

Śāntarakṣita's Answer to
Kumāṛila's Critique of the Buddha's Speakerhood

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1. Introduction

Does the Buddha use his mouth to speak when he preaches? Some Buddhists recognized a supernatural form of preaching by the Buddha. They claimed that the Buddha's teachings spontaneously flow out of such things as walls in response to the wishes of devotees, without the need for the Buddha to turn his attention and while maintaining a state of nonconceptual meditation. Others accepted the usual oral form of preaching. In other words, the Buddha comes out of meditation and speaks, that is, he verbalizes through conceptualization what he has experienced. But of course, the conceptual cognition of the Buddha is considered to be pure worldly wisdom, which is distinguished from the mere false cognition of ordinary people, although the conceptual cognition of the Buddha, as a kind of conceptual cognition, essentially has no corresponding external object.

In criticizing the validity of the Buddhist scriptures, Kumāṛila criticizes the Buddhists' claim that their scriptures were composed by the omniscient Buddha. In other words, he points out that the Buddhist scriptures were not composed by an omniscient being. In this criticism, he raises the issue of the Buddha's speakerhood (*vaktṛtva*). In the meditative state of cognizing everything, the Buddha could not open his mouth, and even if he could, he would preach only a little, not everything, as an ordinary speaker does. There is a quantitative gap between the meditative state of omniscience and the state of preaching. This is the context in which Kumāṛila addresses speakerhood. That is, speakerhood contradicts omniscience. So if the Buddha is a speaker, it proves that he is not omniscient.

Responding to Kumāṛila's criticism, Śāntarakṣita addresses speakerhood in two different places in the last chapter of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* (TS). The most important is the one given in the context of "being composed by an omniscient being," which I call Material II, i.e., TS 3592-3620. This is the refutation with which he responds to Kumāṛila's BṬ verses cited as TS 3237-45. Apart from this, however, Śāntarakṣita also addresses speakerhood in the preceding passages, which I refer to as Material I, i.e., TS 3358-72. This is the refutation he gives to Kumāṛila's BṬ verse cited as TS 3156. Material II was discussed in detail in another article of mine (Kataoka forthcoming). In this paper, I will take a closer look at Śāntarakṣita's response to Kumāṛila's critique of speakerhood addressed in Material I, TS 3358-72. This section is not dealt with by McClintock 2010. However, it is an important part of Śāntarakṣita's arguments and an essential prelude to Material II. In Material I, Śāntarakṣita makes a similar argument, keeping in mind the argument that will be developed later in Material II. (The numbers in parentheses indicate the number of verses.)

	TS <i>pūrvapakṣa</i> (=BṬ)	TS <i>uttarapakṣa</i>
Material I	3156 (1)	3358-72 (15)
Material II	3237-45 (9)	3592-3620 (29)

Interestingly, Kumāṛila himself did not specifically indicate speakerhood in the BṬ verse in question, TS 3156. There he mentions "*jñeyatva*, *prameyatva*, *vastutva*, *sattva*, etc." He criticizes Buddhists, stating that denial of omniscience is easily possible by giving any reason such as *prameyatva*. It is Śāntarakṣita who reads speakerhood into this last "etc." (*ādi*) and answers it in argument. We can see that Śāntarakṣita was very conscious of speakerhood as a logical reason for denying omniscience. In other words, assuming the criticism that Kumāṛila makes later in Material II, Śāntarakṣita reads into the word *ādi* speakerhood and understands it as a logical reason for denying omniscience.

2. Rough correspondences between the three texts

Kumārila's lost work, the BṬ, is probably his later work, modified from the ŚV, possibly in response to Dharmakīrti's objections.¹ The BṬ verse we will discuss in this paper and the corresponding original verse of the ŚV are as follows:

ŚV <i>Codanā</i> 132	BṬ=TS 3156 (<i>pūrvapakṣa</i>)
pratyakṣādyavisamvādi prameyatvādi yasya ca/ sadbhāvacāraṇe śaktam ko nu tam kalpayiṣyati//	yasya jñeyaprameyatva- vastusattvādīlakṣaṇāḥ/ nihantum hetavaḥ śaktāḥ ko nu tam kalpayiṣyati//

The ŚV verse is translated in Kataoka 2011a: II 357 as follows:

132. And who indeed would postulate this [omniscient being] if [a reason], such as “being an object of a valid cognition,” which is not inconsistent with perception and so on, is capable of denying his existence?

As a counterargument to the Buddhists who make the argument that the Buddhist scriptures are valid because they were composed by the omniscient Buddha, Kumārila argues here that the Buddha is not omniscient, on the grounds of *prameyatva* and so forth. In other words, the Buddha is not omniscient because he is an object of a valid cognition, etc., just like an ordinary man in the street.² *Prameyatva* is the reason-property with the widest scope and applies to all objects in the world. And all the objects we have experienced so far are non-omniscient. Therefore, by means of this reason-property, *prameyatva*, we can analogize the Buddha in question to be non-omniscient. This is the counterargument that Kumārila has in mind here. The main idea of the corresponding BṬ verse is the same.

3156. Who indeed would postulate this [omniscient being] if [reasons], such as “being an object of a cognition,” “being an object of a valid cognition,” “being a real entity,” “being existent,” are capable of denying him?

Here Kumārila adds *jñeyatva*, *vastutva*, and *sattva* in addition to *prameyatva*. His intention is to ridicule the Buddhists. In other words, he is trying to win over the Buddhists by saying that it is very easy to deny omniscience by bringing in any of the reasons that have a wide extension, such as *jñeyatva*, which applies to everything.³ For example, *sattva* is a broad reason-property in Vaiśeṣika's ontology that applies to any substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), and action (*karman*). Since all three types of existing things we have experienced so far have been non-omniscient, we can infer that the Buddha in question must also be non-omniscient.

Śāntarakṣita quotes the above BṬ verse as TS 3156 in the *pūrvapakṣa* of his TS.

¹ Kataoka 2011a: II 58.

² Cf. TSP ad 3156: *sugato 'sarvajñāḥ, jñeyatvaprameyatvavastutvasattvavakṛtṛvapuruṣatvādibhyaḥ, rathyāpuruṣavad iti*.

³ Kamalaśīla interprets TS 3156 in relation to the immediately preceding verse, TS 3155. Kumārila's intention, according to Kamalaśīla, is that it is very easy to deny the claim of the Buddhists by using any reason (*yā kācid yuktiḥ*); an omniscient being is utterly impossible (*atyantāsaṃbhavī*), and not something that any judicious person should acknowledge (*na prekṣāvatābhyaupēyaḥ*).

His response to it in the *uttarapakṣa* is TS 3358-72, the group of verses I will discuss in this paper. As mentioned above, this TS 3156, a verse quoted from Kumārila's BṬ, finds its counterpart in ŚV *Codanā* 132. The following is a table of rough correspondences between the three texts:⁴

ŚV <i>Codanā</i>	TS <i>pūrvapakṣa</i> (=BṬ)	TS <i>uttarapakṣa</i>
132: prameyatvādi	3156: jñeya-prameyatva-vastu-sattvādi	jñeyatvādi 3353-54 (2)
		sattvādi 3355-57 (3)
		vakṛtva 3358-72 (15)
		upasaṃhāra 3373 (1)

As can be seen from these correspondences, Kumārila first mentions *prameyatvādi* in the ŚV, and then expands it to explicitly include *jñeyatva*, *prameyatva*, *vastutva*, and *sattva* in the BṬ. In both cases, *ādi* is appended; the BṬ is more specific in its examples. Śāntarakṣita, on the other hand, takes Kumārila's arguments seriously and refutes them in detail. In the *uttarapakṣa*, Śāntarakṣita divides the discussion into *jñeyatva*, *sattva*, and *vakṛtva*. As can be seen from the correspondence table, one verse in the *pūrvapakṣa* is answered in 21 verses, TS 3353-73, in the *uttarapakṣa*. While two verses are devoted to *jñeyatva* and three to *sattva*, a total of 15 verses are devoted to *vakṛtva*. This fact suggests the importance of speakerhood to Śāntarakṣita. As in the other passages discussing speakerhood (Material II, TS 3592-3620 *uttarapakṣa*), here too Śāntarakṣita divides the discussion of speakerhood into two parts: the ordinary form of teaching through conceptualization and the extraordinary form of teaching without conceptualization.

3. The original context of the ŚV verse

The context in which the reasons such as *prameyatva* are mentioned is somewhat complicated. In what follows, I will explain the context in which *prameyatva*, etc., are mentioned, following the structure of the ŚV. I will then compare the compositional structure of the BṬ (quoted in the TS *pūrvapakṣa*) with the ŚV. The following table gives a bird's eye view of the correspondence between the ŚV and BṬ verses of Kumārila on omniscience. (Cf. Kataoka 2011a: II 331, n. 372)

ŚV <i>Codanā</i> 110cd-155 (45.5)	BṬ=TS 3123-3260 (123.5)
	0 upodghātaḥ 3123-26 (4)
1 bhāṣyavyākhyānam 110cd-111 (1.5)	1 bhāṣyavyākhyānam 3127 (1)
	1.1 sarvaśabdārthaḥ 3128-42 (15)
	1.2 sarvasmiṃ jñāte doṣaḥ 3143-56 (14)
2 sarvaṃ jñānīty ayuktam	2 sarvaṃ jñānīty ayuktam
pramāṇavyavasthā 112-115 (4)	2.1 sarvadarśananirāsaḥ 3157-74ab (17.5)
	2.2 sarvaśravaṇanirāsaḥ 3174cd-83 (9.5)
3 sarvajñatvāpauruṣeyatve 116 (1)	3 sarvajñatvāpauruṣeyatve 3184 (1)
4 sarvajña[tva]-abhāvaḥ	4 sarvajña[tva]-abhāvaḥ
4.1 pratyakṣa-abhāvaḥ 117ab (0.5)	4.1 pratyakṣa-abhāvaḥ 3185ab (0.5)
4.2 anumāna-abhāvaḥ 117cd (0.5)	4.2 anumāna-abhāvaḥ 3185cd (0.5)
4.3 śabda-abhāvaḥ 118-120 (3)	4.3 śabda-abhāvaḥ 3186-3213 (28/47*)

⁴ For the correspondence between the verse of ŚV *Codanā* and its counterpart of the BṬ, see Kataoka 2011a: II 334, n. 376; II 45; II 357.

4.3.1 ekadeśasaṃvādanirāsaḥ 121-132 (12)	(ŚV 132~TS 3156, moved to 1.2)
4.3.2 smṛtyavicchedanirāsaḥ 133-136 (4)	(ŚV 134~TS 3191; 135~3190; 136=3192)
	4.4 upamāna-abhāvaḥ 3214-15 (2)
	4.5 arthāpatty-abhāvaḥ 3216-28 (13)
	4' sarvajñabuddhanirāsaḥ 3229-36 (8)
5 sarvajñapraṇītatvanirāsaḥ	5 sarvajñapraṇītatvanirāsaḥ
5.1 drṣṭarūpopadeśaḥ 137 (1)	5.1 drṣṭarūpopadeśaḥ 3237-39 (3)
5.2 adrṣṭarūpopadeśaḥ 138-140 (3)	5.2 adrṣṭarūpopadeśaḥ 3240-45 (6)
6 kevalajñānasarvajñanirāsaḥ 141-142 (2)	(omitted?)
7 nityāgamadarśanasarvajñanirāsaḥ 143-151 (9)	(moved to 2.2)
	7' svatantrasarvajñābhāvaḥ 3246ab (0.5)
8 atulyatvopasaṃhāraḥ 152-155 (4)	(omitted?)

Kumārila's verse in question, ŚV *Codanā* 132, is broadly situated in the context of denying evidential *pramāṇas* for the existence of omniscient beings (§4). Kumārila denies perception (§4.1), inference (§4.2), and verbal testimony (§4.3). Next, he assumes an inference from the Buddhists and denies it (§4.3.1).⁵ That is, the Buddhists present the inference that since the Buddha's scriptures are valid in the perceptual realm, they must also be valid in the non-perceptual religious realm. This is an analogy from the experiential, observable realm (*drṣṭa*) to the non-experiential, unobservable realm (*adrṣṭa*). Of course, as Kumārila points out, agreement/consistency (*saṃvāda*) with *pramāṇas* and validity in some realms does not warrant agreement in all. Partial agreement (*ekadeśasaṃvāda*) is not sufficient for invariable concomitance. In the context of criticizing the argument, Kumārila tries to show that there is a counterargument (*pratipakṣa*) of equal force. In other words, he points out that the Buddhist argumentation is flawed due to *satpratipakṣatva*, having an equally valid counterargument.⁶ The reason that comes up in this context is the *prameyatva* mentioned above. In other words, as a counterargument, Kumārila shows by *prameyatva* that the Buddha is not omniscient. And Śāntarākṣita has read that *vaktṛtva* is also included in the BT's wording *ādi*. The essence of the argument and counterargument assumed by the Buddhists and Kumārila can be reconstructed as follows:

Buddhists (cf. ŚV <i>Codanā</i> 121)	Kumārila (cf. ŚV <i>Codanā</i> 132)
The Buddhist scripture must be valid also with regard to unobservable, religious matters, because it is the same teaching by the same teacher, whose teaching has been proven valid with regard to observable, mundane things. (Kataoka 2011a: II 142)	The Buddha is not omniscient, because, like an ordinary man in the street, he is a <i>prameya</i> or an object of a means of valid cognition, etc. (cf. Kataoka 2011a: II 144; 357, n. 409)

The simple analogy that Kumārila attacks probably presupposes Dignāga's defense of the

⁵ This argument is an inference based on the content of the Buddhist scriptures themselves. In this sense, it is possible to regard this syllogism as an inference based on verbal testimony, and broadly as belonging to the context of verbal testimony (*śabda*). Thus, §4.3.1 (and §4.3.2) can be regarded as subsections of §4.3. Kataoka 2011a: II 182-183, however, separates them as independent sections, §4.4 and §4.5, for convenience.

⁶ For the detailed structure of §4, see Kataoka 2011a: II 182-183.

authority of the Buddhist scriptures.⁷ Of course, Dharmakīrti, who assumes Kumāṛila's criticism, does not have the same method of defense as Dignāga. Rather, he actively criticizes the analogical method of reasoning common to the generation that preceded him, including Dignāga.⁸ Thus, Kumāṛila's criticism is no longer valid for Dharmakīrti. Probably reflecting these circumstances, Kumāṛila seems to have withdrawn this method of criticism in the BṬ. All the verses except for the last one in §4.3.1 are no longer found in the corresponding part of the TS. A verse corresponding to the last verse, ŚV *Codanā* 132, however, appears in a completely different context as TS 3156, in the opening section (§1), where "all" (*sarva*) is discussed in detail.

4. The context of the BṬ verse

When we say that an omniscient being (*sarva-jñā*) cognizes all things, what exactly is the scope of that "all"? As is well known, the pronoun "all" depends on the context. This is the question that §1.1 of the BṬ strictly asks.⁹ This question is one that was not found in the ŚV at all.

Next, in §1.2, Kumāṛila points out various problems in cognizing *all* things in the true sense. For example, if Buddhists insisted that the all-cognizing Buddha really cognizes everything directly, then the Buddha would taste even impure tastes (such as alcohol) directly (§1.2.1). The last of these problems is discussed in TS 3156. Leaving the original context in the ŚV of pointing out *satpratipakṣatva*, Kumāṛila simply shows the ridiculousness of postulating an all-cognizing person: it is easy to deny omniscience by using any reason such as *prameyatva*; therefore, it is impossible and futile to prove the omniscience of the Buddha in competition with other teachers such as Kapila in Sāṃkhya and Vardhamāna in Jainism. The following is a correspondence chart showing Kumāṛila's arguments in §1.2 and Śāntarakṣita's responses to them.

BṬ=TS <i>pūrvapakṣa</i>	TS <i>uttarapakṣa</i>
1.2 sarvasmiñ jñāte doṣāḥ 3143	
1.2.1 aśucirasādayaḥ 3144	3317-18 (2)
1.2.2 vedopavedāṅgavid 3145	3319-20 (2)
1.2.3 anibaddhatvam 3146	3321-23 (3)
1.2.4 vardhamānakapilādayaḥ 3147-48	3324-46 (23)
1.2.5 pratibimbodayaḥ 3149-52	3347-52 (6)
1.2.6 nakulasarpavat 3153-55	3374-79 (6)
1.2.7 jñeyatvādayaḥ 3156	
jñeya-	1.2.7.1 jñeyatvādayaḥ 3353-54 (2)
-sattva-	1.2.7.2 sattvādayaḥ 3355-57 (3)
-ādi-	1.2.7.3 vaktṛtvam 3358-72 (15)
	1.2.7.4 upasaṃhāraḥ 3373 (1)

As we have already seen above, for the single verse, TS 3156, Śāntarakṣita refutes it in detail in his reply. In particular, he spends 15 verses on speakerhood.

5. Śāntarakṣita on speakerhood

The whole of TS 3358-72 is divided into three parts. First, Śāntarakṣita clarifies the intention of his opponent, Kumāṛila (§0). Then, he gives his own answer. First, he responds from the

⁷ See Kataoka 2011a: II 344-345, n. 388.

⁸ Steinkellner 1997: 638-639; Kataoka 2011b: 258.

⁹ For the details of this section, see Kataoka 2003: 43-45.

standpoint of accepting ordinary teaching, assuming the ordinary speakerhood of oral teaching (§1). He then responds from the standpoint of accepting the extraordinary form of teaching, which is the teaching without the use of the mouth and without conceptualization (§2). Its synopsis and original text are shown in the following table:

vaktṛtvam	TS 3358-72 (<i>uttarapakṣaḥ</i>)
0 paramatopanyāsaḥ	tad atrāḍipadākṣipte vaktṛtve yo 'bhimanyate/ niścayaṃ vyatirekasya parasparavirodhataḥ//3358 vikalpe sati vaktṛtvam, sarvajñaś cāvikalpataḥ ¹⁰ / na hy āviṣṭābhilāpena vastu jñānena gamyate//3359
1 savikalpa-upadeśa-pakṣe	atrāpi ye pravaktṛtvam vitarkānuvidhānataḥ/ sarvajñasyābhimanyante,
1.1 siddhasādhyatvam	na tair vacanasambhave//3360 sarvajña iṣyate, nāpi vikalpajñānavṛttitaḥ/
1.2 asiddhatā	tasmīn kṣaṇe 'vikalpe tu vaktṛtvam na prasidhya- ti//3361
1.3 nāsarvajñapraṇītātvaṃ	asarvajñapraṇītātvaṃ na caivaṃ tasya yujyate/ sarvajñatāsamākṣepād ¹¹ , ataḥ saṃvādanam bhav- et//3362 anubhūya yathā kaścīd auṣṇyam paścāt prabhāṣate ¹² / tasmād vastvavisamvādas tadarthānubhavodbha- vāt ¹³ //3363
1.4 upasaṃhāraḥ	tena sarvajñatākāle hetor asyāprasiddhatā/ vyāhāravṛttikāle tu bhavet siddhāprasāddhanam//3364
1.5 saṃdigdhavyatirekitvaṃ	samastavastuvijñānaśaktyapākaraṇe 'pi te/ saṃdigdhavyatirekitvaṃ tadavasthaṃ prasajyate//3365 vyāhāravṛttisāmarthyē hetutvenāpi saṃmate/ saṃdigdhavyatirekitvadoṣa evānuvartate//3366
2 avikalpa-upadeśa-pakṣe	cakrabhramaṇayogena nirvikalpe 'pi tāyini/ saṃbhārāvedhasāmarthyād deśanā saṃpravarta- te ¹⁴ //3367 iti ye sudhiyaḥ prāhus,
2.1 asiddhatā	tān praty api na sidhyati ¹⁵ /
2.2 saṃdigdhavyatirekitvaṃ	vaktṛtvam yat tu lokena matam ādhyavasāyi- kam ¹⁶ //3368 tatra tādṛśi hetoḥ syāt saṃdigdhavyatirekitā/
2.3 ākṣepaḥ	nanu cāsiddhatā kena mate 'trānupapattike//3369
2.4 uttaram	ucyate,

¹⁰ Cf. TS 3604: *na ced vaktṛtvam iṣyeta nāgamopagamo bhavet/ tatpraṇītāgameṣṭau tu tasya vaktṛtvam iṣyatām//*.

¹¹ Cf. TS 3592d: *sarvajñānānvayād iti//*.

¹² Cf. TS 3593: *yathāiveṣṭādīkān arthān anubhūyālpadarśanaḥ/ cetasy āropya tān paścāt pravakty anubhavāśrayān//*.

¹³ Cf. TS 3594: *na ca tadvacanam tasya tadvastvujñānajanma na/*.

¹⁴ Cf. TS 3607: *saṃbhārāvedhataḥ tasya pumsaś cintāmaṇer iva/ nihsaranti yathākāmaṃ kuḍyādibhyo 'pi deśanāḥ//*.

¹⁵ Cf. TS 3608: *ādhipatyaprapattyātāḥ praṇetā so 'bhidhīyate/ vikalpānugataṃ tasya na vaktṛtvam prasajyate//*.

¹⁶ Cf. TS 3608 (quoted above).

2.4.1 svatantrasādhane	yadi vaktṛtvaṃ svatantraṃ sādhanam matam ^{17/} tadānīm āśrayāsiddhaḥ saṃdigdhāsiddhatātha vā//3370 asya cārthasya saṃdehāt saṃdigdhāsiddhatā sthirā ^{18/}
2.4.2 prasaṅgasādhane	prasaṅgasādhanam tasmāt tvayā vaktavyam īdṛ- śam//3371 tatra cāgamamātreṇa siddho dharmah prakāśyate ^{19/} na tu tadbhāvasiddhyartham jñāpakam vidyate pa- ram//3372

Having finished his discussion of *jñeyatva* and *sattva*, Śāntarakṣita begins his discussion of speakerhood (*vaktṛtva*) as follows:

3358. On the other hand, with regard to the speakerhood implied by the word “etc.” here [in v. 3156], one (i.e. Kumāṛila) regards it as determined not to be [in omniscient beings, which is a dissimilar example,] based on the mutual contradiction [between speakerhood and omniscience].

3359. Speakerhood presupposes conceptualization, but [a person is] omniscient because he has no conceptualization. This is because a real entity cannot be cognized by a language-infused [conceptual] cognition.

Kumāṛila presupposes the invariable concomitance that if a person is a speaker, he is necessarily a non-omniscient person. In other words, the two properties, speakerhood and omniscience, are contradictory. The dissimilar example, i.e., omniscient beings, never has the reason-property, speakerhood. In other words, he thinks it is certain that an omniscient person (in the state of cognizing everything) never speaks. This is because a speaker requires conceptualization, but a person with conceptualization cannot be omniscient, because a person with conceptual cognition cannot grasp a real entity.

In response to Kumāṛila’s criticism of omniscience, Śāntarakṣita first responds by acknowledging that omniscient beings have speakerhood based on conceptualization, assuming the ordinary form of teaching.

3360-61. In answering the above opponent (*yo ... atra*), even those Buddhists who admit that an omniscient being can be a speaker based on gross conceptualization, do not admit that he is omniscient when speech occurs. Nor [do they admit that he is omniscient] because conceptualization is at work. In that [omniscient] moment, when there is no conceptualization, speakerhood is not established [in the subject].

According to Buddhists, the Buddha in the meditative state is omniscient, but the Buddha in the state of preaching is not, since at that moment he resorts to conceptualization. In other words, they do not claim that the Buddha is omniscient, i.e., actively perceiving everything, in the state of preaching; nor do they claim the obvious nonsense that he is omniscient precisely because his conceptual cognition is in operation. Therefore, Kumāṛila is trying to prove the obvious, which Buddhists have already acknowledged, that the speaking Buddha is not cognizing everything. Thus, this reason falls into the fault of proving the proven (*siddhasādhya*). Also, the Buddha in the meditative state is not speaking, so at this

¹⁷ Cf. TS 3606ab: *yuktiprasiddhatāyāṃ ca svatantraṃ sādhanam bhavet/*

¹⁸ Cf. TS 3603ab: *atrāpy āhur bhavaty evaṃ, kiṃ dṛṣṭo 'sau tvayā vadan/*

¹⁹ Cf. TS 3603cd, 3605: *prasaṅgasādhanenedam anīṣṭam codyate yadi// ... yady evam, īdṛśo nyāyah prasiddho nyāyavādinām/ prasaṅgasādhane dharmah śraddhāmātrāt parair matah//*

moment, the reason-property, speakerhood, is not established in the subject, the Buddha.

In light of the above, Kumāṛila might give the following criticism: “If that is the case, then when the Buddha speaks, he speaks in the state of conceptualization. Therefore, the Buddhist scriptures would not have been composed by an omniscient being, i.e., a person who is in the state of cognizing everything.” But this criticism misses an important point: the Buddha’s teaching, even though it occurs through conceptualization, is based on his cognition of everything.

3362. And it is not appropriate to say that if so, it is composed by a non-omniscient being, because it is indirectly based on his omniscience. Because of this, its consistency [with other means of valid cognition] is possible.

3363. It is just like a person who has experienced heat and then speaks of it. There is no betrayal of reality based on the [statement], [which] arose from his direct experience of that object.²⁰

It is true that the Buddha spoke on the basis of conceptualization, but the content of his conceptual cognition is based on his preceding cognition of everything, so what he said is valid. It is the same as when one experiences heat and then later verbalizes it. His statement is a means of valid cognition and one will not be deceived by acting on it. Summarizing the above discussion, Śāntarākṣita puts it as follows:

3364. Hence, at the moment of omniscience, this reason is not established [in the subject]. On the other hand, at the moment when the utterance occurs, [the reason] would [fall into the fault of] proving the proven. (It is accepted that he is not cognizing all at the moment when he speaks.)

The discussion can be summarized in the following table:

§1. The omniscient Buddha speaks based on conceptualization.	
§1.2. When he is meditating (and cognizing everything),	§1.1. When he is speaking,
he is not speaking. (The reason is unestablished in the subject.)	he is not cognizing everything. (Kumāṛila is proving the proven.)

In the above discussion, omniscience was interpreted strictly as the active state of being aware of everything. However, it can also be interpreted as the ability to cognize everything, which is more often the case. In other words, Kumāṛila’s argument can be interpreted as an argument that the Buddha, as a speaker, does not have the capacity to cognize everything.

3365. Even if you try to deny [the *potency* of his omniscience and not the active state of cognizing everything, i.e.,] his ability to cognize all entities, [the fault of the reason-property] that its absence [in the dissimilar examples, i.e., omniscient beings,] is dubious remains intact.

²⁰ I do not follow Kamalaśīla’s interpretation that *tasmāt* and *tadarthānubhavodbhavāt* are *vyadhikaraṇa*. (According to his interpretation, the verse can be translated as follows: “There is no betrayal of reality based on the [statement], because [his conceptual cognition] arose from his direct experience of that object.”) Śāntarākṣita most probably intends them as *samānādhikaraṇa*, as confirmed by the parallel passage in TS 3594ab quoted above.

However, even so, the negative concomitance (*vyatireka*) of the reason is questionable, since it is not certain that a person who is capable of cognizing everything, never speaks. That is, a counterexample in which speakerhood is in the omniscient—that an omniscient being speaks—is possible. Kumārila cannot deny its possibility with certainty.

As with omniscience, speakerhood can also be interpreted as the ability to speak. In other words, Kumārila’s criticism can be interpreted as an argument that someone that has the ability to speak cannot be omniscient.

3366. The same fault that its absence [in the dissimilar examples] is dubious persists even if you admit that the ability to speak [and not the active state of speaking], is the reason [to refute his omniscience].

In that case, the flaw is the same. The discussion in TS 3365-66 can be organized as follows:

	3366. Ability to speak (for a person in meditation)	3365. Ability to cognize everything (for a person who is speaking)
Kumārila	An omniscient being never has the ability to speak.	A person who can cognize everything never speaks.
Śāntarakṣita	Not necessarily so.	Not necessarily so.

In the above, the ordinary form of teaching was assumed by Śāntarakṣita. In what follows, he assumes a supernatural form of teaching. In other words, in the meditative state of non-conceptuality, his teachings come out spontaneously (even out of a wall, etc.). In this case, the engine of automatic preaching is the merit and wisdom that the Buddha has accumulated in the past. This can be likened to a disc that keeps spinning due to its continual momentum.

3367-68ab. [Some] wise [Buddhists]²¹ claim this: In the [same] way that a disk keeps turning, even if the savior (i.e. the teacher²²) has no conceptualization, his teaching occurs based on the power of the continual momentum of his [preceding] accumulations [of merit and wisdom]. For them too, [the reason property, i.e., speakerhood,] is not established [in the subject], [because the Buddha never “speaks” in the primary sense of the word.]

In this case, of course, the Buddha is not speaking, so he is not a speaker. In other words,

²¹ Kamalaśīla specifies these Buddhists as certain Vijñānavādins. TSP ad 3368ab: *iti sudhiyaḥ saugatāḥ kecana vijñānavādināḥ*. However, it is not clear whether *kecana* mentioned by Kamalaśīla relates to the *saugatāḥ* mentioned before or to *vijñānavādināḥ* mentioned later. However, considering that Śāntarakṣita’s *sudhiyaḥ* is construed by Kamalaśīla as referring to *saugatāḥ*, as seen in TS 3307 and TS 3591, it is safe to assume that *kecana* here is related to the later *vijñānavādināḥ*. Kamalaśīla’s intention in identifying the Buddhists here as certain Vijñānavādins is that he anticipates in his interpretation of TS 3368d that speakerhood in the literal sense of the word is not possible in the doctrine of consciousness-only that denies the external world. Kamalaśīla thinks that according to this doctrine there is no speaker in the outside world. However, I don’t think that Śāntarakṣita had in mind the doctrine of consciousness-only, as Kamalaśīla construes. Rather I think that Śāntarakṣita intended that the agent of supernatural teaching can also be regarded secondarily by the world as “a speaker.” It is difficult to read the doctrine of consciousness-only into the expression “determination-based speakerhood accepted by people” (TS 3368cd: *vaktṛtvaṃ ... lokena matam ādhyavasāyikam*).

²² Cf. PV II 145ab (Vetter 1990: 52): *tāyaḥ svadṛṣṭamārgoktir*.

speakerhood is not established in the subject.

The previous argument is a strict interpretation of speakerhood. However, it is possible to consider speakerhood more loosely. In other words, it is common for people to regard the Buddha in a meditative state as “a speaker,” even if his teachings flowed spontaneously out of a wall, etc., due to his past accumulation of merit and wisdom.

3368cd-3369ab. If, on the other hand, the [so-called] publicly accepted “speakerhood” assumed on the basis of [erroneous] determination is what it is (cf. TS 3366b: *hetutvenāpi sammate*), [i.e., what you intended as the reason “speakerhood,”] the reason is flawed in that its absence [in the dissimilar examples, i.e., omniscient beings,] is dubious.²³

Even if we admit that the subject, i.e., the meditating Buddha, has “speakerhood” in the secondary sense, this speakerhood does not negate his omniscience. This is because, as we saw above, we cannot deny the possibility that a dissimilar example, i.e., an omniscient being, might have “speakerhood” in this sense.

In response to this nonsensical view of the Buddhists, Śāntarakṣita’s opponent, the Mīmāṃsaka, asks why the reason-property, i.e., speakerhood, is unestablished in the subject.

3369ab. [Mīmāṃsaka:] How can the reason, [i.e., speakerhood,] be unestablished [in the subject] in this irrational view [of the Buddhists]?²⁴ (You should explain why the reason is unestablished in the subject.)

In response to the criticism of irrationality, Śāntarakṣita makes it clear that the Buddhist view is not irrational. He distinguishes between two cases: 1. one in which speakerhood is an independent reason of the argument, i.e., a reason that is well-founded and accepted by both parties; 2. and the other in which speakerhood leads to an undesirable consequence, i.e., a reason that only one party accepts without evidence other than its own scriptures.

3370. Answer. If speakerhood is intended as an independent argumentative reason [accepted by both sides], then it is either unestablished [in the subject] or its absence [in the dissimilar examples] is dubious, [as clarified before in TS 3368ab and TS 3369ab respectively].

3371ab. Also, since this fact [that the Buddha is a speaker] is [unconfirmed and therefore] doubtful, it is certain that the reason is unestablished [in the subject] because it is doubtful.

Speakerhood in the usual sense that both sides recognize, that is, speakerhood with conceptualization, has no locus to which it belongs in this position. In other words, the substratum of the reason-property is unestablished, and therefore the reason is defective because it is classified as *āśrayāsiddha*, a reason-property whose substratum is unestablished. Or, at least, it is doubtful that the Buddha had this kind of speakerhood. It is impossible to

²³ In other words, even if it is admitted that the Buddha “speaks” in the figurative sense of the word, the reason “speakerhood” is still defective inasmuch as it is inconclusive with respect to its target “not being omniscient,” because co-absence of these two relata is dubious. For a counterexample, i.e., an omniscient being who “speaks,” is possible.

²⁴ According to Kamalaśīla, the intention of this opponent is the following: It is unfair that the Buddhists point out the failure of Kumāṛila’s reason “speakerhood” based on their biased and partial position, i.e., the nonsensical theory of consciousness-only.

confirm, because we have not actually seen the Buddha speak in the past. Therefore, the reason-property is unestablished because it is doubtful (*saṃdigdhāsiddha*).

Next, Śāntarakṣita assumes that the reason, speakerhood, is presented as a reason for an undesirable consequence.

3371cd. Therefore, you have no choice but to state this [property] as a reason that leads to an undesirable consequence, [i.e., reductio ad absurdum].

3372. And the property to be pointed out there [in reductio ad absurdum] is the one established only by the scriptures [of the opponents], and for which there is no other evidence to establish its existence. (But the speakerhood that we Buddhists accept, i.e., speakerhood with conceptualization, is not so²⁵; it is well-based on evidence.²⁶)

The reason that a disputant should point out as a reason for an undesirable consequence is the reason that his opponent brings up without evidence. In other words, speakerhood has to be a property that is claimed by the Buddhists on the basis of the Buddhist scriptures alone. It has to be a property that has no evidence to support it. In this case, however, the reason-property, i.e., speakerhood without conceptualization, is well-founded on reason (*yukti*) and therefore is not a property that is claimed on the basis of the Buddhist scriptures alone. In other words, speaking without opening one's mouth is by no means a fantasy that only Buddhists believe in. Thus, the Mīmāṃsaka's attempt to point to speakerhood as the reason for an undesirable consequence does not work for the Buddhists. Śāntarakṣita's argument can be summarized in the following table:

	<i>vakṛtva</i> should be	But in the case of <i>avikalpe tāyini</i> it is
<i>svatantrasādhana</i>	<i>ubhayaniścita</i> (* <i>savikalpa-vakṛtva</i>)	<i>āśrayāsiddha</i> , or <i>saṃdigdhāsiddha</i>
<i>prasaṅgasādhana</i>	<i>āgamamātrasiddha</i> (* <i>nirvikalpa-vakṛtva</i>)	<i>asiddha</i> (* <i>nāgamamātreṇa siddham</i>)

Reasons in independent argumentation (*svatantrasādhana*) need to be approved of by both parties (*ubhayaniścita*). That is, in this case, speakerhood with conceptualization. However, as already mentioned above, such a reason-property is unestablished in the Buddha who is claimed to be in this position. This is because either the substratum to which the reason-property belongs does not exist in the first place, or we cannot be sure that the Buddha had such a property.

On the other hand, if the Mīmāṃsaka intends to point out a reason-property that has an undesirable consequence, that reason-property must be asserted by his Buddhist opponent without any basis other than the Buddhist scriptures. But speakerhood without conceptualization is well-founded outside of the Buddhist scriptures. Therefore, in this case too, speakerhood is unestablished in the subject.

In the following verse, TS 3373, Śāntarakṣita sums up the series of discussions of *jñeyatva*, *sattva*, and *vakṛtva* and says:

3373. Who would not postulate this [omniscient being] if [reasons], such as “being an object of a cognition,” “being a real entity,” “being existent,” are incapable of denying

²⁵ Cf. TSP ad 3372 (1071,18): *na ca vakṛtvaṃ parasyāgamamātreṇa prasiddham*.

²⁶ Cf. TS 3606: *yuktiprasiddhatāyāṃ ca svatantraṃ sādhanam bhavet/ īdṛśaś ca pareṇeṣṭa tatpraṇītaḥ sa āgamah//*.

him in this way?

Needless to say, this verse is a parody of the original verse of Kumāṛila as shown below:

BṬ=TS 3156 (<i>pūrvapakṣa</i>)	TS 3373 (<i>uttarapakṣa</i>)
yasya jñeyaprameyatva- vastusattvādīlakṣaṇāḥ/ nihantūṃ hetavaḥ śaktāḥ ko nu taṃ kalpayiṣyati//	evaṃ yasya prameyatva- vastusattādīlakṣaṇāḥ/ nihantūṃ hetavo 'śaktāḥ ko na taṃ kalpayiṣyati//

6. Summary of the argument in Material I

The following is a summary of Śāntarakṣita's argument in TS 3358-72. (Ś: Śāntarakṣita; M: Mīmāṃsaka)

0. M: The Buddha cannot be omniscient, because he speaks, based on conceptualization.
1. Ś: In the Buddhist position which acknowledges the ordinary oral form of teaching with conceptualization,
 - 1.1. it is accepted that he is not cognizing everything when he is speaking.
 - 1.2. The reason property, speakerhood, is unestablished in the Buddha in the meditative state of cognizing everything.
 - 1.3. The Buddha's teaching, although based on conceptual cognition, is valid, because it is indirectly based on his direct cognition of everything.
 - 1.4. Thus, the reason is defective either as proving the proven or being unestablished.
 - 1.5. Even if we take potentiality into account, the negative invariable concomitance between speakerhood and non-omniscience remains dubious.
2. Ś: In the Buddhist position which acknowledges the extraordinary form of teaching without conceptualization,
 - 2.1. the reason-property, speakerhood, is unestablished in the Buddha.
 - 2.2. You cannot deny that an omniscient being could have taught in this extraordinary way.
 - 2.3. M: Why is the reason unestablished?
 - 2.4. Ś: What is the intended speakership, *svatantrasādhana* or *prasaṅgasādhana*?
 - 2.4.1: There is no such Buddha who possesses the speakerhood with conceptualization that both parties acknowledge, or at least it is doubtful that he ever did, since it is impossible to verify.
 - 2.4.2. The speakerhood without conceptualization that you are trying to point out as leading to an undesirable consequence for Buddhists is not unfounded. Therefore, it is wrong to point it out in *reductio ad absurdum*.

7. Conclusion

1. TS 3358-72, a series of verses by Śāntarakṣita, is a response to the BṬ verse of Kumāṛila, cited as TS 3156. The latter has a parallel verse, ŚV *Codanā* 132.
2. ŚV *Codanā* 132 was originally situated in the context of Kumāṛila's critique of analogical reasoning about testimony as presented by Dignāga, but in the BṬ it is reused in a very different context.
3. Keeping in mind the issue of speakerhood discussed later in the TS (3237-45, 3592-3620), Śāntarakṣita reads speakerhood into the "etc." of the BṬ verse (TS 3156). He then develops an argument that anticipates the later discussion.
4. Śāntarakṣita's opponent, the Mīmāṃsaka, formulates the argument that "the Buddha is not omniscient, because he is a speaker."
5. Śāntarakṣita makes a distinction between two forms of teaching by the Buddha: teaching

- with conceptualization and teaching without conceptualization.
6. The reason-property presented by the opponent, speakership, is flawed either as *siddhasādhya*, *asiddha*, *āśrayāsiddha*, *saṃdigdhāsiddha*, or *saṃdigdhavyatirekin*.
 7. In terms of the ordinary form of oral teaching, the Buddhists agree that the Buddha, who is in the meditative state and cognizing everything, does not speak. On the other hand, what the Buddha said with conceptualization when he came out of meditation is valid.
 8. In terms of the extraordinary form of spontaneous teaching by the Buddha, one cannot deny the possibility that there is a supernatural form of teaching in which the teachings flow out without any action on his part. This form of teaching is not a one-sided assertion based solely on the Buddhist scriptures, but can be justified rationally. That is, it can be explained by the Buddha's accumulated merit and wisdom in the past, like the rotation of a disk.
 9. Speakerhood is an inadequate reason for arguing for non-omniscience, whether we think of it as an independent reason (*svatantrasādhana*) approved of by both parties, or as a reason approved of by only one, leading to an undesirable consequence (*prasaṅga-sādhana*).

Abbreviations and Bibliography

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- TS(P) *Tattvasaṃgraha*(*pañjikā*). *Tattvasaṃgraha of Ācārya Śāntarakṣita with the Commentary Pañjikā of Shri Kamalashīla*. Ed. Dvārikadāsa Śāstrī. 2 vols. Varanasi: Baudha Bharati, 1981, 1982. (Second edition) [Corrections not otherwise noted are based on the edition by Sato 2021.]
- PV II *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*. See Vetter 1990.
- BṚ *Bṛhaṭṭikā* (quoted in TS)
- ŚV For *Codanā* chapter, see Kataoka 2011a: I.

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