta’s view on śāstraprajujana Jayanta replaces a fourfold with a fourteen-fold division of sciences, all of which are concerned with invisible objects (adrṣṭa) and related to the Vedas. Thus he presents a Veda-oriented map of sciences. In this map Nyāya contributes to the Veda by protecting its authoritativeness (vedaprāmāṇyarakṣā) essentially through an inference based on āptoktatva together with various subordinate arguments.

While vedaprāmāṇyarakṣā is a unique as well as a wide-reaching job for Nyāya, the role of prameyatattvajñāna is rather suppressed by Jayanta, who admits the reduction which Vātsyāyana fears. Thus Jayanta shifts the emphasis from prameya to pramāṇa and as a result solves an unconvincing claim by the tradition that Nyāya
is a unique science supplying an adhyātmavidyā in particular.

There might be various external reasons for Jayanta to introduce the vedaprāmāṇyarakṣa as the purpose of Nyāya, e.g. in order to defend an orthodox brahmin against an attack by nāstikas such as Buddhists; Jayanta’s social and political situation and so on. One thing I have confirmed in this paper is that to change a job from prameyatattvajñāna (especially adhyātmavidyā) to vedaprāmāṇyarakṣa is in fact to protect the independent position of Nyāya, about which Jayanta is quite nervous, especially with respect to Mīmāṃsā, which might deprive Nyāya of a new job. Thus he succeeds in showing a more convincing reason for readers to study Nyāya instead of repeating an old view which is rather weak in its claim of Nyāya’s uniqueness.

Abbreviations and Bibliography


M  Adopted readings in the Mysore edition of the Nyāyamaṇḍari.


Mkha  Variant readings given in the footnotes of the Mysore edition.

Mvar  Variant readings given in the endnotes of the Mysore edition.

ND1  Nyāyadarśana of Gautama with the Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana, the Vārttika of Uddyotakara. the Tātparyatikā of Vācaspati & the Pariśuddhi of Udayana. Ed. Anantatalal Thakur. Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1967.


