

Ernst Prets (ed.)

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QUOTATIONS, PARAPHRASES AND
ALLUSIONS IN TEXTS ON INDIAN PHILOSOPHY



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Ernst Prets (ed.)

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Adarśanamātra and *utprekṣā*: A study of a *Bṛhaṭṭikā* fragment*

Kei Kataoka

1. The aim of this article

The main objective of this article is to position a fragment from Kumāṛila's *Bṛhaṭṭikā* (BT) within the history of Indian philosophy. This will be done by means of a theoretical comparison with the Buddhist logic and epistemology of Dignāga, Īśvarasena and Dharmakīrti.¹ First, the context of the verse in the lost *Bṛhaṭṭikā* will be clarified through an examination of the corresponding section of the *Ślokavārttika* (ŚV). Secondly, the ideas upon which this verse is based will be investigated. To do this, the author will compare it to the Buddhist theories of *vyāpti*, *apoha* and *hetu*, familiar due to discussions over the years by a number of excellent scholars, including Steinkellner,² Katsura³ and Pind.⁴ Each of these notions will then be reviewed from the perspective of mere non-experience, *adarśanamātra*, as well as with regard to other relevant ideas discussed by Kumāṛila, in particular nonexistence, omniscience and validity.

* Based on a paper read at the international symposium “Transmission and Tradition: The Meaning and the Role of ‘Fragments’ in Indian Philosophy” held at Shinshu University, Matsumoto, August 20–24, 2012. I would like to thank Alex Watson and Peter Sahota for their comments.

¹ For the approximate dates of Indian authors, see Frauwallner 1961.

² Steinkellner 1966, 1997.

³ Katsura 1984, 1986, 1992.

⁴ Pind 1999, 2009, 2011.

2. The context of Kumārila's *utprekṣā* verse

In the *Tattvasaṅgraha* (TS) Śāntaraksita quotes quite extensively from Kumārila's lost work, the *Bṛhaṭṭikā*.⁵ The *svataḥprāmāṇyaparīkṣā* chapter contains a number of *Bṛhaṭṭikā* verses.⁶ How Kumārila's two works, i.e. ŚV *codanā* and BṬ (quoted in TS) on *svataḥprāmāṇya*, correspond to one another has been illustrated in Kataoka 2011: II 283 as follows:

<i>Ślokavārttika</i> 47–88	<i>Tattvasaṅgraha</i> 2846–2918
1. <i>jñānasya prāmāṇyam</i>	1. <i>jñānasya prāmāṇyam</i>
1.1. <i>svataḥ prāmāṇyam</i>	1.1. <i>svataḥ prāmāṇyam</i>
1.1.1. <i>svataḥ</i> 47–48	1.1.1. <i>svataḥ</i> (2811ab, 2812–15) 2846–50
1.1.2. <i>guṇajñānānavasthā</i> 49–52	1.1.2. <i>anavasthā</i> 2851
	1.1.2.1. <i>saṃgatijñānānavasthā</i> 2852–54
	1.1.2.2. <i>guṇajñānānavasthā</i> 2855–57
	1.1.2.3. <i>svatastvāvaśyakatā</i> 2858–60
1.1.3. <i>upasaṃhāraḥ</i> 53	1.1.3. <i>upasaṃhāraḥ</i> 2861
1.2. <i>parato 'prāmāṇyam</i> 54–61	1.2. <i>parato 'prāmāṇyam</i> 2862–84
2. <i>vedasya prāmāṇyam</i>	2. <i>vedasya prāmāṇyam</i>
2.1. <i>svamatopanyāsaḥ</i> 62–67	2.1. <i>svamatopanyāsaḥ</i> 2885–93
2.2. <i>āptapraṇītātvaṃ</i> 68–70	2.2. <i>āptapraṇītātvaṃ</i> 2894–95
2.3. <i>saṃgatīḥ</i>	2.3. <i>saṃgatīḥ</i>
2.3.1. <i>codanā</i> 71–72	2.3.1. <i>codanā</i> 2896
2.3.2. <i>na saṃgatitāḥ prāmāṇyam</i> 73f.	2.3.2. <i>na saṃgatitāḥ prāmāṇyam</i> 2897f.
2.3.3. <i>saṃgatijñānānavasthā</i> 75–76	(→ moved to 1.1.2.1?)
2.3.4. <i>śrotradhīvat</i> 77–79	2.3.4. <i>śrotradhīvat</i> 2899–2903
2.3.5. <i>pramāṇalakṣaṇam</i> 80	2.3.5. <i>pramāṇalakṣaṇam</i> 2904
2.3.6. <i>upasaṃhāraḥ</i> 81	2.3.6. <i>upasaṃhāraḥ</i> 2905–07
3. <i>pramāṇetaratvaniścayaḥ</i> 82–88	3. <i>pramāṇetaratvaniścayaḥ</i> 2908–18

TS 2871, which begins with the word *utprekṣeta* and thus in the following will be called the *utprekṣā* verse, is located in the section discussing *parato*

⁵ For Kumārila's lost *Bṛhaṭṭikā*, see Frauwallner 1962.

⁶ For general problems concerning the *Bṛhaṭṭikā*, see Kataoka 2011: II 25ff.

'prāmāṇyam, extrinsic invalidity.⁷ The detailed correspondence between ŚV and TS in this section has been shown in Kataoka 2011: II 260 as follows:

	ŚV	TS
<i>aprāmāṇyatraividhyam</i>	54-55	
<i>anavasthābhāvaḥ</i>	56	2862-64
<i>bādhakajñānam</i>	57	2865
<i>kāraṇadoṣajñānam</i>	58	
<i>apavādāśaṅkā</i>	59-61	2866-84

As can be seen from this chart, the *utprekṣā* verse belongs to the section discussing *apavādāśaṅkā*, the suspicion that the innate validity of a cognition could be cancelled. An additional, more detailed correspondence has been presented in Kataoka 2011: II 269:

<i>Ślokavārttika</i> 59–61	<i>Tattvasaṅgraha</i> 2866–84
<i>bādhakabādhakam</i> 59	<i>bādhakabādhakam</i> 2866–69
<i>āśaṅkānupapattiḥ</i> 60	<i>āśaṅkānupapattiḥ</i> 2870–74
	<i>apavādāvadhiḥ</i> 2875–80
<i>anavasthābhāvaḥ</i> 61	<i>anavasthābhāvaḥ</i> 2881–84

A summary of vv. 59-61 is given in Kataoka 2011: II 128-129 as follows: “Having explained the simplest case of invalidation (*bādhā*), Kumārila in vv. 59-61 reflects upon a more complicated case, i.e. the possibility of invalidating invalidation. In fact this problem is inevitable for the Mīmāṃsā view of intrinsic validity. A cognition, including one that invalidates a previous, erroneous cognition, might turn out to be false in the future. Thus, the danger would always exist that a cognition, either the confirmative cognition of an object or the negative invalidation of a previous cognition, might be false. Then there would be no final determination of the cognition.”

Kumārila explains that an invalidating cognition² is valid unless another invalidating cognition³ occurs (v. 59ab). If this occurs, the second cognition² is false and therefore the first cognition¹ is revived as being valid (v. 59cd). But even in this case, the validity of the first cognition¹ is not “proved” by

⁷ The verse is also quoted in HBT 217,10-11, PVA 597,29, JNĀ 162,20-21, RNĀ 38,17-18, 105,19-20, PKM 157,10-11, TBV 8,14-15, VK 198,15-16. See Kataoka 2011: I 15 for variants. (For the abbreviations, see the bibliography in Kataoka 2011: I.)

the third cognition³. The first is valid in and of itself because its causes are not known to be defective (v. 60ab).

One might believe that a cognition can always be suspected of being false, just as the first and second cognitions in this process of invalidation were shown to be. But, according to Kumārila in v. 60cd, unless one has a cognition that the causes are defective, one's suspicions are unjustified. In this way, there is no danger of an endless chain of invalidation. Three or four cognitions are enough. Then the initial cognition "enjoys" (*aśnute*, literally "eats") its intrinsic validity (v. 61).

Here in the *Brhaṭṭikā*, three verses (59–61) from the *Ślokavārttika* are expanded to nineteen verses (2866–84). This expansion indicates that Kumārila felt it necessary to defend his (apparently optimistic) view of intrinsic validity, which can be easily criticized by sceptics claiming that any cognition could be shown invalid in the future.

As the above chart shows, the *utprekṣā* verse (TS 2871) belongs to the *āśaṅkānupapattiḥ* section, which discusses the inappropriateness of a baseless doubt.⁸ This section, i.e. TS 2870–74, corresponds to ŚV *codanā* 60. A general comparison between the two corresponding portions reveals that when composing the *Brhaṭṭikā*, Kumārila has expanded on the single ŚV verse to a considerable degree.⁹ Nonetheless, the basic idea remains the

⁸ Cf. a remark in Kataoka 2011: II 129, n. 85: "In this section of the *Ślokavārttika* dealing with the endless chain of invalidation (vv. 59–61), Kumārila's argument is too brief to convince a sceptic. Therefore, in the corresponding section of the *Brhaṭṭikā* (quoted in the *Tattvasaṅgraha* vv. 2866–84), Kumārila discusses this in more detail. There, instead of 'three or four cognitions', he concludes that three cognitions are enough (*Tattvasaṅgraha* v. 2870). Also, from the practical *vyavahāra* viewpoint, Kumārila criticizes the sceptic's attitude as destructive (*Tattvasaṅgraha* v. 2871): such a sceptic will go to destruction (*kṣayaṃ vrajet*), being full of suspicion (*saṁśayātmā*) in all activities (*sarvavyavahāreṣu*)."

⁹ ŚV *codanā* 60 (Kataoka 2011: I 15):

svata eva hi tatrāpi doṣajñānāt pramāṇatā /
doṣajñāne tv anutpanne nāśaṅkā niṣpramāṇikā //
 TS 2870–74 (see Kataoka 2011: I 15 for variants in 2870–71):
evam parīkṣakajñānatritayaṃ nātivartate /
tataś cājātabādhena nāśaṅkyaṃ bādhakaṃ punaḥ //2870//
utprekṣeta hi yo mohād ajātam api bādhakam /
sa sarvavyavahāreṣu saṁśayātmā kṣayaṃ vrajet //2871//
tathā ca vāsudevena ninditā saṁśayātmā /
nāyam loko 'sti kaunteya na paraḥ saṁśayātmanaḥ //2872//
yāvān evāpavādo 'to yatra sambhāvyate matau /

same: one should not have unwarranted suspicions regarding invalidation. Therefore, this set of verses can be classified as the second type of *Bṛhaṭṭikā* verses,¹⁰ described in Kataoka 2011: II 39–40, i.e. verses that involve detailed explanations and elaborations. Kataoka 2011: II 42 explains this type of verse as follows: “When dealing with a subject in the same way or a similar manner, in the *Bṛhaṭṭikā* we find, in terms of quantity, more verses than in the *Ślokavārttika*. Also, in terms of quality the *Bṛhaṭṭikā* contains more detailed explanations, discussing the same matter with more examples and more sarcastic expressions. Nevertheless, the main track of the argument is still the same.”

3. Theoretical background

3.1. Non-perception or non-experience in epistemology

According to the epistemological theory of Kumārila, X does not exist if none of the five affirmative *pramāṇas* (*pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *śabda*, *upamāna* and *arthāpatti*) attests to its existence. This is Kumārila’s view of *abhāva*, i.e. *pramāṇābhāva* (absence of a means of valid cognition).¹¹ In the Mīmāṃsā tradition this theory can be traced back at least to the Vṛttikāra quoted in the

*anviṣṭe ’nupajāte ca tāvaty eva tadātmani //2873//
kadācit syād apīty evaṃ na bhūyas tatra vastuni /
utprekṣamāṇaiḥ sthātavyam ātmakāmaiḥ pramāṭṛbhiḥ //2874//*

One should also note that *doṣajñāna* is replaced in the *Bṛhaṭṭikā* with *bādha(ka)*. In other words, in the *Bṛhaṭṭikā*, Kumārila does not explain the *kāraṇadoṣajñānabādhyā* type of erroneous cognition in this context. There are two types of erroneous cognition. One is invalidated by *hetūthadoṣajñāna* and the other by *arthānyathātvajñāna*. An invalidating cognition, *arthānyathātvajñāna*, is called *bādha(ka)* in the narrower sense, whereas the general notion which covers both *hetūthadoṣajñāna* and *arthānyathātvajñāna* is also called *bādha(ka)* in the broad sense. Here it seems that Kumārila uses the term *bādha* in the narrower sense. But probably through *upalakṣaṇa* he intends both types of invalidation. This is hinted by the word *ubhayaor api* in the concluding verse, TS 2884. Cf. Kataoka 2011: II 270, n.239 and 271, n.240, which point out that the word *doṣajñānāt* and *doṣajñāna* in 60 should be interpreted as *upalakṣaṇas* that also imply *arthānyathātvajñāna* and *bādhadhī*, respectively.

¹⁰ The first type, on the other hand, is described by Kataoka 2011: II 39 as “verses identical or similar to those in the *Ślokavārttika*.”

¹¹ For Kumārila’s notion of *abhāva*, see Kellner 1997.

Śābarabhāṣya.¹² Buddhist theoreticians before Dharmakīrti hold a similar empirical view: X does not exist if X has not been perceived. Īśvarasena posits non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) as an independent *pramāṇa* and holds that mere non-perception of X attests to the absence of X.¹³

3.2. Non-perception in the theory of truth

Kumārila applies the theory of non-experience to his theory of the invalidity of cognition, and states that a cause of invalidation, such as a defect (*doṣa*) in the sense organs, does not exist if it is not found. Unless we find defects in the causes of a cognition, or unless we later experience that it is false,¹⁴ the cognition is valid in and of itself. Insofar as we do not find any defect and have not been confronted by its falseness, the innate validity of a cognition is not cancelled. Therefore he states:

doṣajñāne tv anutpanne nāśaṅkā niṣpramāṇikā // ŚV codanā 60cd

However, if a cognition of a defect does not arise, [one should] not have a doubt for which there is no means of valid cognition.¹⁵

One could worry endlessly that a cognition might turn out to be false. But this attitude is not justified. If we do not find a problem, there is no problem. We should not worry unnecessarily about the possibility of future falsification. Such fear is baseless, having no support from a means of valid cognition (*āśaṅkā niṣpramāṇikā*). The same idea is expressed in BṬ as follows:

*utprekṣeta hi yo mohād ajātam api bādhakam /
sa sarvavyavahāreṣu saṁśayātmā kṣayaṃ vrajet // TS 2871 (quote from BṬ)*

For a person who, because of delusion, [always] suspects an invalidating [cognition] even though it has not arisen, being full of suspicion in all activities, will go to destruction.¹⁶

¹² Frauwallner 1968: 32,9: *abhāvo 'pi pramāṇābhāvo nāstīty asyārthasyāsaṁnikṛṣṭasya*.

¹³ For Īśvarasena's theory of *anupalabdhi*, see Steinkellner 1966.

¹⁴ ŚV *codanā* 59ab: *tatra doṣāntarajñānaṃ bādhadhīr vā parā na cet /*

¹⁵ Cf. the translation in Kataoka 2011: II 270-271.

¹⁶ Cf. the translation in Kataoka 2011: II 271, n.241.

It is neither realistic nor practically justifiable to imagine unreal falsification.¹⁷ At some point a sceptic should stop doubting.¹⁸ Otherwise such a person will be destroyed.

3.3. Non-perception in establishing invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*)

As reconstructed from Dharmakīrti's criticism of Īśvarasena's theory of non-perception, Īśvarasena holds the view that the invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) between fire and smoke is established merely because a counter-example (or the reason's being in the dissimilar example), smoke without fire (or smoke in a lake, or the like), has never been experienced. Non-experience (*adarśana*) establishes the necessary connection between the two. In other words, it is the experience of *vyatireka* (*asattve 'sattvam*) that establishes *vyāpti*.¹⁹ So far we have never seen smoke without fire. This experience of negative concomitance, i.e. the non-experience of a deviation, guarantees the invariable concomitance. Īśvarasena's view of non-perception can be traced back to Dignāga,²⁰ who also regards non-perception (*adarśana*) as sufficient for establishing invariable concomitance.²¹

¹⁷ Kumāṛila (TS 2881–82) compares the process to that of a legal trial regarding a debt, etc. (*ṛṇādivyavahāra*), in which a complaint is first made by the plaintiff (*pūrvavādin*), followed by a statement of the defendant (*pratyardhin*) and then a counter-statement of the plaintiff. A decision (*nirṇaya*) is delivered after these three claims for fear that otherwise an infinite regress (*anavasthābhayāt*) will occur. Cf. also Katsura 1998: 315–317, where the similarity between Indian logic and Toulmin's model of argumentation is pointed out.

¹⁸ In *Ślokaṣvarttika codanā* 61 Kumāṛila states that three or four cognitions (*tricitratva-jñāna*) are the limit of the reversal of validity and invalidity, whereas in the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* he insists on only three. TS 2870:

*evam parīkṣakajñānatritayam nātivartate /
tataś cājātabādhena nāśaṅkyaṃ bādhakam punaḥ //*

¹⁹ For Dignāga's understanding of *asapakṣe 'sattvam* (PSV ad II 5d: *asaty eva nāstiti nānyatra na viruddhe*), see Lasic 2009a and Kitagawa 1965: 180–182, 258–260.

²⁰ Cf. Katsura 1992: 223: "In this paper I would like to demonstrate that Īśvarasena's theory of 'non-perception', discovered by Steinkellner, can be traced back to Dignāga at least in part, ..."

²¹ Kumāṛila explains Dignāga's view in ŚV *anumāna* 131cd-132 (India Office Manuscript, San Ms I.O. 3739, 37v16–17):

aśeṣāpekṣitatvāc ca saukaryāc cāpy adarśanāt //

According to Dharmakīrti, however, one cannot claim that X does not exist just because it has not been seen.²² Mere non-perception does not attest to its absence. X may exist somewhere although no one has seen it. Mere non-perception (*anupalabdhimātra*) or mere absence of experience (*adr̥ṣṭimātra*) does not prove the absence of a counter-example.²³ The necessity (*niyama*) of the relationship between fire and smoke, in which smoke never exists without fire (*avinābhāva*), cannot be established through non-experience (PV I 31d: *adarśanān na*).²⁴ Mere non-experience does not prove

sādhanaṃ yady apīṣṭo 'tra vyatireko 'numāṃ prati /
tāvatā na hy anaṅgaḥ syād* yuktiḥ śābde 'bhidhāsyate* //*

*sādhanaṃ] ms.; sādhanē ed. *anaṅgaḥ syād] ms.; anaṅgatvaṃ ed. *'bhidhāsyate] ms.;
hi vakṣyate ed.

“Although among these [i.e. positive concomitance and negative concomitance] the negative concomitance is accepted as a means for inference because all [instances] are required and because it is possible [to cover all instances] by means of non-perception, this is not at all sufficient for proving that the positive concomitance is not the factor. The reason will be stated in the chapter dealing with verbal cognition [in particular ŚV *apoha* 75].”

See also Katsura 1986: 52–60 for Dignāga’s predecessor, Vasubandhu, from whom Dignāga has inherited the notion of *nāntarīyaka* and *avinābhāva*. Cf. also Katsura 2004: 163: “However, he also maintains that when two examples are to be formulated, a similar example shows the reason’s mere presence in a set of similar instances, while a dissimilar example shows a pervasion (*vyāpti*) in the form of the reason’s absence in the absence of the property to be proved.”

²² Interestingly, Dignāga criticizes his opponents, whom he alleges use the reasoning of mere non-perception. PSV ad II 3: *yady adarśanamātreṇa dr̥ṣṭebhyaḥ pratiṣedhaḥ kriyate, na ca so 'pi yuktaḥ*. (I would like to thank Horst Lasic for the reference to this source.) See Lasic 2009b: 529–530 for the context. PSV ad III 46a (Sāṃkhya): *na cāyonipūrvakeṣv ekajātyanvayādarśanamātreṇa tadviparyayaprasaṅgo yujyate*. (Tib: K [P144a4–6], V [D56b1–3, P60a4–5]) (A summary delivered by Toshikazu Watanabe at the Indogaku Bukkyo Gakkai conference, Tsurumi University, on July 1, 2012. See also his paper in the present volume.)

²³ Cf. Katsura 2004: 145: “This suggests that Dignāga’s statement of pervasion does not necessarily imply a universal law but rather assumes a general law derived from our observations or experiences”; Katsura [2004: 148]: “Considering Dignāga’s allusion to *anvaya* and *vyatireka* in PSV chapter 5, I am inclined to think that he proposed *vyāpti* or a general law solely on the basis of the fact that no counter-example is observed (*adarśanamātreṇa*) in the domain of dissimilar examples.” See also Tanizawa 2007 for induction and deduction in Indian logic.

²⁴ For Dharmakīrti’s criticism of Īśvarasena, see Steinkellner 1997.

that negative concomitance is *necessarily* the case. Dharmakīrti designates this kind of empirical, probabilistic inference as *śeṣavad anumānam*.²⁵ One cannot claim with certainty that all the rice in a pot is cooked just because most of it is cooked, for deviation is conceivable.²⁶

3.4. Non-perception of an omniscient being

As is clear from Dharmakīrti's application of the critical device *vipakṣe 'dṛṣṭimātreṇa* (PV I 12), "just because a reason has never been seen in a dissimilar example", to the argument concerning the Buddha, Dharmakīrti thinks that a similar empirical attitude is shared by Kumāṛila too. Kumāṛila tries to prove that the Buddha is not free of desire, etc., because the Buddha speaks (ŚV *codanā* 137).²⁷ Kumāṛila resorts to non-experience. In other words, it has never been seen that someone free of desire, etc., speaks. This empirical attitude can be justified in the Mīmāṃsā system at least, because in the absence of the five affirmative *pramāṇas* (*pramāṇābhāva*), the absence of such a person is attested. According to Dharmakīrti, however, there may be an exceptional case in which a person speaks without any desire. Limited experience guarantees nothing. One cannot claim that such an exceptional person, i.e. an omniscient being free of desire, does not exist just because such a person has never been seen: experience is limited. Indeed, as Dharmakīrti shows in PV II, such an exception is possible.²⁸

3.5. Non-perception in *apoha* semantics

Dharmakīrti's criticism of non-perception directly attacks Īśvarasena and his empirical attitude regarding inference. At the same time, it indirectly

²⁵ PV I 14.

²⁶ PV I 13. Cf. also Katsura 1986: 42. For a similar example, see HBT 207.20–22, which mentions salty water, and Katsura 1986: 41.

²⁷ For Kumāṛila's criticism of omniscience, see Kataoka 2003a, 2003c, 2011: II, Pecchia 2008 and Taber 2011.

²⁸ For Dharmakīrti's proof of omniscience, see Vetter 1990, Franco 1997, Moriyama 2012 and Inami's studies (Inami 1992, 2005) on the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter.

refutes the similar attitude held by Dignāga,²⁹ who was the first³⁰ to claim that invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) is established through negative concomitance (*vyatireka*) and not positive concomitance (*anvaya*).³¹ This was one of the strongest motivations for his construction of the negative semantic theory of *apoha*.³² It is a natural consequence for Dignāga to maintain that the meaning of the word “cow” is not a positive entity such as universal cowness,³³ but the mere negation of non-cows (*agonivṛtti*),³⁴ because the relationship between the word and its meaning, just like that between smoke (indicator) and fire (indicated), is established through our experience of negative concomitance:³⁵ no smoke without fire in the case of inference; and no “cow” without a cow in the case of semantics.³⁶ It has never been experienced that the word “cow” has been applied to non-cows.³⁷ In other words, the word “cow” has been applied only (*eva*) to cows. No

²⁹ Katsura 1992: 227–228 points out that Kumārila uses the term *adarśanamātra* when criticizing Dignāga’s theory of *apoha* and that Dharmakīrti uses the same term when criticizing Īśvarasena and thus, implicitly, Dignāga. Katsura 1992: 228: “In any case, by attacking Īśvarasena’s theory of *adarśanamātra*, while ignoring the possible conflict between the implication of the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* ad V.34 and his own position of *svabhāvavapratibandha*, Dharmakīrti, I believe, implicitly criticized Dignāga’s whole system of logic.”

³⁰ See Katsura 1986 for Dignāga’s introduction of the notion *vyāpti*. For the later development of this notion, see Kataoka 2003b.

³¹ According to Dignāga, it is impossible to establish invariable concomitance via a positive method of *anvaya*, because one cannot check every single case. PSV ad 34: *tatra tu tulye nāvaśyaṃ sarvatra vṛttir ākhyeyā, kvacit, ānantye ’rthasyākhyānā-sambhavāt.*

³² See Pind 1999, 2011.

³³ PS V 1bcd: *tathā hi saḥ / kṛtakatvādivat svārtham anyāpohena bhāṣate //*; PS V 11d: *tenānyāpohakṛc chrutiḥ //*.

³⁴ More correctly, words denote things qualified by the negation of non-cows, as Dignāga states in PSV ad V 36d: *śabdo ’rthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭān eva bhāvān āha.*

³⁵ PSV ad V 34: *ato vyatirekamukhenaivānumānam.* Pind 2009: 104: “... the inference is only by means of joint absence (*vyatirekamukhenaiva*).”

³⁶ For Dignāga not only the object <cow> but also the word “cow” is in essence *anyāpoha*. PS V 33ab: *śabdāntaravyudāśena śabde sāmānyam ucyate /.*

³⁷ Cf. Katsura 1998: 288 and Pind 1999: 328.

deviation has been seen so far.³⁸ As described by Kumārila in ŚV *apoha* 75,³⁹ Dignāga assumes that the mere non-perception (*adarśanamātra*) of deviation establishes the invariable concomitance between the word “cow” and its meaning. In Dignāga’s system it is precisely non-perception that guarantees the negative theory of inference and semantics.⁴⁰

3.6. Non-perception in an inferential reason (*hetu*)

Īśvarasena insists that an inferential reason has six characteristics:

1. *pakṣadharmatvam*
2. *sapakṣe sattvam* (= *anvaya*)
3. *vipakṣe ’sattvam* (= *vyatireka*)
4. *abādhitaviṣayatvam*⁴¹
5. *vivakṣitaikasaṃkhyatvam*⁴² (= *asatpratipakṣatvam*)
6. *jñātatvam*⁴³

A valid reason must fulfil these six conditions.

1. Smoke, for example, is a property of a mountain.
2. A positive concomitance, as for example: It has been experienced that smoke exists in kitchens, etc.
3. A negative concomitance, as for example: It has been experienced that smoke never exists in a lake, etc.

³⁸ PSV ad V 34: *atulye tu saty apy ānantye śakyam adarśanamātreṇāvṛtter ākhyānam. ata eva ca svasambandhibhyo ’nyatrādarśanāt tadvyavacchedānumānaṃ svārthābhīdhānam ity ucyate*. Pind 2009: 104: “On the other hand, stating its non-application to what is dissimilar is possible, even though it is infinite (*atulye saty apy ānantye*), through mere non-observation (*adarśanamātreṇa*); and just therefore (*ata eva ca*) it has been explained that [the word’s] denoting its own referent (*svārthābhīdhānam*) is an inference from [its own referent’s] exclusion from these [other referents] (*tadvyavacchedānumānam*), from its not being observed [to apply] to other [referents] than its own relata (*svasambandhibhyo ’nyatrādarśanāt*).”

³⁹ For ŚV *apoha*, there is a Japanese translation by Hattori 1973, 1975.

⁴⁰ Cf. Pind 1999, 2011 for Dignāga’s theory of *apoha* and his background ideas. For Kumārila’s criticism of Dignāga’s theory of *apoha*, see Kataoka 2012.

⁴¹ HB 28*,21.

⁴² HB 32*,6–16.

⁴³ For *jñātatva*, see Steinkellner 1988: 1439.

In other words, both positive concomitance (*anvaya*) and negative concomitance (*vyatireka*) are required.

4. In addition to these three conditions of a valid reason (*liṅgatrairūpya*), it is required that the object to be proved, in this case fire, has not been negated by any *pramāṇa*, i.e. by neither *pratyakṣa* nor *anumāna*. For example, if one tries to prove that fire is cold, one's claim has already been negated by perception.
5. Furthermore, a valid reason must fulfil the fifth condition that it does not have a counter-argument (*pratipakṣa*). If it has a counterbalancing, contradicting reason (*pratihetu*), this is classified as an antinomic reason (*viruddhāvyabhicārin*), i.e. a pseudo-reason that does not exclude a contradicting, counter-reason proving the opposite.⁴⁴ There are cases in which two reasons that contradict each other fulfil the other necessary conditions. If it were not for this fifth condition, they could both be regarded as valid.⁴⁵ But there can only be one valid reason, not two; singularity is necessary.⁴⁶ Through this fifth condition, antinomic reasons that contradict each other are excluded.
6. Finally, the sixth condition requires that a valid reason must be known, i.e., its existence must be brought to awareness.

It is clear that the last three conditions of an inferential reason reflect parallel cases in a debate. An argument does not work if the object to be proved has already been invalidated. Two equally valid arguments that contradict each other cannot bring about a final decision. They merely cause doubt. And finally, even if a valid reason exists (in someone's mind), it is useless if it is not presented in a debate.

Īśvarasena's theory of inferential reason is criticized by Dharmakīrti. His criticism is directed at the third, fourth and fifth conditions, and his argument

⁴⁴ For *viruddhāvyabhicārin*, see Tani 1987, Ono 1987, 2010, Oetke 1994, Ueda 2001, 2008 and Iwata 2010.

⁴⁵ Dharmakīrti's presupposed example in HB 32*,6–16 is the following: 1. *śabdo nityaḥ, śrāvanatvāt, śabdatvavat*; 2. *śabdo 'nityaḥ, kṛtakatvāt, ghaṭavat*. See also Watanabe 2011: 464–465.

⁴⁶ Arcaṭa's analysis of the compound *vivakṣitaikasamkhyatvam* is not straightforward. I simply analyze it as *vivakṣitā ekasamkhyā yasya hetoḥ sa vivakṣitaikasamkhyāḥ, tasya bhāvaḥ*. Cf. PS III 23ab (Kitagawa 1965: 193). Cf. also Katsura 1979: 72–74 for Dignāga's description in the *Nyāyamukha*.

is the same in all three cases. Dharmakīrti's powerful device is the distinction between nonexistence (*abhāva*) and non-perception (*anupalabdhi*).⁴⁷ Mere non-perception of X does not guarantee the absence of X.⁴⁸ We have already seen Dharmakīrti's criticism with regard to the third condition, i.e. *vyatireka*. One cannot claim that the relationship "without fire no smoke" is *necessarily* the case just because a counter-example has never been perceived.⁴⁹

Similarly, one cannot claim that one's inferential reason is valid just because it has not been refuted until now. Mere non-perception of an invalidating cognition (*bādhaka*) does not guarantee that there is no possibility of invalidation.⁵⁰ A reason established through an empirical method is not necessarily certain. And also, one cannot claim that one's argument is free of counter-arguments just because no counter-argument has been raised until now.⁵¹ A counter-argument may exist somewhere or sometime in the future, as perhaps in the mind of a person more clever.⁵² One cannot claim that there is no invalidating cognition (*bādhaka*) and no counter-argument (*pratihetu*) just because they have not been perceived in one's limited experience. The possibility of falsification is always open in probabilistic reasoning.⁵³ According to Dharmakīrti, this is a limitation in empirical epistemology.

Dharmakīrti's criticism concerning the possibility of falsification attacks Īśvarasena directly. But it is also aimed at Dignāga. Before Īśvarasena, Dignāga had already accepted what Īśvarasena posits as the fifth condition,

⁴⁷ For Dignāga, on the other hand, subjective non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) leads directly to the conclusion of objective nonexistence (*abhāva*). PSV ad 31a: *adrṣtatvād vyudāso vā. (31a) atha vā yasmād bhedaśabdo bhedāntarārthe na drṣṭaḥ, tasmād apohate.*

⁴⁸ For Dharmakīrti, valid *anupalabdhi* should be qualified by *drṣya*. In other words, proper non-perception that can prove the absence of an object should be non-perception of a perceivable object and not of any kind including imperceivable objects.

⁴⁹ Cf. Katsura 1992: 225: "Dharmakīrti had to refute Īśvarasena's theory that the negative concomitance (*vyatireka* or the absence of the reason in the dissimilar instances) could be determined by mere non-perception (*adarśanamātreṇa*)."

⁵⁰ HB 29*,20: *na bādhāyā abhāvo 'bādhā, kiṃ tarhi bādhāyā anupalabdhīḥ.*

⁵¹ HB 31*,10–11.

⁵² Cf. Arcaṭa's sarcastic comment directed toward Mīmāṃsakas (HBT 217,12–18), in which Kumārila is mentioned as an example of a more clever person (*prajñātīśayaśālin*).

⁵³ HB 31*,12: *aśakyaniścayatva*; HB 31*,16–17: *tulyalakṣaṇe hi drṣṭaḥ pratiyogisaṃbhavo 'drṣṭapratiyogiṣv api śaṅkāṃ utpādayati, viśeṣābhāvāt.*

i.e. *vivakṣitaikasamkhyatva*. In PS III 23ab (Kitagawa 1965: 193), Dignāga comments that oneness (*ekatva*) is needed with regard to an inferential reason (*hetu*) so that he can exclude the possibility of an antinomic reason, the *viruddhāvyabhicārin*.

Kumārila's theory of truth (i.e. his theory of invalidation) is also within the range of Dharmakīrti's criticism. Kumārila states in ŚV and BṬ that fear (*āśāṅkā*, *utprekṣā* < *utprekṣeta*) of unreal falsification, caused by ignorance (*mohāt*), is baseless (*niṣpramāṇikā*) and even harmful in everyday activity (*vyavahāreṣu*). Scepticism would lead to the infinite regress of falsification. Reversal of validity and invalidity would lead a sceptical person to destruction (*kṣaya*). According to Dharmakīrti, however, imagining (*utprekṣā* < *utprekṣiṇī*) falsification is not caused by ignorance (*moha*) but by wisdom (*prajñā*).

HB 32*,2–3: *na ca sambhavatpratihatūnām api sarvadā tasyopalabdhiḥ. atīśayavatī tu prajñōtprekṣiṇī dṛṣṭā.*

And with regard to reasons for which a counter-reason is possible, it (a counter-reason) is not always perceived. But it is experienced that excellent wisdom conceives of [a counter-reason that no one has ever perceived].

For Kumārila *utprekṣā* is a fanciful imagination, an unrealistic fear of falsification by an ignorant, sceptic person, whereas for Dharmakīrti it is an appropriate imagination, the sharp awareness of a possible counter-argument by a person of excellent wisdom.⁵⁴ A counter-argument may exist somewhere although it has never been conceived by anybody. For Dharmakīrti, imagining a possible falsification, although it has never been seen, and examining validity is fundamentally the proper way for the mind to operate. Mere non-experience guarantees nothing.

Kumārila: *utprekṣeta hi yo mohād ajātam api bādhakam.*

Dharmakīrti: *atīśayavatī tu prajñōtprekṣiṇī dṛṣṭā.*

⁵⁴ Commenting on the passage, Arcaṭa (HBṬ 217,8;10-11) quotes Kumārila's ŚV *codanā* 60cd and BṬ's *utprekṣā* verse (=TS 2871).

4. Conclusion

Prior to Dharmakīrti, non-perception (*anupalabdhī*, *anupalambha*) or non-experience (*adarśana*) was a key concept for theoreticians in both Buddhism and Mīmāṃsā. For Dignāga and Īśvarasena it supports their theories of inference, semantics and dialectical logic. The certainty of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) is based on the experience of negative concomitance (*vyatireka*), in other words, the non-experience of a counter-example or a deviation (*vyabhicāra*). The negation of non-cows is the meaning of the word “cow”, because the word “cow” has never been experienced being applied to non-cows. A reason is regarded as valid unless it has not been revealed as being false by an invalidating cognition (*bādhaka*) or suspended by a counter-reason (*pratihetu*). Similarly, for Kumārila, too, non-experience or the absence of the five means of valid cognition (*pramāṇābhāva*) is the key concept for his inferential theory, which he uses to criticize the omniscience of the Buddha. Because it is established through experience that a person free of desire, etc. does not act, the allegedly omniscient Buddha, free of desire, cannot undertake the action of teaching. Non-perception is also the core (of the converse side) of Kumārila’s theory of truth. Falsification is not to be imagined; it must really be seen. For Kumārila objectivity or reality is empirical and not something beyond our experience. For Dharmakīrti, however, such theories are empirical and probabilistic and cannot meet his strict criteria. It is not the case that X does not exist just because X has not been seen. Dharmakīrti criticizes preceding generations of thinkers by examining the probabilistic limit of mere non-experience (*adarśanamātra*). His criticism of *adarśanamātra* aims not only at his predecessors such as Dignāga and Īśvarasena, but also his opponent Kumārila, who shares the empirical attitude of Buddhists before Dharmakīrti. Indeed, the fundamental difference between Kumārila and Dharmakīrti is demonstrated by their opposite evaluations of *utprekṣā*.

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- TS *Tattvasaṅgraha(pañjikā)* (Śāntarakṣita): *Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita with the Commentary Pañjikā of Shri Kamalashīla*. Ed. Dvārikadāsa Śāstrī, 2 vols. Varanasi: Baudha Bharati 1981, 1982.
- PKM *Prameyakamala-mārtaṇḍa by Shri Prabha Chandra*. Ed. Mahendra Kumar Shastri. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1990.
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