1 Introduction: Vedaprāmāṇya according to Jayanta

a Vedaprāmāṇya in the Āgamaḍamba

The ninth century¹ Kashmirian author Bhaṭṭa Jayanta,² a Naiyāyika famous for his magnum opus Nyāyamaṇji, wrote a play Āgamaḍamba, in which a young Mimāmsaka named Saṅkṛṣana takes a major role. Saṅkṛṣana appears in this way:

Āgamaḍamba, 1st anka:

svādhyāyaḥ pathito yathāvidhi parāṃśūṇi cāṅgūni śan
mimāṃsāpi nirūpātī vihitam karma dvijanmocitaḥ/
nityādhitakutākadbhāṣaragirām yāvat tu vedadvīṣām
nyakkāro na kṛtah kṛtārtha iva me tāvan na vidyāśramah//
agryāḥ caite vedaviplavakṛtāṃ kubuddhayah śauddhodanīśāḥyāḥ, tad enān
eva stenān iva tāvan nigrhṇīmāḥ. AḌ 52.3-12 (9.22-10.4)

I learned my Veda according to the rule, reflected upon six Vedāṅgas and mastered Mimāmsā, too. In this way, I completed the duty expected of a Brahmin. It is, however, as if [all] the trouble [I took] to study (vidyā śrama)³ has not achieved its goal until I humiliate the enemies of the

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¹ Hegde [1983:15] “Thus the date of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta falls, beyond any doubt, between 820 A. D. and 900 A. D.”
² He calls himself Bhaṭṭajayanta instead of Jayantabhaṭṭa. Āgamaḍamba 1st anka: śaśāva eva vyākaraṇavivarāṇaṅkaranād vṛttikāra iti prathitāparanāmno bhaṭṭajayantaṣya ... AḌ 32.13-15 (2.22-23).
³ Dr. V. Raghavan (in his introduction to the edition of the Āgamaḍamba, x) seems to interpret this compound as “vidyā-śramaḥ” (period for study). “[H]e feels his duty is not yet fully discharged.” Jayanta, however, implies here that Saṅkṛṣana’s learning (śruta), i.e. effort for knowledge (vidyā-śrama), would be useless if he does not defeat his opponents and effect a change in the social
Vedas, those who always agitate their voice made dusty by their bad speculation. And the foremost among those who destroy the Vedas are these stupid [Buddhists], pupils of [the Buddha] son of Śuddhodana. Therefore, I will punish them first of all like thieves.

What makes this snātaka angry is the transgression of Vedic dharmas and the refutation of the Vedas’ authoritativeness by nāstikas, against whom he starts a campaign to protect the Vedas and defeats a Buddhist teacher Dharmottara and a Jain teacher Jinaraksita. Succeeding in convincing the king to ban one of the most corrupt sects, the Nālāmbaras, he is appointed to a government post for religious affairs. The play ends in a long lecture by a Naiyāyika chairman named Dhairyarāsi, who tries to establish the authoritativeness of the Vedas (vedaprāmāṇya) as well as that of all āgamas (sarvāgama-prāmāṇya).

In the Āgama-dhāmbara Jayanta tries to establish the authoritativeness of all āgamas mainly by applying an argument similar to that applied to the Vedas. The same is
true of the Nyāyamañjarī, where the Vedas’ authoritativeness is a central concern. Indeed, Jayanta states in the beginning of the book that it is Nyāya’s purpose to protect the Vedas’ authoritativeness (vedapraṃāṇyaraksā).\textsuperscript{7} And this attitude penetrates the whole Nyāyamañjarī, in particular the most important section śabda-parīkṣā (3-6 ānikas), which covers more than one third of the text (554 pages of 1419 in the Mysore edition), as is clearly shown by Jayanta himself when he summarizes its various subordinate arguments which aim at a single goal of proving the Veda as authoritative (NM I 412.11-415.3).

c Problems and questions

With regard to the Nyāya tradition, however, it seems that Jayanta’s statement not only deviates from it but also contradicts the orthodoxy, which officially claims that Nyāya gives us knowledge of the true nature (tattvajñāna) of, in particular, the twelve prameyas, which leads us to liberation directly, i.e. without depending on the Vedas.\textsuperscript{8}

Veda [never does]. Or if [they accept that] the Vedas have no beginning and therefore become intrinsically valid, [they may as well accept that] those teachings e.g. of Pāṇcatātra [become intrinsically valid too] in the same manner."

Cf. Nyāyakalikā: tatra [vaidikeṣu racaneṣu] śvātantryam iśvarasyeti tatpranītatvena vedāḥ pramāṇam iti. vedavad āgamaṅṭarāṇy api tanmūlatvād āptaprāṇītatvād vā pramāṇam iti veditavyāṇi. NK 4.11-14. “God is the author of those [Vedic scriptures]. Therefore the Vedas are means of valid cognition because they are composed by Him. In the same manner as the Vedas, other scriptures too should be understood as means of valid cognition because they are Veda-based or composed by reliable persons.” Nyāyamañjarī, 4th ānika: anye sarvāgamaṁ tu prāmaṇyam pratipedire/ ... sarvatra vedavat karturar āptasya parikalpanāt/ Kataoka [2004:193.3-5] (NM I 640.6-8). “Others however understand that all scriptures are valid. ... For in all cases [of scriptures] reliable authors are postulated as in the case of the Vedas.”

\textsuperscript{7} Nyāyamañjarī, 1st ānika: nyāyavistarās tu mūlastambhabhūṭaḥ sarvāvidyānām, vedapraṃāṇa-ṛakṣa-hetūtvāt. NM I 7.7-8. (*-rakṣa-) M; omits. MkhaG\textsubscript{1} “Nyāyavistarā, on the other hand, is the basic trunk of all sciences, because it is a means for protecting the Vedas’ authoritativeness.”

\textsuperscript{8} Jayanta does not feel it to be a big problem to accept the traditional view that
How, then, should we place Jayanta’s view in the Nyāya tradition? Why does he need to bring in an apparently new idea, instead of repeating the old one? Are there any problems in the orthodox view? How does he describe the purpose of Nyāya? What is the place of Nyāya in the large picture of the various branches of learning? How does he think Nyāya protects the authoritativeness of the Vedas? Are Mimāṃsakas unable to do so?

In order to answer these questions, first we shall look at a model description by Patañjali of śāstra-prayojana, then the Nyāya orthodoxy, and finally investigate Jayanta’s own description and discussion.

2 Patañjali on śāstra-prayojana: five Veda-oriented purposes of grammar
Patañjali starts his Mahabhāṣya by enumerating five purposes of grammar, all of which are in various ways connected with the Vedas:\(^9\)

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{rakṣa}: protects the Vedas, viz. preserves it correctly.
  \item \textit{ūha}: changes mantras in proper forms when they are applied.
  \item \textit{āgama}: an unquestionable injunction to study the Veda also implies that grammar should necessarily be studied, since it is the main (pradhāna) of all six Vedāṅgas.
  \item \textit{laghu}: grammar is the easiest way to know language, i.e. the Vedas and so on.
  \item \textit{asamdeha}: grammar removes doubts (and makes one certain) about the Vedas.
\end{itemize}

By applying Patañjali’s terminology to Mimāṃsā, one could say that the latter has two combined purposes as its aim, i.e. \textit{āgama} and \textit{asamdeha}: the injunction to study the Veda “svādhyāyo ‘dhyetavyaḥ”, also implies Mimāṃsā study, because hermeneutics is necessary to make sense of the Vedas, i.e. to remove doubts and bring about determinate knowledge about the meaning of the Vedas.

Nyāya aims at liberation (NM II 264.19: \textit{niḥśreyasārthatvāc chāstrasya}). He can accept that \textit{prameyatattvajñāna} leads one to liberation directly (NM II 264.20-265.1: \textit{prameyajñānasya pramāṇajñānavad anyajñānopayogitām antarena svata eva mithyājñānanirvṛttyādikramenāpavargahetutvapratijñānāt}). But he does not accept Nyāya’s independence of the Vedas, because the Vedas are the original sole provider of \textit{ātmajñāna} and Akṣapāda bases himself on the Vedas when he teaches that \textit{ātmajñāna} is a means for liberation (NM II 461.9-12. See my later discussion 4c, “Jayanta’s deviation from the Nyāya orthodoxy”). I thank Dr. Alex Watson for reminding me of Jayanta’s relevant passage in the \textit{Atmavāda}.

\(9\) \textit{Mahabhāṣya}, paspaśāhnika, VMBh I 1.14-2.2. Jayanta (in the \textit{pūrpavakṣa}) mentions these five purposes in NM II 233.
Among the remaining possibilities, Jayanta can be regarded as having chosen raksā, with a modification of Patañjali's meaning: he says that Nyāya protects the Vedas from enemies. The orthodox Nyāya view, however, seems different. Nyāya does not feel it essential or necessary, even as an excuse, to present itself as connected with the Vedas. For Nyāya is an independent method for acquiring the knowledge which leads one to liberation. Let us look at the orthodox view about the purpose of Nyāya described in the Nyāyasūtra and the Nyāyabhāṣya.

3 The Nyāya orthodoxy on sāstraprayojana
a The purpose of Nyāya described in the Nyāyasūtra: tattvajñānān nihśreyasādhigamah

Nyāyasūtra 1.1.1, enumerating sixteen padārthas which will be discussed later, states the purpose of this science (*sāstra-prayojana).

Nyāyasūtra 1.1.1: pramāṇaprameyasamśayaprayojananadrṣṭānta-siddhāntavatarkanirnayavādajalpavitandāhetvābhāsa-echalajātinigrasthānānām tattvajñānān nihśreyasādhigamah//
One obtains final beatitude from the knowledge of the true nature of pramāṇa, prameya, samśaya, prayojana, drṣṭānta, siddhānta, avayava, tarka, nirṇaya, vāda, jalpa, vitanḍā, hetvābhāsa, chala, jūti and nigrasthāna.

Nyāya gives us the knowledge of the true nature of these sixteen principles, which leads us to final beatitude (nihśreyasa).10

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10 The relationship between nihśreyasa and apavarga is problematic and therefore some scholars have tried to clarify it. Cf. ‘Sekundärliteratur’ given in Slaje [1986].

According to the Nyāyabhāṣya, nihśreyasa is a general term for the good which includes various fruits of each science. Therefore we can postulate a fruit proper for each science (ND1 5.17: tad idam tattvajñānam nihśreyasādhigamaḥ ca yathāvidyām veditavyam). Thus apavarga which Nyāya gives is one of possible nihśrayasas (ND1 5.17-19: iha tv adhyātma-vidyāyām ... nihśreyasādhigamo 'pavargaprāptiḥ').

The Nyāyavārttika divides nihśreyasa into two, visible and invisible (ND1 13.14: nihśreyasam punar drṣṭādṛṣṭabhedād dvedhā bhavati). The visible nihśreyasa is that which arises from pramāṇādītatattvajñāna (ND1 13.14-15: tatra pramāṇādipadārthata-tattvajñānād drṣṭām nihśreyasam) as is shown in the Nyāyasūtra 1.1.1. The invisible nihśreyasa is that which arises from prameyatattvajñāna (ND1 13.16-17: param tu nihśreyasam atmādhe prameyasya tattvajñānād bhavati) as is shown in the Nyāyasūtra 1.1.2. The former nihśreyasa, which corresponds to (or includes?) jīvanmukti (ND1 152.8), arises directly (ND1 152.6-7: yat tāvad aparam
The following sūtra 1.1.2 shows the process to reach liberation (apavarga) through the knowledge of the true nature (tattvajñāna).

Nyāyāsūtra 1.1.2: duḥkhajanamaprayr̥t̥idharmaṇyājñānāṁ uttarottarāpye tadanantarāpyaḥ(1) apavargaḥ//
1) -pāyād[ ND2Ch, Slaje [1986: 164, n.7] ; -bhāvād ND1
Among pain, [re]birth, undertaking, evil qualities and false knowledge, when each following item perishes, each preceding item perishes [respectively]. From that arises liberation.

niḥśreyasam tat tattvajñānānantaram eva bhavati), while the latter does indirectly (ND1 152.9: param tu niḥśreyasam tattvajñānāt kramena bhavati). According to Uddyotakara, therefore, niḥśreyasa in the first sūtra is visible lower fruit (drṣṭa, apara), while the apavarga in the second sūtra is invisible higher fruit (adrṣṭa, para). Cf. Slaje [1986:174]: “Und so hat Vācaspatai wie Uddyotakara die Aussage von NSū 1.1.1 unter dem Aspekt der Lebenderlösung gedeutet, und diese Form einer „niedrigeren Erlösung“ in den Kontext der „endgültigen Erlösung“ von NSū 1.1.2 als Vorstufe integriert.”

Therefore there lies a possible contradiction with Vātsyāyana, who interprets niḥśreyasa in the first sūtra as general and apavarga in the second sūtra as particular for Nyāya and thus the former includes the latter. For these two are different for Uddyotakara. I would like to point out two odd attitudes of Uddyotakara: first he keeps silent about the purpose of the Upaniṣads, while he mentions svargapraṇāti as a purpose of the three Vedas (ND1 21.10-12). Uddyotakara, as a vārttikākāra, should have explained that the purpose of the pūrvakāṇḍa is svargādi and that of the uttarakāṇḍa is mokṣa. But he avoids it. He might have hesitated to say explicitly that the niḥśreyasa in the first sūtra includes mokṣa, because mokṣa (except for jīvanmukti) corresponds to the apavarga in the second sūtra; second he skips commenting on the Nyāyabhāṣya (ND1 5.17-19=ND1 21.16-17: iha tv adhyātmavidyāyām ... niḥśreyasādhiṣam 'pavargaprāptih) which clearly states that apavarga in the second sūtra is one of the niḥśreyasas in the first sūtra.

With regard to the first sūtra, Jayanta’s understanding of the tradition seems to be based on the Bhāṣya. For he accepts that liberation is brought about by the knowledge of the sixteen principles. Nyāyamaṇjarī, 1st āhnikā: ity esa śoḍaśapadārthānibandhanena niḥśreyasasya muninā niradeśi panthāḥ/ anyas tu sann api padārthagana 'pavargamārgopayogavirahāda iva nopadiṣṭaḥ// NM I 29.1-4.
“Thus the sage [Ākṣapāda] taught this path for final beatitude by the composition of the sixteen principles. As for other groups of things, although they exist, he did not teach them here because they do not contribute to the path for liberation.”
It is likely that the *Nyāyasūtra*, at least as an official view, presents itself as an independent means for liberation, i.e. independent of the Vedas.

**b  The fourfold division of sciences in the *Nyāyabhāṣya*: catuvridyāsthamānah**

*Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.1 does not mention other sciences. Vātsyāyana, in *Nyāyabhāṣya* ad 1.1.1, takes a wider view in order to show the place of Nyāya among other sciences. He mentions a categorization of science into four kinds, one of which is identified as Nyāya.

*Nyāyabhāṣya* ad 1.1.1: \[imāś tu catasra vidyāḥ prthakprasthānāh prāṇabhṛtām anugrahāyopadīśyante, yāsām caturthiṣyam ānvikṣikī nyāyavidyā.\]\[\text{ND}_1\ 2.15-16, \text{ND}_2\ 2.18-20\]

But these four sciences, each of which has its individual topic, are taught in order to help living beings. Among them, the fourth is this ānvikṣikī, i.e. Nyāya-science.

Each science has its own independent information (*abhidheya*) and purpose (*prayojana*). Vātsyāyana expresses this independence with the term ‘having individual topics’ (*prthakprasthānāh*). Thus four sciences, i.e. trayī, vārtā, daṇḍanīti and ānvikṣikī, are not mutually connected. Using the terminology *tattvajñāna* and *nīhṣreyasa* of the Śūtra, Vātsyāyana clarifies that each science has its own way.

*Nyāyabhāṣya* ad 1.1.1: \[tad idam tattvajñānam niḥsreyasādhitagram ca yathāvidyāṃ veditavyam. iva tv adhyātmavidyāyām ātmādiṣṭhānam, tattvajñānam, niḥsreyasādhitagram 'pavargapṛaptir iti'.\]\[\text{ND}_1\ 5.17-19, \text{ND}_2\ 6.2-3\]

1) -dhigamaḥ ca] \[\text{ND}_1\text{ND}_2\ ; -dhigamārtham Ch \] 2) -ātmādiṣṭhānam] \[\text{ND}_1\text{ND}_2\ ; -ātmādītattvajñānam Ch \] 3) -gapṛaptir iti] \[\text{ND}_1\text{ND}_2\ ; -gaprāptih Ch \]

The above-mentioned knowledge of the true nature and the attainment of final beatitude should be understood according to [each] science. As for this case, i.e. in the science of ātman, it is the knowledge of ātman and so on that

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11 Cf. *Kauṭiliyārthaśāstra*, 1.2, vidyāsāmuddeśa: ānvikṣikī trayī vārtā daṇḍanītiḥ ceti vidyāḥ/1/ ... catasra eva vidyā iti kauṭilyah/8/ ... balābale caitāsām [trayādīnām] hetubhir ānvikṣaṃśānā lokasyopakarotī/.../11/ pradīpah sarvavidyānām upāyāh sarvakarmanām/ āśrayah sarvadharmānām śaśvad ānvikṣikī matā/12/ \[AS 4.3-14.\]
is the knowledge of the true nature, and the obtaining of liberation that is the attainment of final beatitude.

With the help of the Nyāyavārttika,\textsuperscript{12} we can make a diagram as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>trayi</th>
<th>object of tattvajñāna</th>
<th>nihśreyasa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>vārtā</td>
<td>dharma (ātman)</td>
<td>svargādi (apavarga)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>daṇḍanītī</td>
<td>sāmādi</td>
<td>sasya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ānvikṣikī (nyāya)</td>
<td>ātmādi</td>
<td>prthivi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The three Vedas (trayi) teach dharma and ātman, the knowledge of which leads one to heaven etc. and liberation respectively. (The Nyāyavārttika does not mention ātman and liberation, perhaps intentionally.) The science of agriculture (vārtā) teaches proper ground and so on (bhūmyādi), through which one get grains (sasyādhigama). Politics teaches conciliation (sāman) and so forth, which leads one to attain kingship over the world (prthivīvījaya). The last science, i.e. ānvikṣikī, teaches sixteen principles, especially those prameyas relevant for liberation such as ātman. This science of ātman (adyātmavidyā) leads one to liberation. We can say that Vātsyāyana introduces the fourfold division in order to show Nyāya’s unique position among branches of science.

c The task of Nyāya in general and in particular: pramāṇa, prameya and saṃśayādi

The Nyāyasūtra, although it explains the process of how to attain liberation through tattvajñāna in Sūtra 1.1.2, does not bother to explain how each of the sixteen padārthas leads one to final beatitude. The Nyāyabhāṣya, on the other hand, shows it by dividing possible cases into three, viz. pramāṇa, prameya and saṃśayādi.

Pramāṇa

Vātsyāyana explains in general how pramāṇa leads one to a fruit and establishes that pramāṇa grasps an object (pramāṇam arthavat) and therefore is valid.\textsuperscript{13} He attributes to pramāṇa a wider role, i.e. the means to get any kind of fruits through supplying cognition of objects.

In this way, all activities, so long as they are intended to have a secured fruit, require a means of valid cognition (pramāṇa). Thus Nyāya can give us a secure ground for all kinds of activity.

Vātsyāyana identifies Nyāya with the process of examination of an object

\textsuperscript{12} Nyāyavārttika ad 1.1.1, ND\textsubscript{1} 21.9-17.
\textsuperscript{13} Nyāyabhāṣya ad 1.1.1, ND\textsubscript{1} 1.1-7, ND\textsubscript{2} 1.6-11.
through pramānas (pramāñair arthaparikṣaṇaṁ nyāyah), mainly bearing in mind the logical proof which consists of five component parts (pañcāvayavāh).\textsuperscript{14}

The last of the four branches of science (caturasro vidyāh) is called ānvikṣīki, which Vātsyāyana identifies with Nyāya (caturthiṣyāṃ ānvikṣīki nyāyavidyā). According to him, the supreme Nyāya (paramo nyāyah) is nothing but syllogism (pañcāvayavāh)\textsuperscript{15} in the sense that Nyāya operates by means of inference, which relies on perception and verbal testimony (pratyakṣaṁgamāśritam cānumāṇam sānvikṣā).

By means of this identification of Nyāya as ānvikṣīki, i.e. examination of an object in the form of inference with the help of perception and verbal testimony, Vātsyāyana succeeds in showing the wider contribution of Nyāya-teaching, besides its particular job for liberation. The following statement shows well the aspect of Nyāya in the wider context.

\textit{Nyāyabhāṣya ad 1.1.1:} seyam ānvikṣīki pramāṇādibhiḥ padārthair
vibhayamāṇa
pradīpaḥ sarvavidyānāṃ upāyaḥ sarvakarmanāṁ/
aśrayaḥ sarvadharmāṇāṃ vidyoddeṣe pariṣṭitā// ND₁ 5.13-15, ND₂ 5.18-20

*parsiṣṭitā] J (in the footnote of ND₁), NM ; prakīrtitā ND₁ND₂Ch
This ānvikṣikī, which is divided by principles such as pramāṇas, is examined [and established] in the enumeration of sciences (i.e. Kaṭṭilyārthaśāstra 1.2.12, AS 4.13-14, pāda d: saśvad ānvikṣikī matā) as a light of all sciences, means of all actions, [and] substratum of all dharmas.

Only Nyāya can help actions and support dharmas. Nyāya is a single light of all other sciences. Thus Nyāya has not only its own fruit, i.e. liberation, but also contributes to others, mainly through inference. We can see here Vātsyāyana’s intention to show that Nyāya has general and particular contributions.

**Prameya**
There are twelve prameyas, which begin with ātman and end with apavarga.16 Although there exist in our world endless objects of pramāṇas (ND₁ 1.6: pramāṇārtho 'parisamkheyah),17 the tattvajñāna of them does not necessarily lead one to liberation.18 What the Śūtra teaches, at least according to the Bhāṣya, is the least necessary list of those objects (prameyas) which one should know to destroy his false knowledge (mithyajñāna) for the sake of liberation.

Nyāyabhāṣya ad 1.1.1: ātmadeḥ khalu prameyasya tattvajñānān

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16 Nyāyasūtra 1.1.9: ātmaśarirendriyārthabuddhimahapravṛttidosapreyabhāva- phaladuhkhāpavargās tu prameyam// “On the other hand, the object of valid cognition is the following: ātman, body, sense-organs, the objects of sense-organs, cognition, internal organ, undertaking, evil qualities, rebirth, fruit, pain and liberation.”

17 Uddyotakara interprets “pramāṇa-artha” as “a purpose (prayojana) of each pramāṇa” (ND₁ 11.11: arthaśabdasya prayojanavācītvā) because arthas are only fourfold (sukha, sukha-etu, duhkha, duhkha-etu) and therefore not countless (ND₁ 11.8-9: etāvān ayam pramāṇārtho yad uta sukhaduhkhē taddhētuś ceti). In fact Vātsyāyana seems to accept of artha two aspects, i.e. from the viewpoint of epistemology (‘object’) and that of value (‘purpose’).

niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ. ... heyam tasya nirvartakaṁ hānam ātyantikaṁ tasyopāyo 'dhigantavya iti etāṁ catvāry arthapādāṁ samyag buddhavo niḥśreyasam adhigacchati. ND1 2.9-12, ND2 2.14-16

As is well-known, one attains final beatitude by means of the knowledge of the true nature of prameyas such as ātman. ... One attains the final beatitude after knowing correctly these four arthapadas: one should know what is to be avoided, its cause, the ultimate avoidance, [and] its means.¹⁹

Vātsyāyana shows how each knowledge of twelve items leads one to liberation. First we have various kinds of false knowledge regarding prameyas, e.g. “There is no ātman”, “Liberation is terrible.”²⁰ The knowledge of the true nature destroys this sort of false knowledge and through various steps one reaches final goal, i.e. liberation.²¹

¹⁹ The fourfold set is clearly absorbed from the Buddhist catvāry āryasatyāni, i.e. duḥkha, samudaya, nirodha and mārga. But the Nyāyavr̥ttika (ad 1.1.1, ND1 8.1-4) distorts it and enumerates instead heya (duḥkha, duḥkhahetu), hāna (tattvajñāna), upāya (sāstra) and adhigantavya (apavarga).

²⁰ Nyāyabhāṣya ad 1.1.2: tatrātmādyapavargaparyante¹) prameye mithyājñānam anekaprakāraṁ vartate. ātmani āvat “nāsti” iti, anātmani “ātmā” iti. ... apavarge “bhīṣmah khalv ayam sarvakāryoparamah, sarvaviprayoge 'pavarge bahu bhadrakam lupyata iti katham buddhimān sarvasukhocchedam acaitanyam amum apavargam rocayet” iti. ND1 150.5-15, ND2 6.9-18

¹) -paryante] ND1,ND2 ; -paryantam Ch

“As for those prameyas, which start with ātman and end with liberation, there are various kinds of false knowledge: first as for ātman “It does not exist,” and as for non-ātman ‘[This is] ātman”; ... and as for liberation ‘Terrible indeed is this cessation of all results. In the [state of] liberation, which is disconnection from everything, many good things get lost (bahu bhadrakam lupyate). Therefore how could a wise man be pleased with this insentient liberation (acaitanyam amum apavargam) which is a cutting off of every pleasure (sarvasukhocchedam).’”

²¹ Nyāyabhāṣya ad 1.1.2: yadā tu tattvajñānān mithyājñānam apaiti tadā mithyājñānāpāye doṣā apayanti, doṣāpāye pravṛttir apaiti, pravṛttiyapāye janmāpaiti, janmāpāye duḥkham apaiti, duḥkhāpāye cātyantiko ‘pavargo niḥśreyasam iti. ND1 151.6-8, ND2 7.12-14. “But when the false knowledge vanishes by means of the knowledge of the true nature, the evil qualities vanish since the false knowledge vanished; when the evil qualities vanish, the undertaking vanishes; when the undertaking vanishes, the [re]birth vanishes; when the [re]birth vanishes, the pain vanishes; when the pain vanishes, there is a final beatitude, i.e. ultimate liberation.”
Although Vātsyāyana explains that the tattvajñāna of each of the twelve items is equally relevant to liberation, it is clear from the order of enumeration that ātmajñāna is the main means and the rest are subordinate. This observation is in fact confirmed by the fact that Vātsyāyana explicitly states that Nyāya is an adhyātmavidyā (ND, 5.18).

In comparison with pramāṇa, which has a wide scope of contribution to all actions and all sciences, the prameya-tattvajñāna is more specific, being the direct knowledge leading to liberation.

Therefore, when the tradition says that Nyāya offers the tattvajñāna which leads one to liberation, it means mainly the prameya-tattvajñāna, more specifically adhyātmavidyā, as is revealed by Vātsyāyana.

**Samšayādi** It is not surprising to find the possibility of Nyāya being reduced to adhyātmavidyā, because Nyāya, like many other systems, aims at the liberation of ātman. Our assumption is already expressed by Jayanta. But this reduction would cause a problem, so Vātsyāyana fears: if Nyāya was reduced to adhyātmavidyā, it would become non-different from Upaniṣad teachings and therefore lose its unique position among the four branches of science, which validates the Naiyāyika insistence that one should start learning Nyāya. In order to solve this problem, Vātsyāyana picks up the remaining items, i.e. samśayādi, which can be reduced to pramāṇa or prameya.

*Nyāyabhāṣya* ad 1.1.1: tasyāḥ prthak prasthānam samśayādayaḥ padārthāḥ, teśāṁ prthagvacanam antareṇādhyātmavidyāmātram iyam syād yathopanisadah. tasmāt samśayādibhiḥ padārthaiḥ prthak prasthāpyate. ND1 2.16-18, ND2 2.20-3.2

1) prasthānam] emendation (Cf. Nyāyavārttika ad 1.1.1: tasyāḥ samśayādiprasthānam antareṇa ... ND1 14.9) ; -prasthānah ND1;ND2;Ch

Of this [nyāyavidyā, only] the principles beginning with doubt are the specific topic. Without a separate statement of these [principles] this

22 Nyāyamañjarī, 4th āhnikā: kim cāgamānāṁ virodho 'pi nātiva vidyate. pradhāne puruṣārthe sarvesāṁ avivādāt. ... tathā hy apavarga upeyāḥ sarvasāṁstreṣu nirdiśyate. tadupāyāḥ sarvatra jñānam upadiṣyate. jñānaviṣaye tu vivadante. tatrāpi prāyaśa ātmaviṣayatāyāṁ bahūnām avipratipattiḥ. Kataoka [2004:192.4-191.4] (NM 1 640.18-641.4). “Furthermore there are not many contradictions either among scriptures, because no one disputes the main aim of human beings. ... To explain, liberation is taught as a goal in all teachings. Knowledge is taught as its means everywhere. But they dispute the object of knowledge. Even on that point, in most cases, many agree that ātman is the object.”
\[\text{[nyāyavidyā]}\] would be a mere science of ātman like the Upaniṣads. Therefore \([\text{the nyāyavidyā]}\) is established separately by means of principles such as doubt.

In this way, Vātsyāyana succeeds in recycling the superfluous item, i.e. changing it into a good excuse for the uniqueness of Nyāya.

**d Some problems left unsolved in the Nyāya-tradition**

The traditional view on the purpose of Nyāya can be summed up as follows:

i) General aspect: the general aspect of Nyāya which examines the object through pramāṇas has wide scope, supporting all actions and helping all sciences as a light.

ii) Specific aspect: the prameya-tattvajñāna is a direct means to liberation. In order to distinguish Nyāya from Upaniṣad, which can also teach ātman, Nyāya teaches samśayādi.

If we consider the context of Nyāyasūtra 1.1.1, where the author should convince readers to start reading the text, the traditional view looks weak, especially on its uniqueness distinguished from any other science. They first insist that their branch can offer good means to achieve liberation, which in fact is available in another branch, also. Then they provide the excuse that although it is available in another branch, they can offer really unique knowledge, i.e. samśayādi-tattvajñāna, which can in fact be reduced to the other two, either pramāṇa- or prameya-tattvajñāna, as they admit.\(^{23}\) What then do they give us as their specialty?

**4 Jayanta’s view on śāstraprayojana**

**a The fourteen-fold division of sciences: caturdaśavidyāsthānāḥ**

While the Nyāyasūtra did not pay attention to other sciences, the Nyāyabhāṣya introduced a fourfold division in order to show that Nyāya has a unique and independent place among all sciences. Jayanta, however, substitutes the fourfold with a fourteen-fold division.\(^{24}\)

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\(^{23}\) Nyāyabhāṣya ad 1.1.1: tatra samśayādināṁ prthagvacanam anarthakam, samśayādayo hi yathāsambhavam pramāṇeṣu prameyeṣu cāntarbhavanto nā vyatiricयanta iti. satyam evam etat. ND₁ 2.13-14, ND₂ 2.17-18. “[Q:] Among them the separate reference to doubt etc. is pointless, because doubt etc., being included in pramāṇa and prameya accordingly, are not different [from them]. [A:] It is true.”

\(^{24}\) Jayanta himself gives two scriptural evidences for the fourteen-fold division, the Yājñavalkyasmṛti 1.3 and an unknown source. Nyāyamañjarī, 1st āhnika: yathoktām.
First of all, he limits the scope of all sciences (śāstra, vidyāsthaṇa) to the transcendental world (ādṛṣṭa) which people except for yogins can never experience directly. For there is no use for us to be taught about observable matters, e.g. “The person who is dirty should bathe” or “The person who is hungry should eat”.  

Second, in the hierarchy of all sciences which deal with unobservable matters (ādṛṣṭa), he places the four Vedas on the top, followed by ten other sciences. The...
first three groups, i.e. the four Vedas which begin with the Atharvaveda,²⁷ Smṛtis and Itihāsa-Purāṇas, can tell us invisible things directly by themselves (svata eva), i.e. from their own mouth.

Nyāyamañjari, 1st āhnikā: tad evam vedapurūṇadharmaśāstrāṇām svata eva puruṣārthasādhanopadeśasvabhāvatvād vidyāsthānatvam. NM I 6.6-7.

In the above-mentioned way, the Vedas, Purāṇas and Dharmaśāstras are [fit to be counted as] branches of science, because it is their nature to teach, by themselves, means for the aims of human beings.

The four Vedas teach us the methods to attain liberation, heaven and so on. Smṛtis can also teach us dharmas by themselves.²⁸ Purāṇas and the Itihāsas do the same, by telling stories.²⁹ The last group, i.e. the six Vedāṅgas, Mimāṁsā and Nyāya, does not tell us about the invisible world by itself, but only helps the former, especially the four Vedas. The six Vedāṅgas help the Vedas as shown by their name “Veda-auxiliaries”.³⁰ Mimāṁsā helps us to understand the Vedas, i.e. to be certain

²⁷ Jayanta regards the Atharvaveda as the foremost among the four Vedas (NM I 5.5: prathamo 'tharvavedah). He spends many pages to establish its authoritativeness. The opponent thinks that it does not contribute to the dharmas taught in the three Vedas and it is outside of the three (NM I 614.7-9: atharvavedasya tu trayyāmnātadharmopayogānupalabdhes trayībāhyatvena na tatsamānayogākṣematvam). First Jayanta shows the equality of the four Vedas with regard to validity, name and contribution (NM I 626.11-12: tena pramāṇatāyām vedasvādhyaśabdavācayate puruṣārthasādhanavidhāv api catvārah samā vedāḥ). Then he tries to show that the Atharvaveda is the first of all four (NM I 626.14-15: atharvaveda eva prathamah). We can see another reason that Jayanta prefers a fourteen-fold to fourfold division of sciences, which refers to the Vedas as trayi instead of catvāro vedāḥ.

²⁸ Nyāyamañjari, 1st āhnikā: smṛtiśāstram api manvādyupanihaddham aṣṭakāśikhiṣākharaprapāpravartanādipuruṣārthasādhanopadeśya eva ṅṛṣyațe. NM I 5.10-11. “A Smṛti-teaching composed by Manu or other [teachers] is also seen to teach [people] means for the aims of human beings, such as Aṣṭakā, keeping a tuft of hair, and promoting drinking booths.”

²⁹ Nyāyamañjari, 1st āhnikā: itihāsapurūṇābhīyām apy upākhyānādivarṣanena vaidika evārthah praṇeṇa (praṇeṇa) MkhaGī; prāyeh M) pratanyate. NM I 6.2-3. “The same content of the Veda is in most cases expanded by the Itihāsas and Purāṇas too, by telling tales and so on.”

³⁰ Nyāyamañjari, 1st āhnikā: aṅgāni vyākaranakalpaṇijaḥṣāchandondiruktāṇi
about Vedic passages and their meanings. Nyāya protects the authoritativeness of the Vedas, as we will see later in some depth.

31 Nyāyamañjarī, 1st āhnikā: vicāram antareṇāvyavasthitavedāvyārthānavadhāraṇān mimāṁsā vedāvyārthavicārātmiṇā vedābhāsya karaṇasya (vedābhāsya karaṇasya) G1; vedābhāsya M) itikartavyatārūpam anubhavanti vidyāsthānātām pratipadyate. tathā ca bhaṭṭāḥ --- dharme pramīyamāṇe tu vedena karaṇātmanā/ itikartavyatābhāgaḥ mimāṁsā pūryāvyātī/ (Bṛhaṭṭīkā; cf. PrP 404.15-16) iti. ata eva saaptamam angam iti na ganyate mimāṁsā. pratyāśaṇnātavāḥ vedākadeśabhātavāḥ. vicārasahāyo hi śabdaḥ svārthāṃ nirākāṅkṣam prabodhayitum kṣamah. NM I 6.9-11. “The auxiliaries [of the Vedas], i.e. grammar, ritual-manual, astrology, Śīkṣā, prosody and etymology, become [suitable as] branches of science through derivation of words and so on which contribute to the meaning of the Vedas. Their name ‘auxiliary’ itself makes it clear that they are followers of those [Vedas].”

32 The same scheme is repeated again with a clearer division of sākṣātpuruṣarthasādhanaopadeśini and tadupayogini. Nyāyamañjarī, 4th āhnikā: sarvathā tāvad vedāḥ catvāraḥ purāṇaṃ sṛṣṭir iti śad imāni vidyāsthānāni sākṣātpuruṣarthasādhanaopadeśini pūrvoktātātā pramāṇam. vyākaraṇātāni tu śad aṅgānyā anātvenaiva tadupayogini, na sākṣādvardhamopadeśini. ... mimāṁsā vedāvyārthavicārātmiṇā. vedaprāmāṇyaśaṣṭhābhūtē ca nyāyavistara ity ātmukha evoktam. tad imāni caturdaśa vidyāsthānāni pramāṇam. kāṇicit sākṣādvapadeśini, kāṇicit tadupayoginītī siddham. Kataoka [2004:203.6-201.1] (NM I 634.18-645.5). “In whatever way, first, these six branches of science, i.e. the four Vedas, the Purāṇa and the Smṛti, which directly teach means for the aims of human beings, are means of valid cognition (pramāṇa) in the way mentioned above. The six auxiliaries [of the Vedas], i.e. Grammar and so on, on the other hand, contribute to the [Vedas] precisely as [their] auxiliaries (aṅgatvenaiva), and they do not teach dharmas directly. ... Mimāṁsā is essentially an examination of meanings of Vedic
Thus the fourteen-fold division enables Jayanta to bring together the goals of all sciences into a single, invisible fruit, either liberation or heaven and so on, the foremost teacher of which is the Veda. We can see the advantage of introducing a new division: it functions as a map of branches of science which is more Veda-oriented than the old one. While in the old scheme Nyāya is an independent branch leading to liberation, the new one makes it subordinate to the Vedas. In order to keep this characteristic feature of being Veda-oriented, the new division excludes politics and agriculture, i.e. branches of science which concern the visible world, and thereby secures their independence from the Vedas.33

b  The purpose of Nyāya described in the Nyāyamañjarī

We have seen the place of Nyāya among branches of science according to the fourteen-fold division, which Jayanta introduces with the intention of showing a Veda-oriented map of science. Now let us look closely at the role of Nyāya. According to the tradition, Nyāya aims in particular at liberation, for which Nyāya gives us tattvajñāna, mainly prameya-tattvajñāna, while pramāṇa contributes in general for all activities and sciences. Jayanta, however, explicitly defines Nyāya as a science which aims to protect the authoritativeness of the Vedas.

Nyāyamañjarī, 1st āhnikā: nyāyavistarasa tu mūlastambhahūtaḥ sarvavidyānām, vedaprāmāṇya-∗rakṣā-hetuvāt. NM I 7.7-8.
∗-rakṣā-] M ; omits MkhaG₁
Nyāyavistara [taught by Akṣapāda], on the other hand, is the basic trunk of sentences. Nyāyavistara is a cause of ascertaining the authoritativeness of the Vedas. This is [already] taught in the very beginning [of this book]. Therefore these fourteen branches of science are means of valid cognition. Some teach directly [and] some contribute to the former. —This is established.”

33 Jayanta himself tries to solve a possible contradiction with the old view of fourfold division. Nyāyamañjarī, 1st āhnikā: nanu catasraḥ ced vidyās tat katham caturdaśaśa darśitāḥ. naiṣa virodhah. vārtādaññathyār drṣṭākaprayojanatvāna sarvapuruṣārthopadeśividyāvargye āgaṇānārhatvāt trayyānvikṣikyoś ca tatra nirdesāt tāś ācārya caturdaśaśaśa vidyāḥ. NM I 9.12-14.
1) nirdesāt tāś] G₁ ; nirdesāc M

“[Q:] If sciences are four, why [did you] show fourteen [sciences]? [A:] This is not a contradiction. Sciences of agriculture and politics, because they aim at only observed [results] (drṣṭa), cannot be enumerated in the group of sciences which teach [means for] the aims of human beings in general; and the three Vedas (trayī) and ānvikṣiki are shown in that [fourteen-fold list]. Therefore those fourteen [branches] alone are sciences.”

33
all branches of science, because it is a means for protecting the Vedas’
authoritativeness.

As we have seen in the Āgamaḍambhara, Buddhists and other heretics attack the
Veda, which is now almost falling to the ground unless someone protects it.

Nyāyamañjari, 1st āhnikā: vedesu hi tārkika¹⁻раcitakutarkaviplāvita-
prāmāṇyeye śithiliṣṭāḥ katham iva bahuvitattayāyāsādīsādhīyam
vedārtheṇuṣṭhānam ādīriyeraṃ sādhavah. NM I 7.8-10.
¹) tārkika-] G₁ ; dustārkika- M

For, when their confidence in the Vedas becomes shaky because their
validity is destroyed by the bad speculation of philosophers, then how can
good people care about the performance of the objects of the Vedas which is
accomplished through spending a lot of money, energy and so on?

Smṛtis, Purāṇas and the Itihāsas are independent subbranches and are too far away
from the main branch to protect it. Six Vedāṅgas and Mimāṃsā are, as it were, busy
with their own work, i.e. to help their boss in his office. They are not strong
enough to save the Veda in a fight with heretics. Only Nyāya can do it.

Nyāyamañjari, 1st āhnikā: kim vā tadānim¹ svāминi parimāṇe
tadanuyāyinā mimāṃsādvidyāsthānaparījanena kṛtyaṃ iti. NM I 7.10-11.
¹) tadānim] G₁ ; omits M

Or, at that time [when good people’s faith in the Vedas has become shaky],
since the master has become faint, what is the use of the attendants, i.e.
branches of science such as Mimāṃsā, who follow that [master]?

Protecting the Veda is a unique job suitable only for Nyāya, which in fact
contributes to the other sciences through saving their so-called master (svāmin). In
this sense Nyāya can be a science with a wide scope.

Nyāyamañjari, 1st āhnikā: tasmād aśeṣauṣṭātārkikopamardadvārakṛḍha-
taravedprāmāṇyapatrayādhāyāyāyopadesākṣamam aksapādopadiṣṭam
idam nyāyavistārākhyam sāstraṃ sāstrapratiṣṭhānanibandhanam iti dhuryam
vidyāsthānam. NM I 7.11-14.

Therefore this teaching called Nyāyavistara taught by Aksapāda, which is
capable of teaching logic that provides a firmer faith in the authoritativeness
of the Vedas through crushing all bad philosophers, is the base for
establishing [all] teachings; thus it is the most responsible branch of science.

Nyāya contributes particularly to save the Veda and through this unique job makes
some more general contributions.

Thus the principal task of Nyāya is to establish the authoritativeness of the Vedas. Jayanta in fact spends hundreds of pages proving the Vedas’ authoritativeness. The chapters of sabda-parikṣā consist of more than one third of the whole Nyāyamañjarī. And the elaborate arguments expounded in these chapters are, as Jayanta states in the beginning, intended to establish the Vedas’ authoritativeness. Consistent with this is his unique interpretation of Nyāyasūtra 1.1.7, “āptopadesaḥ sabdāḥ”. This sūtra proves the authoritativeness of verbal testimony in general on the ground that it is speech by a reliable person (āpta). The tradition puts effort into defining conditions for “being reliable” (āptatva). After showing this orthodox interpretation, Jayanta suggests an alternative one.

Nyāyamañjarī, 3rd āhika: atha vā vedāprāmaṇyasyasiddhyarthatvac chāstrasya tatprāṇetur āptasyeśvārasya yathāṣrutam evedaṃ lakṣaṇam. sa sākṣātkāṛtadharma eva, dharmasyeśvaraprātyakṣagocaratvāt. NM I 401.1-3.

Or because the [Nyāya] teaching is for the sake of establishing the Vedas’ authoritativeness, this definition [can be interpreted] literally as referring to God, i.e. the reliable author of those [Vedas]. He is one who has perceived [and therefore reached] dharma directly [i.e. fulfils the definition of an āpta], because dharma is an object of God’s perception.

Thus, according to Jayanta, we can say that the essence of this huge Nyāya-tree lies in this proof. (My own reconstruction which I would like to name paramaparamo nyāyah.)

vedāḥ pramāṇam
āptabhūtasarvajñaparameśvarapraṇītatvāt
yad yad āptoktaṁ tat tat pramāṇam yathāyurvedā
tvedā āptoktāḥ
tasmād vedāḥ pramāṇam

c Jayanta’s deviation from the Nyāya orthodoxy

It is clear that Jayanta deviates from the tradition. What, then, does he have to say to reconcile his own view with the orthodoxy? His view is given in his interpretation of Nyāyasūtra 1.1.1, where he himself puts forward a question about the conflict between the two.

Nyāyamañjarī, 1st āhika: nanu śodasa-padārthatattva-jñānasya katham nihśreyasādhihamahetutvam iti vaktavyam. vedāprāmaṇyasyasiddhyartham idam1) śastram iti tāvanmātram eva vyutpādyatām, kim śodasa-padārthakanthāgranthanena. NM I 22.2-4
1) *idam*] Mkha ; *cedam* MG,

[Q:] But what is the need to say that the knowledge of the true nature of the sixteen principles is the cause for attaining final beatitude? This teaching aims to establish the Vedas’ authoritiveness—only this much should be explained. What is the use of stringing together patched garments of sixteen principles?

Jayanta, following the three divisions of sixteen *padarthas* introduced by Vātsyāyana, accepts the tradition that the *prameya-tattvajñāna* leads one directly to liberation.\(^\text{34}\) But he deviates from the tradition when he says that we are informed of the causal relationship between *ātmādi* and liberation only by the Upaniṣads.\(^\text{35}\) Vātsyāyana indeed feared this kind of reductionism which might destroy Nyāya’s independence. But Jayanta simply admits it and makes consistent his view that Nyāya is for the sake of the Veda.

Nyāyamañjari, 1st āhnika: *ātmādyya*\(^\text{1}\)-pavargaparyantadvādaśavidharpameyajñānam tāvad anyaḥpramāṇa na pariṣṭhitam eva sākṣ̄ād apavargasādhānām iti vacyāyaṁ... *tasya tu prameyasyātmāder apavargasādhānātmā vāktam kāmānubandhaḥ.* NM I 22.5-8.

1) *ātmādyya*] G₁ ; *ātmā* M

As for the knowledge of the twelve kinds of *prameyas* which start with *ātmā* and end with liberation, we will state that it is a cause of accomplishing liberation directly without being at all a means for other knowledge. ... But [our] knowledge that [the knowledge of] those *prameyas* such as *ātmā* is a means for liberation is solely based on the [Vedic] scripture.

Thus the Veda enjoys the status of being the sole provider of the causal knowledge

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\(^{34}\) Jayanta regards liberation as the highest goal of Nyāya-teaching. Nyāyamañjari, 9th āhnika: *evam sārīrādau duḥkhparyante heye prameya nirṇīte yadartha etadupadeśah, yat param upādeyam prameyam, yadarthāḥ śāstrārambhah, tam apavargam laksayitum āha.* NM II 430.3-4. “Thus we ascertained [ten] *prameyas*, i.e. beginning with body and ending with pain, which should be avoided (*heya*). [Now Akṣapāda] teaches [sūtra 1.1.22] to define liberation, for which he taught these [ten *prameyas*], which is a supreme *prameya* to be obtained, and for which [Nyāya-]science starts.”

\(^{35}\) Strictly speaking, the subject to be informed should be understood as ordinary people like us, who are not yogins, as Jayanta noted in NM 4.18 (... *asmadādeḥ, na yoginīm iva ...*).
for liberation, and also for heaven and so on. In order to determine this scriptural authoritativeness through other pramāṇas, mainly through anumāna, give us confidence in it and protect its authoritativeness from enemies, Nyāya supplies us with good instruments, i.e. pramāṇas with the help of doubt and so on (samśayādi).

### d Jayanta’s uniqueness on śāstraprayojana as seen in the Nyāya tradition

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36 Therefore Akṣapāda, when he teaches the causal relationship between ātmajñāna and liberation, repeats what the Vedas said. Nyāyamañjari, 9th āhnikā: yat tu kutas tasya nihśreyasādhanavat avagatam iti. akṣapādavacanād iti brūmah. akṣapādās tāvad evam upadiṣṭavān ‘ātmajñānāṁ nihśreyasādhyagamah’ iti. na ca nispramāṇakam artham eṣa ṛṣir upādiśkaṁ iti bhavitavyam atra pramāṇena. tat tu vaidikam vidhiḥvāyam ātmā jñātavyam iti. NM II 461.9-12. “With regard to the question how we know that this [ātmajñāna] is a means of final beatitude, we reply: [we know it] from the statement of Akṣapāda. First Akṣapāda taught that one obtains final beatitude through the knowledge of ātmā. And there must be some source (pramāṇa) of this because this sage could not have taught a thing without any source. And (tu) that [source] is a Vedic injunctive sentence ‘One should know the ātmā’.”

37 Nyāyamañjari, 1st āhnikā: tasya [āgamasya] prāmāṇyanirṇītir anumāṇanibandhanā/ āptoktattvam ca tainting avinābhāvi vakṣyate// pratibandhagrahe tasya pratyakṣam upayujyate/ ... upamānāṁ tu kvacit karmani sopayogam. ... samśayādayas tu padārthā yathāsambhavam pramāṇeṣu prameyeṣu cāntarbhavanto ’pi nīyāprayṛtvitihṛtviḥ prthag upadiśyante. nīyāṣ ca vedaprāmāṇya-pratiṣṭhāpana*-purvavatvena puruṣārthopayogitvam upayūtiti dārśitam. NM I 22.11-23.3. (*-pratiṣṭhāpana- M ; -pratiṣṭhā- G1) “To ascertain that it (āgama) is valid is based on inference. And being spoken by a reliable person (āptoktattva) will be stated later as its (=prāmāṇya’s) inferential mark as being invariably concomitant [with it]. Perception is useful to grasp the essential connection of that [āptoktattva with prāmāṇya]. ... As for comparison, it is useful for a certain ritual. ... As for the principles such as doubt, although they are accordingly included [under the category of] pramāṇas and prameyas, they are taught separately because they are the cause for Nyāya to operate. And it is already taught that Nyāya becomes contributive to the aim of human beings through establishing the authoritativeness of the Vedas.” Nyāyamañjari, 1st āhnikā: tad evam upadeśavyāṁ padārthāḥ samśayādayah/ tannūlanyāyanirnirnaya vedaprāmāṇya-siddhaye// NM I 28.9-10. “In this way, therefore, the principles such as doubt should be taught so that the authoritativeness of the Vedas, which is to be ascertained by logic based on these [doubt etc.], will be established.”
The Nyāya tradition regards itself as an independent science for liberation. That is why Vātsyāyana introduces a fourfold division of branches of science. The main cause of achieving liberation is *prameya*-tattvajñāna, which becomes possible through *pramaṇas*. According to Vātsyāyana, *pramaṇa* has wider scope: it supports all actions and shines as a single light for all sciences. On the contrary, *prameya*-tattvajñāna is for liberation in particular. But there is an unfavorable possibility that Nyāya might be dissolved into Upaniṣadic teachings, because both give ātmajñāna for the sake of liberation. In order to avoid this undesirable consequence, Vātsyāyana puts forward *samśayādi* as Nyāya’s distinguishing mark.

Deviating from the tradition, Jayanta insists that Nyāya aims to protect the authoritativeness of the Vedas. That is the reason why he introduces the fourteen-fold division of branches of science instead of the fourfold. He accepts that the direct cause of liberation is *prameya*-tattvajñāna. But the most important knowledge for liberation, i.e. cognition of the causal relationship between ātmādi and liberation, is originally given by the Upaniṣads and not by Nyāya. Therefore Nyāya’s main job is not concerned with *prameya* as the tradition intends, but rather with *pramaṇa*. Jayanta interprets the old metaphor of Nyāya as “support” and “light” in a specific context that Nyāya helps other colleagues, too, through protecting their boss, i.e. the Veda.

Jayanta’s uniqueness lies in the fact that he consistently regards Nyāya as Veda-oriented. And this attitude becomes manifest as a shift of emphasis from *prameya* to *pramaṇa*.

5 Nyāya’s Unique Job, heavy for Mimāṃsā

a Mimāṃsā’s contribution to the Vedas: *vedavākyārthavicāra* as śāstrapravoyajana

Jayanta thinks that it is the unique job of Nyāya to protect the authoritativeness of
the Vedas. But this raises a question. It is possible for Nyāya’s colleague, Mimāṃsa, to do it. So could Nyāya be dismissed altogether?

Nyāyamañjari, 1st āhika: nanu vedaprāṃāṇyanirṇayaprayojanaś cen nyāyavistaraḥ, kṛtam anena, mimāṃsāta eva tatsiddheḥ. tatra hy arthavicāra vat prāṃāṇyavicāra ’pi kṛta eva. NM I 10.2-4.

[Q:] If the Nyāyavistara [taught by Aksapāda] aims to determine the validity of the Vedas, it (Nyāyavistara) is not necessary [at all], because that (vedaprāṃāṇyanirṇaya) is established just by Mimāṃsa. For that examines the validity of the Vedas as well as their meanings.

Jayanta tries to avoid making Nyāya redundant on two grounds: it is not Mimāṃsa’s main job to protect the Vedas’ authoritativeness, because it has its own job; furthermore Mimāṃsa is in fact unable to protect the Vedas’ authoritativeness.

In order to clear the way for his first reason, he defined in advance the purpose of Mimāṃsa, faithfully following Kumārila.

Nyāyamañjari, 1st āhika: satyam. sa tv ānuṣaṅgikāḥ. tatra mukhyas tv arthavicāra eva. prthakprasthānā himā vidyāḥ. sā ca vākyārthavidyā, na pramāṇavidyeti. NM I 10.4-6.

True! But that (prāṃāṇyavicāra) is secondary. What is primary there is only to examine [the Vedas’] meanings. For these sciences have individual topics. And that (Mimāṃsa) is a science for examining the meaning of sentences and not a science of pramāṇas.

Thus, following Mimāṃsa’s own self-reflection, Jayanta succeeds in restricting Mimāṃsa to her secretarial role, i.e. the examination of meanings of Vedic sentences (vedavākyārthavicāra), which helps her boss to communicate to us dharmas (and ātman in the case of Uttaramimāṃsa).

**b Incompetence of Mimāṃsa for protecting the Vedas: svatahprāṃāṇya and paratahprāṃāṇya**

But there is the possibility that Mimāṃsa could actually invade Nyāya’s territory, although it has its own job. And this anxiety is real, for in fact Kumārila tries to protect the Vedas’ authoritativeness based on the svatahprāṃāṇya theory. But Jayanta states that it is not only a secondary (ānuṣaṅgika) but also an unachievable job for Mimāṃsa.

Nyāyamañjari, 1st āhika: na ca mimāṃsakāḥ samyagvedaprāṃāṇyarakṣanakṣamām saraṇīm avalokayitum kṣamāḥ. kutarkakaṇṭakanikaraniruddhasaṅcāramārgābhāsapuriprabhūntāḥ khalu ta iti vakṣyāmah. NM I 10.6-8.
And Mimāmsakas are not able to find a path which makes it possible to protect well the validity of the Vedas. As we will state later, they are indeed wandering on the wrong path, a narrow road obstructed by a mass of thorns of bad speculation.

Jayanta intends that the theory of svatahprāmāṇya is not competent enough to protect the authoritativeness of the Vedas and that the theory of paratahprāmāṇya alone can do it. In the third āhnika of the Nyāyamaṇjarī, Jayanta discusses in detail validity (prāmāṇya) of cognition in general, first describing Kumārila’s view and then refuting it.

According to the Mimāṃsā theory of svatahprāmāṇya, cognition has validity by nature, automatically illuminates objects as they are, and does not require external confirmation. 38 Cognition is exceptionally invalidated only when there is a problem: 39 when there is a problem in the cognizing process (kāraṇadosa) or when there arises a counter-cognition (bādhakapratyaya) subsequently. Thus cognition is in principle reliable. 40 Therefore it is not only unnecessary but destructive to have

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38 Nyāyamaṇjarī, 3rd āhnika: ataś cotpattau svakāryakaraṇe svaprāmāṇyaniścaye ca nirapeksatvād apeksātryarāhitatvāt svatahprāmāṇyam iti siddham. tad uktam (Ślokavārttika, codanā v. 47) --- svatah sarvaprāmāṇānām prāmāṇyam iti gṛhyatām/ na hi svato 'sati śaktih kartum anyena pāryate// NM I 430.8-12. “And therefore, it is established that [a pramāṇa] is intrinsically valid because it is free from three kinds of dependence: because it does not require [something external] in order to arise [as a valid cognition], in order to accomplish its own task, and in order to determine its validity. This is taught [by Kumārila]: ‘One should know that all pramāṇas are valid by themselves. For an external thing cannot produce a capacity if it does not exist innately’.”

39 Nyāyamaṇjarī, 3rd āhnika: sthite caivam autosargike prāmāṇye, yatra tasyāpavādah kvacid bhavati tatrāprāmāṇyam. NM I 431.10-11. “And in this way once it is established that validity is innate, [only] that is invalid which, [only] in some cases, has an exceptional rejection (apavāda).”

40 Nyāyamaṇjarī, 3rd āhnika: dvividha evāpavādah: bādhakapratyayaḥ kāraṇadosajñānām ca. tad uktam bhāsyakṛtā---yatra duṣṭam kāraṇam yatra ca mithyeti pratyayah, sa evāsāmicināh pratyayah nānya (Śābarabhāṣya ad 1.1.3-5, vṛttikāra, Frauwallner [1968:26.20-21]) (yasya ca duṣṭam) iti. vārttikakāra ’py āha---tasmād bodhātmakatvena prāptā buddheḥ pramāṇatā/ arthānayathātvahetūthadosajñānād apodyate// (Ślokavārttika, codanā v. 53) iti. NM I 431.13-18. “Exceptional rejection (apavāda) is only of two kinds: a counter-cognition (bādhakapratyaya) and a cognition of defects in causes
excessive doubts about its validity.

_Nyāyamaṇjarī_, 3rd āhnika:

\[ \text{hathuḥ utpādyamānas tu hinasti sakalāḥ kriyāḥ/} \\
vabhāryāparirambhe 'pi bhaven mātari samśayah/ NM I 433.1-2. \]

But [a doubt] which is forcibly made to arise destroys all activities. Even when one embraces his wife, he would have a doubt ‘Is she Mother?’.

Jayanta, refuting each point made by Kumārila, establishes _paratahprāmāṇya_. The main point can be summarized as follows: Kumārila too admits that there are two kinds of cognition, valid and invalid. In consequence we always have doubts about the validity of cognition whether it is true or not. In order to remove this doubt, we need confirmation. Thus cognition depends on other cognition. So the _paratahprāmāṇya_-theory is established.\(^{41}\) Bearing in mind this argument, Jayanta rejects Mimāṃsā’s invasion of the territory of Nyāya.

_Nyāyamaṇjarī_, 1st āhnika: na hi pramāṇāntarasamvādādāryam antareṇa pratyakṣādīny api pramāṇabhāvam bhajante, kim uta taddhīnāvṛttir eṣa

(kāraṇadosaṣajñāna). Thus taught the author of the _Bhāṣya_: When it has a defective cause, and when it has a [counter-]cognition that it is wrong, only that is wrong cognition. The author of the _Vārttika_ too says: Therefore the validity of a cognition, which has resulted [merely] by its being cognition in nature, is exceptionally canceled by [invalidating] cognition that the object is otherwise or by cognition of defects in causes.”

\(^{41}\) This is pointed out by a Prābhākara opponent in the beginning of the argument about _khyāti_. _Nyāyamaṇjarī_, 3rd āhnika: viparitakhyātāv abhyupagamyamāṇāyām bādhyaabodhasandrabhasubhikṣe sati tattādharmyād anutpannañḥāde 'pi bodhe duspariharah samśayah. samśaye ca samvādādāryavansanam api dhruvam avataraṇīti paratahprāmāṇyam anivāryam. NM I 452.2-5. “Once you accept [as a doctrine of error] ‘the cognition of a wrong object’, there is an abundant supply [of the possibility] that a deniable cognition is interwoven. Therefore due to the common property [of being cognition] it is difficult to avoid a doubt about cognition although it does not have a counter-cognition already arisen. And when there is a doubt, there necessarily occurs a seeking for confirmation etc., too, and thus extrinsic validity is inevitable.” The Siddhāntin also summarizes the point in the same manner. _Nyāyamaṇjarī_, 3rd āhnika: buddhidvāvidhyadarśanāt/ samśaye sati samvādasūpekṣatvām tathaiva tat// NM I 480.14-15. “Because we experience that there are two kinds of cognition [i.e. true and false], we [necessarily] have a doubt. Therefore it is left unsolved that cognition requires confirmation etc.”
śabdaḥ. ... arthatathātvetaratvapariniścaye tu puruṣamukhapreksitvam
asyāparihāryam. tasmād āptoktatvād eva śabdah pramāṇībhavati, nānyatheti.
etac cāsmin eva śāstre vyutpādayiṣyate. NM I 10.8-11.2.

For without a confirmation by means of an agreement with another pramāṇa,
even perception etc. do not become valid, not to say this speech, which
operates in dependence on them. ... But in order to determine whether or not
the meaning is true, it is inevitable [i.e. necessary] to consider the person’s
face in the case of this [speech]. Therefore speech becomes valid only on the
basis of being spoken by a reliable person (āptoktatvād eva), and not in other
ways. And this will be explained in this same teaching.

Jayanta thinks that the passive way of Mimamsā is weak. Mimamsakas only repeat
that cognition which arises from the Vedas is valid because we have not found any
problem.

Nyāya, on the contrary, has a positive way of demonstrating a good reason for
the validity of the Vedas. The Vedas are valid because they are composed by God,
who creates and knows everything. In this sense, Jayanta regards Nyāya as strong
enough to protect the authoritativeness of the Vedas.

6 Conclusion

The Nyāya orthodoxy on śāstraprayojana  The Nyāya tradition claims that a
means of liberation is the knowledge of the true nature (tattvajñāna) of, especially,
the twelve prameyas which begin with ātman. Thus Vātsyāyana calls Nyāya
adhyātma vidyā. But the identification of Nyāya as adhyātma vidyā causes a problem
that Nyāya could be dissolved into Upaniṣadic teachings. In order to avoid this
reduction, Vātsyāyana puts forward samāsyaḍi as a distinguishing mark of Nyāya,
which should have a separate topic (prthakprasthāna) from other sciences,
especially the Upaniṣads, in a map of the four branches of science (caturvidyāsthāna). While prameyatattvajñāna aims at liberation in particular,
pramāṇa contributes in general to all activities and all sciences.

Jayanta’s view on śāstraprayojana  Jayanta replaces a fourfold with a
fourteen-fold division of sciences, all of which are concerned with invisible objects
(adṛśta) and related to the Vedas. Thus he presents a Veda-oriented map of
sciences. In this map Nyāya contributes to the Veda by protecting its
authoritativeness (vedaprāmāṇyarakṣā) essentially through an inference based on
āptoktatva together with various subordinate arguments.

While vedaprāmāṇyarakṣā is a unique as well as a wide-reaching job for Nyāya,
the role of prameyatattvajñāna is rather suppressed by Jayanta, who admits the
reduction which Vātsyāyana fears. Thus Jayanta shifts the emphasis from prameya
to pramāṇa and as a result solves an unconvincing claim by the tradition that Nyāya
is a unique science supplying an *adhyātmavidyā* in particular.

There might be various external reasons for Jayanta to introduce the *vedaprāmāṇyarakṣā* as the purpose of Nyāya, e.g. in order to defend an orthodox brahmin against an attack by nāstikas such as Buddhists; Jayanta’s social and political situation and so on. One thing I have confirmed in this paper is that to change a job from *prameyatattva/jñāna* (especially *adhyātmavidyā*) to *vedaprāmāṇyarakṣā* is in fact to protect the independent position of Nyāya, about which Jayanta is quite nervous, especially with respect to Mīmāṃsā, which might deprive Nyāya of a new job. Thus he succeeds in showing a more convincing reason for readers to study Nyāya instead of repeating an old view which is rather weak in its claim of Nyāya’s uniqueness.

Abbreviations and Bibliography


**M** Adopted readings in the Mysore edition of the *Nyāyamaṇjarī*.


**Mkha** Variant readings given in the footnotes of the Mysore edition.

**Mvar** Variant readings given in the endnotes of the Mysore edition.

**ND1** *Nyāyadarśana of Gautama with the Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana, the Vārttika of Uddyotakara, the Tātparyāṭikā of Vācaspati & the Parisuddhi of Udayana.* Ed. Anantalal Thakur. Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1967.


