Sucaritamiśra on Apoha

Kei KATAOKA

1 A critical edition of the apoha section of Sucaritamiśra’s Kāśikā

Sucaritamiśra’s Kāśikā published from Trivandrum in three parts (in 1926, 1929 and 1943) stopped at the end of the saṁbandhāṅkṛṣṇa section. The remaining sections, i.e., sphota, ākṛti, apoha and so on, were not published despite the availability of manuscripts. The present author has started editing the apoha section of the Kāśikā consulting four manuscripts, i.e., three Devanāgarī and one Malayālam manuscript. So far two parts have been published. The first part (Kataoka 2014a) covers Sucarita’s long commentary on v. 1; and the second part (Kataoka 2015) covers Sucarita’s commentary on vv. 2–94.

2 Kāśikā ad Ślokavārttika apoha v. 1

It might appear surprising that Sucaritamiśra spends many pages (38 pages in the Adyar manuscript; 39 pages in my edition) just on a single verse. In his commentary on v. 1 Sucaritamiśra offers his own elaborate critique of apoha as a kind of introduction to the entire section on apoha. One can regard this opening part as an updated version of the Mīmāṃsā criticism of apoha which reflects the trend of arguments of his time, around the first half of the tenth century. This part contains new arguments developed after Kumārila.

3 The historical development of the apoha theory

After Dignāga, the founder of the Buddhist theory of apoha, Dharmakīrti and his followers continued to modify the theory in response to Kumārila’s criticism. Śākyabuddhi (660–720) and Śāntaraksita (725–788) are known to hold the “internal” view that the object of conceptual cognition is cognition’s own form (svapratibhāsa).1 In other words, they regard an image or a form reflected in cognition (jñānākara) as the direct object of conceptual cognition and also of a word. Dharmottara (740–800), who is known to be a nirākārajñānavādīn,2 severely criticizes this view and claims that the object of conceptual cognition, apoha, is

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neither external nor internal, i.e., neither outside nor inside the mind. For him apoha is something merely fabricated (āropita), unreal (nistattva) and false (alika). Taking into consideration both types of Buddhist theories, Sucaritamiśra rejects the Buddhist claim. The present paper gives an overview of the topics related to apoha discussed in the Kāśikā and also pays attention to its sources.

4 Two Buddhist theories of apoha

As briefly mentioned above, when Sucarita introduces the Buddhist theory of apoha, he divides it into two subclasses: one is the svākāra theory and the other is the alīka theory.

ŚVK ad apoha v. 1, §2.1.7: yo hi vikalpānāṁ viśayaḥ sa śabdārthaḥ, ... kas tasyā [=kalpanāyā] viśayaḥ? (1) svākāra evety eke. (2) kalpitaṁ nistattvam alīkam ity anye.

[Buddhist:] For the object of conceptual cognition is the object of an utterance (i.e. the meaning of a word). ...

[Q] What is the object of [conceptual cognition]?

[A] Some [Buddhists] say that it is its own form, whereas others say that it is something [mentally] constructed, untrue and false.

Sucarita calls the former group jñānakāravādin (§2.3.5). Vācaspati, too, designates the former as jñānakāravādin (NKāṇ Ster ed., 1390.8). Vācaspati also calls the former sākāravādin (1390.11) and the latter nirākārajñānavādin (1392.9).3 Jayanta, too, pays close attention to this dichotomy. He regards the former theory as a line of thought arisen from ātmakhyāti (NM apoha II §3.2: ātmakhyātitgarbha saraṇīḥ) and the latter as a line of thought arisen from asatkhyāti (§3.1: asatkhyātitgarbha saraṇīḥ). We can therefore infer that around the ninth and tenth centuries it was well established among brahmin scholars that the Buddhist theory of apoha was divided into two subclasses.

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3 But see note 2 on p. 1393 (Stern ed.), which reports a variant reading: bimbākārajñānavādināṁ for nirākārajñānavādināṁ.
5 Sources of the two Buddhist theories

We can trace the main source of the former theory to Dharmakīrti’s works as interpreted by his early commentators such as Sākyabuddhi, and the latter to Dharmottara’s *Apohaprakaraṇa*. In his *Apohaprakaraṇa*, for which we only have a Tibetan translation, Dharmottara severely criticizes the “internal” theory of *apoha* and instead claims that the object of conceptual cognition, i.e., *apoha*, is neither internal nor external. In the opening verse of his *Apohaprakaraṇa* Dharmottara clearly states that the object of conceptual cognition is neither cognition itself nor external (AP: *buddhir no na bahir*). Jayanta glosses this and states that *apoha* is neither internal nor external (NM *apoha* II, §2.1: *nāntar na bahih†).

6 Sucarita’s source: Śālikanātha’s *Prakaraṇapaṇḍikā*

Sucarita’s reference to the two Buddhist theories in the *apoha* section quoted above (§2.1.7 in my edition) is based on his explanation in the preceding section, i.e., the *ākṛti* section, which runs as follows:

ŚVK ākṛti, Adyar ms. p. 2594: *kim idānāṃ jñānākāra evāyam āpamah. (1) tathā nāmeti kecit. (2) na tv evam api, bahiravabhāṣāt, na cārthagata eva, anekatavirodhāpātāt, kim tv asamm eva jñānaṃ bhāsamānam anu bhāsate, śabdam iva pratiśabda ity anye.

[Q] Then does it follow that this is merely the form of cognition?
[A-2] Other [Buddhists] say: No, that is not the case, either, because it appears externally. Nor is it the case that it is something solely belonging to an external object, because the contradiction of plurality [of *apoha* such as *agonivṛtti* which functions as a kind of single universal like cowness] would follow. Rather it is nothing at all; it appears after cognition appears, just as an echo appears after a sound.

Here Sucarita gives reasons and the example of an echo (*pratiśabda*) to support Dharmottara’s view of *apoha* as being neither internal nor external. Sucarita’s present description in the *ākṛti* section is based on Śālikanātha’s PrP, which runs as follows:

PrP 76.1–3: *sa cāyam tasyākāraḥ prathamāno na jñānasyaiva, baḥiṣṭvenāvabhāṣāt. na cārthagata eva, uktena nyāyena nirastavāt. kim tv ayam asann eva jñānam anu bhāsate, śabdam iva pratiśabdaḥ.*

And this form which is revealing itself does not belong to cognition, because it appears as something external. Nor is it the case that it is something solely be-

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longing to an external object, because such a possibility was already rejected
due to the rational mentioned above. Rather it is nothing at all; it appears after
cognition, just as an echo appears after a sound.

To sum up, Sucarita’s explanation of the two Buddhist theories in the apoha
section is based on his explanation in the ākṛti section, which again is based on
Śālikaṇātha’s description in the Prakaṇapaṇcikā.5

PrP 76.1–3:  ŚVK ākṛti, Adyar ms. p. 2594:
sa cāyaṁ tasyākāraḥ prathamāno na
jñānasyaiva, bahiṣṭvenāvahāsāt.

na cārthagata eva, uktena nyāyena ni-
rastatvāt.

kiṁ tv ayam asann eva jñānam anu
bhāsate,
śabdam iva pratiśabdaḥ.

ŚVK apoha §2.1.7: yo hi vikalpānāṁ viśayaḥ sa śabdārthaḥ. ... kas tasyā

7 Other explanations by Sucarita based on the Prakaṇapaṇcikā

The apoha section of the Kāśikā begins with a reference to Buddhist opponents
who reject the existence of real universals such as cowness that the realists postu-
late. The steps of the arguments made by Sucarita’s Buddhists run as follows:

§2.1.1. A recurrent form (anugata-rūpa) does not really exist.

§2.1.2. Cognition of cowness is a conceptual cognition based on the percep-
tion of individual, real cows.

§2.1.3-6. [Q] How is it possible to explain śabda and our activity based on
it that, according to the Buddhist theory, would lack a corresponding
object?

§2.1.7. [A] The object of conceptual cognition is the object of śabda.

Here again we can trace Sucarita’s source directly to the ākṛti section and in-
directly to Śālikaṇātha’s Prakaṇapaṇcikā. Sucarita makes it clear that his expla-
nation of Buddhist sāmānya is already present in the previous section, i.e., ākṛti,
by saying: “It was already elaborated before that a common property is merely

5 For more detailed sources regarding the relationship between Sucarita and Śālikaṇātha, see
Kataoka 2014a:343(20), n. 41.
the form of conceptual cognition.” (§2.1.2: vikalpākāramātram eva sāmānyam iti prāk prapañcitam eva.) The portion of the ākṛti section referred to (Adyar ms. pp. 2593–2594) is based on PrP 73.6–74.5.

PrP 73.6–13: ŚVK ākṛti, p. 2593:
kāryabhūtā hi buddhīr eśa kāraṇam
āksipānti yadantarām evopajāyate
 tad eva kāraṇaṁ kalpayati . . .
sā ceyāṁ  svalakṣaṇavidyadārśana-
samanantarabhāvinī
tā eva vyaktyaṁ svanirbhāsā bud-
dhīr upajanayā tannukhena tām
ekākārānuḥbhāsinīṁ dhiyam āvirbhāva-
yanti.7

nikāntabheda-vatīnāṁ ca vyaktīnāṁ
dhāśaircid eśa mahīṁ na sarvāsāṁ iti
kim anupapannam.
yathā hy atyaṃtavibhīnā api caṣuṣā-
lokanāmaḥśaṁyogyā ekāśaṁgrāśaṁ-
panipatatī ekavijñānodayālakṣaṇāṁ
kāryam abhānte, tathā vyaktayō ṃ
dhiyaḥ nārābhanta iti netaṁ prati-patta-
thīnāṁ.8

ŚVK apoha, 2.1.2: svalakṣaṇa-viśālaya
śadārṇa-prabhabhas tv ekākāravikalpaṁ,
tadbhāva-bhāvāt. tasmin hi sati taṭprśṭhabhāväga
vyaktaya eva svasaṁvedanadvāreṇa
tasyaḥ kāraṇaṁ.

Here the main point of the discussion is as follows: conceptual cognition of
cowness, according to Buddhists, is caused by a clear perception of individual
cows, because the former accords with the existence of the latter (tadbhāvabhāvāt).

PrP 74.2–5: ŚVK ākṛti, pp. 2593–2594:
esā ca maṇiśā na svalakṣaṇaṁ
viśādāvabhāsino hi tāḥ. ekākārā ca
viṣayākaroṁ, tasya viśādāvabhāsi-
tvāt.

6 “To explain: when this cognition as a result alludes to [its own] cause, it causes one to postu-
late only that cause, immediately following which, it (the cognition) is produced.”
7 “And because this [conceptual cognition] arises immediately after the perception of a partic-
ular, the same individuals, having produced [perceptual] cognitions of the [individuals’] own
forms, cause to appear, through these [perceptual cognitions], a cognition that has a single
form.”
8 “Of all individuals, all of whom are totally different [from each other], only some have this
power and not all [i.e. only some individuals are grouped]. Therefore, what is inappropriate?
For just as the eyes, light, the internal organ, and their connection, when they fall in the
same causal aggregate, produce a single result, i.e., the production of a single cognition,
similarly [these] individuals, too, produce [a single result]. Therefore, this is not difficult to
understand.”
8 Sucarita’s rejection of the \textit{jñānākāra} theory

After introducing the two Buddhist theories (in §2.1.7), Sucarita first criticizes the theory of \textit{jñānākāra} (in §2.2.1–2.2.4).\footnote{2.2 is located still in the \textit{pārvapaksa}. (The \textit{uttarapaksa}, i.e., Sucarita’s \textit{siddhānta}, starts from §3.) Therefore, it is the \textit{nirākāra-jñānavādin} who criticizes the \textit{jñānākāravādin} here.} The main points of his arguments run as follows:

\textbf{§2.2.1.} Cognition’s form (\textit{jñānākāra}) is not different from conceptual cognition itself (\textit{vikalpajñānād ananyah}) and therefore, being unique, cannot be the object of words (\textit{avisayaḥ śabdānām}).

\textbf{§2.2.2.} When cognizing itself (\textit{svasaṁvittau}), i.e., with respect to its own form, which is not different from cognition itself (\textit{svato ’bhinne svākāre}), conceptual cognition (\textit{kalpanā}) is not conceptual (\textit{avikalpikā}) but perceptual (\textit{pratyakṣa}).

\textbf{§2.2.3.} Externality (\textit{bāhyatva}) of the image that appears in conceptual cognition (\textit{vikalparatibhāsa}) is not \textit{śabdārtha}, either.

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9 “And this [conceptual] cognition does not deal with a particular, because it (a particular) has a clear image, whereas the [conceptual] cognition has an [unclear] image of an object which can be associated with a verbal designation. And this is because a verbal designation cannot cause a clear image to appear, for such cognition that has a clear image does not occur merely by means of a verbal designation. Therefore, this [conceptual cognition] does not cause a clear image to appear.”
Conceptual cognition itself, being the object of anubhava, cannot be different from externality which is alleged to be an object of conceptual cognition.

Among these four points the first and the second are found to be directly based on Dharmottara’s Apohaprákaraṇa.

8.1 vikalpajñānād ananyāḥ
Sucara explains the first point with the expression vikalpajñānād ananyāḥ, i.e., jñānākāra is not different from conceptual cognition itself, which is based on Dharmottara’s expression: “anyāpoha (gžan sel ba) is not different from cognition (sēs pa daṅ tha mi dad pa’i phyr) gzugs brjod byar yoṅs.”

My reconstruction:

\[
\text{tasmāt kathāṁ buddheḥ pratibimbah.}
\]

\[
tarkavit kutaścin nimittād anyāpohēṃ śabdārthaṁ kalpayītva nirvikalpa-viṣayam api śabdārthavenādhyava- sitāṃ pratibimbaṁ jñānābhinnatvāt svalakṣaṇam sad api śabdavācyam kathāṁ parikalpayet.
\]

AP 241.2–10:

dei phyir jī ltar blo’i gzugs brjod yin/ rto ge rig pa rgyu mtshan ‘ga’ žig las gžan sel ba sgrā’i don du brtags nas rto pa med pa’i yul yan sgrā’i don du lhag par žen pa sēs pa daṅ tha mi dad pa’i phyr gzugs brjod raṅ gi mtshan nīd yan yan sgrā’i brjod byar yoṅs su brtags par jī ltar ‘gyur te/

\[
\text{sēs daṅ tha dad pa ma yin pa sgrā’i brjod byar yoṅs su brtags par jī ltar ‘gyur ro/}
\]

\[
\text{sēs daṅ tha dad ma yin pa/ jī ltar don gžan ‘braṅ bar ‘gyur/}
\]

\[
\text{žes bya ba la sogs pas brjod bya yin pa slob dpon gyis bkag pa yin no/}
\]

ŚVK apoha §2.2.1–2: kathāṁ punar jñānākāro ‘bhīlāpasaṁsargayogah. sa hi vikalpajñānād ananyās tadvad eva kṣaṇiko ’sādāraṇaṇaḥ iti sūkhādīvasaṁsargaḥ aviṣayaḥ sābdānaṃ. ... nirākṛtan niśīcāntaṁ ṣvayam eva vikalpākarasya sābdavācyatvam jñānād avyatiriktaṁ ca katham arthāntaraṁ vrajet// (PV 1:71cd) iti.

11 The reconstructed Sanskrit text of the AP is italicized in the following.
12 “Therefore, how can it (the object of conceptual cognition) be a reflected image in a cognition? How can a wise man, having postulated exclusion of others as a word-meaning for some reason, postulate a reflected image, which he considers as a word-meaning although it is [in fact] the object of a non-conceptual cognition, as a word-meaning despite its being a particular because it is not different from a cognition? How can something not different from a cognition be postulated as a word-meaning? It is denied by the master (Dharmakīrti) that [a reflected image in a cognition] is a denotation when he says the following: And how can something not different from a cognition go out to another object?” Cf. a German translation by Frauwallner 1937:262.
Sucarita’s way of quoting Dharmakīrti’s PV 1:71cd is almost the same as Dharmottara’s. We can easily confirm that Dharmottara’s phrase “vācyatva is denied by the ācārya” (brjod bya yin pa slob dpon gyis bkag pa) is glossed by Sucarita by adding some explanatory words such as vikalpākārasya.

8.2 ātmany avikalpikā

Sucarita’s second point is that conceptual cognition is not conceptual with respect to itself (ātmany avikalpikā). Dharmottara explains this with the phrase raṅ gi bdag ŋid la rnam par mi rtog pa.  

AP 237.28–238.5:

Gzuṅ ba'i rnam pa ni raṅ rig pa'i yul yin gyi
rnam par rtog pa'i ni ma yin no/
'di ltar gaṅ žig ņes par byas pa de rnam par rtog pa'i yul yin no/
gzuṅ ba'i rnam pa ni ņes pa ma yin na
ji ltar rnam par rtog pa'i yul du 'gyur/
de'i phyir rnam par rtog pa sgra daṅ
'dres pa'i don ņes par byed kyaṅ
raṅ gi bdag ŋid la rnam par mi rtog pa yin no/
gaṅ gi phyir bdag ŋid ni ma ņes pa yin la/
ma ņes pa yāṅ rnam par rtog pa'i yul ma yin no/
de ltar yāṅ/
ņes pa rnam's kyis ma ņes pa/ de ni ji
ltar de dag yul// ņes bsd do/

My reconstruction:
grāhyākāraḥ svasamvedanasya viṣayaḥ,
na tu vikalpasya.
tathā hi yo niściyate sa vikalpasya viṣayaḥ.
grāhyākāro 'niścitaḥ san
katham vikalpasya viṣayo bhavati.
tasmād vikalpo 'bhilāpasanīsarga-
[yoga]arthaṁ niścinvann apy
ātmany avikalpakaḥ.

ŚVK apoha §2.2.2: api ceyanā kalpanā svasaṅvittau pratyakṣam iṣṭā. sā katham ātmany avikalpikā bhūtvā svato 'bhinnā svākāre vikalpavatī bhavisyati.
Cf. NKaṅ, Gosvāmī ed., 184.2–3: na vikalpāṇāṁ viṣayaḥ svākāro 'pi tu svasamvedanasya.

13 Sanskrit words in square brackets are supplements to the Tibetan supplied by the present author.
14 “An objective aspect is the object of self-awareness and not [the object] of conceptual cognition. To explain: every [object] that is ascertained is the object of conceptual cognition. How can an objective aspect, although not ascertained, be the object of conceptual cognition? Therefore, conceptual cognition is non-conceptual with respect to itself although it ascertains an object to be associated with verbal designations. For [cognition] itself is not ascertained; and every [object] that is not ascertained is not the object of conceptual cognition. And similarly it is stated: How can a form which is not ascertained be the object of [ascertaining cognitions]?” Cf. Frauwallner 1937:258.
The third point, i.e., externality of jñānākāra (vikalpākārasya bāhyatvam), is presented by Sucarita here as one possible alternative that directly contacts a word (śabdasamprṣṭa). We do have evidence for a Buddhist view that posits externality as a possible alternative. Jñānasrīmitra, for example, refers to the view of Dhammadharmottara, whom he calls the Tīkākāra:

\[ \text{JNĀ 229:24: tatprātipitam āropitabāhyatvam vā.} \]

Here Jñānasrīmitra presents Dhammadharmottara’s view as one which posits āropita or āropitabāhyatva as a denotation (vācyā). We can also confirm the view of alīkabāhyatva in Vācaspati’s works (Kataoka 2014a:348(15)). In Dhammadharmottara’s AP, however, this option is not explicitly presented. Probably the view of bāhyatva as a word-meaning is introduced into the theory of āropita only after Dhammadharmottara.

It is probably also the case for the theory of jñānākāra. We come across references to externality (bāhyatva) in Dharmakīrti (PVSV ad 1:75cd: bāhyaiva), Kamalaśīla (TSP ad 2c: bāhyatvenādhyāropita ākāraḥ), Kṛṇakagomin (PVSVT 113.20: sādṛśyam antareṇa vāsanābalad evādhyavastābāhyarūpaśya vikalpasyotpatteḥ; 169.13: na hi sādṛśyanimitto bāhyatvāropā iti niveditam etat) and Prajñākaragupta (PVA ad 2:170: apoho bāhyatvenādhyavastito bhavati). The two possible alternatives, i.e., svapratibhāsa and its bāhyatva, however, are not clearly stated in their works as we see in Sucarita’s phrases such as svapratibhāsā-bāhyatvavyoh or tatpratibhāsa-bāhyatva. I guess, therefore, that Sucarita’s reference to the view of externality of jñānākāra (A2 below) as a possible alternative reflects a later stage of the theory’s history, much more contemporaneous to his time.

A theoretical consideration also supports my guess, because the view of externality in the svapratibhāsa (A2 above) is probably introduced to avoid Dhammadharmottara’s criticism that jñānākāra (=grāhyākāra) is a perceptual object and not conceptual. The newly introduced view (A2) admits that grāhyākāra is a perceptual object, but further proceeds to claim that its externality is conceptual. This view is reported by Sucarita as follows:

\[ \text{§2.2.4: yat tusvātmā vikalpasyānubhūyate grāhyākāraḥ, tadbhāhyatvam ca śabdasamprṣṭatayā vikalpyateiti.} \]

On the other hand, it is said: Conceptual cognition itself is directly experienced as an objective aspect but its externality is conceptually cognized as a
direct denotation of a word.

Sucarita’s way of quoting the passage (yat tu ... iti) also suggests that this view can be ascribed to some real proponent of jñānākāra who came after Dharmottara.

8.4 niścīyate and ananubhūyamāṇa

The fourth point raised by Sucarita is basically the same as that of the first (AP 241.2–10) and the second (AP 237.28–31) explained above. The same logic is here applied to externality (bāhyatva) of the image that appears in conceptual cognition (vikalpapratibhāsa). Firstly, externality that is alleged to be an object of a word is not different (abheda) from conceptual cognition. Secondly, conceptual cognition itself, which is the object of svasānvinī, is different from the object of conceptual cognition that is ascertained (niścīyate). Dharmottara here clarifies the opposition between the two objects with opposing expressions *na niścīyate (ma ṇes pa) and *niścīyate (ṁes par byas pa), whereas Sucarita contrasts the two objects as anubhūyamāṇa and ananubhūyamāṇa.

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<td>*svasānvedanasya viśayaḥ na niścīyate</td>
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<td></td>
<td>*vikalpasya viśayaḥ niścīyate</td>
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<td>vikalpyate</td>
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<td>ananubhūyamāṇa</td>
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9 A fault of the theory of āropita

In §2.3 Sucarita introduces Dharmottara’s theory of āropita, something fabricated, which is mentally constructed (kalpita) and false (alika). He then points out a fault of this theory. If something mentally constructed and false were a word-meaning (śabdārtha), then a word-meaning would be positive (vidhirūpa) and not negative; and thus it would be inappropriate to call it anyāpoha or anyanivṛtti. In other words, Dharmottara’s āropita does not fit as a candidate for negative apoha. The same fault is pointed out in Jayanta’s NM (apoha III §2.4), too. The source is found in Dharmottara’s AP.
Two points are important here.

1. If something fabricated (sgro btags; äropita) is a word-meaning (sgra'i don; šabdārtha), then a word-meaning would be positive (sgrub pa'i raṅ bźin; vidhirūpa) and not negative, i.e., not exclusion of others (gžan sel; anyāpoha, anyanivṛtti).

2. This would lead to the unwelcome result that exclusion of others (gžan ldog pa; anyāpoha) is not understood directly from a word; but rather by implication from the affirmation of one thing (gcig sgrub pa; ekavidhi).

15 "If a fabricated form alone were a word-meaning because it is ascertained by a conceptual cognition, a word-meaning would be positive. And when it (a fabricated form) is ascertained, by implication from the affirmation of one thing, negation of the other is ascertained, as in the expression: “This is fire, not water”; but it is not the case that negation of the other is understood [directly from a word]. For negation of the other cannot be understood without the ascertainment of one thing.” Cf. Frauwallner 1937:262.

16 "Therefore, if something fabricated were a word-meaning, a word-meaning would be positive and [not negative, i.e.,] not exclusion of others. This is the view of some people.” Cf. Frauwallner 1937:262.
Dharmottara gives the following sentence as a reason for the second point:

AP 241.15–16: gcig ņes par ma byas pa ni gzan las ldog pa rtogs par mi ‘thad pa’i phyir roll (*na hy ekaniścayam antareṇānyanivṛtiḥ pratyetun yujyate.¹⁷)

ŚVK *apoha* §2.3: ekavidhināntarīyako hy anyāpohāḥ.

It might be the case that the original structure of the AP’s Sanskrit is the same as the ŚVK, namely in a form such as *ekaniścayanāntarīyakī hy anyanivṛtih*, which might have been translated into Tibetan in an easily understandable form.

10 Three characteristics of *apoha*

In order to defend his theory of āropita as being *apoha*, Dharmottara discusses three points which indicate that the object of both conceptual cognition and words is in fact (philosophically speaking) negative exclusion (*vyārtyi)*. The three characteristics of *apoha* that he introduces are the following:

1. *bhāvabhāvasādhāraṇa*: *apoha* is common both to existence and nonexistence, i.e., “cow” is connectable with “exists” and “does not exist.”

2. *bāhyasadrśa*: the object of conceptual cognition is similar to an external object although they are totally different, because they share a similarity of being different from something else.

3. *niyatarūpa*: the object of conceptual cognition is definite and exclusive as in the expression “this is a cow only” (*gaur eva*).

10.1 *bhāvabhāvasādhāraṇa*

The original Sanskrit form of Dharmottara’s explanation of the first characteristic, *bhāvabhāvasādhāraṇa*, can be reconstructed from Sucarita’s description in §2.3.1, because here Sucarita very closely follows Dharmottara’s AP. The following is the comparison of Dharmottara’s AP in Tibetan translation and Sucarita’s gloss of it.

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¹⁷ Straightforwardly, *rtogs par mi ‘thad pa* can be reconstructed as *pratyetum nopapadyate*. It is not common in Sanskrit, however, for *nopapadyate* to be connected with the infinitive *pratyetum*. This may also suggest that the original structure is the same as Sucarita reads.
10.1.1 sadasattvena praty apekṣā na syāt

AP 241.18–22:  
\[\text{My reconstruction:} \]
\[\text{atra yadi bahir dahanārthakriyāsama-rtho drṣṭo yādṛśas} \]
\[\text{tādṛśa eva vikalpair bāhyavahnitvenā-
\text{ropitā avabhāsyate,} \]
\[\text{[tadā] bāhyā iva niścīyata ity} \]
\[\text{asti nāsti veti bhāvābhāvavikalpā-
\text{ntaram praty anapekṣāḥ syāt,} \]
\[\text{na ca tābhyaṁ saṁbadhyeta.}^{18} \]

ŚVK apoha §2.3.1: yadi ca yādṛṣṇa bahir 19 dahanādyarthakriyāsamartha drṣṭas tādṛśa eva vikalpair āropitā, evam tarhi vrkṣa ity ukte sadasattve praty apekṣā na syāt. tadvacanaśabdasamabhivyāhārasa ca, yathāsti vrkṣo na veti.

The main point of the argument here is as follows: If an image made to appear by conceptual cognition were similar to an external object such as real fire, then people would not anticipate a further semantic component, either “exists” or “does not exist,” when they hear the word “fire,” nor would they say “the fire exists” or “the fire does not exist,” because the fire would be ascertained as if being externally existent.

Interestingly, in the latter half of the sentence Sucarita uses an example of a tree (vrkṣa) instead of fire mentioned in the first half, although, in view of consistency, Dharmottara intends only fire in this paragraph throughout. As will be shown later, this example of a tree was relocated to the present paragraph from another portion of the AP. In other words, as a result of importing the well known example of a tree used in another context, Sucarita breaks the consistency of the present paragraph.

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18 “Here, if [an image] fabricated as an external [real] fire which is made to appear by conceptual cognitions were similar to an external [fire] which is perceived as being able to perform a function, i.e., burning, [then], being ascertained as if being external, another conceptualization of existence or nonexistence, i.e., either “exists” or “does not exist” would not be expected [by it]; nor could its connection with them arise.” Cf. Frauwallner 1937:262–263.

19 The reading of the edition dahanādir artha- is corrected to dahanādyartha-. 
10.1.2 *na sadbhāvāpekṣā and nābhāvāpekṣā*

AP 241.22–25:

gaṇ gi phyir phyi rol gyi me ni dños po
yod pa la mi ltos te/
mthoṅ ba ŋid kyi ṛaṅ bžin ni yod pa’i
dños po’i bdag ŋid du yod pa’i phyir rol/

dños po med pa la yaṅ mi ltos te/
mthoṅ ba de’i raṅ bžin ni med pa daṅ
’gal ba’i phyir rol/

My reconstruction:

na hi bāhyo vahniḥ sadbhāvāpekṣaḥ,

drṣṭaśvabhāvasyaiva sadbhāvātmaka-
tvena sattvāt.

na ṛaṃ abhāvāpekṣaḥ,

drṣṭaśvabhāvasyāsattvavirodhāt.20

ŚVK *apoha* §2.3.1: na hi bāhye drṣṭyamāne sadbhāvāpekṣā bhavati, drṣṭaśvabhāv-
syaiva sadbhāvātmakatvāt. nāpy abhāvāpekṣā, drṣṭaśvarūpasyāsattvavirodhāt.

External, real fire does not require a further connection with either existence (*na sadbhāvāpekṣā*) or nonexistence (*nābhāvāpekṣā*), because being real, i.e., inasmuch as its nature is directly perceived, it is existent in nature (*sadbhāvātmakatvāt*) and it is contradictory for it to be nonexistent (*asattvavirodhāt*).

10.1.3 *bhāvāvyabhicārāt and abhāvavirodhāt*

AP 241.25–28:
de bžin du mthoṅ ba daṅ ’dra bar sgro
btags pa yan dños po mi ’khrul pa daṅ/
dños po med pa daṅ ’gal ba’i phyir de
dag la mi ltos po daṅ/
de dag daṅ gzi mthun ŋams su myoṅ
bar mi ’gyur rol/

My reconstruction:

evam eva drṣṭasaḍṛśaḥ samāropito ’pi
bhāvāvyabhisarād
abhāvavirodhāc ca tayor nāpekṣeta,

da ca tābhyaṃ saha samānādhihīrano
’nubhyaṃta.21

ŚVK *apoha* §2.3.1: evam eva drṣṭasaḍṛśaḥ samāropito ’pi bhāvāvyabhisarād
abhāvavirodhāc cāsti nāstīti nāpekṣeta. na ca tābhyaṃ saṃbhadihīyeta. . . .

Similarly, the image fabricated by conceptual cognition as being similar to an external object would require neither the component “exists” nor the component “does not exist” and would not be connected with them, because it does not deviate from existence (*bhāvāvyabhicārāt*) and because it contradicts nonexistence (*abhāvavirodhāt*).

20 “For external [real] fire does not require [a further connection with] existence, because being precisely [a real entity] whose nature is directly perceived, it does exist inasmuch as it is existent in nature. Nor does it expect [a connection with] nonexistence, because being [a real entity] whose nature is directly perceived, it is contradictory for it to be nonexistent.” Cf. Frauwallner 1937:263.

21 “Similarly, although it is fabricated [by conceptual cognition] as being similar to a perceived object, it would require neither [existence nor nonexistence] and would not be experienced as having the same locus as them, because it does not deviate from existence and because it contradicts nonexistence.” Cf. Frauwallner 1937:263.
10.1.4 \textit{vidhipratisedhasadhara}na and \textit{ubhayasanbandhayoga}

AP 242.2–5: \hspace{1cm} My reconstruction:
\begin{itemize}
\item de’i phyir sgrub pa dañ dagag pa thun moñ ba
\item gñis ka dañ ’breł par ruñ ba’i don
\item rnam par rtog pas ñes pa yin no
\item žes bya ba’i don ’di ñams su myoñ ba
\item las ’oñs pa yin gyi
\end{itemize}

\textit{SVK apoha} §2.3.1: \textit{ato vidhipratisedhasadhara}na \textit{ubhayasanbandhayoga} \textit{vikalpair artho} ’vasiyata ity anubhavayattam etat.\textsuperscript{22}

Therefore, it is concluded on the basis of experience (\textit{anubhavāyatta}) that the object ascertained by conceptual cognition is common to affirmation and negation (\textit{vidhipratisedhasadhara}na) and is connectable with both “exists” and “does not exist” (\textit{ubhayasanbandhayoga}).

10.1.5 \textit{bāhyavidharman}

AP 242.6–9: \hspace{1cm} My reconstruction:
\begin{itemize}
\item de’i phyir gñis ka’i thun moñ ba’i phyi rol dañ chos mi mthun pa rnam par rtog pas sgrubo ttags pa ’di ni sgrub pa’i tshul du sgrubo ttags par ma mthon’ no/
\item gñgi phyir phyi rol dañ ’dra bar snañ ba sgrub pa’i rañ bžin gyis sgrubo ttags pa ni ma yin no/
\end{itemize}

\textit{SVK apoha} §2.3.2: \textit{evañ cobbhayasadhara}nañ bāhyavidharmāropito vikalpair ity āśrayaññam. \textit{dr̥ṣṭa}ññadśre hy āropyamāne vidhirūpañ śabdārtho bhuvet, darśanena bhāvarūpaivādhūnāt.

Therefore, it is to be accepted that the object made up by conceptual cognition is common to both existence and nonexistence (\textit{ubhayasanbandhayoga}) and (in fact)
\textsuperscript{22} “Therefore, it is concluded on the basis of experience that the object which is common to affirmation and negation and which is connectable with both [existence and nonexistence] is ascertained by conceptual cognitions.” Cf. Frauwallner 1937:263. The Tibetan translation has \textit{artha} (\textit{don}) and thus may suggest \textit{ity eso} \textit{’rtho} \textit{’nubhavāyatta}. Considering Sucarita’s corresponding passage, however, it is probable that \textit{don} is supplied by a Tibetan translator in order to clarify the referent of \textit{etat}.

\textsuperscript{23} “Therefore, [the object] which is common to both [existence and nonexistence] and which is dissimilar to an external [object] is made up of conceptual cognitions; [it is] not the [perceived] object which is positive in nature. For [the object] which is similar to an external object and which is positive in nature is not made up.” Cf. Frauwallner 1937:263. Those words that I think are probably supplied by a Tibetan translator are marked with round brackets.
dissimilar to an external object (bāhyavidhāra), because if it were (in fact) similar to an external object it would be positive in nature (vidhīrūpa).

10.1.6 avṛksābhāvanīṣṭhaṁ vrksam āropayati

AP 242.11–15:

de la rnam par rtog pas ni bsgrub pa’i raṅ bzin la reg pa ’am sgrub pa daṅ ’dra bar sgro btags ni mi nus kyi/
’on kyiā śiṅ ma yin med pas khyad par du gyur pa śiṅ ma yin med pa’i mthar thug pa’i śiṅ sgro ’dogs par byed pa ’ba’ žig tu zad do/

My reconstruction:

ato vikalpo vidhīrūpaṁ spratṣaṁ tatsadrśaṁ* cāropayitum asamartho
(Tib: *vidhisadrśaṁ)

‘vrksābhāvavīṣṭaṁ avṛksābhāva-

nīṣṭhaṁ vrksam kevalam āropayati.24

Therefore, conceptual cognition makes up only a tree that culminates in the negation of non-trees (avṛksābhāvanīṣṭha), because it can neither touch something positive nor make up something similar to it.

10.1.7 Syllogism

AP 244.10-16:

gaṅ žig dnos po daṅ dnos po med pa thun moṅ du žen pas ņes par ’dzin pa de ni gcig las ldog pa ņes pa lhur byed pa yin te/
dper na bum pa ma yin par ņes pas bum pa ma yin par ņes par ’dzin pa na yod dam med ces dnos po daṅ dnos po med pa thun moṅ du ņes par ’dzin par byed pa bzin no/

My reconstruction:

yad bhāvabhāvasādhāraṇaṁ (adhy-
avasāyena) avadhāryate,
tad anyavyāvṛtti(niścaya)param.

yathāghaṭajñānenaṅghato ’vadhārya-
māno ’sti na veti bhāvabhāvasādha-
raṇo ’vadhāryate.

sarvaś ca vikalpair bhāvabhāvāsā-
dhāraṇaṁ rūpam avadhāryate.25

24 “Therefore, conceptual cognition makes up only a tree that is qualified by the nonexistence of non-trees and that culminates in the negation of non-trees, because it can neither touch something positive nor make up something similar to it.” Cf. Frauwallner 1937:264.

25 “Every [object] that is ascertained as being common to existence and nonexistence culminates in the exclusion of others, just as a non-pot [such as a cloth] which is ascertained by a cognition of a non-pot, is ascertained as being common to existence and nonexistence, i.e., [connectable with] “exists” and “does not exist.” And all conceptual cognition ascertains an
ŠVK *apoha* §2.4.1: *yad bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇāṁ rūpam avasīyate*, tad anyavāyvratti-niṣṭham. yathāghāta-vasāyena pato ‘vaśīyamānaḥ sa hy asti na veti bhāvābhāvasādāhāraṇo ‘vaśīyate, anyanivrūttinīṣṭhaḥ ca. tathā ca sarvād bhāvābhāvasādāhāra- ṇārūpābhavinivesānīṣṭhaḥ anubhavāsviddham.

The syllogism shown at the end can be summed up as follows:26

**Vyāpti:** Every object that is ascertained as being common to existence and nonexistence, i.e., connectable with “exists” and “does not exist,” culminates in the exclusion of others.

**Drṣṭānta:** Like a cloth which is ascertained as a non-pot.

**Pakṣadharmatā:** The objects of all words are the same, i.e., they are ascertained as being common to existence and nonexistence.27

### 10.1.8 Correspondence and absence of correspondence

The correspondence and the absence of correspondence between the AP and the ŠVK are as follows:

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The Tibetan translation *ţen pas ˙nes par ‘dzin pa* suggests *adhyavasāyena vadhāryate*. Other corresponding parts are translated in the following passages merely as *ţes par ‘dzin pa* (avadhāryate) without *ţen pas*. Sucarita’s corresponding passages all have the same form *avadhāryate* instead of *avadhāryate*. It might be possible that a Tibetan translator translates the simple word *avadhāryate* into an explanatory phrase *ţen pas ˙nes par ‘dzin pa* in its first occurrence.

For Sucarita -para and -nis. t. ha are synonymous. Cf. ŠVK *apoha* §2.4.3 (Kataoka 2014a: 317(46)–316(47)): *yat kilatyantavisadr ˙s ˙san ˙sam tadrupagheran ˙sam tad anyavyāvṛttiparām.* (Quoted below in p. 42.)

26 *Udāharaṇa* is divided into *vyāpti* and *drṣṭānta* for the sake of clarity. Pakṣadharmatā corresponds to *upanaya* (application) in the Naiyāyika system of *pañcāvayava*.

27 Conclusion: Therefore, they are ultimately exclusion of others.
There are three paragraphs of the AP (marked with asterisks) the correspondences of which are not clearly recognizable. (A) In the first case, AP 241.28–242.2, Dharmottara gives an example, “tree,” which Sucarita transferred to and incorporated into 41.7–42.1, and therefore, most probably, omitted here. (B) The second case, AP 242.5–6, is a sentence which restates the content of a preceding passage in a negative formula, and therefore most probably Sucarita considered it omissible. (C) The third case, AP 242.9–11, is again a reference to the example “tree” together with an explanation, which Sucarita made into a compact reason darśanena bhāvarūpavidhānāt subordinate to the preceding sentence.

10.2 bāhyasadrśa

The second characteristic of apoha, namely, “being (apparently) similar to an external object” (bāhyasadrśa) is explained by Suracita in §2.4.3. His explanation is based on Dharmottara’s AP as shown below.

AP 244.29–245.5: gaṅ zīg śīn tu mi 'dra ba de'i raṅ bźin du 'dzin pa de ni gzhan las bzlog pas byas pa'i 'dra bar 'dzin pa lhur len pa yin te/

dper na snam bu bum pa daṅ śīn tu mi 'dra yaṅ śīn ma yin par khyad par can du nes par rtogs pa na 'di yaṅ śīn ma yin na 'di yaṅ śīn ma yin žes yin na bum pa daṅ 'dra bar nes par rtogs pa bźin no/
de bźin du ram par rtog pa'i don phyi rol daṅ śīn tu mi mthun pa yaṅ phyi rol tu nes par rtogs pa yin no/
ram par rtog pas phyi rol nes par byed pa yaṅ ŋams su moṅ bas grub pol/

My reconstruction:
yad atyantavisadrśānāṁ tādrūpyagaraḥaṇam tad anyavyārvitiktasadrśyaya-(graḥaṇa)param.
yathā ghaṭātyantavisadrśo 'pi paṭo vrksābhāvaviśiṣṭo 'vadhāryamāṇaḥ “ayam apy avṛksaḥ, ayam apy avṛksaḥ” iti ghaṭasadrśo 'vadhāryate.
tathā ca vikalpaviṣayo ('ṛtho) 'ryaṇaṁ bāhyavisadrśo 'pi bāhyo 'vadhāryate.
vikalpena bāhyāvadhāraṇaṁ apy anubhavasiddham.²⁸

ŚVK apoha §2.4.3: yat kālītyantavisadrśānāṁ tādrūpyagrahaṇaṁ tad anyavyā-vṛtīparam. yathā ghaṭapaṭayor ekāntavisadrśayor apy avṛkṣo 'yam ayaṁ ceti tādrūpyenāvadhāraṇaṁ anyaniṛvṛtiṁ eva. tathā ca vikalpaviṣayo 'ṛtho 'ṛṭaṁsāṁ atyantabāhyavisadrśo bāhyo 'vadhāryateity anubhavasiddham eva.

²⁸ "Every [cognition] which grasps something totally dissimilar as being similar in fact has a similarity based on exclusion of others as its object, just as a cloth, although being totally different from a pot, when it is ascertained as being qualified by the nonexistence of a tree, is ascertained as being similar to a pot, as in the expression: "This too is non-tree, this too is non-tree." And the object of conceptual cognition, although being totally dissimilar to an external object, is ascertained as being external. That conceptual cognition ascertains something as being external, too, is established on the basis of experience." Cf. Frauwallner 1937:267.
Sucaritamiśra on Apoha (Kei KATAOKA)

PVSVT 112.18–22: etena yad ucyateyad bāhyātyantavisadṛśasya svākārasya tādṛṣṭapṛyagraḥanām tād ananyivrṛttikṛṣṭasādṛṣyaparam. yathā ghaṭaṣvisadrśo ‘pi paṭo vrkṣabhāvaviśiṣṭo ‘vadhāryamāṇāḥ “ayam apy avṛkṣaḥ” iti ghaṭasadrśo ‘vadhāryate, vrkṣavyāvrter ghaṭapaṭayos tulyatvāt. tathā vikalpaśayato ‘tyantām bāhyaṣvisadrśo ‘pi bāhyo ‘vadhāryate, ‘anyaivrṛttikṛṣṭasārūpyaprahaṇātiti.29

Here Dharmottara and Sucarita intend a syllogism:

Vyāpti: Every cognition which grasps something totally dissimilar as being similar in fact has exclusion of others as its object.

Drṣṭānta: Like a cloth which is grasped as being similar to a pot inasmuch as being a non-tree.

Paśadharmanātā: The object of conceptual cognition, although totally dissimilar to an external object, is ascertained as being similar to it.30

It is clear that Sucarita very closely follows Dharmottara’s original passages. Our impression is further confirmed when we compare Sucarita with Jayanta, whose corresponding passage (NM apoha III 2.7.3) does not take the form of a syllogism although there is a loose correspondence in terms of contents.

10.3 niyatarūpa

The third characteristic of apoha is niyatarūpa, i.e., having a restricted, definite form. In other words, the content of conceptual cognition takes a formula, for example, “This is a cow only and not something else.” Here again Sucarita’s description closely follows Dharmottara’s syllogism presented in the AP.

AP 245.21–25:

My reconstruction:

gaṇ ṣīg ṃe pa’i raṇ bāṅsin ṃe par rtogs
dpar na ‘di ni bum pa kho nā’o žes ṃes

del nyi bum pa ṃes par rtogs pa’i

dergu du ram par rtog pa thams cad

yan niyatarūpaḥadhāraṇam tad anya-

yathā ghata evaśam iti niyataghaṭāva-

yathā ca sarve vikalpā niyataghrāhakā
dhāraṇam vikalpaḥ.

tathā ca sarve vikalpā niyataghrāhakā

anubhavasiddham.31

29 See the apparatus of my edition, ŚVK apoha §2.4.3, for variant readings; see also NKAś 1386.8–1388.5 and NVTT 443.6–9 quoted there.
30 Conclusion: Therefore, it in fact communicates exclusion of others.
The syllogism intended here can be summed up as follows:

**Vyāpti:** Every cognition which ascertains something in a restricted, definite form “This is X only and not something else” in fact has exclusion of others as its object.

**Drṣṭānta:** Like the conceptual cognition “This is a pot only.”

**Paksadharmaṭā:** All conceptual cognition grasps an object in a restricted, definite form “X only.”

Jayanta, on the other hand, does not follow the AP closely (NM *apoha* III §2.7.2), although in terms of content he ultimately conveys the same thing.

So far we have compared Sucarita’s explanation of the three characteristics of *apoha* with corresponding passages in the AP. In all cases it is demonstrated that Sucarita closely follows Dharmottara’s original phrasing and sentence structure. In this way, with regard to the three characteristics of *apoha*, Sucarita’s passages are a very important source for reconstructing the original form of Dharmottara’s AP.

11 *ekapratyavamarsa*, etc.

Similar investigations are possible with regard to Sucarita’s description of *tatkāritvādhyavasāya* (ŚVK *apoha* III §2.3.3.2) and *ekapratyavamarsa* (§2.3.3.3), in which Sucarita follows, in terms of content, the logical steps of Dharmottara’s arguments in the AP.

AP 247.13–17:  

My reconstruction:

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ṣnār ma mṭhōṅ ba’i dnōs po la go mṭhōṅ ba’i de ma thag pa’i žen pa mṭhōṅ ba’i raṅ bźṁ dnōs po gźan la ldog par ’dzin pa ci ’dra ba žig yin/ gaṅ gi phyir ’bras bu’i khyad par byed pas na rnam par rtog pas de’i ’bras bu can ma yin pa dag las ldog pa’i raṅ bźṁ du gsal bar byed pa yin na/
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31 “Every [cognition] which ascertains something in a definite form has exclusion of others as its object, just as in the case of the conceptual cognition “This is a pot only,” which ascertains a pot in a definite form. And all conceptual cognition grasps [an object in] a definite form. This [reason] too is established on the basis of experience.” Cf. Frauwallner 1937:268.

32 Conclusion: Therefore, it in fact communicates exclusion of others.
In these cases Sucarita paraphrases Dharmottara’s sentences in different forms without losing each logical point. In the first case, AP 247.13–15, for example, the logical point “only after A, B is possible” is paraphrased in the ŚVK as “Before A, B is impossible” (A: käryadarśana; B: tatkārītvādhyaśaya). In other words, both passages explain the point that the ascertainment of cows as being the same in that they accomplish the same result is possible only after having seen the result. In the second case, AP 247.22–23, Dharmottara’s simple phrase “they are different like real entities” (dravyavad ... bhinnā) is explained by Sucarita as “they are different for each of the entities that is to be seen” (yāvaddṛśyaṁ bhidyamāṇāṁ)
together with a concluding remark “how can they be one result?” (katham ekaṁ kāryam). In the third case, AP 247.28–29, both passages explain the point that perceptions (darśana) can be regarded as being non-different (abhīna) from each other due to their single result, i.e., one and the same judgment (ekapratyavamarśa) that they produce.

12 Concluding remarks

1. Like other authors around his time Sucarita knows the subdivisions of the Buddhist theory of apoha: jñānakāra theory on the one hand and Dharmottara’s opposing view on the other.

2. Śālikanātha’s PraKarāṇaṇapāṭcitkā is one of the sources of Sucarita’s explanation of the Buddhist theory of apoha.

3. Sucarita’s Kaśīka is an important source for our reconstruction of some parts of the original form of Dharmottara’s ApohapraKarāṇa. This is particularly the case with regard to the three characteristics of apoha described by Dharmottara, i.e., bhāvabhāvasādhāraṇa, bāhyasāḍa and niyataρūpa.

Abbreviations and Bibliography

Primary sources

ApohapraKarāṇa

AP Dharmottara’s ApohapraKarāṇa. See the Tibetan text edited in Frauwallner 1937.

Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali


Tattvasaṅgrahapaṇjikā


Nyāyakanikā (=NKaṅ)

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Gosvāmī  

Nyāyamaṇjarī


NM apoha I: See Kataoka 2011.
NM apoha II: See Kataoka 2008.
NM apoha III: See Kataoka 2009.
NM apoha IV: See Kataoka 2010.

Nyāyavārttikatātparyātiṭkā


Prakaraṇapaṭcikā


Pramāṇavārttika

PV 1  See PVSV.

Pramāṇavārttika-alaṃkāra


Pramāṇavārttika-ṭikā of Śākyabuddhi


Pramāṇavārttika-svavṛtti


Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti-ṭikā

Pramāṇaviścaya


Ślokavārttika


Ślokavārttikakāśikā


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ŚVK apoha: See Kataoka 2014a.

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