

Bhaṭṭa Jayanta on the purpose of Nyāya*

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1 Introduction: *Vedaprāmāṇya* according to Jayanta

a *Vedaprāmāṇya* in the *Āgamadāmbara*

The ninth century¹ Kashmirian author Bhaṭṭa Jayanta,² a Naiyāyika famous for his magnum opus *Nyāyamañjari*, wrote a play *Āgamadāmbara*, in which a young Mīmāṃsaka named Saṅkarṣaṇa takes a major role. Saṅkarṣaṇa appears in this way:

Āgamadāmbara, 1st *aṅka*:

svādhyāyaḥ paṭhito yathāvidhi parāmṛṣṭāni cāṅgāni ṣan
mīmāṃsāpi nirūpiteti vihitam karma dvijanmocitam/
nityādhūtakutarkadhūsaragirām yāvat tu vedadvīṣām
nyakkāro na kṛtaḥ kṛtārtha iva me tāvan na vidyāśramah//
agryāś caite vedaviplavakṛtām kubuddhayāḥ śauddhodaniśisyakāḥ. tad enān
eva stenān iva tāvan nigrhṇīmah. AD 52.3-12 (9.22-10.4)

I learned my Veda according to the rule, reflected upon six Vedāngas and mastered Mīmāṃsā, too. In this way, I completed the duty expected of a Brahmin. It is, however, as if [all] the trouble [I took] to study (*vidyāśrama*)³ has not achieved its goal until I humiliate the enemies of the

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¹ Hegde [1983:15] “Thus the date of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta falls, beyond any doubt, between 820 A. D. and 900 A. D.”

² He calls himself Bhaṭṭajayanta instead of Jayantabhaṭṭa. *Āgamadāmbara* 1st *aṅka*: śaiśava eva vyākaraṇavivaraṇakaraṇād vṛttikāra iti prathitāparanāmno bhaṭṭajayantasya ... AD 32.13-15 (2.22-23).

³ Dr. V. Raghavan (in his introduction to the edition of the *Āgamadāmbara*, x) seems to interpret this compound as “*vidyā-āśramah*” (period for study). “[H]e feels his duty is not yet fully discharged.” Jayanta, however, implies here that Saṅkarṣaṇa’s learning (*śruta*), i.e. effort for knowledge (*vidyā-śrama*), would be useless if he does not defeat his opponents and effect a change in the social

Vedas, those who always agitate their voice made dusty by their bad speculation. And the foremost among those who destroy the Vedas are these stupid [Buddhists], pupils of [the Buddha,] son of Śuddhodana.⁴ Therefore, I will punish them first of all like thieves.

What makes this *snātaka* angry is the transgression of Vedic dharmas and the refutation of the Vedas' authoritativeness by *nāstikas*, against whom he starts a campaign to protect the Vedas and defeats a Buddhist teacher Dharmottara and a Jain teacher Jinarakṣita. Succeeding in convincing the king to ban one of the most corrupt sects, the Nilāmbaras,⁵ he is appointed to a government post for religious affairs. The play ends in a long lecture by a Naiyāyika chairman named Dhairyarāśi, who tries to establish the authoritativeness of the Vedas (*vedaprāmāṇya*) as well as that of all āgamas (*sarvāgamaprāmāṇya*).

b *Vedaprāmāṇya* in the *Nyāyamañjarī*: *vedarakṣā* as *śāstraprayojana*

In the *Āgamaḍambara* Jayanta tries to establish the authoritativeness of all āgamas mainly by applying an argument similar to that applied to the Vedas.⁶ The same is

situation. Cf. *Āgamaḍambara*, 4th *aṅka*: *sarva eva hi yathāsthitā ime. snātakasya dhig apārthakam śrutam.* AD 192.9-10 (74.10-11). “For all of these [sects] without exception remains the same. What a pity! The *snātaka*'s learning (*śruta*) is useless.” Cf. also an inserted verse 1064 after *Mahābhārata* 8.65.30 (MBh Vol. 10, 568b): *nāsatyadasrātrisutodbhavādyair aṣṭāṅgavidyāśramam udvahadbhiḥ/ ābaddhapaṭṭo vraṇalāghavena yathā sureśo ditijaiḥ kṣatāṅgah//* (I thank Prof. H. Isaacson for this reference.)

⁴ Jayanta seems intentionally to use the expression *śauddhodani*, implying that the Buddha is just a human being. Cf. *Nyāyamañjarī*, 4th *āhnika*: *nanu buddhaḥ śuddhodanasya rājño 'patyam sa katham iśvaro bhavet.* Kataoka [2004:185.5] (NM I 644.10). “[Opponent:] The Buddha is a son of King Śuddhodana. How can he be God?”

⁵ Cf. Kataoka [2004:178.1-4] (NM I 649.4-7).

⁶ *Āgamaḍambara* 4th *aṅka*: *evam tāvad vedam āptapraṇītam ye manvānās tatprāmāṇyatvam āhuḥ/ sa pratyekam pañcarātrādiśāstraprāmāṇye 'pi nyāyamārgaḥ samānah// ... na prāmāṇyāt sarvathā tatprāṇītā granthā ete vedavat pratyavetāḥ// yadi vānādayo vedāḥ svata eva pramāṇatām/ yāntu, kāmaṇ tathaivaitāḥ pañcarātrādicodanāḥ//* AD 232.3-12 (90.12-91.2). “Thus, first of all, if they insist that the Veda is valid by accepting that it is composed by a reliable person [i.e. God], this way of reasoning (*nyāyamārga*) is similar [and applicable] to the validity of each and every teaching, e.g. of Pañcarātra. ... These compositions, [since they] are composed by them [i.e. reliable persons], would never fall from validity as the

true of the *Nyāyamañjarī*, where the Vedas' authoritativeness is a central concern. Indeed, Jayanta states in the beginning of the book that it is Nyāya's purpose to protect the Vedas' authoritativeness (*vedaprāmāṇyarakṣā*).⁷ And this attitude penetrates the whole *Nyāyamañjarī*, in particular the most important section *śabda-parīkṣā* (3-6 āhnikas), which covers more than one third of the text (554 pages of 1419 in the Mysore edition), as is clearly shown by Jayanta himself when he summarizes its various subordinate arguments which aim at a single goal of proving the Veda as authoritative (NM I 412.11-415.3).

c Problems and questions

With regard to the Nyāya tradition, however, it seems that Jayanta's statement not only deviates from it but also contradicts the orthodoxy, which officially claims that Nyāya gives us knowledge of the true nature (*tattvajñāna*) of, in particular, the twelve *prameyas*, which leads us to liberation directly, i.e. without depending on the Vedas.⁸

Veda [never does]. Or if [they accept that] the Vedas have no beginning and therefore become intrinsically valid, [they may as well accept that] those teachings e.g. of Pañcarātra [become intrinsically valid too] in the same manner.”

Cf. *Nyāyakalikā*: *tatra [vaidikeśu racaneśu] svātantryam īśvarasyeti tatprāṇitavēna vedāḥ pramāṇam iti. vedavad āgamāntarāṇy api tanmūlatvād āptapraṇitavād vā pramāṇam iti veditavyāni.* NK 4.11-14. “God is the author of those [Vedic scriptures]. Therefore the Vedas are means of valid cognition because they are composed by Him. In the same manner as the Vedas, other scriptures too should be understood as means of valid cognition because they are Veda-based or composed by reliable persons.” *Nyāyamañjarī*, 4th āhnika: *anye sarvāgamānām tu prāmāṇyam pratipedire/ ... sarvatrā vedavat kartur āptasya parikalpanāt/* Kataoka [2004:193.3-5] (NM I 640.6-8). “Others however understand that all scriptures are valid. ... For in all cases [of scriptures] reliable authors are postulated as in the case of the Vedas.”

⁷ *Nyāyamañjarī*, 1st āhnika: *nyāyavistarās tu mūlastambhabhūtaḥ sarvavidyānām, vedaprāmāṇya-*rakṣā-hetutvāt.* NM I 7.7-8. (*-rakṣā-) M; omits. MkhaG₁) “Nyāyavistara, on the other hand, is the basic trunk of all sciences, because it is a means for protecting the Vedas' authoritativeness.” *nanu vedaprāmāṇyanirṇayaprayojanaś cen nyāyavistarāḥ.* ... NM I 10.2. “If Nyāyavistara aims at ascertaining the Vedas' authoritativeness, ...” *yasya hi vedaprāmāṇye saṃśayānā viparyastā vā matis tam prati śāstrārambhāḥ.* NM I 11.10-11. “For [Akṣapāda] commences [this Nyāya] teaching for those whose mind is doubting or wrong with regard to the Vedas' authoritativeness.”

⁸ Jayanta does not feel it to be a big problem to accept the traditional view that

How, then, should we place Jayanta's view in the Nyāya tradition? Why does he need to bring in an apparently new idea, instead of repeating the old one? Are there any problems in the orthodox view? How does he describe the purpose of Nyāya? What is the place of Nyāya in the large picture of the various branches of learning? How does he think Nyāya protects the authoritativeness of the Vedas? Are Mīmāṃsakas unable to do so?

In order to answer these questions, first we shall look at a model description by Patañjali of *śāstra-prayojana*, then the Nyāya orthodoxy, and finally investigate Jayanta's own description and discussion.

2 Patañjali on *śāstraprayojana*: five Veda-oriented purposes of grammar

Patañjali starts his *Mahābhāṣya* by enumerating five purposes of grammar, all of which are in various ways connected with the Vedas:⁹

- a *rakṣā*: protects the Vedas, viz. preserves it correctly.
- b *ūha*: changes mantras in proper forms when they are applied.
- c *āgama*: an unquestionable injunction to study the Veda also implies that grammar should necessarily be studied, since it is the main (*pradhāna*) of all six *Vedāṅgas*.
- d *laghu*: grammar is the easiest way to know language, i.e. the Vedas and so on.
- e *asamdeha*: grammar removes doubts (and makes one certain) about the Vedas.

By applying Patañjali's terminology to Mīmāṃsā, one could say that the latter has two combined purposes as its aim, i.e. *āgama* and *asamdeha*: the injunction to study the Veda “*svādhyāyo 'dhyetavyah*”, also implies Mīmāṃsā study, because hermeneutics is necessary to make sense of the Vedas, i.e. to remove doubts and bring about determinate knowledge about the meaning of the Vedas.

Nyāya aims at liberation (NM II 264.19: *nihśreyasārthatvāc chāstrasya*). He can accept that *prameyatattvajñāna* leads one to liberation directly (NM II 264.20-265.1: *prameyajñānasya pramāṇajñānavad anyajñānopayogitām antareṇa svata eva mithyajñānanivṛttyādikramenāpavargahetutvapratijñānāt*). But he does not accept Nyāya's independence of the Vedas, because the Vedas are the original sole provider of *ātmajñāna* and Akṣapāda bases himself on the Vedas when he teaches that *ātmajñāna* is a means for liberation (NM II 461.9-12. See my later discussion 4c, “Jayanta's deviation from the Nyāya orthodoxy”). I thank Dr. Alex Watson for reminding me of Jayanta's relevant passage in the *ātmavāda*.

⁹ *Mahābhāṣya*, *paspāśahnika*, VMBh I 1.14-2.2. Jayanta (in the *pūrvapakṣa*) mentions these five purposes in NM II 233.

Among the remaining possibilities, Jayanta can be regarded as having chosen *rakṣā*, with a modification of Patañjali's meaning: he says that Nyāya protects the Vedas from enemies. The orthodox Nyāya view, however, seems different. Nyāya does not feel it essential or necessary, even as an excuse, to present itself as connected with the Vedas. For Nyāya is an independent method for acquiring the knowledge which leads one to liberation. Let us look at the orthodox view about the purpose of Nyāya described in the *Nyāyasūtra* and the *Nyāyabhāṣya*.

3 The Nyāya orthodoxy on *śāstraprayojana*

a The purpose of Nyāya described in the *Nyāyasūtra*: *tattvajñānān nihśreyasādhigamah*

Nyāyasūtra 1.1.1, enumerating sixteen *padārthas* which will be discussed later, states the purpose of this science (**śāstra-prayojana*).

Nyāyasūtra 1.1.1: *pramāṇaprameyasaṁśayaprayojanadrṣṭānta-siddhāntavayavatarkanirṇayavādajalpavitanḍāhetvābhāsa-cechala jātinigrasthānānām tattvajñānān nihśreyasādhigamah//*

One obtains final beatitude from the knowledge of the true nature of *pramāṇa*, *prameya*, *samśaya*, *prayojana*, *drṣṭānta*, *siddhānta*, *avayava*, *tarka*, *nirṇaya*, *vāda*, *jalpa*, *vitaṇḍā*, *hetvābhāsa*, *chala*, *jāti* and *nigraha sthāna*.

Nyāya gives us the knowledge of the true nature of these sixteen principles, which leads us to final beatitude (*nihśreyasa*).¹⁰

¹⁰ The relationship between *nihśreyasa* and *apavarga* is problematic and therefore some scholars have tried to clarify it. Cf. ‘Sekundärliteratur’ given in Slaje [1986].

According to the *Nyāyabhāṣya*, *nihśreyasa* is a general term for the good which includes various fruits of each science. Therefore we can postulate a fruit proper for each science (ND₁ 5.17: *tad idam tattvajñānam nihśreyasādhigamaś ca yathāvidyām veditavyam*). Thus *apavarga* which Nyāya gives is one of possible *nihśrayasas* (ND₁ 5.17-19: *iha tv adhyātmavidyāyām ... nihśreyasādhigamo 'pavargaprāptih*).

The *Nyāyavārttika* divides *nihśreyasa* into two, visible and invisible (ND₁ 13.14: *nihśreyasam punar drṣṭādrṣṭabhedād dvedhā bhavati*). The visible *nihśreyasa* is that which arises from *pramāṇāditattvajñāna* (ND₁ 13.14-15: *tatra pramāṇādipadārthatattvajñānād drṣṭam nihśreyasam*) as is shown in the *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.1. The invisible *nihśreyasa* is that which arises from *prameyatattvajñāna* (ND₁ 13.16-17: *param tu nihśreyasam ātmādeḥ prameyasya tattvajñānād bhavati*) as is shown in the *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.2. The former *nihśreyasa*, which corresponds to (or includes?) *jīvanmukti* (ND₁ 152.8), arises directly (ND₁ 152.6-7: *yat tāvad aparam*

The following sūtra 1.1.2 shows the process to reach liberation (*apavarga*) through the knowledge of the true nature (*tattvajñāna*).

Nyāyasūtra 1.1.2: *duḥkhajanmapravr̄ttidoṣamithyājñānānām uttarottarāpāye tadanantarāpāyād¹⁾ apavargah//*

1) -*pāyād*] ND₂Ch, Slaje [1986: 164, n.7] ; -*bhāvād* ND₁

Among pain, [re]birth, undertaking, evil qualities and false knowledge, when each following item perishes, each preceding item perishes [respectively]. From that arises liberation.

ni[h]śreyasam tat tattvajñānānantaram eva bhavati), while the latter does indirectly (ND₁ 152.9: param tu niḥśreyasam tattvajñānāt krameṇa bhavati). According to Uddyotakara, therefore, niḥśreyasa in the first sūtra is visible lower fruit (drṣṭa, apara), while the apavarga in the second sūtra is invisible higher fruit (adrṣṭa, para). Cf. Slaje [1986:174]: “Und so hat Vācaspati wie Uddyotakara die Aussage von NSū 1.1.1 unter dem Aspekt der Lebenderlösung gedeutet, und diese Form einer „niedrigeren Erlösung“ in den Kontext der „endgültigen Erlösung“ von NSū 1.1.2 als Vorstufe integriert.”

Therefore there lies a possible contradiction with Vātsyāyana, who interprets *niḥśreyasa* in the first sūtra as general and *apavarga* in the second sūtra as particular for Nyāya and thus the former includes the latter. For these two are different for Uddyotakara. I would like to point out two odd attitudes of Uddyotakara: first he keeps silent about the purpose of the Upaniṣads, while he mentions *svargapr̄apti* as a purpose of the three Vedas (ND₁ 21.10-12). Uddyotakara, as a *vārttikakāra*, should have explained that the purpose of the *pūrvakāṇḍa* is *svargādi* and that of the *uttarakāṇḍa* is *mokṣa*. But he avoids it. He might have hesitated to say explicitly that the *niḥśreyasa* in the first sūtra includes *mokṣa*, because *mokṣa* (except for *jīvanmukti*) corresponds to the *apavarga* in the second sūtra; second he skips commenting on the *Nyāyabhaṣya* (ND₁ 5.17-19=ND₁ 21.16-17: *iha tv adhyātmavidyāyām ... niḥśreyasādhigamo 'pavargapr̄aptih*) which clearly states that *apavarga* in the second sūtra is one of the *niḥśreyasas* in the first sūtra.

With regard to the first sūtra, Jayanta's understanding of the tradition seems to be based on the *Bhaṣya*. For he accepts that liberation is brought about by the knowledge of the sixteen principles. *Nyāyamañjari*, 1st āhnika: *ity eṣa ṣoḍaśapadārthanibandhanena niḥśreyasasya muninā niradeśi panthāḥ/ anyas tu sann api padārthagaṇo 'pavargamārgopayogavirahād iha nopadiṣṭah// NM I 29.1-4.* “Thus the sage [Akṣapāda] taught this path for final beatitude by the composition of the sixteen principles. As for other groups of things, although they exist, he did not teach them here because they do not contribute to the path for liberation.”

It is likely that the *Nyāyasūtra*, at least as an official view, presents itself as an independent means for liberation, i.e. independent of the Vedas.

b The fourfold division of sciences in the *Nyāyabhāṣya*: *caturvidyāsthānāḥ*

Nyāyasūtra 1.1.1 does not mention other sciences. Vātsyāyana, in *Nyāyabhāṣya* ad 1.1.1, takes a wider view in order to show the place of Nyāya among other sciences. He mentions a categorization of science into four kinds,¹¹ one of which is identified as Nyāya.

Nyāyabhāṣya ad 1.1.1: *imāś tu catasro vidyāḥ pṛthakprasthānāḥ prāṇabhrītām anugrahāyopadiṣyante, yāsāṁ caturthiyam ānvikṣikī nyāyavidyā.* ND₁ 2.15-16, ND₂ 2.18-20

But these four sciences, each of which has its individual topic, are taught in order to help living beings. Among them, the fourth is this *ānvikṣikī*, i.e. Nyāya-science.

Each science has its own independent information (**abhidheya*) and purpose (**prayojana*). Vātsyāyana expresses this independence with the term ‘having individual topics’ (*pṛthakprasthānāḥ*). Thus four sciences, i.e. *trayī*, *vārtā*, *daṇḍanīti* and *ānvikṣikī*, are not mutually connected. Using the terminology *tattvajñāna* and *nihśreyasa* of the Sūtra, Vātsyāyana clarifies that each science has its own way.

Nyāyabhāṣya ad 1.1.1: *tad idam tattvajñānam nihśreyasādhigamaś¹⁾ ca yathāvidyam veditavyam. iha tv adhyātmavidyāyām ātmādijñānam²⁾ tattvajñānam, nihśreyasādhigamo 'pavargaprāptir iti³⁾.* ND₁ 5.17-19, ND₂ 6.2-3

1) -*dhigamaś ca*] ND₁ND₂ ; -*dhigamārthaṁ* Ch 2) -*ātmādijñānam*] ND₁ND₂ ; -*ātmāditattvajñānam* Ch 3) -*gaprāptir iti*] ND₁ND₂ ; -*gaprāptih* Ch

The above-mentioned knowledge of the true nature and the attainment of final beatitude should be understood according to [each] science. As for this case, i.e. in the science of *ātman*, it is the knowledge of *ātman* and so on that

¹¹ Cf. *Kauṭilyārthaśāstra*, 1.2, *vidyāsamuddeśa*: *ānvikṣikī trayī vārtā daṇḍanītiś ceti vidyāḥ/1/ ... catasra eva vidyā iti kauṭilyaḥ/8/ ... balābale caitāsāṁ [trayyādīnāṁ] hetubhir anvikṣamāṇā lokasyopakaroti.../11/ pradīpah sarvavidyānāṁ upāyah sarvakarmaṇām/ āśrayaḥ sarvadharmaṇām śaśvad ānvikṣikī matā//12// AS 4.3-14.*

is the knowledge of the true nature, and the obtaining of liberation that is the attainment of final beatitude.

With the help of the *Nyāyavārttika*,¹² we can make a diagram as follows.

	object of <i>tattvajñāna</i>	<i>nihśreyasa</i>
<i>trayī</i>	<i>dharma</i> (<i>ātman</i>)	<i>svargādi</i> (<i>apavarga</i>)
<i>vārtā</i>	<i>bhūmyādi</i>	<i>sasya</i>
<i>daṇḍanīti</i>	<i>sāmādi</i>	<i>pr̥thivī</i>
<i>ānvikṣikī</i> (<i>nyāya</i>)	<i>ātmādi</i>	<i>apavarga</i>

The three Vedas (*trayī*) teach *dharma* and *ātman*, the knowledge of which leads one to heaven etc. and liberation respectively. (The *Nyāyavārttika* does not mention *ātman* and liberation, perhaps intentionally.) The science of agriculture (*vārtā*) teaches proper ground and so on (*bhūmyādi*), through which one get grains (*sasyādhigama*). Politics teaches conciliation (*sāman*) and so forth, which leads one to attain kingship over the world (*pr̥thivīvijaya*). The last science, i.e. *ānvikṣikī*, teaches sixteen principles, especially those *prameyas* relevant for liberation such as *ātman*. This science of *ātman* (*adhyātmavidyā*) leads one to liberation. We can say that Vātsyāyana introduces the fourfold division in order to show Nyāya's unique position among branches of science.

c The task of Nyāya in general and in particular: *pramāṇa*, *prameya* and *saṃśayādi*

The *Nyāyasūtra*, although it explains the process of how to attain liberation through *tattvajñāna* in Sūtra 1.1.2, does not bother to explain how each of the sixteen *padārthas* leads one to final beatitude. The *Nyāyabhaṣya*, on the other hand, shows it by dividing possible cases into three, viz. *pramāṇa*, *prameya* and *saṃśayādi*.

Pramāṇa Vātsyāyana explains in general how *pramāṇa* leads one to a fruit and establishes that *pramāṇa* grasps an object (*pramāṇam arthavat*) and therefore is valid.¹³ He attributes to *pramāṇa* a wider role, i.e. the means to get any kind of fruits through supplying cognition of objects.

In this way, all activities, so long as they are intended to have a secured fruit, require a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*). Thus Nyāya can give us a secure ground for all kinds of activity.

Vātsyāyana identifies Nyāya with the process of examination of an object

¹² *Nyāyavārttika* ad 1.1.1, ND₁ 21.9-17.

¹³ *Nyāyabhaṣya* ad 1.1.1, ND₁ 1.1-7, ND₂ 1.6-11.

through *pramāṇas* (*pramāṇair artha-parīkṣanam nyāyah*), mainly bearing in mind the logical proof which consists of five component parts (*pañcāvayavāḥ*).¹⁴

The last of the four branches of science (*catasro vidyāḥ*) is called *ānvikṣiki*, which Vātsyāyana identifies with Nyāya (*caturthiyam ānvikṣiki nyāya-vidyā*). According to him, the supreme Nyāya (*paramo nyāyah*) is nothing but syllogism (*pañcāvayavāḥ*)¹⁵ in the sense that Nyāya operates by means of inference, which relies on perception and verbal testimony (*pratyakṣāgamāśritam cānumānam sānvikṣā*).

By means of this identification of Nyāya as *ānvikṣiki*, i.e. examination of an object in the form of inference with the help of perception and verbal testimony, Vātsyāyana succeeds in showing the wider contribution of Nyāya-teaching, besides its particular job for liberation. The following statement shows well the aspect of Nyāya in the wider context.

Nyāyabhāṣya ad 1.1.1: *seyam ānvikṣiki pramāṇādibhiḥ padārthair*

¹⁴ *Nyāyabhāṣya* ad 1.1.1: *kah punar ayam nyāyah. pramāṇair artha-parīkṣanam*¹⁾. *pratyakṣāgamāśritam cānumānam*²⁾ *sānvikṣā. pratyakṣāgamābhyaṁ īkṣitasyānvikṣanam anvikṣā. tayā pravartata ity ānvikṣiki nyāya-vidyā nyāya-śāstram.* ND₁ 3.5-8, ND₂ 3.11-13

1) *-parīkṣanam*] ND₁ND₂ ; *-parīkṣanam nyāyah* Ch 2) *cānumānam*] ND₁ND₂ ; *anumānam* Ch.

“[Q:] But what is this Nyāya? [A:] [It is] an examination of an object through means of valid cognition. And inference, which is based on perception and verbal testimony, is [nothing but] *anvikṣā*. The *anv-ikṣā* is a following observation (*anv-ikṣaṇa*) of a thing which has been observed by perception and verbal testimony. That which acts with this [*anvikṣā*] is *ānvikṣiki*, i.e. Nyāya-science, Nyāya-teaching.”

¹⁵ *Nyāyabhāṣya* ad 1.1.1: *teṣu [pañcāvayaveṣu] pramāṇasamavāyāḥ. 1. āgamāḥ pratijñā. 2. hetur anumānam. 3. udāharanam pratyakṣam. 4. upamānam upanayah*¹⁾. 5. *sarvesām ekārthasamavāye sāmarthyapradarśanam nigamanam iti. so 'yam paramo nyāya iti.*²⁾ ND₁ 4.9-12, ND₂ 4.14-16

1) *upamānam upanayah*] ND₁ND₂ ; *upanayanam upamānam* Ch. 2) *iti*] ND₁Ch ; omits ND₂

“Means of valid cognition enter together into these [five component parts of syllogism in this way]: 1. The proposition is verbal testimony. 2. The logical reason is inference. 3. The illustration is perception. 4. The application is the comparative identification. 5. It is the conclusion to show that all [four] are capable of entering together into one object. And these [five component parts] are called ‘the supreme logic’.”

vibhajyamānā

*pradīpaḥ sarvavidyānām upāyah sarvakarmanām/
āśrayaḥ sarvadharmaṇām vidyoddeṣe parīkṣitā*// ND₁ 5.13-15, ND₂ 5.18-20*

**parīkṣitā*] J (in the footnote of ND₁), NM ; *prakīrtitā* ND₁ND₂Ch

This *ānvikṣikī*, which is divided by principles such as *pramāṇas*, is examined [and established] in the enumeration of sciences (i.e. *Kauṭilyārthaśāstra* 1.2.12, AS 4.13-14, pāda d: *śāsvad ānvikṣikī matā*) as a light of all sciences, means of all actions, [and] substratum of all dharmas.

Only Nyāya can help actions and support dharmas. Nyāya is a single light of all other sciences. Thus Nyāya has not only its own fruit, i.e. liberation, but also contributes to others, mainly through inference. We can see here Vātsyāyana's intention to show that Nyāya has general and particular contributions.

Prameya There are twelve *prameyas*, which begin with *ātman* and end with *apavarga*.¹⁶ Although there exist in our world endless objects of *pramāṇas* (ND₁ 1.6: *pramāṇārthaḥ 'parisamkhyeyah'*),¹⁷ the *tattvajñāna* of them does not necessarily lead one to liberation.¹⁸ What the Sūtra teaches, at least according to the *Bhāṣya*, is the least necessary list of those objects (*prameyas*) which one should know to destroy his false knowledge (*mithyājñāna*) for the sake of liberation.

Nyāyabhāṣya ad 1.1.1: *ātmādeḥ khalu prameyasya tattvajñānān*

¹⁶ *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.9: *ātmāśarīrendriyārthabuddhimānāpravṛttidoṣapretyabhāvaphaladuḥkhāpavargās tu prameyam//* “On the other hand, the object of valid cognition is the following: *ātman*, body, sense-organs, the objects of sense-organs, cognition, internal organ, undertaking, evil qualities, rebirth, fruit, pain and liberation.”

¹⁷ Uddyotakara interprets “*pramāṇa-artha*” as “a purpose (*prayojana*) of each *pramāṇa*” (ND₁ 11.11: *arthāśabdasya prayojanavācivat*) because *arthas* are only fourfold (*sukha*, *sukhahetu*, *duḥkha*, *duḥkhahetu*) and therefore not countless (ND₁ 11.8-9: *etāvān ayam pramāṇārthaḥ yad uta sukhaduḥkhe taddhetus ceti*). In fact Vātsyāyana seems to accept of *artha* two aspects, i.e. from the viewpoint of epistemology ('object') and that of value ('purpose').

¹⁸ Cf. *Nyāyamañjarī*, 7th āhnika: *jñātam samyag asamyag vā yan mokṣāya bhavāya vā/ tat prameyam ihābhīṣṭam na pramāṇārthamātrakam//* NM II 264.14-15. “Here [in the sūtra 1.1.2, Akṣapāda] accepts as *prameya* [only that which leads one] to liberation [if one] knows [it] correctly or [that which binds one] to this world [if one] knows [it] incorrectly, and not objects of *pramāṇas* in general.”

nihśreyasādhigamah. ... heyam tasya nirvartakam hānam ātyantikam tasyopāyo 'dhigantavya ity etāni catvāry arthapadāni samyag buddhvā nihśreyasam adhigacchati. ND₁ 2.9-12, ND₂ 2.14-16

As is well-known, one attains final beatitude by means of the knowledge of the true nature of *prameyas* such as *ātman*. ... One attains the final beatitude after knowing correctly these four *arthapadas*: one should know what is to be avoided, its cause, the ultimate avoidance, [and] its means.¹⁹

Vātsyāyana shows how each knowledge of twelve items leads one to liberation. First we have various kinds of false knowledge regarding *prameyas*, e.g. “There is no *ātman*”, “Liberation is terrible.”²⁰ The knowledge of the true nature destroys this sort of false knowledge and through various steps one reaches final goal, i.e. liberation.²¹

¹⁹ The fourfold set is clearly absorbed from the Buddhist *catvāry āryasatyāni*, i.e. *duḥkha*, *samudaya*, *nirodha* and *mārga*. But the *Nyāyavārttika* (ad 1.1.1, ND₁ 8.1-4) distorts it and enumerates instead *heya* (*duḥkha*, *duḥkhahetu*), *hāna* (*tattvajñāna*), *upāya* (*śāstra*) and *adhigantavya* (*apavarga*).

²⁰ *Nyāyabhāṣya* ad 1.1.2: *tatrātmādyapavargaparyante*¹⁾ *prameye mithyājñānam anekaprakārakam vartate. ātmani tāvat “nāsti” iti, anātmani “ātmā” iti. ... apavarge “bhīṣmaḥ khalv ayam sarvakāryoparamah, sarvaviprayoge ‘pavarge bahu bhadrakam lupyata iti kathām buddhimān sarvasukhoccchedam acaitanyam amum apavargam rocayet’* iti. ND₁ 150.5-15, ND₂ 6.9-18

1) -*paryante*] ND₁ND₂ ; -*paryantam* Ch

“As for those *prameyas*, which start with *ātman* and end with liberation, there are various kinds of false knowledge: first as for *ātman* “It does not exist”, and as for non-*ātman* ‘[This is] *ātman*'; ... and as for liberation ‘Terrible indeed is this cessation of all results. In the [state of] liberation, which is disconnection from everything, many good things get lost (*bahu bhadrakam lupyate*). Therefore how could a wise man be pleased with this insentient liberation (*acaitanyam amum apavargam*) which is a cutting off of every pleasure (*sarvasukhoccchedam*).’”

²¹ *Nyāyabhāṣya* ad 1.1.2: *yadā tu tattvajñānān mithyājñānam apaiti tada mithyājñānāpāye doṣā apayanti, doṣāpāye pravṛttir apaiti, pravr̥tyapāye janmāpaiti, janmāpāye duḥkham apaiti, duḥkhāpāye cātyantiko ‘pavargo nihśreyasam iti.* ND₁ 151.6-8, ND₂ 7.12-14. “But when the false knowledge vanishes by means of the knowledge of the true nature, the evil qualities vanish since the false knowledge vanished; when the evil qualities vanish, the undertaking vanishes; when the undertaking vanishes, the [re]birth vanishes; when the [re]birth vanishes, the pain vanishes; when the pain vanishes, there is a final beatitude, i.e. ultimate liberation.”

Although Vātsyāyana explains that the *tattvajñāna* of each of the twelve items is equally relevant to liberation, it is clear from the order of enumeration that *ātmajñāna* is the main means and the rest are subordinate. This observation is in fact confirmed by the fact that Vātsyāyana explicitly states that Nyāya is an *adhyātmavidyā* (ND₁ 5.18).

In comparison with *pramāṇa*, which has a wide scope of contribution to all actions and all sciences, the *prameya-tattvajñāna* is more specific, being the direct knowledge leading to liberation.

Therefore, when the tradition says that Nyāya offers the *tattvajñāna* which leads one to liberation, it means mainly the *prameya-tattvajñāna*, more specifically *adhyātmavidyā*, as is revealed by Vātsyāyana.

Samśayādi It is not surprising to find the possibility of Nyāya being reduced to *adhyātmavidyā*, because Nyāya, like many other systems, aims at the liberation of *ātman*. Our assumption is already expressed by Jayanta.²²

But this reduction would cause a problem, so Vātsyāyana fears: if Nyāya was reduced to *adhyātmavidyā*, it would become non-different from Upaniṣadic teachings and therefore lose its unique position among the four branches of science, which validates the Naiyāyika insistence that one should start learning Nyāya. In order to solve this problem, Vātsyāyana picks up the remaining items, i.e. *samśayādi*, which can be reduced to *pramāṇa* or *prameya*.

Nyāyabhaṣya ad 1.1.1: *tasyāḥ pṛthak prasthānam*¹⁾ *samśayādayaḥ padārthāḥ teṣāṁ pṛthagvacanam antareṇādhyātmavidyāmātram iyam syād yathopaniṣadaḥ. tasmāt samśayādibhiḥ padārthaiḥ pṛthak prasthāpyate.* ND₁ 2.16-18, ND₂ 2.20-3.2

1) *prasthānam*] emendation (Cf. *Nyāyavārttika* ad 1.1.1: *tasyāḥ samśayādiprasthānam antareṇa ... ND₁ 14.9*); -*prasthānāḥ* ND₁ND₂Ch

Of this [*nyāyavidyā*, only] the principles beginning with doubt are the specific topic. Without a separate statement of these [principles] this

²² *Nyāyamañjari*, 4th āhnika: *kim cāgamānāṁ virodhō 'pi nātīva vidyate. pradhāne puruṣārthe sarveṣāṁ avivādāt. ... tathā hy apavarga upeyaḥ sarvaśāstreṣु nirdiṣyate. tadupāyaḥ sarvatra jñānam upadiṣyate. jñānaviṣaye tu vivadante. tatrāpi prāyaśa ātmaviṣayatāyāṁ bahūnām avipratipattiḥ.* Kataoka [2004:192.4-191.4] (NM I 640.18-641.4). “Furthermore there are not many contradictions either among scriptures, because no one disputes the main aim of human beings. ... To explain, liberation is taught as a goal in all teachings. Knowledge is taught as its means everywhere. But they dispute the object of knowledge. Even on that point, in most cases, many agree that *ātman* is the object.”

[*nyāyavidyā*] would be a mere science of *ātman* like the Upaniṣads. Therefore [the *nyāyavidyā*] is established separately by means of principles such as doubt.

In this way, Vātsyāyana succeeds in recycling the superfluous item, i.e. changing it into a good excuse for the uniqueness of Nyāya.

d Some problems left unsolved in the Nyāya-tradition

The traditional view on the purpose of Nyāya can be summed up as follows:

- i) General aspect: the general aspect of Nyāya which examines the object through *pramāṇas* has wide scope, supporting all actions and helping all sciences as a light.
- ii) Specific aspect: the *prameya-tattvajñāna* is a direct means to liberation. In order to distinguish Nyāya from Upaniṣad, which can also teach *ātman*, Nyāya teaches *saṃśayādi*.

If we consider the context of *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.1, where the author should convince readers to start reading the text, the traditional view looks weak, especially on its uniqueness distinguished from any other science. They first insist that their branch can offer good means to achieve liberation, which in fact is available in another branch, also. Then they provide the excuse that although it is available in another branch, they can offer really unique knowledge, i.e. *saṃśayādi-tattvajñāna*, which can in fact be reduced to the other two, either *pramāṇa-* or *prameya-tattvajñāna*, as they admit.²³ What then do they give us as their specialty?

4 Jayanta's view on *śāstraprayojana*

a The fourteen-fold division of sciences: *caturdaśavidyāsthānāḥ*

While the *Nyāyasūtra* did not pay attention to other sciences, the *Nyāyabhaṣya* introduced a fourfold division in order to show that Nyāya has a unique and independent place among all sciences. Jayanta, however, substitutes the fourfold with a fourteen-fold division.²⁴

²³ *Nyāyabhaṣya* ad 1.1.1: *tatra saṃśayādīnām prthagvacanam anarthakam, saṃśayādayo hi yathāsaṃbhavāṇi pramāṇeṣu prameyeṣu cāntarbhavanto na vyatiricyanta iti. satyam evam etat.* ND₁ 2.13-14, ND₂ 2.17-18. “[Q:] Among them the separate reference to doubt etc. is pointless, because doubt etc., being included in *pramāṇa* and *prameya* accordingly, are not different [from them]. [A:] It is true.”

²⁴ Jayanta himself gives two scriptural evidences for the fourteen-fold division, the *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* 1.3 and an unknown source. *Nyāyamañjarī*, 1st āhnika: *yathoktam*.

First of all, he limits the scope of all sciences (*sāstra*, *vidyāsthāna*) to the transcendental world (*adr̄ṣṭa*) which people except for yogins can never experience directly. For there is no use for us to be taught about observable matters, e.g. “The person who is dirty should bathe” or “The person who is hungry should eat”.²⁵

Second, in the hierarchy of all sciences which deal with unobservable matters (*adr̄ṣṭa*), he places the four Vedas on the top,²⁶ followed by ten other sciences. The

purāṇatarkamīmāṃsādharmaśāstrāṅgamiśritāḥ/ vedāḥ sthānāni vidyānāṁ dharmasya ca caturdaśa// (Yājñavalkya, 1.3) iti. anyatrāpy uktam. aṅgāni vedāś catvāro mīmāṃsā nyāyavistarāḥ/ purāṇām dharmaśāstram ca vidyā hy etāś caturdaśa// (?) iti. NM I 8.4-9. Both are quoted again with other sources in NM I 618-619. The latter is quoted again in NM II 258.8-9.

²⁵ *Nyāyamañjarī*, 1st āhnikā: *dr̄ṣṭādṛṣṭabhedena ca dvividhah puruṣārthasya¹⁾ panthāḥ. tatra²⁾ dr̄ṣṭe viṣaye ... bhojanādāv anapekṣitaśāstrasyaiva bhavati pravṛttih. na hi “malināḥ snāyāt” “bubhukṣito³⁾ ‘snīyāt’ iti śāstram upayujyate. adr̄ṣṭe tu svargāpavargamārgē³⁾ ... lokasya śāstram eva prakāśaḥ. tad eva sakalasadupāyadarśane divyam cakṣur asmadādeḥ ... tasmād asmadādibhiḥ⁴⁾ śāstram evādhigantavyam⁵⁾. NM I 4.10-19*

1) *puruṣārthasya*] MG₁ ; *puruṣasya* Mvar 2) *tatra*] M ; *tasya* MkhaG₁ 3) *bubhukṣito*] Mvar. ; *bubhukṣito vā* MG₁ 3) *-mārge*] Mvar. ; *-mātre* MG₁ 4) *-smadādibhiḥ*] emendation ; *-smadādeḥ* MG₁ 5) *evādhigantavyam*] M ; *evāvagantavyam* G₁

“And the path to the goal of human beings is of two kinds according to the distinction between what is observed and what is not observed. Of these two, as for an observed matter such as eating, ... one undertakes [it] without relying on a teaching. For a teaching, “The person who is dirty should bathe” [or] “The person who is hungry should eat”, is not useful. On the other hand, as for an unobserved matter such as the path to heaven or liberation, ... teaching alone is a light for people. And it alone is a divine eye for people like us to see all correct means. ... Therefore it is a teaching that people like us should obtain.”

²⁶ *Nyāyamañjarī*, 1st āhnikā: *tac ca caturdaśavidham yāni vidvāmsaś caturdaśa vidyāsthānāny ācakṣate. tatra vedāś catvāraḥ. ... ta ete¹⁾ catvāro vedāś tāvat²⁾ sākṣād eva puruṣārthasādhanopadeśasvabhāvāḥ, “agnihotram juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ” “ātmā jñātavyaḥ” ityādiśruteḥ. NM I 5.2-8*

1) *ta ete*] Mvar ; *ete* MG₁ 2) *tāvat*] Mvar ; omits MG₁

“And the [śāstras] are of fourteen kinds. They are termed by scholars ‘the fourteen branches of science’. Among them the Vedas are four. ... First of all, these four Vedas by nature [can] teach means for the aims of human beings in a direct way [i.e. without depending on other authorities]. For there are śrutis ‘One who wishes heaven should perform an agnihotra-offering’, ‘One should know the

first three groups, i.e. the four Vedas which begin with the Atharvaveda,²⁷ Smṛtis and Itihāsa-Purāṇas, can tell us invisible things directly by themselves (*svata eva*), i.e. from their own mouth.

Nyāyamañjarī, 1st āhnika: *tad evam vedapurāṇadharmaśāstrāṇāṁ svata eva puruṣārthaśādhanopadeśasvabhāvatvād vidyāsthānatvam*. NM I 6.6-7.

In the above-mentioned way, the Vedas, Purāṇas and Dharmaśāstras are [fit to be counted as] branches of science, because it is their nature to teach, by themselves, means for the aims of human beings.

The four Vedas teach us the methods to attain liberation, heaven and so on. Smṛtis can also teach us dharmas by themselves.²⁸ Purāṇas and the Itihāsas do the same, by telling stories.²⁹ The last group, i.e. the six Vedāṅgas, Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya, does not tell us about the invisible world by itself, but only helps the former, especially the four Vedas. The six Vedāṅgas help the Vedas as shown by their name “Veda-auxiliaries”.³⁰ Mīmāṃsā helps us to understand the Vedas, i.e. to be certain

‘ātman’ and so on.”

²⁷ Jayanta regards the *Atharvaveda* as the foremost among the four Vedas (NM I 5.5: *prathamo 'tharvavedah*). He spends many pages to establish its authoritativeness. The opponent thinks that it does not contribute to the dharmas taught in the three Vedas and it is outside of the three (NM I 614.7-9: *atharvavedasya tu trayāmnātadharmaśāstraśādhanopadeśas trayibāhyatvena na tatsamānayogaśabdam*). First Jayanta shows the equality of the four Vedas with regard to validity, name and contribution (NM I 626.11-12: *tena pramāṇatāyām vedasvādhyāyaśabdam* *vaidikā* *pravartanādipuruṣārthaśādhanopadeśy* *eva dr̥syate*). Then he tries to show that the *Atharvaveda* is the first of all four (NM I 626.14-15: *atharvaveda eva prathamah*). We can see another reason that Jayanta prefers a fourteen-fold to fourfold division of sciences, which refers to the Vedas as *trayī* instead of *catvāro vedāḥ*.

²⁸ *Nyāyamañjarī*, 1st āhnika: *smṛtiśāstram api manvādyupanibaddham aṣṭakāśikhākarmaśāstraśādhanopadeśy* *eva dr̥syate*. NM I 5.10-11. “A Smṛti-teaching composed by Manu or other [teachers] is also seen to teach [people] means for the aims of human beings, such as *Aṣṭakā*, keeping a tuft of hair, and promoting drinking booths.”

²⁹ *Nyāyamañjarī*, 1st āhnika: *itihāsapurāṇābhyaṁ apy upākhyānādivarṇanena vaidika evārthaḥ prāyeṇa (prāyeṇa] MkhaG₁; prāyah M) pratanyate*. NM I 6.2-3. “The same content of the Veda is in most cases expanded by the Itihāsas and Purāṇas too, by telling tales and so on.”

³⁰ *Nyāyamañjarī*, 1st āhnika: *aṅgāni vyākaraṇakalpajyotiḥsikṣāchandoniruktāni*

about Vedic passages and their meanings.³¹ Nyāya protects the authoritativeness of the Vedas, as we will see later in some depth.³²

vedārthopayogipadādivyutpādanadvāreṇa vidyāsthānatvam pratipadyante. teṣām aṅgasamākhyaiwa tadanugāmitām prakaṭayati. NM I 6.9-11. “The auxiliaries [of the Vedas], i.e. grammar, ritual-manual, astrology, Śikṣā, prosody and etymology, become [suitable as] branches of science through derivation of words and so on which contribute to the meaning of the Vedas. Their name ‘auxiliary’ itself makes it clear that they are followers of those [Vedas].”

³¹ *Nyāyamañjarī*, 1st āhnika: *vicāram antareñāvyavasthitavedavākyārthānavadhāraṇān mīmāṃsā vedavākyārthavicārātmikā vedākhyasya karaṇasya (vedākhyasya karaṇasya)* G₁; *vedākarasya M) itikartavyatārūpam anubhavantī vidyāsthānatām pratipadyate. tathā ca bhaṭṭah --- dharme pramīyamāne tu vedena karaṇātmanā/ itikartavyatābhāgāmī mīmāṃsā pūrayiṣyati// (Brhaṭṭīkā; cf. PrP 404.15-16) iti. ata eva saptamam aṅgam iti na gaṇyate mīmāṃsā. pratyāsannatvena vedaikadeśabhūtatvāt. vicārasahāyo hi śabdaḥ svārtham̄ nirākāṅkṣam̄ prabodhayitum̄ kṣamah.* NM I 6.13-7.5. “Because without investigation one [can] not ascertain an undetermined meaning of a Vedic sentence, Mīmāṃsā, which is essentially an investigation of meanings of Vedic passages, becomes a branch of science by taking the form of *itikartavyatā* (subordinate means for activity) of the Veda, [which corresponds to] *karaṇa* (means for activity). And this is [taught by] Kumārila [as follows]: ‘But when one cognizes a dharma through the Veda which corresponds to *karaṇa*, it is Mīmāṃsā which can fulfill the role of *itikartavyatā*.’ That is the very reason why Mīmāṃsā is not counted as the seventh auxiliary. For it is a part of the Veda as being close [to it]. For speech can communicate its meaning without further expectation [only] when it is helped by an investigation.”

³² The same scheme is repeated again with a clearer division of *sākṣātpuruṣārthasādhanopadeśīni* and *tadupayogīni*. *Nyāyamañjarī*, 4th āhnika: *sarvathā tāvad vedāś catvārah purāṇam smṛtir iti ṣaḍ imāni vidyāsthānāni sākṣātpuruṣārthasādhanopadeśīni pūrvoktarītyā pramāṇam. vyākaraṇādīni tu ṣaḍ aṅgāny aṅgatvenaiva tadupayogīni, na sākṣāddharmopadeśīni. ... mīmāṃsā vedavākyārthavicārātmikā. vedaprāmāṇyaniścayahetuś ca nyāyavistara ity āmukha evoktam. tad imāni caturdaśa vidyāsthānāni pramāṇam. kānicit sākṣādupadeśīni, kānicit tadupayogīnīti siddham.* Kataoka [2004:203.6-201.1] (NM I 634.18-645.5). “In whatever way, first, these six branches of science, i.e. the four Vedas, the Purāṇa and the Smṛti, which directly teach means for the aims of human beings, are means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) in the way mentioned above. The six auxiliaries [of the Vedas], i.e. Grammar and so on, on the other hand, contribute to the [Vedas] precisely as [their] auxiliaries (*aṅgatvenaiva*), and they do not teach dharmas directly. ... Mīmāṃsā is essentially an examination of meanings of Vedic

Thus the fourteen-fold division enables Jayanta to bring together the goals of all sciences into a single, invisible fruit, either liberation or heaven and so on, the foremost teacher of which is the Veda. We can see the advantage of introducing a new division: it functions as a map of branches of science which is more Veda-oriented than the old one. While in the old scheme Nyāya is an independent branch leading to liberation, the new one makes it subordinate to the Vedas. In order to keep this characteristic feature of being Veda-oriented, the new division excludes politics and agriculture, i.e. branches of science which concern the visible world, and thereby secures their independence from the Vedas.³³

b The purpose of Nyāya described in the *Nyāyamañjarī*

We have seen the place of Nyāya among branches of science according to the fourteen-fold division, which Jayanta introduces with the intention of showing a Veda-oriented map of science. Now let us look closely at the role of Nyāya. According to the tradition, Nyāya aims in particular at liberation, for which Nyāya gives us *tattvajñāna*, mainly *prameya-tattvajñāna*, while *pramāṇa* contributes in general for all activities and sciences. Jayanta, however, explicitly defines Nyāya as a science which aims to protect the authoritativeness of the Vedas.

Nyāyamañjarī, 1st āhnika: *nyāyavistarās tu mūlastambhabhūtah sarvavidyānām, vedaprāmāṇya-*rakṣā-hetutvāt.* NM I 7.7-8.

*-rakṣā-] M ; omits MkhaG₁

Nyāyavistara [taught by Akṣapāda], on the other hand, is the basic trunk of

sentences. *Nyāyavistara* is a cause of ascertaining the authoritativeness of the Vedas. This is [already] taught in the very beginning [of this book]. Therefore these fourteen branches of science are means of valid cognition. Some teach directly [and] some contribute to the former. —This is established.”

³³ Jayanta himself tries to solve a possible contradiction with the old view of fourfold division. *Nyāyamañjarī*, 1st āhnika: *nanu catasraś ced vidyāś tat katham caturdaśa darśitāḥ. naiṣa virodhāḥ. vārtādaṇḍanītyor drṣṭaikaprayojanatvena sarvapuruṣārthopadeśividyāvarge gaṇanānarhatvāt trayānvīkṣikyoś ca tatra nirdeśāt tāś¹⁾ caturdaśaiva vidyāḥ.* NM I 9.12-14.

1) *nirdeśāt tāś]* G₁ ; *nirdeśāc* M

“[Q:] If sciences are four, why [did you] show fourteen [sciences]? [A:] This is not a contradiction. Sciences of agriculture and politics, because they aim at only observed [results] (*drṣṭa*), cannot be enumerated in the group of sciences which teach [means for] the aims of human beings in general; and the three Vedas (*trayī*) and *ānvīkṣikī* are shown in that [fourteen-fold list]. Therefore those fourteen [branches] alone are sciences.”

all branches of science, because it is a means for protecting the Vedas' authoritativeness.

As we have seen in the *Āgamadāmbara*, Buddhists and other heretics attack the Veda, which is now almost falling to the ground unless someone protects it.

Nyāyamañjari, 1st āhnika: *vedeṣu hi tārkika¹⁾-racitakutarkaviplāvita-prāmānyeṣu śithilitāsthāḥ katham iva bahuvittavyayāyāsādisādhyam vedārthānuṣṭhānam ādriyeran sādhavaḥ*. NM I 7.8-10.

1) *tārkika*-] G₁; *dustārkika*- M

For, when their confidence in the Vedas becomes shaky because their validity is destroyed by the bad speculation of philosophers, then how can good people care about the performance of the objects of the Vedas which is accomplished through spending a lot of money, energy and so on?

Smṛtis, Purāṇas and the Itihāsas are independent subbranches and are too far away from the main branch to protect it. Six Vedāṅgas and Mīmāṃsā are, as it were, busy with their own work, i.e. to help their boss in his office. They are not strong enough to save the Veda in a fight with heretics. Only Nyāya can do it.

Nyāyamañjari, 1st āhnika: *kim vā tadānīm¹⁾ svāmini parimlāne tadanuyāyinā mīmāṃsādividyāsthānaparijanena krtyam iti*. NM I 7.10-11.

1) *tadānīm*] G₁; omits M

Or, at that time [when good people's faith in the Vedas has become shaky], since the master has become faint, what is the use of the attendants, i.e. branches of science such as Mīmāṃsā, who follow that [master]?

Protecting the Veda is a unique job suitable only for Nyāya, which in fact contributes to the other sciences through saving their so-called master (*svāmin*). In this sense Nyāya can be a science with a wide scope.

Nyāyamañjari, 1st āhnika: *tasmād aśeṣaduṣṭatārkikopamardadvārakadrḍhataravedaprāmānyapratyayādhāyinyāyopadeśakṣamam akṣapādopadiṣṭam idam nyāyavistarākhyam śāstram śāstrapratiṣṭhānanibandhanam iti dhuryam vidyāsthānam*. NM I 7.11-14.

Therefore this teaching called Nyāyavistara taught by Akṣapāda, which is capable of teaching logic that provides a firmer faith in the authoritativeness of the Vedas through crushing all bad philosophers, is the base for establishing [all] teachings; thus it is the most responsible branch of science.

Nyāya contributes particularly to save the Veda and through this unique job makes

some more general contributions.

Thus the principal task of Nyāya is to establish the authoritativeness of the Vedas. Jayanta in fact spends hundreds of pages proving the Vedas' authoritativeness. The chapters of *śabda-parīkṣā* consist of more than one third of the whole *Nyāyamañjari*. And the elaborate arguments expounded in these chapters are, as Jayanta states in the beginning, intended to establish the Vedas' authoritativeness. Consistent with this is his unique interpretation of *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.7, “*āptopadeśah śabdaḥ*”. This sūtra proves the authoritativeness of verbal testimony in general on the ground that it is speech by a reliable person (*āpta*). The tradition puts effort into defining conditions for “being reliable” (*āptatva*). After showing this orthodox interpretation, Jayanta suggests an alternative one.

Nyāyamañjari, 3rd āhnika: *atha vā vedaprāmānyasiddhyarthatvāc chāstrasya tatpranetur āptasyeśvarasya yathāśrutam evedam lakṣaṇam. sa sākṣātkṛtadharma eva, dharmasyeśvarapratyakṣagocaravat*. NM I 401.1-3.
Or because the [Nyāya] teaching is for the sake of establishing the Vedas' authoritativeness, this definition [can be interpreted] literally as referring to God, i.e. the reliable author of those [Vedas]. He is one who has perceived [and therefore reached] dharma directly [i.e. fulfils the definition of an *āpta*], because dharma is an object of God's perception.

Thus, according to Jayanta, we can say that the essence of this huge Nyāya-tree lies in this proof. (My own reconstruction which I would like to name *paramaparamonyāyah*.)

*vedāḥ pramāṇam
āptabhūtasarvajñaparameśvarapranītavat
yad yad āptoktam tat tat pramāṇam yathāyurvedah
vedā āptoktāḥ
tasmād vedāḥ pramāṇam*

c Jayanta's deviation from the Nyāya orthodoxy

It is clear that Jayanta deviates from the tradition. What, then, does he have to say to reconcile his own view with the orthodoxy? His view is given in his interpretation of *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.1, where he himself puts forward a question about the conflict between the two.

Nyāyamañjari, 1st āhnika: *nanu ṣoḍaśapadārthatattvajñānasya katham
nihśreyasādhigamahetutvam iti vaktavyam. vedaprāmānyasiddhyartham
idam¹⁾ śāstram iti tāvanmātram eva vyutpādyatām, kim
ṣoḍaśapadārthakanthāgranthanena.* NM I 22.2-4

1) *idam*] Mkha ; *cedam* MG₁

[Q:] But what is the need to say that the knowledge of the true nature of the sixteen principles is the cause for attaining final beatitude? This teaching aims to establish the Vedas' authoritativeness—only this much should be explained. What is the use of stringing together patched garments of sixteen principles?

Jayanta, following the three divisions of sixteen *padārthas* introduced by Vātsyāyana, accepts the tradition that the *prameya-tattvajñāna* leads one directly to liberation.³⁴ But he deviates from the tradition when he says that we are informed of the causal relationship between *ātmādi* and liberation only by the Upaniṣads.³⁵ Vātsyāyana indeed feared this kind of reductionism which might destroy Nyāya's independence. But Jayanta simply admits it and makes consistent his view that Nyāya is for the sake of the Veda.

Nyāyamañjarī, 1st āhnika: *ātmādyā*¹⁾-*pavargaparyantadvādaśavidhaprameyajñānam tāvad anyajñānānaupayikam eva sākṣād apavargasādhanam iti vakṣyāmah. ... tasya tu prameyasyātmāder apavargasādhanatvādhigama āgamaikanibandhanah.* NM I 22.5-8.

1) *ātmādyā*-] G₁ ; *ātmā-* M

As for the knowledge of the twelve kinds of *prameyas* which start with *ātman* and end with liberation, we will state that it is a cause of accomplishing liberation directly without being at all a means for other knowledge. ... But [our] knowledge that [the knowledge of] those *prameyas* such as *ātman* is a means for liberation is solely based on the [Vedic] scripture.

Thus the Veda enjoys the status of being the sole provider of the causal knowledge

³⁴ Jayanta regards liberation as the highest goal of Nyāya-teaching. *Nyāyamañjarī*, 9th āhnika: *evam śarīrādau duḥkhaparyante heye prameya nirṇite yadartha etadupadeśah, yat param upādeyam prameyam, yadarthah śāstrārambhah, tam apavargam lakṣayitum āha.* NM II 430.3-4. “Thus we ascertained [ten] *prameyas*, i.e. beginning with body and ending with pain, which should be avoided (heya). [Now Akṣapāda] teaches [sūtra 1.1.22] to define liberation, for which he taught these [ten *prameyas*], which is a supreme *prameya* to be obtained, and for which [Nyāya-]science starts.”

³⁵ Strictly speaking, the subject to be informed should be understood as ordinary people like us, who are not yogins, as Jayanta noted in NM 4.18 (... *asmadādeḥ, na yoginām iva* ...).

for liberation, and also for heaven and so on.³⁶ In order to determine this scriptural authoritativeness through other *pramāṇas*, mainly through *anumāna*, give us confidence in it and protect its authoritativeness from enemies, Nyāya supplies us with good instruments, i.e. *pramāṇas* with the help of doubt and so on (*samśayādi*).³⁷

d Jayanta's uniqueness on *sāstraprayojana* as seen in the Nyāya tradition

³⁶ Therefore Akṣapāda, when he teaches the causal relationship between *ātmajñāna* and liberation, repeats what the Vedas said. *Nyāyamañjarī*, 9th āhnika: *yat tu kutas tasya niḥśreyasasādhanatvam avagatam iti. akṣapādavacanād iti brūmaḥ. akṣapādas tāvad evam upadiṣṭavān ‘ātmajñānān niḥśreyasādhigamah’ iti. na ca nispramāṇakam artham esa ṛṣir upādiṣad iti bhavitavyam atra pramāṇena. tat tu vaidikam vidhivākyam ātmā jñātavya iti.* NM II 461.9-12. “With regard to the question how we know that this [*ātmajñāna*] is a means of final beatitude, we reply: [we know it] from the statement of Akṣapāda. First Akṣapāda taught that one obtains final beatitude through the knowledge of *ātman*. And there must be some source (*pramāṇa*) of this because this sage could not have taught a thing without any source. And (*tu*) that [source] is a Vedic injunctive sentence ‘One should know the *ātman*’.”

³⁷ *Nyāyamañjarī*, 1st āhnika: *tasya [āgamasya] prāmāṇyanirṇītir anumānanibandhanā/ āptoktatvam ca tallīngam avinābhāvi vakṣyate// pratibandhagrahe tasya pratyakṣam upayujyate/ ... upamānam tu kvacit karmaṇi sopayogam. ... samśayādayas tu padārthā yathāsambhavam pramāṇeṣu prameyeṣu cāntarbhavanto 'pi nyāyapravṛttihetutvāt prthag upadiṣyante. nyāyaś ca vedaprāmāṇya-pratiṣṭhāpana*-pūrvakatvena puruṣārthropayogitvam upayātīti darśitam.* NM I 22.11-23.3. (*-pratiṣṭhāpana-) M ; -pratiṣṭhā- G₁) “To ascertain that it (*āgama*) is valid is based on inference. And being spoken by a reliable person (*āptoktatva*) will be stated later as its (=prāmāṇya’s) inferential mark as being invariably concomitant [with it]. Perception is useful to grasp the essential connection of that [*āptoktatva* with *prāmāṇya*]. ... As for comparison, it is useful for a certain ritual. ... As for the principles such as doubt, although they are accordingly included [under the category of] *pramāṇas* and *prameyas*, they are taught separately because they are the cause for Nyāya to operate. And it is already taught that Nyāya becomes contributive to the aim of human beings through establishing the authoritativeness of the Vedas.” *Nyāyamañjarī*, 1st āhnika: *tad evam upadeśtavyāḥ padārthāḥ samśayādayaḥ/ tanmūlanyāyanirṇeyavedaprāmāṇya-siddhaye//* NM I 28.9-10. “In this way, therefore, the principles such as doubt should be taught so that the authoritativeness of the Vedas, which is to be ascertained by logic based on these [doubt etc.], will be established.”

The Nyāya tradition regards itself as an independent science for liberation. That is why Vātsyāyana introduces a fourfold division of branches of science. The main cause of achieving liberation is *prameya-tattvajñāna*, which becomes possible through *pramāṇas*. According to Vātsyāyana, *pramāṇa* has wider scope: it supports all actions and shines as a single light for all sciences. On the contrary, *prameya-tattvajñāna* is for liberation in particular. But there is an unfavorable possibility that Nyāya might be dissolved into Upaniṣadic teachings, because both give *ātmajñāna* for the sake of liberation. In order to avoid this undesirable consequence, Vātsyāyana puts forward *samśayādi* as Nyāya's distinguishing mark.

Deviating from the tradition, Jayanta insists that Nyāya aims to protect the authoritativeness of the Vedas. That is the reason why he introduces the fourteen-fold division of branches of science instead of the fourfold. He accepts that the direct cause of liberation is *prameya-tattvajñāna*. But the most important knowledge for liberation, i.e. cognition of the causal relationship between *ātmādi* and liberation, is originally given by the Upaniṣads and not by Nyāya. Therefore Nyāya's main job is not concerned with *prameya* as the tradition intends, but rather with *pramāṇa*. Jayanta interprets the old metaphor of Nyāya as “support” and “light” in a specific context that Nyāya helps other colleagues, too, through protecting their boss, i.e. the Veda.

Nyāyamañjarī, 1st āhnika:

tenāgamapramāṇatadvārākhilaphalapradā/
iyam ānvikṣiki vidyā vidyāsthāneṣu gaṇyate//
āha ca bhāṣyakāraḥ
pradīpaḥ sarvavidyānām upāyah sarvakarmanām/
āśrayaḥ sarvadharmānām vidyoddeṣe parīkṣitā*// NM I 28.11-15.

*parīkṣitā] MG₁, J (variant given in ND₁'s footnote); prakīrtitā ND₁ND₂Ch
Therefore this science ānvikṣiki is counted as an [individual] science among
branches of science, because it gives every fruit through [establishing] the
authoritativeness of the scripture. And the author of the *Bhāṣya* says, “[This
ānvikṣiki] is examined [and established] in the enumeration of sciences as a
light of all sciences, means of all actions, [and] substratum of all dharmas.”

Jayanta's uniqueness lies in the fact that he consistently regards Nyāya as Veda-oriented. And this attitude becomes manifest as a shift of emphasis from *prameya* to *pramāṇa*.

5 Nyāya's Unique Job, heavy for Mīmāṃsā

a Mīmāṃsā's contribution to the Vedas: *vedavākyārthavicāra* as *śāstraprayojana*

Jayanta thinks that it is the unique job of Nyāya to protect the authoritativeness of

the Vedas. But this raises a question. It is possible for Nyāya's colleague, Mīmāṃsā, to do it. So could Nyāya be dismissed altogether?

Nyāyamañjarī, 1st āhnika: *nanu vedaprāmāṇyanirṇayaprayojanaś cen nyāyavistarāḥ, kṛtam anena, mīmāṃsāta eva tatsiddheḥ. tatra hy arthavicāravat prāmāṇyavicāro 'pi kṛta eva.* NM I 10.2-4.

[Q:] If the Nyāyavistara [taught by Akṣapāda] aims to determine the validity of the Vedas, it (Nyāyavistara) is not necessary [at all], because that (*vedaprāmāṇyanirṇaya*) is established just by Mīmāṃsā. For that examines the validity of the Vedas as well as their meanings.

Jayanta tries to avoid making Nyāya redundant on two grounds: it is not Mīmāṃsā's main job to protect the Vedas' authoritativeness, because it has its own job; furthermore Mīmāṃsā is in fact unable to protect the Vedas' authoritativeness.

In order to clear the way for his first reason, he defined in advance the purpose of Mīmāṃsā, faithfully following Kumārila.

Nyāyamañjarī, 1st āhnika: *satyam. sa tv ānuṣaṅgikāḥ. tatra mukhyas tv arthavicāra eva. pṛthakprasthānā himā vidyāḥ. sā ca vākyārthavidyā, na pramāṇavidyeti.* NM I 10.4-6.

True! But that (*prāmāṇyavicāra*) is secondary. What is primary there is only to examine [the Vedas'] meanings. For these sciences have individual topics. And that (Mīmāṃsā) is a science for examining the meaning of sentences and not a science of *pramāṇas*.

Thus, following Mīmāṃsā's own self-reflection, Jayanta succeeds in restricting Mīmāṃsā to her secretarial role, i.e. the examination of meanings of Vedic sentences (*vedavākyārthavicāra*), which helps her boss to communicate to us *dharma*s (and *ātman* in the case of Uttaramīmāṃsā).

b Incompetence of Mīmāṃsā for protecting the Vedas: *svataḥprāmāṇya* and *parataḥprāmāṇya*

But there is the possibility that Mīmāṃsā could actually invade Nyāya's territory, although it has its own job. And this anxiety is real, for in fact Kumārila tries to protect the Vedas' authoritativeness based on the *svataḥprāmāṇya* theory. But Jayanta states that it is not only a secondary (*ānuṣaṅgika*) but also an unachievable job for Mīmāṃsā.

Nyāyamañjarī, 1st āhnika: *na ca mīmāṃsakāḥ samyagvedaprāmāṇyarakṣaṇa-kaśmaṁ saranīm avalokayitum kaśmāḥ.¹⁾ kutarkakanṭakanikaraniruddha-saṅcāramārgābhāsaparibhrāntāḥ khalu ta iti vakyāmaḥ.* NM I 10.6-8.

1) *kṣamāḥ*] Mvar ; *kuśalāḥ* MG₁

And Mīmāṃsakas are not able to find a path which makes it possible to protect well the validity of the Vedas. As we will state later, they are indeed wandering on the wrong path, a narrow road obstructed by a mass of thorns of bad speculation.

Jayanta intends that the theory of *svataḥprāmāṇya* is not competent enough to protect the authoritativeness of the Vedas and that the theory of *parataḥprāmāṇya* alone can do it. In the third āhnika of the *Nyāyamañjarī*, Jayanta discusses in detail validity (*prāmāṇya*) of cognition in general, first describing Kumārila's view and then refuting it.

According to the Mīmāṃsā theory of *svataḥprāmāṇya*, cognition has validity by nature, automatically illuminates objects as they are, and does not require external confirmation.³⁸ Cognition is exceptionally invalidated only when there is a problem:³⁹ when there is a problem in the cognizing process (*kāraṇadoṣa*) or when there arises a counter-cognition (*bādhakapratyaya*) subsequently. Thus cognition is in principle reliable.⁴⁰ Therefore it is not only unnecessary but destructive to have

³⁸ *Nyāyamañjarī*, 3rd āhnika: *atas cotpattau svakāryakarane svaprāmāṇyaniscaye ca nirapeksatvād apeksātrayarahitavāt svataḥprāmāṇyam iti siddham. tad uktam* (*Ślokavārttika*, codanā v. 47) --- *svataḥ sarvapramāṇānāṁ prāmāṇyam iti grhyatām/ na hi svato 'satī śaktih kartum anyena pāryate//* NM I 430.8-12. “And therefore, it is established that [a *pramāṇa*] is intrinsically valid because it is free from three kinds of dependence: because it does not require [something external] in order to arise [as a valid cognition], in order to accomplish its own task, and in order to determine its validity. This is taught [by Kumārila]: ‘One should know that all *pramāṇas* are valid by themselves. For an external thing cannot produce a capacity if it does not exist innately’.”

³⁹ *Nyāyamañjarī*, 3rd āhnika: *sthite caivam autsargike prāmāṇye, yatra tasyāpavādaḥ kvacid bhavati tatrāprāmāṇyam.* NM I 431.10-11. “And in this way once it is established that validity is innate, [only] that is invalid which, [only] in some cases, has an exceptional rejection (*apavāda*).”

⁴⁰ *Nyāyamañjarī*, 3rd āhnika: *dvividha evāpavādaḥ: bādhakapratyayaḥ kāraṇadoṣajñānāṁ ca. tad uktam bhāṣyakṛtā---yatra duṣṭam kāraṇam yatra ca mithyeti pratyayaḥ, sa evāśamicināḥ pratyayaḥ nānya* (*Śābarabhāṣya* ad 1.1.3-5, *vṛttikāra*, Frauwallner [1968:26.20-21] (yasya ca duṣṭam)) *iti. vārttikakāro 'py āha---tasmād bodhātmakatvena prāptā buddheḥ pramāṇatā/ arthānyathātvahetūtthadoṣajñānād apodyate//* (*Ślokavārttika*, codanā v. 53) *iti.* NM I 431.13-18. “Exceptional rejection (*apavāda*) is only of two kinds: a counter-cognition (*bādhakapratyaya*) and a cognition of defects in causes

excessive doubts about its validity.

Nyāyamañjarī, 3rd āhnika:

*haṭhād utpādyamānas tu hinasti sakalāḥ kriyāḥ/
svabhāryāparirambhe 'pi bhaven mātari samśayah// NM I 433.1-2.*

But [a doubt] which is forcibly made to arise destroys all activities. Even when one embraces his wife, he would have a doubt ‘Is she Mother?’.

Jayanta, refuting each point made by Kumārila, establishes *parataḥprāmāṇya*. The main point can be summarized as follows: Kumārila too admits that there are two kinds of cognition, valid and invalid. In consequence we always have doubts about the validity of cognition whether it is true or not. In order to remove this doubt, we need confirmation. Thus cognition depends on other cognition. So the *parataḥprāmāṇya*-theory is established.⁴¹ Bearing in mind this argument, Jayanta rejects Mīmāṃsā’s invasion of the territory of Nyāya.

Nyāyamañjarī, 1st āhnika: *na hi pramāṇāntarasaṁvādadārḍhyam antareṇa
pratyakṣādīny api pramāṇabhbāvam bhajante, kim uta tada dhīnavṛttir eṣa*

(*kāraṇadoṣajñāna*). Thus taught the author of the *Bhāṣya*: When it has a defective cause, and when it has a [counter-]cognition that it is wrong, only that is wrong cognition. The author of the *Vārttika* too says: Therefore the validity of a cognition, which has resulted [merely] by its being cognition in nature, is exceptionally canceled by [invalidating] cognition that the object is otherwise or by cognition of defects in causes.”

⁴¹ This is pointed out by a Prabhākara opponent in the beginning of the argument about *khyāti*. *Nyāyamañjarī*, 3rd āhnika: *viparitakhyātāv abhyupagamyamānāyām bādhya bodhasandarbhasubhikṣe sati tatsādharmyād anutpannabādhake 'pi bodhe duṣpariharaḥ samśayah. samśaye ca samvādādyanveṣanam api dhruvam avataratīti parataḥprāmāṇyam anivāryam. NM I 452.2-5.* “Once you accept [as a doctrine of error] ‘the cognition of a wrong object’, there is an abundant supply [of the possibility] that a deniable cognition is interwoven. Therefore due to the common property [of being cognition] it is difficult to avoid a doubt about cognition although it does not have a counter-cognition already arisen. And when there is a doubt, there necessarily occurs a seeking for confirmation etc., too, and thus extrinsic validity is inevitable.” The Siddhāntin also summarizes the point in the same manner. *Nyāyamañjarī*, 3rd āhnika: *buddhidvividhyadarśanāt/ samśaye sati samvādasāpekṣatvam tathaiva tat// NM I 480.14-15.* “Because we experience that there are two kinds of cognition [i.e. true and false], we [necessarily] have a doubt. Therefore it is left unsolved that cognition requires confirmation etc.”

śabdah. ... arthatathātvataratvapariniścaye tu purusamukhapreksitvam asyāparihāryam. tasmād āptoktatvād eva śabdah pramāṇībhavati, nānyatheti. etac cāsmīn eva śāstre vyutpādayiṣyate. NM I 10.8-11.2.

For without a confirmation by means of an agreement with another *pramāṇa*, even perception etc. do not become valid, not to say this speech, which operates in dependence on them. ... But in order to determine whether or not the meaning is true, it is inevitable [i.e. necessary] to consider the person's face in the case of this [speech]. Therefore speech becomes valid only on the basis of being spoken by a reliable person (*āptoktatvād eva*), and not in other ways. And this will be explained in this same teaching.

Jayanta thinks that the passive way of Mīmāṃsā is weak. Mīmāṃsakas only repeat that cognition which arises from the Vedas is valid because we have not found any problem.

Nyāya, on the contrary, has a positive way of demonstrating a good reason for the validity of the Vedas. The Vedas are valid because they are composed by God, who creates and knows everything. In this sense, Jayanta regards Nyāya as strong enough to protect the authoritativeness of the Vedas.

6 Conclusion

The Nyāya orthodoxy on *śāstraprayojana* The Nyāya tradition claims that a means of liberation is the knowledge of the true nature (*tattvajñāna*) of, especially, the twelve *prameyas* which begin with *ātman*. Thus Vātsyāyana calls Nyāya *adhyātmavidyā*. But the identification of Nyāya as *adhyātmavidyā* causes a problem that Nyāya could be dissolved into Upaniṣadic teachings. In order to avoid this reduction, Vātsyāyana puts forward *samśayādi* as a distinguishing mark of Nyāya, which should have a separate topic (*prthagprasthāna*) from other sciences, especially the Upaniṣads, in a map of the four branches of science (*caturvidyāsthāna*). While *prameyatattvajñāna* aims at liberation in particular, *pramāṇa* contributes in general to all activities and all sciences.

Jayanta's view on *śāstraprayojana* Jayanta replaces a fourfold with a fourteen-fold division of sciences, all of which are concerned with invisible objects (*adr̥ṣṭa*) and related to the Vedas. Thus he presents a Veda-oriented map of sciences. In this map Nyāya contributes to the Veda by protecting its authoritativeness (*vedaprāmāṇyarakṣā*) essentially through an inference based on *āptoktatva* together with various subordinate arguments.

While *vedaprāmāṇyarakṣā* is a unique as well as a wide-reaching job for Nyāya, the role of *prameyatattvajñāna* is rather suppressed by Jayanta, who admits the reduction which Vātsyāyana fears. Thus Jayanta shifts the emphasis from *prameya* to *pramāṇa* and as a result solves an unconvincing claim by the tradition that Nyāya

is a unique science supplying an *adhyātmavidyā* in particular.

There might be various external reasons for Jayanta to introduce the *vedaprāmānyarakṣā* as the purpose of Nyāya, e.g. in order to defend an orthodox brahmin against an attack by *nāstikas* such as Buddhists; Jayanta's social and political situation and so on. One thing I have confirmed in this paper is that to change a job from *prameyatattvajñāna* (especially *adhyātmavidyā*) to *vedaprāmānyarakṣā* is in fact to protect the independent position of Nyāya, about which Jayanta is quite nervous, especially with respect to Mīmāṃsā, which might deprive Nyāya of a new job. Thus he succeeds in showing a more convincing reason for readers to study Nyāya instead of repeating an old view which is rather weak in its claim of Nyāya's uniqueness.

Abbreviations and Bibliography

- AD *Much Ado About Religion*. Ed. and Tr. Csaba Dezső. New York University Press and JJC Foundation, 2005. (I also indicate in parentheses old page numbers of the *Āgamaḍambara of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa*. Ed. V. Raghavan & Anantalal Thakur. Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1964.)
- AS *The Kauṭilya Arthaśāstra*. Part I. Ed. R.P. Kangle. Bombay: University of Bombay, 1960.
- Ch *The Nyaya-Darshana*. Ed. Gangānātha Jha and Dhundhirāja Shastri. Benares: Chowkhambā Sanskṛit Series Office, 1925.
- G₁ A Manuscript of the *Nyāyamañjarī* preserved in the Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek, Göttingen, Cod. Ms. Sanscr, Mu. I,95.
- PrP *Prakaraṇa Pañcikā of Śālikanātha Miśra with the Nyāya-siddhi of Jaipuri Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa*. Ed. A. Subrahmanya Sastri. Varanasi: Banaras Hindu University, 1961.
- M Adopted readings in the Mysore edition of the *Nyāyamañjarī*.
- MBh *The Mahābhārata*. Ed. V. S. Sukthankar and S. K. Belvalkar. Vol. 10. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1954.
- Mkha Variant readings given in the footnotes of the Mysore edition.
- Mvar Variant readings given in the endnotes of the Mysore edition.
- ND₁ *Nyāyadarśana of Gautama with the Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana, the Vārttika of Uddyotakara, the Tātparyaṭikā of Vācaspati & the Pariśuddhi of Udayana*. Ed. Anantalal Thakur. Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1967.
- ND₂ *Gautamiyanyāyadarśana with Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana*. Ed. Anantalal Thakur. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1997.
- NK *The Nyāya Kalikā of Jayanta*. Ed. Ganga Nath Jha. Benares, 1925.
- NM *Nyāyamañjarī of Jayantabhaṭṭa*. Ed. K.S. Varadacharya. 2 vols. Mysore: Oriental Research Institute, 1969, 1983.
- NMGBh *Cakradhara's Nyāyamañjarī-granthibhāṅga*. Ed. Nagin J. Shah. Ahmedabad: L.D. Institute of Indology, 1972.

- VMBh *The Vyākaraṇa Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali*. Ed. F. Kielhorn. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1985.
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