

Sucaritamīśra on Apoha*

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1 A critical edition of the *apoha* section of Sucaritamīśra's *Kāśikā*

Sucaritamīśra's *Kāśikā* published from Trivandrum in three parts (in 1926, 1929 and 1943) stopped at the end of the *sambandhākṣepa* section. The remaining sections, i.e., *sphoṭa*, *ākṛti*, *apoha* and so on, were not published despite the availability of manuscripts. The present author has started editing the *apoha* section of the *Kāśikā* consulting four manuscripts, i.e., three Devanāgarī and one Malayālam manuscript. So far two parts have been published. The first part (Kataoka 2014a) covers Sucarita's long commentary on v. 1; and the second part (Kataoka 2015) covers Sucarita's commentary on vv. 2–94.

2 *Kāśikā ad Ślokavārttika apoha v. 1*

It might appear surprising that Sucaritamīśra spends many pages (38 pages in the Adyar manuscript; 39 pages in my edition) just on a single verse. In his commentary on v. 1 Sucaritamīśra offers his own elaborate critique of *apoha* as a kind of introduction to the entire section on *apoha*. One can regard this opening part as an updated version of the Mīmāṃsā criticism of *apoha* which reflects the trend of arguments of his time, around the first half of the tenth century. This part contains new arguments developed after Kumārila.

3 The historical development of the *apoha* theory

After Dignāga, the founder of the Buddhist theory of *apoha*, Dharmakīrti and his followers continued to modify the theory in response to Kumārila's criticism. Śākyabuddhi (660–720) and Śāntarakṣita (725–788) are known to hold the “internal” view that the object of conceptual cognition is cognition's own form (*svapratibhāsa*).¹ In other words, they regard an image or a form reflected in cognition (*jñānākāra*) as the direct object of conceptual cognition and also of a word.

Dharmottara (740–800), who is known to be a *nirākārajñānavādin*,² severely criticizes this view and claims that the object of conceptual cognition, *apoha*, is

* The present article is based on a paper read at the 16th World Sanskrit Conference held in Bangkok (Renaissance Rachaprasong) on June 29th, 2015. This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 15K02043. I thank Elliot Stern, Peter Sahota, and Somdev Vasudeva for their comments.

¹ Cf. Sakurai 2000; Ishida 2005; Kataoka 2009:488(11); Kataoka 2014b:118, n. 23.

² Oki 1982:190–192; Kataoka 2014a:340(23).

neither external nor internal, i.e., neither outside nor inside the mind. For him *apoha* is something merely fabricated (*āropita*), unreal (*nistattva*) and false (*alīka*). Taking into consideration both types of Buddhist theories, Sucaritamīśra rejects the Buddhist claim. The present paper gives an overview of the topics related to *apoha* discussed in the *Kāśikā* and also pays attention to its sources.

4 Two Buddhist theories of *apoha*

As briefly mentioned above, when Sucarita introduces the Buddhist theory of *apoha*, he divides it into two subclasses: one is the *svākāra* theory and the other is the *alīka* theory.

ŚVK ad *apoha* v. 1, §2.1.7: *yo hi vikalpānām viṣayaḥ sa śabdārthaḥ. ... kas tasyā [=kalpanāyā] viṣayaḥ? (1) svākāra evety eke. (2) kalpitam nistattvam alīkam ity anye.*

[Buddhist:] For the object of conceptual cognition is the object of an utterance (i.e. the meaning of a word). ...

[Q] What is the object of [conceptual cognition]?

[A] Some [Buddhists] say that it is its own form, whereas others say that it is something [mentally] constructed, untrue and false.

Sucarita calls the former group *jñānākāravādin* (§2.3.3.5). Vācaspati, too, designates the former as *jñānākāravādin* (NKaṇ Stern ed., 1390.8). Vācaspati also calls the former *sākāravādin* (1390.11) and the latter *nirākārajñānavādin* (1392.9).³ Jayanta, too, pays close attention to this dichotomy. He regards the former theory as a line of thought arisen from *ātmakhyāti* (NM *apoha* II §3.2: *ātmakhyātigarbhā saraṇiḥ*) and the latter as a line of thought arisen from *asatkhyāti* (§3.1: *asatkhyātigarbhā saraṇiḥ*). We can therefore infer that around the ninth and tenth centuries it was well established among brahmin scholars that the Buddhist theory of *apoha* was divided into two subclasses.

	1. Dharmakīrti, etc.	2. Dharmottara
Jayanta	<i>ātmakhyātigarbhā</i>	<i>asatkhyātigarbhā</i>
Sucarita	<i>jñānākāravādin</i>	
Vācaspati	<i>sākāravādin</i>	<i>nirākārajñānavādin</i>

³ But see note 2 on p. 1393 (Stern ed.), which reports a variant reading: *bimbākārajñānavādinām* for *nirākārajñānavādinām*.

5 Sources of the two Buddhist theories

We can trace the main source of the former theory to Dharmakīrti's works as interpreted by his early commentators such as Śākyabuddhi,⁴ and the latter to Dharmottara's *Apohaprakaraṇa*. In his *Apohaprakaraṇa*, for which we only have a Tibetan translation, Dharmottara severely criticizes the "internal" theory of *apoha* and instead claims that the object of conceptual cognition, i.e., *apoha*, is neither internal nor external. In the opening verse of his *Apohaprakaraṇa* Dharmottara clearly states that the object of conceptual cognition is neither cognition itself nor external (AP: *buddhir na bahir*). Jayanta glosses this and states that *apoha* is neither internal nor external (NM *apoha* II, §2.1: *nāntar na bahiḥ*).

6 Sucarita's source: Śālikanātha's *Prakaraṇapañcikā*

Sucarita's reference to the two Buddhist theories in the *apoha* section quoted above (§2.1.7 in my edition) is based on his explanation in the preceding section, i.e., the *ākṛti* section, which runs as follows:

ŚVK *ākṛti*, Adyar ms. p. 2594: *kim idānīm jñānākāra evāyam āpannaḥ. (1) tathā nāmeti kecit. (2) na tv evam api, bahiravabhāsāt, na cārthagata eva, anekatvavirodhāpātāt, kim tv asann eva jñānam bhāsamānam anu bhāsate, śabdān iva pratiśabda ity anye.*

[Q] Then does it follow that this is merely the form of cognition?

[A-1] Some [Buddhists] say: Yes, let that be the case.

[A-2] Other [Buddhists] say: No, that is not the case, either, because it appears externally. Nor is it the case that it is something solely belonging to an external object, because the contradiction of plurality [of *apoha* such as *agonivṛtti* which functions as a kind of single universal like cowness] would follow. Rather it is nothing at all; it appears after cognition appears, just as an echo appears after a sound.

Here Sucarita gives reasons and the example of an echo (*pratiśabda*) to support Dharmottara's view of *apoha* as being neither internal nor external. Sucarita's present description in the *ākṛti* section is based on Śālikanātha's PrP, which runs as follows:

PrP 76.1–3: *sa cāyam tasyākāraḥ prathamāno na jñānasyaiva, bahiṣṭvenā-vabhāsāt. na cārthagata eva, uktena nyāyena nirastatvāt. kim tv ayam asann eva jñānam anu bhāsate, śabdān iva pratiśabdaḥ.*

And this form which is revealing itself does not belong to cognition, because it appears as something external. Nor is it the case that it is something solely be-

⁴ PVT ad 1:40 (cf. Ishida 2011:198): *vikalpabuddhipratibhāsas tu tṛṭīyaḥ, anyo 'pohyate 'neneti kṛtvā, yo 'yam śāstrakārya śabdavācīyatayābhimataḥ*. See also Kataoka 2012:115.

longing to an external object, because such a possibility was already rejected due to the rational mentioned above. Rather it is nothing at all; it appears after cognition, just as an echo appears after a sound.

To sum up, Sucarita's explanation of the two Buddhist theories in the *apoha* section is based on his explanation in the *ākṛti* section, which again is based on Śālikanātha's description in the *Prakaraṇapañcikā*.⁵

PrP 76.1–3:

sa cāyaṃ tasyākāraḥ prathamāno na
jñānasyaiva, bahiṣṭvenābhāsāt.

na cārthagata eva, uktena nyāyena ni-
rastatvāt.

kiṃ tv ayam asann eva jñānam anu
bhāsate,
śabdān iva pratiśabdaḥ.

ŚVK *ākṛti*, Adyar ms. p. 2594:

kim idānīm jñānākāra evāyam
āpannaḥ. tathā nāmeti kecit. na

tv evam api, bahiravabhāsāt,

na cārthagata eva, anekatvavi-
rodhāpātāt,

kiṃ tv asann eva jñānam bhāsamānam
anu bhāsate,

śabdān iva pratiśabda ity anye.

ŚVK *apoha* §2.1.7: yo hi vikalpānām viśayaḥ sa śabdārthaḥ. ... kas tasyā
[=kalpanāyā] viśayaḥ? svākāra evety eke. kalpitam nistattvam alīkam ity anye.

7 Other explanations by Sucarita based on the *Prakaraṇapañcikā*

The *apoha* section of the *Kāśikā* begins with a reference to Buddhist opponents who reject the existence of real universals such as cowness that the realists postulate. The steps of the arguments made by Sucarita's Buddhists run as follows:

§2.1.1. A recurrent form (*anugatarūpa*) does not really exist.

§2.1.2. Cognition of cowness is a conceptual cognition based on the perception of individual, real cows.

§2.1.3-6. [Q] How is it possible to explain *śabda* and our activity based on it that, according to the Buddhist theory, would lack a corresponding object?

§2.1.7. [A] The object of conceptual cognition is the object of *śabda*.

Here again we can trace Sucarita's source directly to the *ākṛti* section and indirectly to Śālikanātha's *Prakaraṇapañcikā*. Sucarita makes it clear that his explanation of Buddhist *sāmānya* is already present in the previous section, i.e., *ākṛti*, by saying: "It was already elaborated before that a common property is merely

⁵ For more detailed sources regarding the relationship between Sucarita and Śālikanātha, see Kataoka 2014a:343(20), n. 41.

the form of conceptual cognition.” (§2.1.2: *vikalpākāramātram eva sāmānyam iti prāk prapañcitam eva.*) The portion of the *ākṛti* section referred to (Adyar ms. pp. 2593–2594) is based on PrP 73.6–74.5.

PrP 73.6–13:

kāryabhūtā hi buddhir eṣā kāraṇam
ākṣīpanī yadanantaram evopajāyate
tad eva kāraṇam kalpayati . . .⁶
sā ceyam svalakṣaṇaviśayadarśana-
samanantarabhāvinīti

tā eva vyaktayaḥ svanirbhāsā bu-
ddhīr upajanayya tanmukhena tām
ekākārānubhāsinīm dhiyam āvirbhāva-
yanti.⁷

nītāntabhedavatīnām ca vyaktīnām
kāśāncid eṣa mahimā na sarvāsām iti
kim anupapannam.

yathā hy atyantabhinnā api cakṣurā-
lokamaṇaḥsaṃyogā ekasāmagrīsamu-
panipatitā ekavijñānodayaślakṣaṇam
kāryam ārabhante, tathā vyaktayo 'pi
kim nārabhanta iti nedaṃ pratipattika-
ṭṭhinam.⁸

ŚVK *apoha*, 2.1.2: svalakṣaṇaviśayaviśadadarśanaprabhavas tv ekākāravikalpaḥ,
tadbhāvabhāvāt. tasmin hi sati tatprṣṭhabhāvīgotvādivikalpo jāyate.

ŚVK *ākṛti*, p. 2593:

kāryabhūtā hi buddhiḥ kāraṇam
ākṣīpanī yadanantarabhāvinī tat
kāraṇīkārayati,
svalakṣaṇadarśanasamanantarabhāvinī
ca seti

vyaktaya eva svasaṃvedanadvāreṇa
tasyāḥ kāraṇam.

na ca nānābhūtās tā ekasmai kāryāya
na ghaṭanta iti sāmpratam.

drṣṭam hi bhinnānām api cakṣurā-
lokādīnām ekaṃ rūpādijñānātmakaṃ
kāryam.

Here the main point of the discussion is as follows: conceptual cognition of cowness, according to Buddhists, is caused by a clear perception of individual cows, because the former accords with the existence of the latter (*tadbhāvabhāvāt*).

PrP 74.2–5:

eṣā ca manīṣā na svalakṣaṇam
viśayīkaroti, tasya viśadābhāsi-
tvāt,

ŚVK *ākṛti*, pp. 2593–2594:

viśadābhāsinīyo hi tāḥ. ekākārā ca
dhīr aviśadaviśayā,

⁶ “To explain: when this cognition as a result alludes to [its own] cause, it causes one to postulate only that cause, immediately following which, it (the cognition) is produced.”

⁷ “And because this [conceptual cognition] arises immediately after the perception of a particular, the same individuals, having produced [perceptual] cognitions of the [individuals’] own forms, cause to appear, through these [perceptual cognitions], a cognition that has a single form.”

⁸ “Of all individuals, all of whom are totally different [from each other], only some have this power and not all [i.e. only some individuals are grouped]. Therefore, what is inappropriate? For just as the eyes, light, the internal organ, and their connection, when they fall in the same causal aggregate, produce a single result, i.e., the production of a single cognition, similarly [these] individuals, too, produce [a single result]. Therefore, this is not difficult to understand.”

asyāś cābhilāpasamsargayogyārtha-
pratibhāsatvāt.

abhilāpasamsargayogyaviṣayatvāt.

abhilāpānām ca viśadākāram ava-
bhāsitum āśakteḥ,
abhilāpamātreṇa tathāvidhapratītya-
bhāvāt.
tenaiṣā na svacchākārābhāsinī.⁹

abhilāpānām ca viśadābhāsa-
bhāvāsamābhavāt,
abhilāpāntare tathādarśanāt.

iha tu samasamayabhāvinirvikalpa-
kasvalakṣaṇaviṣayaviśadadarśana-
bhāvitvāt tathābhāsaḥ, tadabhāve
tathānupalambhāt.

ŚVK *apoha*, §2.1.2: ato vikalpākāramātram eva sāmānyam iti prāk prapañcitam
eva. na tu vyāvṛttātmanām anugataṁ nāma kimcit tātṭvikam rūpam.

Cowness is only an object of conceptual cognition and not an object of percep-
tion, because conceptual cognition, since it deals with only an unclear image to be
denoted by a word, cannot have individual cows as its object.

8 Sucarita's rejection of the *jñānākāra* theory

After introducing the two Buddhist theories (in §2.1.7), Sucarita first criticizes the
theory of *jñānākāra* (in §2.2.1–2.2.4).¹⁰ The main points of his arguments run as
follows:

§2.2.1. Cognition's form (*jñānākāra*) is not different from conceptual cogni-
tion itself (*vikalpajñānād ananyaḥ*) and therefore, being unique, cannot
be the object of words (*aviśayaḥ śabdānām*).

§2.2.2. When cognizing itself (*svasamvittau*), i.e., with respect to its own
form, which is not different from cognition itself (*svato 'bhinne
svākāre*), conceptual cognition (*kalpanā*) is not conceptual (*avikalpikā*)
but perceptual (*pratyakṣa*).

§2.2.3. Externality (*bāhyatva*) of the image that appears in conceptual cogni-
tion (*vikalpapratibhāsa*) is not *śabdārtha*, either.

⁹ "And this [conceptual] cognition does not deal with a particular, because it (a particular) has
a clear image, whereas the [conceptual] cognition has an [unclear] image of an object which
can be associated with a verbal designation. And this is because a verbal designation cannot
cause a clear image to appear, for such cognition that has a clear image does not occur merely
by means of a verbal designation. Therefore, this [conceptual cognition] does not cause a
clear image to appear."

¹⁰ §2.2 is located still in the *pūrvapakṣa*. (The *uttarapakṣa*, i.e., Sucarita's *siddhānta*, starts from
§3.) Therefore, it is the *nirākārajñānavādīn* who criticizes the *jñānākāravādīn* here.

§2.2.4. Conceptual cognition itself, being the object of *anubhava*, cannot be different from externality which is alleged to be an object of conceptual cognition.

Among these four points the first and the second are found to be directly based on Dharmottara's *Apohaprakaraṇa*.

8.1 *vikalpajñānād ananyaḥ*

Sucarita explains the first point with the expression *vikalpajñānād ananyaḥ*, i.e., *jñānākāra* is not different from conceptual cognition itself, which is based on Dharmottara's expression: “*anyāpoha (gṛāṇ sel ba)* is not different from cognition (*śes pa dañ tha mi dad pa*).”¹¹

AP 241.2–10:

de'i phyir ji ltar blo'i gzugs brñan yin/
rtog ge rig pa rgyu mtshan 'ga' žig las
gṛāṇ sel ba sgra'i don du brtags nas
rtog pa med pa'i yul yañ sgra'i don du
lhag par žen pa **śes pa dañ tha mi dad
pa'i phyir** gzugs brñan rañ gi mtshan
ñid yin yañ sgra'i brjod byar yoñs su
brtags par ji ltar 'gyur te/
śes pa dañ tha dad pa ma yin pa sgra'i
brjod byar yoñs su brtags par ji ltar
'gyur ro/
śes dañ tha dad ma yin pa/ ji ltar don
gṛāṇ 'brañ bar 'gyur//
žes bya ba la sogs pas **brjod bya yin
pa slob dpon gyis bkag pa** yin no/

My reconstruction:

*tasmāt katham buddheḥ pratibimbaḥ.
tarkavit kutaścin nimittād anyāpohaṁ
śabdārthaṁ kalpayitvā nirvikalpa-
viśayam api śabdārthatvenādhyava-
sitam pratibimban jñānābhinnatvāt
svalakṣaṇam sad api śabdavācyaṁ
katham parikalpayet.*

*jñānād abhinnaṁ śabdavācyaṁ ka-
tham parikalpyeta.*

*jñānād avyatiriktaṁ ca katham arthā-
ntaram vrajet// (PV1:71cd)*

*ityādinā vācyaṭvam ācāryeṇa niṣi-
ddham.*¹²

ŚVK *apoha* §2.2.1–2: *katham punar jñānākāro 'bhilāpasamsargayogyaḥ. sa hi vikalpajñānād ananyas tadvad eva kṣaniko 'sādhāraṇa iti sukhādisvasamvittivad aṣṭayaḥ śabdānām. ... nirākṛtaṁ cedam ācāryeṇa svayam eva vikalpākārasya śabdavācyaṭvam jñānād avyatiriktaṁ ca katham arthāntaram vrajet// (PV 1:71cd) iti.*

¹¹ The reconstructed Sanskrit text of the AP is italicized in the following.

¹² “Therefore, how can it (the object of conceptual cognition) be a reflected image in a cognition? How can a wise man, having postulated exclusion of others as a word-meaning for some reason, postulate a reflected image, which he considers as a word-meaning although it is [in fact] the object of a non-conceptual cognition, as a word-meaning despite its being a particular because it is not different from a cognition? How can something not different from a cognition be postulated as a word-meaning? It is denied by the master (Dharmakīrti) that [a reflected image in a cognition] is a denotation when he says the following: And how can something not different from a cognition go out to another object?” Cf. a German translation by Frauwallner 1937:262.

Sucarita's way of quoting Dharmakīrti's PV 1:71cd is almost the same as Dharmottara's. We can easily confirm that Dharmottara's phrase "vācyatva is denied by the ācārya" (*brjod bya yin pa slob dpon gyis bkag pa*) is glossed by Sucarita by adding some explanatory words such as *vikalpākārasya*.

8.2 ātmany avikalpikā

Sucarita's second point is that conceptual cognition is not conceptual with respect to itself (*ātmany avikalpikā*). Dharmottara explains this with the phrase *rañ gi bdag ñid la rnam par mi rtog pa*.¹³

AP 237.28–238.5:

gzuñ ba'i rnam pa ni rañ rig pa'i yul
yin gyi
rnam par rtog pa'i ni ma yin no//
'di ltar gañ žig ñes par byas pa de rnam
par rtog pa'i yul yin no//
gzuñ ba'i rnam pa ni ñes pa ma yin na
ji ltar rnam par rtog pa'i yul du 'gyur/
de'i phyir rnam par rtog pa sgra dañ
'dres pa'i don ñes par byed kyañ
rañ gi bdag ñid la rnam par mi rtog
pa yin no//
gañ gi phyir bdag ñid ni ma ñes pa yin
la/
ma ñes pa yañ rnam par rtog pa'i yul
ma yin no//
de ltar yañ/
ñes pa rnam kyis ma ñes pa/ de ni ji
ltar de dag yul// žes bsad do/

My reconstruction:

*grāhyākāraḥ svasaṁvedanasya viṣa-
yaḥ,
na tu vikalpasya.
tathā hi yo niścīyate sa vikalpasya
viṣayaḥ.
grāhyākāro 'niścitaḥ san
katham vikalpasya viṣayo bhavati.
tasmād vikalpo 'bhilāpasamsarga-
[yogya]artham niścinvann apy
ātmany avikalpakāḥ.*

ātmā hy aniścitaḥ

aniścitaś ca na vikalpasya viṣayaḥ.

tathā coktam

yan na niścīyate rūpañ tat teṣāñ
viṣayaḥ katham// (PV 1:57cd) *iti*.¹⁴

ŚVK *apoha* §2.2.2: *api ceyam kalpanā svasaṁvittau pratyakṣam iṣṭā. sā katham ātmany avikalpikā bhūtvā svato 'bhinne svākāre vikalpavatī bhaviṣyati.*

Cf. NKaṇ, Gosvāmī ed., 184.2–3: *na vikalpānām viṣayaḥ svākāro 'pi tu svasaṁvedanasya.*

¹³ Sanskrit words in square brackets are supplements to the Tibetan supplied by the present author.

¹⁴ "An objective aspect is the object of self-awareness and not [the object] of conceptual cognition. To explain: every [object] that is ascertained is the object of conceptual cognition. How can an objective aspect, although not ascertained, be the object of conceptual cognition? Therefore, conceptual cognition is non-conceptual with respect to itself although it ascertains an object to be associated with verbal designations. For [cognition] itself is not ascertained; and every [object] that is not ascertained is not the object of conceptual cognition. And similarly it is stated: How can a form which is not ascertained be the object of [ascertaining cognitions]?" Cf. Frauwallner 1937:258.

8.3 *vikalpākārasya bāhyatvam*

The third point, i.e., externality of *jñānākāra* (*vikalpākārasya bāhyatvam*), is presented by Sucarita here as one possible alternative that directly contacts a word (*śabdasaṃsprṣṭa*). We do have evidence for a Buddhist view that posits externality as a possible alternative. Jñānaśrīmitra, for example, refers to the view of Dharmottara, whom he calls the *Ṭīkākāra*:

JNĀ 229:24: *tatrāropitam āropitabāhyatvaṃ vā*.

Here Jñānaśrīmitra presents Dharmottara's view as one which posits *āropita* or *āropitabāhyatva* as a denotation (*vācya*). We can also confirm the view of *alīkabāhyatva* in Vācaspati's works (Kataoka 2014a:348(15)). In Dharmottara's AP, however, this option is not explicitly presented. Probably the view of *bāhyatva* as a word-meaning is introduced into the theory of *āropita* only after Dharmottara.

It is probably also the case for the theory of *jñānākāra*. We come across references to externality (*bāhyatva*) in Dharmakīrti (PVSV ad 1:75cd: *bāhya iva*), Kamalaśīla (TSP ad 2c: *bāhyatvenādhyāropita ākāraḥ*), Karṇakagomin (PVSVṬ 113.20: *sādrśyam antareṇa vāsanābalād evādhyavasitabāhyarūpasya vikalpasyotpatteḥ*; 169.13: *na hi sādrśyanimitto bāhyatvāropa iti niveditam etat*) and Prajñākaragupta (PVA ad 2:170: *apoho bāhyatvenādhyavasito bhavati*). The two possible alternatives, i.e., *svapratibhāsa* and its *bāhyatva*, however, are not clearly stated in their works as we see in Sucarita's phrases such as *svapratibhāsa-bāhyatvayoḥ* or *tatpratibhāsa-bāhyatva*. I guess, therefore, that Sucarita's reference to the view of externality of *jñānākāra* (A2 below) as a possible alternative reflects a later stage of the theory's history, much more contemporaneous to his time.

	A. <i>sākāravāda</i>	B. <i>nirākārajñānavāda</i>
1.	<i>svapratibhāsa</i>	<i>āropita</i>
2.	<i>(svapratibhāsasya) bāhyatvam</i>	<i>āropitasya bāhyatvam</i>

A theoretical consideration also supports my guess, because the view of externality in the *sākāravāda* (A2 above) is probably introduced to avoid Dharmottara's criticism that *jñānākāra* (= *grāhyākāra*) is a perceptual object and not conceptual. The newly introduced view (A2) admits that *grāhyākāra* is a perceptual object, but further proceeds to claim that its externality is conceptual. This view is reported by Sucarita as follows:

§2.2.4: *yat tusvātmā vikalpasyānubhūyate grāhyākāraḥ, tadbāhyatvaṃ ca śabdasaṃsprṣṭatayā vikalpyateiti*.

On the other hand, it is said: Conceptual cognition itself is directly experienced as an objective aspect but its externality is conceptually cognized as a

direct denotation of a word.

Sucarita's way of quoting the passage (*yat tu ... iti*) also suggests that this view can be ascribed to some real proponent of *jñānākāra* who came after Dharmottara.

8.4 *niścīyate* and *ananubhūyamāna*

The fourth point raised by Sucarita is basically the same as that of the first (AP 241.2–10) and the second (AP 237.28–31) explained above. The same logic is here applied to externality (*bāhyatva*) of the image that appears in conceptual cognition (*vikalpapratibhāsa*). Firstly, externality that is alleged to be an object of a word is not different (*abheda*) from conceptual cognition. Secondly, conceptual cognition itself, which is the object of *svasaṃvitti*, is different from the object of conceptual cognition that is ascertained (*niścīyate*). Dharmottara here clarifies the opposition between the two objects with opposing expressions **na niścīyate* (*ma ñes pa*) and **niścīyate* (*ñes par byas pa*), whereas Sucarita contrasts the two objects as *anubhūyamāna* and *ananubhūyamāna*.

	object of self-awareness	object ascertained by conceptual cognition
AP	<i>*svasaṃvedanasya viṣayaḥ na niścīyate</i>	<i>*vikalpasya viṣayaḥ niścīyate</i>
ŚVK	svātmā anubhūyate anubhūyamāna	vikalpapratibhāsa/bāhyatva vikalpyate ananubhūyamāna

9 A fault of the theory of *āropita*

In §2.3 Sucarita introduces Dharmottara's theory of *āropita*, something fabricated, which is mentally constructed (*kalpita*) and false (*alīka*). He then points out a fault of this theory. If something mentally constructed and false were a word-meaning (*śabdārtha*), then a word-meaning would be positive (*vidhirūpa*) and not negative; and thus it would be inappropriate to call it *anyāpoha* or *anyanivṛtti*. In other words, Dharmottara's *āropita* does not fit as a candidate for negative *apoha*. The same fault is pointed out in Jayanta's NM (*apoha* III §2.4), too. The source is found in Dharmottara's AP.

AP 241.11–18:

gal te rnam par rtog pas sgro btags kyi
rañ bžin ñes par byas pas de ñid sgra'i
don yin na

sgrub pa'i rañ bžin sgra'i don yin mod
de ñes na yañ me ñid chu ma yin pa'i
phyir

gžan ldog pa ni gcig sgrub pa'i šugs
kyis ñes pa yin gyi/

gžan las ldog pa rtogs par byas pa ni
ma yin no//

gcig ñes par ma byas pa ni gžan las
ldog pa rtogs par mi 'thad pa'i phyir
ro//

des na gal te sgro btags sgra'i don yin
na

sgrub pa'i tshul ñid du 'gyur gyi
gžan sel ba'i don du ni ma yin no
žes bya ba ni kha cig gi'o//

My reconstruction:

*yadi vikalpenāropitasya rūpasya niści-
tatvāt tad eva śabdārthaḥ,*

vidhirūpaḥ śabdārthaḥ syāt.

*tanniścaye ca “vahnir eva na jalam”
ity*

*anyanivṛttir ekavidhisāmarthyān niś-
cīyate,*

na tv anyanivṛtṭiḥ pratīyate.

*na hy ekaniścayam antareṇānyanivṛ-
tṭiḥ pratyeturṇ yujyate.*¹⁵

*tasmād yady āropitaṁ śabdārthaḥ
syāt,*

vidhirūpa eva [śabda-]artho bhavet,

na tv anyāpohaḥ

*ity eke.*¹⁶

ŚVK apoha §2.3: astu tarhi kalpitam alīkaṁ śabdārthaḥ. astu tāvat, katharṁ tad anyanivṛttirūpam. evaṁ hi pratibhāsānugūṇatayā vidhirūpa eva śabdārthaḥ kalpito bhavet, na tv apoharūpaḥ. ekavidhināntarīyako hy anyāpohaḥ, na pratītikṛtaḥ.

NM *apoha* III 2.4: nanv evam āropitākāraṇīyā eva vikalpā uktā bhavanti. vyāvṛtṭiṣayātvaṇācōyuktir ananvitety uktam.

Two points are important here.

1. If something fabricated (*sgro btags*; *āropita*) is a word-meaning (*sgra'i don*; *śabdārtha*), then a word-meaning would be positive (*sgrub pa'i rañ bžin*; *vidhirūpa*) and not negative, i.e., not exclusion of others (*gžan sel*; *anyāpoha*, *anyanivṛttirūpa*).
2. This would lead to the unwelcome result that exclusion of others (*gžan ldog pa*; *anyāpoha*) is not understood directly from a word; but rather by implication from the affirmation of one thing (*gcig sgrub pa*; *ekavidhi*).

¹⁵ “If a fabricated form alone were a word-meaning because it is ascertained by a conceptual cognition, a word-meaning would be positive. And when it (a fabricated form) is ascertained, by implication from the affirmation of one thing, negation of the other is ascertained, as in the expression: “This is fire, not water”; but it is not the case that negation of the other is understood [directly from a word]. For negation of the other cannot be understood without the ascertainment of one thing.” Cf. Frauwallner 1937:262.

¹⁶ “Therefore, if something fabricated were a word-meaning, a word-meaning would be positive and [not negative, i.e.,] not exclusion of others. This is the view of some people.” Cf. Frauwallner 1937:262.

Dharmottara gives the following sentence as a reason for the second point:

AP 241.15–16: gcig ñes par ma byas pa ni gžan las ldog pa rtogs par mi 'thad pa'i phyir ro// (**na hy ekaniścayam antareṇānyanivṛttiḥ pratyeturṇ yujyate*.¹⁷)

ŚVK *apoha* §2.3: ekavidhināntarīyako hy anyāpohaḥ.

It might be the case that the original structure of the AP's Sanskrit is the same as the ŚVK, namely in a form such as *ekaniścayanāntarīyakī hy anyanivṛttiḥ*, which might have been translated into Tibetan in an easily understandable form.

10 Three characteristics of *apoha*

In order to defend his theory of *āropita* as being *apoha*, Dharmottara discusses three points which indicate that the object of both conceptual cognition and words is in fact (philosophically speaking) negative exclusion (*vyāvṛtti*). The three characteristics of *apoha* that he introduces are the following:

1. *bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇa*: *apoha* is common both to existence and nonexistence, i.e., “cow” is connectable with “exists” and “does not exist.”
2. *bāhyasadrśa*: the object of conceptual cognition is similar to an external object although they are totally different, because they share a similarity of being different from something else.
3. *niyatarūpa*: the object of conceptual cognition is definite and exclusive as in the expression “this is a cow only” (*gaur eva*).

10.1 *bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇa*

The original Sanskrit form of Dharmottara's explanation of the first characteristic, *bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇa*, can be reconstructed from Sucarita's description in §2.3.1, because here Sucarita very closely follows Dharmottara's AP. The following is the comparison of Dharmottara's AP in Tibetan translation and Sucarita's gloss of it.

¹⁷ Straightforwardly, *rtogs par mi 'thad pa* can be reconstructed as *pratyeturṇ nopapadyate*. It is not common in Sanskrit, however, for *nopapadyate* to be connected with the infinitive *pratyeturṇ*. This may also suggest that the original structure is the same as Sucarita reads.

10.1.1 *sadasattve praty apekṣā na syāt*

AP 241.18–22:

'di la gal te phyi rol sreg pa'i don byed
 par bzod pa mthoñ ba ci 'dra ba
 de 'dra ba kho nar nram par rtog pas
 phyi rol gyi me ñid du sgro btags pa
 snañ bar byed na ni
 phyi rol bzin du ñes par 'gyur gyi
 yod dam med ces dños po dan dños po
 med pa'i nram rtog gzan ñe ba la mi
 ltos śiñ
 de dag dan 'brel par yañ mi 'gyur ro//

My reconstruction:

atra yadi bahir dahanārdhakriyāsama-
rtho dr̥ṣṭo yādṛśas
tādṛśa eva vikalpair bāhyavahnitvenā-
ropita avabhāsyate,

[tadā] bāhya iva niścīyata ity
asti nāsti veti bhāvābhāvavikalpā-
ntaram praty anapekṣaḥ syāt,

*na ca tābhyāñ sambadhyeta.*¹⁸

ŚVK *apoha* §2.3.1: *yadi ca yādṛśo bahir* ¹⁹*dahanādyarthakriyāsamartho dr̥ṣṭas*
tādṛśa eva vikalpair āropyate, evaṃ tarhi vṛkṣa ity ukte sadasattve praty apekṣā
na syāt. tadvacanaśabdasamabhivyāhāraś ca, yathāsti vṛkṣo na veti.

The main point of the argument here is as follows: If an image made to appear by conceptual cognition were similar to an external object such as real fire, then people would not anticipate a further semantic component, either “exists” or “does not exist,” when they hear the word “fire,” nor would they say “the fire exists” or “the fire does not exist,” because the fire would be ascertained as if being externally existent.

Interestingly, in the latter half of the sentence Sucarita uses an example of a tree (*vṛkṣa*) instead of fire mentioned in the first half, although, in view of consistency, Dharmottara intends only fire in this paragraph throughout. As will be shown later, this example of a tree was relocated to the present paragraph from another portion of the AP. In other words, as a result of importing the well known example of a tree used in another context, Sucarita breaks the consistency of the present paragraph.

¹⁸ “Here, if [an image] fabricated as an external [real] fire which is made to appear by conceptual cognitions were similar to an external [fire] which is perceived as being able to perform a function, i.e., burning, [then], being ascertained as if being external, another conceptualization of existence or nonexistence, i.e., either “exists” or “does not exist” would not be expected [by it]; nor could its connection with them arise.” Cf. Frauwallner 1937:262–263.

¹⁹ The reading of the edition *dahanādir artha-* is corrected to *dahanādyartha-*.

10.1.2 *na sadbhāvēpekṣā and nābhāvēpekṣā*

AP 241.22–25:

gañ gi phyir phyi rol gyi me ni dños po
yod pa la mi ltos te/
mthoñ ba ñid kyī rañ bñin ni yod pa'i
dños po'i bdag ñid du yod pa'i phyir
ro//

dños po med pa la yañ mi ltos te/
mthoñ ba de'i rañ bñin ni med pa dañ
'gal ba'i phyir ro//

My reconstruction:

na hi bāhyo vahniḥ sadbhāvēpekṣaḥ,

*drṣṭasvabhāvasyaiva sadbhāvētmaka-
tvena sattvāt.*

nāpy abhāvēpekṣaḥ,

*drṣṭasvabhāvasyāsattvavirodhāt.*²⁰

ŚVK *apoha* §2.3.1: *na hi bāhye drṣyamāne sadbhāvēpekṣā bhavati, drṣṭasvabhāva-
syaiva sadbhāvētmakatvāt. nāpy abhāvēpekṣā, drṣṭasvarūpasyāsattvavirodhāt.*

External, real fire does not require a further connection with either existence (*na sadbhāvēpekṣā*) or nonexistence (*nābhāvēpekṣā*), because being real, i.e., inasmuch as its nature is directly perceived, it is existent in nature (*sadbhāvētmakatvāt*) and it is contradictory for it to be nonexistent (*asattvavirodhāt*).

10.1.3 *bhāvēvyabhicārāt and abhāvavirodhāt*

AP 241.25–28:

de bñin du mthoñ ba dañ 'dra bar sgro
btags pa yañ dños po mi 'khrul pa dañ/
dños po med pa dañ 'gal ba'i phyir de
dag la mi ltos pa dañ/
de dag dañ gñi mthun ñams su myoñ
bar mi 'gyur ro//

My reconstruction:

*evam eva drṣṭasadrśaḥ samāropito 'pi
bhāvēvyabhicārād*

abhāvavirodhāc ca tayo nāpekṣeta,

*na ca tābhyāñ saha samānādhikaraṇo
'nubhūyeta.*²¹

ŚVK *apoha* §2.3.1: *evam eva drṣṭasadrśaḥ samāropito 'pi bhāvēvyabhicārād
abhāvavirodhāc cāsti nāstīti nāpekṣeta. na ca tābhyāñ sambadhyeta. ...*

Similarly, the image fabricated by conceptual cognition as being similar to an external object would require neither the component “exists” nor the component “does not exist” and would not be connected with them, because it does not deviate from existence (*bhāvēvyabhicārāt*) and because it contradicts nonexistence (*abhāvavirodhāt*).

²⁰ “For external [real] fire does not require [a further connection with] existence, because being precisely [a real entity] whose nature is directly perceived, it does exist inasmuch as it is existent in nature. Nor does it expect [a connection with] nonexistence, because being [a real entity] whose nature is directly perceived, it is contradictory for it to be nonexistent.” Cf. Frauwallner 1937:263.

²¹ “Similarly, although it is fabricated [by conceptual cognition] as being similar to a perceived object, it would require neither [existence nor nonexistence] and would not be experienced as having the same locus as them, because it does not deviate from existence and because it contradicts nonexistence.” Cf. Frauwallner 1937:263.

10.1.4 *vidhipratīṣedhasādhāraṇa* and *ubhayasāmbandhayogya*

AP 242.2–5:

de'i phyir sgrub pa dan dgag pa thun
moñ ba

gñis ka dan 'brel par ruñ ba'i don
rnam par rtog pas ñes pa yin no
žes bya ba'i don 'di ñams su myoñ ba
las 'oñs pa yin gyi/

My reconstruction:

ato vidhipratīṣedhasādhāraṇa

ubhayasāmbandhayogya 'rtho

vikalpair avasīyata

*ity anubhavāyattam etat.*²²

ŚVK *apoha* §2.3.1: *ato vidhipratīṣedhasādhāraṇa ubhayasāmbandhayogya
vikalpair artho 'vasīyata ity anubhavāyattam etat.*

Therefore, it is concluded on the basis of experience (*anubhavāyatta*) that the object ascertained by conceptual cognition is common to affirmation and negation (*vidhipratīṣedhasādhāraṇa*) and is connectable with both “exists” and “does not exist” (*ubhayasāmbandhayogya*).

10.1.5 *bāhyavidharman*

AP 242.6–9:

de'i phyir gñis ka'i thun moñ ba'i phyi
rol dan chos mi mthun pa rnam par rtog
pas sgro btags pa 'di ni sgrub pa'i tshul
du sgro btags par ma mthoñ ño//
gañ gi phyir phyi rol dan 'dra bar snañ
ba sgrub pa'i rañ bžin gyis sgro btags
pa ni ma yin no//

My reconstruction:

*tasmād ubhayasādhāraṇo bāhyavi-
dharmāropito vikalpaiḥ, (sa) na dr̥ṣṭo
vidhirūpaḥ (āropitaḥ).*

*na hi bāhyasadṛśaḥ (pratibhāsamāno)
vidhirūpa āropitaḥ.*²³

ŚVK *apoha* §2.3.2: *evam cobhayasādhāraṇo bāhyavidharmāropito vikalpair ity
āśrayaṇīyam. dr̥ṣṭasadr̥ṣe hy āropyamāṇe vidhirūpaḥ śabdārtho bhavet, darśanena
bhāvarūpavidhānāt.*

Therefore, it is to be accepted that the object made up by conceptual cognition is common to both existence and nonexistence (*ubhayasādhāraṇa*) and (in fact)

²² “Therefore, it is concluded on the basis of experience that the object which is common to affirmation and negation and which is connectable with both [existence and nonexistence] is ascertained by conceptual cognitions.” Cf. Frauwallner 1937:263. The Tibetan translation has *artha* (*don*) and thus may suggest *ity eṣo 'rtho 'nubhavāyattaḥ*. Considering Sucarita's corresponding passage, however, it is probable that *don* is supplied by a Tibetan translator in order to clarify the referent of *etat*.

²³ “Therefore, [the object] which is common to both [existence and nonexistence] and which is dissimilar to an external [object] is made up of conceptual cognitions; [it is] not the [perceived] object which is positive in nature. For [the object] which is similar to an external object and which is positive in nature is not made up.” Cf. Frauwallner 1937:263. Those words that I think are probably supplied by a Tibetan translator are marked with round brackets.

dissimilar to an external object (*bāhyavidharmā*), because if it were (in fact) similar to an external object it would be positive in nature (*vidhirūpa*).

10.1.6 *avr̥kṣābhāvaniṣṭhaṁ vr̥kṣam āropayati*

AP 242.11–15:

de la nram par rtog pas ni bsgrub pa'i
rañ bzin la reg pa 'am sgrub pa dañ 'dra
bar sgro btags ni mi nus kyi/
'on kyañ śiñ ma yin med pas khyad par
du gyur pa śiñ ma yin med pa'i mthar
thug pa'i śiñ sgro 'dogs par byed pa
'ba' žig tu zad do//

My reconstruction:

*ato vikalpo vidhirūpaṁ spraṣṭum
tatsadr̥śaṁ* cāropayitum asamartho*
(Tib: **vidhisadr̥śaṁ*)
'*vr̥kṣābhāvaviśiṣṭam avr̥kṣābhāva-
niṣṭhaṁ vr̥kṣam kevalam āropayati*.²⁴

ŚVK *apoha* §2.3.2: *ato vidhirūpaṁ spraṣṭum tatsadr̥śaṁ cāropayitum asamartho vikalpo 'vr̥kṣābhāvaniṣṭhaṁ vr̥kṣam āropayati*.

Therefore, conceptual cognition makes up only a tree that culminates in the negation of non-trees (*avr̥kṣābhāvaniṣṭha*), because it can neither touch something positive nor make up something similar to it.

10.1.7 Syllogism

AP 244.10-16:

gañ žig dños po dañ dños po med pa
thun moñ du žen pas nes par 'dzin pa
de ni gcig las ldog pa nes pa lhur byed
pa yin te/
dper na bum pa ma yin par śes pas bum
pa ma yin par nes par 'dzin pa na yod
dam med ces dños po dañ dños po med
pa thun moñ du nes par 'dzin par byed
pa bzin no//
nram par rtog pa thams cad kyis kyañ
dños po dañ dños po med pa dag gi
rañ bzin thun moñ du nes par 'dzin par
byed do//

My reconstruction:

*yad bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇam (adhy-
avasāyena) avadhāryate,
tad anyavyāvṛtti(niścaya)param.*

*yathāghaṭajñānenāghaṭo 'vadhārya-
māno 'sti na veti bhāvābhāvasādhā-
raṇo 'vadhāryate.*

*sarvaiś ca vikalpair bhāvābhāvasā-
dhāraṇaṁ rūpam avadhāryate*.²⁵

²⁴ “Therefore, conceptual cognition makes up only a tree that is qualified by the nonexistence of non-trees and that culminates in the negation of non-trees, because it can neither touch something positive nor make up something similar to it.” Cf. Frauwallner 1937:264.

²⁵ “Every [object] that is ascertained as being common to existence and nonexistence culminates in the exclusion of others, just as a non-pot [such as a cloth] which is ascertained by a cognition of a non-pot, is ascertained as being common to existence and nonexistence, i.e., [connectable with] “exists” and “does not exist.” And all conceptual cognition ascertains an

ŚVK *apoha* §2.4.1: yad bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇaṁ rūpam avasīyate, tad anyavyāvṛtti-
niṣṭham. yathāghaṭāvasāyena paṭo 'vasīyamānaḥ sa hy asti na veti bhāvābhāvasā-
dhāraṇo 'vasīyate, anyanivṛttiniṣṭhaś ca. tathā ca sarve śābdā bhāvābhāvasādhāra-
ṇarūpābhiniveśinaḥity anubhavasiddham.

The syllogism shown at the end can be summed up as follows:²⁶

Vyāpti: Every object that is ascertained as being common to existence and nonexistence, i.e., connectable with “exists” and “does not exist,” culminates in the exclusion of others.

Drṣṭānta: Like a cloth which is ascertained as a non-pot.

Pakṣadharmatā: The objects of all words are the same, i.e., they are ascertained as being common to existence and nonexistence.²⁷

10.1.8 Correspondence and absence of correspondence

The correspondence and the absence of correspondence between the AP and the ŚVK are as follows:

	AP	ŚVK apoha	Key concepts
1	241.18–22	41.5–42.1	sadasattvānapekṣatvam
2	241.22–25	42.1–3	sadbhāvātmakatvāt
3	241.25–28	42.3–5	bhāvāvyabhicārāt
	*241.28–242.2	(f 41.7–42.1) (A)	(“vrkṣaḥ”)
4	242.2–5	42.5–7	vidhipratiṣedhasādhāraṇatvam
	*242.5–6	(B)	(bāhyārthaḥ)
5	242.6–9	42.9–11	bāhyavidharmāropaḥ
	*242.9–11	(f 42.10–11) (C)	(drṣṭavrkṣādi)
6	242.11–15	42.11–12	avrkṣābhāvaniṣṭhatvam
7	244.10–16	45.9–46.3	anyavyāvṛttiniṣṭham

image as being common to existence and nonexistence.” Cf. Frauwallner 1937:266.

The Tibetan translation *žen pas nes par 'dzin pa* suggests *adhyavasāyenāvadhāryate*. Other corresponding parts are translated in the following passages merely as *nes par 'dzin pa* (*avadhāryate*) without *žen pas*. Sucarita's corresponding passages all have the same form *avasīyate* instead of *avadhāryate*. It might be possible that a Tibetan translator translates the simple word *avadhāryate* into an explanatory phrase *žen pas nes par 'dzin pa* in its first occurrence.

For Sucarita *-para* and *-niṣṭha* are synonymous. Cf. ŚVK *apoha* §2.4.3 (Kataoka 2014a: 317(46)–316(47)): *yat kilāryantavisadrṣānām tādrūpyagrahaṇam tad anyavyāvṛttiparam*. (Quoted below in p. 42.)

²⁶ *Udāharaṇa* is divided into *vyāpti* and *drṣṭānta* for the sake of clarity. *Pakṣadharmatā* corresponds to *upanaya* (application) in the Naiyāyika system of *pañcāvayava*.

²⁷ Conclusion: Therefore, they are ultimately exclusion of others.

There are three paragraphs of the AP (marked with asterisks) the correspondences of which are not clearly recognizable. (A) In the first case, AP 241.28–242.2, Dharmottara gives an example, “tree,” which Sucarita transferred to and incorporated into 41.7–42.1, and therefore, most probably, omitted here. (B) The second case, AP 242.5–6, is a sentence which restates the content of a preceding passage in a negative formula, and therefore most probably Sucarita considered it omissible. (C) The third case, AP 242.9–11, is again a reference to the example “tree” together with an explanation, which Sucarita made into a compact reason *darśanena bhāvarūpavidhānāt* subordinate to the preceding sentence.

10.2 *bāhyasadrśa*

The second characteristic of *apoha*, namely, “being (apparently) similar to an external object” (*bāhyasadrśa*) is explained by Suracita in §2.4.3. His explanation is based on Dharmottara’s AP as shown below.

AP 244.29–245.5:

gañ žig śin tu mi ’dra ba de’i rañ bžin
du ’dzin pa de ni gžan las bzlog pas
byas pa’i ’dra bar ’dzin pa lhur len pa
yin te/

dper na snam bu bum pa dañ śin tu mi
’dra yañ śiñ ma yin par khyad par can
du ñes par rtogs pa na ’di yañ śiñ ma
yin na ’di yañ śiñ ma yin žes yin na
bum pa dañ ’dra bar ñes par rtogs pa
bžin no//

de bžin du rnam par rtog pa’i don phyi
rol dañ śin tu mi mthun pa yañ phyi rol
tu ñes par rtogs pa yin no//

rnam par rtog pas phyi rol ñes par byed
pa yañ ñams su myoñ bas grub po//

My reconstruction:

*yad atyantavisadrśānām tād rūpyagra-
haṇam tad anyavyāvṛttikṛtasādrśya-
(grahaṇa)param.*

*yathā ghaṭātyantavisadrśo ’pi paṭo
vrkṣābhāvaviśiṣṭo ’vadhāryamā-
ṇaḥ “āyam apy avrkṣaḥ, āyam apy
avrkṣaḥ” iti ghaṭasadrśo ’vadhāryate.*

*tathā ca vikalpaviśayo (’rtho) ’tyantam
bāhyavisadrśo ’pi bāhyo ’vadhāryate.*

*vikalpena bāhyāvadhāraṇam apy
anubhavasiddham.*²⁸

ŚVK *apoha* §2.4.3: *yat kilātyantavisadrśānām tād rūpyagrahaṇam tad anyavyā-
vṛttiparam. yathā ghaṭapaṭayor ekāntavisadrśayor apy avrkṣo ’yam ayañ ceti
tād rūpyeṇāvadhāraṇam anyanivṛttikṛtam eva. tathā ca vikalpaviśayo ’rtho
’tyantāsann atyantabāhyavisadrśo bāhyo ’vadhāryateity anubhavasiddham eva.*

²⁸ “Every [cognition] which grasps something totally dissimilar as being similar in fact has a similarity based on exclusion of others as its object, just as a cloth, although being totally different from a pot, when it is ascertained as being qualified by the nonexistence of a tree, is ascertained as being similar to a pot, as in the expression: “This too is non-tree, this too is non-tree.” And the object of conceptual cognition, although being totally dissimilar to an external object, is ascertained as being external. That conceptual cognition ascertains something as being external, too, is established on the basis of experience.” Cf. Frauwallner 1937:267.

PVSVT 112.18–22: etena yad ucyateyad bāhyātyantavisadrśasya svākārasya tād rūpyagrahaṇaṁ tad anyanivṛttikṛtasādrśyaparam. yathā ghaṭavisadrśo 'pi paṭo vṛkṣābhāvaviśiṣṭo 'vadhāryamāṇaḥ “āyam apy avṛkṣaḥ” iti ghaṭasadrśo 'vadhāryate, vṛkṣavyāvṛtter ghaṭapaṭayos tulyatvāt. tathā vikalpaviśayo 'tyantaṁ bāhyavisadrśo 'pi bāhyo 'vadhāryate, 'nyanivṛttikṛtasārūpyagrahaṇātiti.²⁹

Here Dharmottara and Sucarita intend a syllogism:

Vyāpti: Every cognition which grasps something totally dissimilar as being similar in fact has exclusion of others as its object.

Drṣṭānta: Like a cloth which is grasped as being similar to a pot inasmuch as being a non-tree.

Pakṣadharmatā: The object of conceptual cognition, although totally dissimilar to an external object, is ascertained as being similar to it.³⁰

It is clear that Sucarita very closely follows Dharmottara's original passages. Our impression is further confirmed when we compare Sucarita with Jayanta, whose corresponding passage (NM *apoha* III 2.7.3) does not take the form of a syllogism although there is a loose correspondence in terms of contents.

10.3 *niyatarūpa*

The third characteristic of *apoha* is *niyatarūpa*, i.e., having a restricted, definite form. In other words, the content of conceptual cognition takes a formula, for example, “This is a cow only and not something else.” Here again Sucarita's description closely follows Dharmottara's syllogism presented in the AP.

AP 245.21–25:

gañ žig ñes pa'i rañ bžin ñes par rtogs
par byed pa de ni gžan las ldog pa'i yul
can yin te/

dper na 'di ni bum pa kho na'o žes ñes
pa ñid kyi bum pa ñes par rtogs pa'i
rtog pa bžin no//

My reconstruction:

yan *niyatarūpā*vadhāraṇaṁ tad anya-
nivṛttiviśayam.

yathā ghaṭa evāyam iti niyataghaṭāva-
dhāraṇaṁ vikalpaḥ.

de bžin du ram par rtog pa thams cad
kyañ ñes pa ñid du 'dzin par
ñams su myoñ bas grub pa yin no//

tathā ca sarve vikalpā niyatagrāhakā
ity
anubhavasiddham.³¹

²⁹ See the apparatus of my edition, ŚVK *apoha* §2.4.3, for variant readings; see also NKaṇ 1386.8–1388.5 and NVTṬ 443.6–9 quoted there.

³⁰ Conclusion: Therefore, it in fact communicates exclusion of others.

ŚVK *apoha* §2.4.4: *api ca niyatarūpāvadhāraṇam anyanivṛtṭiviśayaṁ dr̥ṣṭam. yathā ghaṭa evāyam ity aghaṭanivṛtṭiviśayam. tathā ca sarve vikalpā na saṁdi-gdhaviśayāḥity anubhavasiddham eva.*

The syllogism intended here can be summed up as follows:

Vyāpti: Every cognition which ascertains something in a restricted, definite form “This is X only and not something else” in fact has exclusion of others as its object.

Dr̥ṣṭānta: Like the conceptual cognition “This is a pot only.”

Pakṣadharmatā: All conceptual cognition grasps an object in a restricted, definite form “X only.”³²

Jayanta, on the other hand, does not follow the AP closely (NM *apoha* III §2.7.2), although in terms of content he ultimately conveys the same thing.

So far we have compared Sucarita’s explanation of the three characteristics of *apoha* with corresponding passages in the AP. In all cases it is demonstrated that Sucarita closely follows Dharmottara’s original phrasing and sentence structure. In this way, with regard to the three characteristics of *apoha*, Sucarita’s passages are a very important source for reconstructing the original form of Dharmottara’s AP.

11 *ekapratyavamarśa, etc.*

Similar investigations are possible with regard to Sucarita’s description of *tatkāritvādhyavasāya* (ŚVK *apoha* III §2.3.3.2) and *ekapratyavamarśa* (§2.3.3.3), in which Sucarita follows, in terms of content, the logical steps of Dharmottara’s arguments in the AP.

AP 247.13–17:

sṅar ma mthoṅ ba’i dños po la go
mthoṅ ba’i de ma thag pa’i zen pas
mthoṅ ba’i raṅ bzin dños po gzan las
ldog par ’dzin pa ci ’dra ba zig yin/
gaṅ gi phyir ’bras bu’i khyad par byed
pas na nram par rtog pas de’i ’bras bu
can ma yin pa dag las ldog pa’i raṅ bzin
du gsal bar byed pa yin na/

My reconstruction:

*adr̥ṣṭapūrve vastuni darśanānanta-
rādhyavasāyena “dr̥ṣṭarūpaṁ vastv
anyavyāvṛttam” ity avadhāraṇaṁ
kīdṛk.
kāryaviśeṣakaraṁ hi vikalpenātatkā-
ryavyāvṛttarūpaṁ prakāśyate.*³³

³¹ “Every [cognition] which ascertains something in a definite form has exclusion of others as its object, just as in the case of the conceptual cognition “This is a pot only,” which ascertains a pot in a definite form. And all conceptual cognition grasps [an object in] a definite form. This [reason] too is established on the basis of experience.” Cf. Frauwallner 1937:268.

³² Conclusion: Therefore, it in fact communicates exclusion of others.

ŚVK *apoha* §2.3.3.2: prāk kāryadarśanād adṛṣṭapūrvavastudarśane katham tatkāritvādhyavasāyaḥ. tadanavadhāraṇe ca katham atatkārivyāvṛttaṁ rūpaṁ vikalpair āropitam abhiniviśante śabdāḥ.

AP 247.22–23:

gal te dños po bzin du mthoñ ba yañ
tha dad pa ma yin nam/

My reconstruction:

*nanu dravyavad darśanāny api bhin-
nāni.*³⁴

ŚVK *apoha* §2.3.3.3: nanu darśanāny api yāvaddṛśyaṁ bhidyamānāni katham ekaṁ kāryam.

AP 247.28–31:

mthoñ ba'i de ma thag tu 'byuñ ba'i
ñes par byed pas ni tha dad pa med par
žen par byed do//
de'i phyir mthoñ ba gcig byed pa'i gsal
ba rnamś 'bras bu de mi byed pa dag
las ldog pa rañ bzin mtshuñs par rtogs
par byed do/

My reconstruction:

*taddarśanānantarabhāvipratyavamar-
śena tv abhinnaṭvenādhyavasāyante.*

*tasmād ekadarśanakāriṇyo vyaktayo
'tatkāribhyo vyāvṛttarūpās tulyaṁ
pratīyante.*³⁵

ŚVK *apoha* §2.3.3.3: na, ekapratyavamarśahetutvena teṣāṁ abhedāt. bhavati hi gāṁ dṛṣṭavato gaur iti pūrvāparayor eko 'vamarśaḥ. tadekatvāc ca tatkāriṇāṁ darśanānām abhedāḥ. tadabhedāc ca dṛśyānāṁ vyaktīnām.

In these cases Sucarita paraphrases Dharmottara's sentences in different forms without losing each logical point. In the first case, AP 247.13–15, for example, the logical point “only after A, B is possible” is paraphrased in the ŚVK as “Before A, B is impossible” (A: *kāryadarśana*; B: *tatkāritvādhyavasāya*). In other words, both passages explain the point that the ascertainment of cows as being the same in that they accomplish the same result is possible only after having seen the result. In the second case, AP 247.22–23, Dharmottara's simple phrase “they are different like real entities” (*dravyavad ... bhinnāni*) is explained by Sucarita as “they are different for each of the entities that is to be seen” (*yāvaddṛśyaṁ bhidyamānāni*)

³³ “With regard to an entity that one has never seen before how can one ascertain by means of judgment which arises immediately after perception, that the entity that is perceived is excluded from the other? For an [entity] which has a particular effect is shown by conceptual cognition as being excluded from those things which do not have the same effect.” Cf. Frauwallner 1937:270.

³⁴ “Surely perceptions, too, are different like real entities.” Cf. Frauwallner 1937:270.

³⁵ “[Perceptions] are regarded as being non-different [from each other] due to [their single result, i.e.,] one and the same judgment that arises immediately after the perceptions of them. Therefore, individual entities that produce one and the same perception are understood as being similar inasmuch as they are [all] excluded from those things which do not have the same effect.” Cf. Frauwallner 1937:270.

together with a concluding remark “how can they be one result?” (*katham ekaṁ kāryam*). In the third case, AP 247.28–29, both passages explain the point that perceptions (*darśana*) can be regarded as being non-different (*abhinna*) from each other due to their single result, i.e., one and the same judgment (*ekapratyavamarśa*) that they produce.

12 Concluding remarks

1. Like other authors around his time Sucarita knows the subdivisions of the Buddhist theory of *apoha*: *jñānākāra* theory on the one hand and Dharmottara’s opposing view on the other.
2. Śālikanātha’s *Prakaraṇapañcikā* is one of the sources of Sucarita’s explanation of the Buddhist theory of *apoha*.
3. Sucarita’s *Kāśikā* is an important source for our reconstruction of some parts of the original form of Dharmottara’s *Apohaprakaraṇa*. This is particularly the case with regard to the three characteristics of *apoha* described by Dharmottara, i.e., *bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇa*, *bāhyasadrśa* and *niyatarūpa*.

Abbreviations and Bibliography

Primary sources

Apohaprakaraṇa

AP *Dharmottara’s Apohaprakaraṇa*. See the Tibetan text edited in Frauwallner 1937.

Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali

JNĀ *Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali*. Ed. Anantalal Thakur. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1987.

Tattvasaṁgrahapañjikā

TSP *Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita with the Commentary Pañjikā of Shri Kamalashīla*. Ed. Dvārikadāsa Śāstrī. 2 vols. Varanasi: Baudha Bharati, 1981, 1982.

Nyāyakaṇikā (=NKaṇ)

Stern *Vidhivivekaḥ of Maṇḍanamiśra with Commentary, Nyāyakaṇikā, of Vācaspatimiśra, and Supercommentaries, Juṣadhvaṅkaraṇī and Svaditāṅkaraṇī, of Parameśvaraḥ, Critical and Annotated Edition: the Pūrvapakṣaḥ*. Ed. Elliot M. Stern. Dissertation submitted to the University of Pennsylvania, 1988.

Gosvāmī *Vidhivivekaḥ of Śrī Maṇḍana Miśra with the Commentary Nyāyakaṇikā of Vāchaspati Miśra*. Ed. Mahāprabhulāl Gosvāmī. Varanasi: Tara Publications, 1978.

Nyāyamañjarī

NM *Nyāyamañjarī of Jayantabhaṭṭa with Ṭippaṇi - Nyāyasaurabha by the Editor*. Ed. K.S. Varadācārya. 2 vols. Mysore: Oriental Research Institute, 1969, 1983.

NM *apoha* I: See Kataoka 2011.

NM *apoha* II: See Kataoka 2008.

NM *apoha* III: See Kataoka 2009.

NM *apoha* IV: See Kataoka 2010.

Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā

NVTṬ *Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā of Vācaspatimiśra*. Ed. Anantalal Thakur. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1996.

Prakaraṇapañcikā

PrP *Prakaraṇa Pañcikā of Śālikanātha Miśra with the Nyāya-siddhi of Jaipuri Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa*. Ed. A. Subrahmanya Sastri. Varanasi: Banaras Hindu University, 1961.

Pramāṇavārttika

PV 1 See PVSV.

Pramāṇavārttika-alaṅkāra

PVA *Pramāṇavārtikabhāṣyam or Vārtikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta*. Ed. Rāhula Sāṅkrītyāyana. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1953.

Pramāṇavārttika-ṭīkā of Śākyabuddhi

PVT See Inami et al. 1992.

Pramāṇavārttika-svavṛtti

PVSV *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti: the First Chapter with the Autocommentary*. Ed. Raniero Gnoli. Roma: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1960.

Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti-ṭīkā

PVSVṬ *Ācārya-Dharmakīrteḥ Pramāṇavārttikam (Svārthānumānaparicchedaḥ) Svopajñavṛtṭyā Karṇakagomi-viracitayā Taṭṭikayā ca sahitam*. Ed. Rāhula Sāṅkrītyāyana. Allahabad: Kitāb Mahal, 1943.

Pramāṇaviniścaya

- PVin *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścaya, Chapters 1 and 2.* Ed. Ernst Steinkellner. Beijing-Vienna: China Tibetology Publishing House/Austrian Academy of Sciences Press, 2007.

Ślokavārttika

- ŚV *Ślokavārttika of Śrī Kumārila Bhaṭṭa.* Ed. Swāmī Dvārikadāsa Śāstrī. Varanasi: Tara Publications, 1978.

Ślokavārttikakāśikā

- ŚVK *Mīmāṃsāślokavārttikam, Sucaritamīśrapraṇītayā Kāśikākhyayā Ṭikayā sametam.* Ed. K. Sāmbaśiva Śāstrī (Part I, II). Trivandrum: CBH Publications, 1990; Ed. V.A. Rāmasvāmi Śāstrī (Part III). Trivandrum: University of Travancore, 1943.
Adyar ms.: A manuscript preserved in the Adyar Library, Chennai, No. 38.G.5-5, 63359, TR 66-5.
ŚVK *apoha*: See Kataoka 2014a.

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- 2014a “Sucaritamiśra’s Critique of *Apoha*: A Critical Edition of *Kāśikā* ad *Ślokavārttika apoha* v. 1.” *The Memoirs of Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia*, 165, 362(1)–289(74).
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