

Sāmaṭa, Yajñaṭa and Śāntarakṣita on how to cognize everything

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1. Introduction

Śāntarakṣita discusses omniscience in chapter 26, the final chapter of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* (TS). The structure of this chapter is simple, comprising criticism from the opponents and a rebuttal by Śāntarakṣita. In other words, the whole chapter consists of two parts, namely the *pūrvapakṣa* and the *uttarapakṣa*. Śāntarakṣita first quotes a considerable number of verses from the lost *Bṛhaṭṭikā* (BT) of Kumāṛila.¹ Next, he introduces a criticism that seems to belong to Mīmāṃsakas after Kumāṛila. The commentator Kamalaśīla identifies these theorists as Sāmaṭa and Yajñaṭa.² (Hereafter I will refer to them as SY.) After introducing the criticisms from these opponents (Kumāṛila and SY) as the *pūrvapakṣa* in the first half of the chapter, Śāntarakṣita responds to them in order in the *uttarapakṣa*. The entire chapter, with the exception of TS 3123-26, which is an introduction to the rest of the chapter, is organized as shown in the following table.

	TS <i>pūrvapakṣa</i>	TS <i>uttarapakṣa</i>
I	3127-3246ab (Kumāṛila's BT)	3261-3620 (Śāntarakṣita)
II	3246cd-60 (SY)	3621-3645 (Śāntarakṣita)

In this paper, I will focus on SY's criticism of omniscience (14.5 verses)³ and Śāntarakṣita's refutation of this criticism (25 verses).⁴ Since the criticism and the responses are far apart in the text of the TS, it is difficult to see their correspondence. In this paper, therefore, I will try to make the correspondence between the criticism and response as clear as possible by dividing the verses into smaller groups. The following table shows a detailed correspondence between the *pūrvapakṣa* and the *uttarapakṣa* of

this section.

	TS 3246cd-60 (<i>pūrvapakṣa</i>)	TS 3621-45 (<i>uttarapakṣa</i>)
0 katham	3246cd-47	
1 yugapat	3248	3621-25
2.1 paripātyā	3249	3626
2.2 svecchayā		3627-28
2.3 paripātyā		3629-30
3 ekasvabhāvataḥ	3250-54	3631-36
4 yathāpradhānam	3255-56	3637-38
5 śaktyā	3257-59	3639-43
6 upasamhāraḥ	3260	3644
7 nirākārādicintā		3645

As revealed in the introductory verse (TS 3247), the following five options are the subjects on which the groupings are broadly based. (The translation of these terms is based on McClintock 2010: 155.)

1. Simultaneously (*yugapat*)
2. Successively (*paripātyā*)
3. Through a single nature (*ekasvabhāvataḥ*)
4. In terms of the most important [things] (*yathāpradhānam*)
5. Due to the capacity [to know all things] (*śaktyā*)

In what follows, after confirming the correspondence between the *pūrvā* and *uttarapakṣa* in the original Sanskrit text, I will present an annotated translation of the verses of each group. In light of the preceding exchange of arguments between Kumārila and Śāntarakṣita, I would like to clarify what the exchange of arguments between SY and Śāntarakṣita is all about. In other words, it is the aim of this paper to clarify the entire controversy by examining Śāntarakṣita's argument in terms of what was hotly debated regarding omniscience in the post-Kumārila period of SY and Śāntarakṣita, i.e., around the first half of the eighth century.

2. Correspondence between the *pūrvapakṣa* and the *uttarapakṣa*

Śāntarakṣita refutes each and every criticism given by his opponents.⁵ Therefore, there is a close correspondence between criticism and reply in his text. The following table shows the criticisms from the opponents (SY) on the left and the corresponding responses by Śāntarakṣita on the right. (The following text is based on a critical edition prepared by Sato 2021.)

TS 3246cd-60 (Sāmaṭa-Yajñāta)	TS 3621-45 (<i>uttarapakṣa</i>)
<p>idaṃ ca cintyate bhūyaḥ sarvadarśī katham mataḥ//3246 ⁽¹⁾yugapat ⁽²⁾paripāṭyā vā sarvaṃ caikasvabhāvataḥ⁽³⁾/ jānan ⁽⁴⁾yathāpradhānaṃ vā ⁽⁵⁾śaktyā veṣyeta sarvavit//3247</p>	
<p>(3247a: ⁽¹⁾yugapat) yugapac chucyaśucyādi- svabhāvānāṃ virodhinām/ jñānaṃ naikadhiyā dṛṣṭaṃ bhinnā vā gatayaḥ kvacit//3248</p>	<p>yugapac chucyaśucyādi- svabhāvānāṃ virodhinām/ jñānaṃ ekadhiyā dṛṣṭaṃ na viruddhā vidā hi te//3621 anyonyaparihāreṇa sthitalakṣaṇatātha vā/ ekasmīn asahasthānaṃ virodhas teṣu sambhavet//3622 ekajñānāvabhāsitvaṃ na tu teṣāṃ virodhitā/ śucyaśucyahiśikhyādeś cakṣuṣā sakṛdīkṣaṇāt//3623 sukhaduḥkḥādibhede tu yat sakṛn nāsti vedanam/ hetvabhāvād asāṃnidhyāt taj jñeyam na virudhyate//3624 nīlapītāvadātādi- rūpabhedā virodhinaḥ/ deśaprakṛtibhedena vīkṣyante yugapad yataḥ//3625</p>

TS 3246cd-60 (Sāmaṭa-Yajñaṭa)	TS 3621-45 (<i>uttarapakṣa</i>)
(3247a: ⁽²⁾ paripāṭyā) bhūtaṃ bhavad bhaviṣyac ca vastv anantaṃ krameṇa kaḥ/ pratyekaṃ śaknuyād boddhuṃ vatsarāṇāṃ śatair api//3249	ekajñānakṣaṇavyāpta- niḥśeṣajñeyamaṇḍalaḥ/ prasādhito hi sarvajñaḥ kramo nāśrīyate tataḥ//3626
(3247a: ⁽¹⁾ yugapat ⁽²⁾ paripāṭyā vā)	yad yad icchati boddhuṃ vā tat tad vetti niyogataḥ/ śaktir evaṃvidhā tasya prahñāvaraṇo hy asau//3627 yugapat paripāṭyā vā svecchayā pratipadyate/ labdhajñānavaśitvo hi *sa kṣṇair āsravaiḥ ⁶ prabhuḥ//3628
(3247a: ⁽²⁾ paripāṭyā)	yad vā ṣoḍaśabhiś cittaiś catuḥsatyasvabhāvakaṃ/ krameṇa vetti vijñeyaṃ sarvaṃ sarvavid ity ataḥ//3629 tatra tādrśi vijñāne krameṇa bhavati prabhoḥ/ lavamātro 'pi nāpekṣyaḥ kim aṅgābdaśatāvadhīḥ//3630
(3247b: ⁽³⁾ ekasvabhāvataḥ) svabhāvenāvibhaktena yaḥ sarvaṃ avabudhyate/ svalakṣaṇāni bhāvānāṃ sarveśāṃ na sa budhyate//3250 boddhrā sāmānyarūpasya sarvajñenāpi tena kim/3251ab anyākāreṇa bodhena naiva vastv avagamyate//3251cd	svabhāvenāvibhaktena yaḥ sarvaṃ avabudhyate/ svarūpāny eva bhāvānāṃ sarveśāṃ so 'vabudhyate//3631 sātmakākṣaṇikādibhyo yad vyāvṛttaṃ svalakṣaṇaṃ/ sadotprekṣānimittatvāt sāmānyaṃ tad ihocyate//3632 tadgrāhakaṃ ca vijñānaṃ bhāvanābalabhāvi yat/ yogīśānāṃ abhivyaktaṃ tat svalakṣaṇagocaram//3633

TS 3246cd-60 (Sāmaṭa-Yajñaṭa)	TS 3621-45 (<i>uttarapakṣa</i>)
tad ekākāravijñānam samyañ mithyāpi vā bhavet/ samyaktve dṛṣṭabādhaivaṃ prasaktaṃ sarvaṃ advayaṃ//3252 tataś ca śiṣyasarvajña- dharmādharmataduktayaḥ/ na syur vo bhinnarūpatve svabhāvānavadhāraṇāt//3253 mṛṣātve tv ekabodhasya bhrāntaḥ prāpnoti sarvavit/ na śraddheyaṃ vacas tasya tadonmattādivīkyavat//3254	tattvānyatvādyanirdeśyaṃ yat paraiś ca prakalpitaṃ/ sāmānyaṃ tasya naitena grahaṇaṃ yogicetasā//3634 avikalpaṃ avibhrāntaṃ tad yogīśvaramānasam/ vikalpavibhramākrāntaṃ tadgrahe ca prasajyate//3635 vikalpātmā ca sāmānyaṃ avācyaṃ yat prakīrtitaṃ/ nityānugatirūpaṃ tan nīrūpaṃ pratipāditam//3636
(3247c: ⁽⁴⁾ yathāpradhānam) sahetu saphalaṃ karma jñānenālaukikena yaḥ/ samādhijena jānāti sa sarvajño yadīśyate//3255 pratyakṣam anumānaṃ vā śābdaṃ vā tadatatkr̥tam/ pramāṇam asya sadbhāve nāstīti nāsti tādr̥śaḥ//3256	sahetu saphalaṃ karma jñānenālaukikena yaḥ/ samādhijena jānāti sa sarvajño 'padiśyate//3637 purastād anumānena tasya sattā prasādhitā/ pramāṇam asya sadbhāve tad astīty asti tādr̥śaḥ//3638
(3247d: ⁽⁵⁾ śaktyā) yugapat paripātyā vā kathaṃ kāryād vinānumā//3257ab sāmarthyam api naivāsti samarthe sarvaṃ eva vā//3257cd sarve sarvāvabodhe ca kṣetrajñāḥ prabhaviṣṇavaḥ/ upāyavikalatvāt tu budhyante nikhilaṃ na te//3258	yugapat paripātyā vā jñānaṃ kāryāt prakāśitāt//3639ab sāmarthyam api tasyāsti deśanāṃ kurute yadā//3639cd svabhyastadharmanairātmyā yasyeyaṃ deśanāmalā/ sādhitā sarvaśāstreṇa sarvamānair abādhitā//3640

TS 3246cd-60 (Sāmaṭa-Yajñaṭa)	TS 3621-45 (<i>uttarapakṣa</i>)
	samsāryanucitajñānā keśavāder agocaraḥ/ śīrobhir arcyate bhaktyā yā cātīva manīṣibhiḥ//3641 samastaduritārāti- vargabhaṅgavidhāyinī/ citrābhyudayaniṣpatti- nirvāṇaprāptikāraṇam//3642
labdhāsādhāraṇopāyo ’śeṣapuṃsām vilakṣaṇaḥ/ tatraikaḥ sarvavit kaścīd ity evaṃ niṣpramāṇakam//3259	labdhāsādhāraṇopāyo ’śeṣapuṃsām vilakṣaṇaḥ/ sa ekaḥ sarvavin nātha ity etat sapramāṇakam//3643
itthaṃ yadā na sarvajñaḥ kaścīd apy upapadyate/ na dharmādhigame hetuḥ pauruṣeyaṃ tadā vacaḥ//3260	itthaṃ yadā ca sarvajñaḥ kaścīd evopapadyate/ dharmādyadhigame hetuḥ pauruṣeyaṃ tadā vacaḥ//3644
	nirākārādicintā tu sarvajñe nopayujyate/ yathā hi bhavatām jñānaṃ kvacid arthe tathā param//3645

3. Translation and notes

3.1. Introductory words by Śāntarakṣita

The criticism given by SY begins at 3246cd. In the immediately preceding 3246ab, Kumāṛila, the opponent of the Buddhist argument, sums up the BṬ’s long argument up to this point by stating as follows:

3246ab. [Kumāṛila:] Thus, man’s independent omniscience lacks an instance.⁷

This half-verse, as well as the next half-verse, are presumably supplied by Śāntarakṣita himself and not a direct quote. Here, the Sanskrit term *nirāspada* (lacking a place, rest-less, objectless) indicates that independent omniscience, i.e., a kind of quality that Bud-

dhists claim a human being can have, has no instantiating case.⁸ In other words, no one among mankind cognizes everything independently. Śāntarakṣita then introduces the criticism from SY as follows:

3246cd. [SY:] And, furthermore, the following is examined: In which manner is he accepted as all-seeing?

What is being asked here is the question of how the Buddha cognize everything. To put it logically, as a first step, the opponents tentatively posit the existence of an omniscient being. Then, they try to show that omniscience is impossible by showing that none of the options explaining how are possible. In other words, just as in the Buddhist tetralemma, the opponents are trying to destroy all possibilities by forcing the Buddhists to make choices. The next verse, which gives the five options, is also presumably a summary by Śāntarakṣita not SY's own words.

3247. [SY:] Is he regarded as omniscient because he cognizes everything simultaneously or sequentially, or by one nature, or according to importance, or due to his potential ability?⁹

It is important to note that these five options are not mutually exclusive. They can be divided into three groups in terms of content: questions of order, questions of object, and questions of ability.

1. Order	(¹)simultaneously/ (²)successively?
2. Object	
2.1. Aspect	(³)generally/(individually)
2.2. Value	(⁴)important/(unimportant, too)
3. Ability	(⁵)potentially/(actually)

From the sharpness of these questions, we can see that SY's understanding of Buddhist theories has gone a step further compared to Kumārila's time. There is no doubt that SY

have successfully addressed issues that Buddhists themselves have been concerned about. At the time of Kumāṛila, the main focus was still on the rejection of omniscience itself. SY, on the other hand, tentatively posit omniscience and ask how omniscience is possible. It should be noted that the specific modes of the Buddha's omniscience (or of his direct intuitive realization of the four truths) had already been discussed in detail within the Buddhist tradition that accepts omniscience. In other words, these questions were topics that had already been discussed at length within the Buddhist tradition, as will be confirmed later in looking at individual discussions. At the time of Kumāṛila, however, they had not yet been brought to the forefront as subjects of external debate. In other words, much of the debate was still internal to Buddhism. As the debate progressed, these questions came to the forefront of the controversy with the Mīmāṃsakas by the time of SY and Śāntarakṣita.

First of all, there is the question of order, whether the Buddha cognizes everything simultaneously or sequentially. As for this, the fact that Śāntarakṣita later mentions sixteen minds in his reply (§2.3) shows that in actual meditation, omniscience does not necessarily imply the comprehension of everything at once. This shows that SY address a serious problem for Buddhists themselves. SY have more detailed information about the content of meditation in Buddhism than did their predecessors.

This question of order was not asked by Kumāṛila. However, Nāgasena, in a treatise discussing the three bodies of the Buddha, introduces the question of whether omniscience is simultaneous or sequential.¹⁰ Dhammapāla, too, asks a similar question.¹¹ Also in earlier Buddhist treatises, it was debated whether the intuition of the four truths is simultaneous or sequential.¹² That this has become a hot issue with Mīmāṃsā is evident from the fact that it is also addressed by Maṇḍanamiśra in *Vidhiviveka* 1.18. He shows that there can be neither sequential nor simultaneous options for omniscience. (VV 1.18c: *kramākramau na kalpete*).¹³

The second issue, whether the Buddha cognizes everything generally or individually,¹⁴ was already introduced by Kumāṛila in his question of what the concrete content of "all" is (TS 3127-42). Therefore, it is a bit redundant. However, it is clear that here, in SY, the criticism is intended to be more in line with the Buddhist side. First of all, the

issue of the general aspect¹⁵ corresponds to the issue of the specific characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*, the unique particular) and the general characteristic (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, universal) in Buddhism. It is also related to the problem of impermanence (*anityatva*) and other general aspects that are meditated upon.¹⁶ It can be appreciated that SY skillfully point out the discrepancy within the Buddhist doctrine (“The object of perception is limited to the specific characteristics” and “The object of meditation is [presumably] the general characteristics”), in line with the Buddhists’ own observation.¹⁷

It is also clear that the next criticism was made with an awareness of the topic that Buddhists themselves (especially after Dharmakīrti) are concerned with: whether the content of “everything” is important to human beings (e.g., the four truths and karmic retribution) or whether it includes everything that is not important (e.g., the number of hairs). This problem also partially overlaps with the one that Kumāṛila had already raised in his questioning of the content of “everything” (TS 3127-42), but here the problem is presented in a way that is more in line with the Buddhist side. In other words, the question is precisely whether it is *pradhāna* (important) or not. The following table compares Kumāṛila’s and SY’s treatment of “all,” the object of omniscience.¹⁸

	Kumāṛila’s BṬ (TS <i>pūrvapakṣa</i>)	Sāmaṭa-Yajñaṭa (TS <i>pūrvapakṣa</i>)
1	dharmajñāḥ/sarvajñāḥ (3127)	yathāpradhānaṃ (3255-56)
2	prakṛtasarvajñāḥ (3128)	
3	sarvaśabdajñāḥ (3129)	
4	tailodakaghr̥tādisarvajñāḥ (3130)	[yathāpradhānaṃ (3255-56)]
5	saṃkṣepasarvajñāḥ (3131-34)	ekasvabhāvataḥ (3250-54)
6	viśeṣasarvajñāḥ (3135-42)	[yathāpradhānaṃ (3255-56)]

The question “what is everything?” is discussed in detail by Kumāṛila. His discussion still gives the impression of being unsystematic. What is possible as “all” is enumerated without any particular systematic organization. This is confirmed by the fact that there are several separate places (1,4,6 in the table above) whose content is related to the “important/unimportant” issue we are now concerned with. Nor is the viewpoint of whether or not it is important necessarily a consistent question in Kumāṛila. For exam-

ple, in TS 3136, Kumāṛila gives the atoms in the body, as well as hairs on the head and body, as examples of objects that are *impossible* to know; and in TS 3137, the details of all parts and individuals as objects that are *useless* to know.¹⁹

The third issue that arises in the discussion of capability is whether one is omniscient in terms of potential ability or because one is cognizing everything.²⁰ The latter is no doubt assumed as the primary theory of the Buddhists. This problem of capability is related to the problem of the means of realization of omniscience, that is, how to cultivate one's ability to become enlightened. This is also a topic that has been discussed extensively since Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇasiddhi* (PV II). In Kumāṛila's discussion, this is a topic that was discussed in the BṬ as a limit to the improvement of ability (TS 3167-73).²¹ It is natural to assume that one of the reasons SY have taken up this secondary issue of the potential omniscience is to focus on the important issue of the means (*sādhana*) of achieving omniscience. What they have in mind is the following structure:

$$\text{sādhana} \Rightarrow \text{śakti} \Rightarrow \text{sarvajñāna} \Rightarrow \text{kārya}$$

By cultivating the capacity for omniscience through practice, this particular person, the Buddha, actually comes to cognize everything. Then, based on this cognition of everything, he gives teachings. Conversely, from the resulting teachings, his omniscience and omniscient capacity are inferred.²² This structure clearly presupposes the chain of causality that Dharmakīrti presents with regard to the four epithets of the Buddha that Dignāga refers to in the opening verse of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (PS). The following are the causal relationships of compassion (*karuṇā*), repeated practice (*abhyāsa*), cognition (*jñāna*), and teaching (*upadeśa*) underlying the four epithets:²³

$$\text{karuṇā} \Rightarrow \text{abhyāsa} \Rightarrow \text{jñāna} \Rightarrow \text{upadeśa}$$

In SY's discussion, omniscience is dichotomized as both a potential ability and the actual operation of cognizing everything. The causal chain of the above terms shows why SY consider the issue of capability to be closely related to the issue of practice. As

for the teaching, on the other hand, Śāntarakṣita later (in TS 3639d) refers to it as the final result.

Kamalaśīla describes these criticisms regarding the five choices as coming from Sāmaṭa and Yajñaṭa. It is not clear whether the five groups of verses quoted next (TS 3248-59) are Śāntarakṣita's reworking of the prose into verse, or whether Sāmaṭa and Yajñaṭa wrote them in verse form from the beginning and Śāntarakṣita quoted them verbatim. The former seems more likely, given that Kamalaśīla does not specifically attribute each verse to one of the two. SY's criticisms seem to have been summarized by Śāntarakṣita in these five topics. One plausible hypothesis is as follows: Sāmaṭa and Yajñaṭa, the Mīmāṃsā scholars who followed Maṇḍana, each dealt with these issues in prose. Then Śāntarakṣita reworked them into verse form. It is quite possible that Śāntarakṣita was selective in addressing the parts of the criticism that were particularly important for the Buddhist side. This may partly explain why these objections are so closely in line with Buddhist doctrines.²⁴

3.2. *Simultaneously*

In the question of whether all things are cognized simultaneously or sequentially, the primary position for the Buddhist side is undoubtedly the former.²⁵ Here SY address the problem of cognizing everything at the same time in terms of the perspective favored by Buddhist logicians: contradiction between two terms.

3248. [SY:] (A) It is not experienced that contradictory [things], such as purity and impurity, are cognized simultaneously by a single cognition.

(B) Nor [is it experienced that] different cognitions [arise] in any one [mind simultaneously].

The first option (A) is that a single cognition simultaneously perceives contradictory objects, while the second option (B) is that multiple cognitions, each perceiving a contradictory object, simultaneously exist in the same person. The first option is certainly the primary position that the Buddhists accept as their own.²⁶

To this criticism of SY, Śāntarakṣita replies, in a play on the *pūrvapakṣa* verse, and in quite the opposite sense, as follows:

3621. [Śāntarakṣita:] It is experienced that contradictory things, such as purity and impurity, are simultaneously cognized by a single cognition. This is because they do not contradict one cognition.

The diversity of object images in a cognition is a topic that had been discussed in detail since Dharmakīrti with the key term *citrādvaita* (the non-duality of wondrously variegated cognition). Therefore, it is quite easy for Śāntarakṣita to deal with this criticism of apparent contradiction. We do perceive a variety of contradictory images in our perception.

3622. They can be contradictory, i.e., either mutually exclusive or not in the same place.

3623. However, it is not a contradiction for them to be manifested in the same cognition, for we see, with our eyes, the pure and the impure, the serpent and the peacock, etc., at the same time.

Buddhist logicians distinguish between two kinds of *virodha*: a contradiction that is characterized by mutual exclusion (*parasparaparihāraśthalakṣaṇa*) and the one characterized by mutual incompatibility in one place (*sahānavasthānalakṣaṇa*). *Virodhas* (contradiction, opposition, incompatibility) allowed in Dharmakīrti's system are limited to these two, i.e., *parasparaparihāraśthalakṣaṇa* and *sahānavasthānalakṣaṇa*. This being the case, it is not a contradiction at all for these contradictory things to be manifested in the same perception. In other words, such a psychological phenomenon, in which contradictory things manifest in one mind at the same time, does not fall into either of the two categories of *virodha*. They coexist in one mind. On the other hand, the fact that contradictory sensations such as pleasure and pain cannot occur simultaneously is explained from a different perspective, namely, not in terms of contradiction but in

terms of lack of cause.

3624. On the other hand, it should be understood that the reason why we do not feel different things such as pleasure and pain at the same time is that they do not occur [simultaneously] due to the lack of cause and not [because] they contradict [each other in a single cognition].

3625. This is shown by the fact that different colors, such as blue, yellow, and white, which contradict each other in terms of location and nature, are observed simultaneously.

In reality we do not feel both pleasure and pain at the same time. Therefore, it may be said that two contradictory things cannot be manifested in the same perception. However, this phenomenon is because the causes of pleasure and pain are missing, not because they contradict each other in a single cognition. Śāntarakṣita shows as evidence that contradictory colors can be seen simultaneously.

Thus, Śāntarakṣita's response is that *virodha* is limited to these two types, and therefore, the appearance of two contradictory objects in the same perception is not a "contradiction" from the outset. There is no theoretical obstacle to cognizing all diverse objects at the same time, including contradictory ones.

3.3. *Sequentially I*

The second option is that the Buddha cognizes everything in order, over time, in meditation. SY deny this possibility, as follows:

3249. [SY:] Who could cognize the infinite number of real entities in the past, present, and future, one by one, sequentially, even if given hundreds of years?²⁷

It is impossible to know all the things of all three times, even if a person had hundreds of years. This criticism is easily warded off by Śāntarakṣita in the following way:

3626. [Śāntarakṣita:] We have proved precisely the omniscient being who knows all objects to be known by a single moment of cognition.²⁸ We do not hold [the view of] sequence.

Śāntarakṣita's response here is that the criticism is pointless because it is the theory of simultaneity, not the theory of sequence, that Buddhists have adopted as their theory. It is the preceding passages, TS 3444 and 3446 (quoted later), that Śāntarakṣita refers to here as the proof of omniscience. What he has in mind as the group of all objects to be known is all impermanent dharmas. In other words, the "all" intended here is everything that pertains to the important matter, *sarve dharmā anātmānaḥ*, and not also the unimportant things.

3.4. Both

Above, Śāntarakṣita answered on the premise of adopting the theory of simultaneity. However, he goes on to alternatively suggest that both the simultaneity and sequence theories are possible.

3627. [Śāntarakṣita:] Or he [can] certainly cognize everything he wishes to cognize. He has this ability because he has destroyed [all] obstacles.

3628. Whether simultaneously or sequentially, he [can] perceive as he wishes. This is because the lord has become the master of cognition, having destroyed the defilements.²⁹

Kamalaśīla calls this type of omniscient being "one who cognizes everything as he wishes" (*svecchāsarvajña*). As will be discussed later, this theory is practically the same as the capability theory, as suggested by the phrase *yugapat paripātyā vā* (TS 3628a), which will be repeated in TS 3639a.

It is important to note here that the Buddha is considered omniscient because he has eliminated all obstacles. This is a statement that presupposes a causal relationship between practice and the capacity for omniscience. It should also be noted that

Śāntarakṣita has not made any particular qualification here regarding the object of omniscience. He is probably trying to leave room for the inclusion of unimportant things. As we will discuss later, Śāntarakṣita distinguishes two types of arguments with regard to proving omniscience: the primary argument (I) and the indirect argument (II). Omniscience of important matters is the former, and the ability to know everything, including unimportant matters, is the latter.

I	The Buddha knows everything that matters. This is inferred from his teachings on heaven and liberation.
II	In particular, from his teaching of <i>dharmā-nairātmya</i> , we can confirm that he has the wisdom that destroys the two kinds of obstacles. Thus, he is proven to have the potential to know everything, including unimportant things. (Cf. TS 3337-38)

3.5. *Sequentially II*

In response to the criticism of the sequence theory, Śāntarakṣita presented the two options above: the non-adoption of the sequence theory, and the possibility of both simultaneous and sequential cognition. Finally, here, he presents the option of adopting only the sequence theory. In other words, he responds to SY's criticism in a straightforward manner. He is showing off his confidence that he can comfortably answer any criticism from Mīmāṃsā.

3629. [Śāntarakṣita:] Or, with sixteen minds, he cognizes successively all the objects to be known, i.e., the four truths.³⁰ So he is called omniscient.

3630. In that case, because such cognitions occur to him in sequence, the lord does not need even ten seconds,³¹ much less hundreds of years.

The following process of insight in the *darśanamārga*, the path of seeing the four truths, is assumed here as shown in the following table:

	dharmajñānakṣānti	dharmajñāna	anvayajñānakṣānti	anvayajñāna
duḥkhe	1	2	3	4
samudaye	5	6	7	8
nirodhe	9	10	11	12
mārge	13	14	15	16

The first stage is *duḥkhe dharmajñānakṣāntiḥ*, the mental receptivity to the dharma-cognition of pain; the second is *duḥkhe dharmajñānam*, the dharma-cognition of pain; the third is *duḥkhe 'nvayajñānakṣāntiḥ*, the mental receptivity to the subsequent cognition of pain pertaining to the two upper spheres of existence; the fourth is *duḥkhe 'nvayajñānam*, the subsequent cognition of pain pertaining to the two upper spheres; the fifth is *samudaye dharmajñānakṣāntiḥ*, the receptivity to the dharma-cognition of the origin of pain; and so on. Needless to say, “all,” considered here as the object of meditation, is not really all things, but all important objects to be known, consisting of the four truths.

Here, Śāntarakṣita is accepting that, with respect to Argument I above (the proof of the one who knows all important matters), it does not matter if knowing is sequential rather than simultaneous.

3.6. Generally

In TS 3131-34, Kumāṛila considered the case of one who knows everything collectively (*saṃkṣepeṇa sarvajñāḥ*; *saṃkṣiptasarvajñāḥ*), for example, as existent and non-existent (*bhāva/abhāva*), as an object of cognition (*jñeya*), as principles (*padārtha*) enumerated in each system, or as six types of objects cognized by the six means of valid cognition (*ṣaṭprameya*). However, Śāntarakṣita does not bother to respond to any of these in the answer section, obviously because he adopts none of these theories as his own. From the perspective of Śāntarakṣita, Kumāṛila is proving the proven.

The main contrast presupposed by Kumāṛila was between the possibility of things being known collectively (*saṃkṣepeṇa*) versus being known individually (*viśeṣeṇa*). Here, the question is presented by SY more clearly in conformity with the Buddhist system of *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* (general characteristic) and *svalakṣaṇa* (specific characteris-

tic, unique particular).

3250. [SY:] The one who cognizes everything in the form of one indivisible nature does not cognize the specific characteristics of all existents.³²

3251ab. What is the use of such a person, even an omniscient one, if he cognizes [only] the general aspect?

3251cd. A real entity is never cognized by a cognition that has a different image. [In other words, the cognition of a universal does not capture a particular.]

Obviously, SY here have in mind the dichotomy of specific and general characteristics in Buddhist epistemology. In other words, the cognition that captures the general characteristic does not capture the specific characteristic, which is real. Therefore, in the meditative state, the Buddha's perception of the general aspect of "impermanence" for all existing dharmas is mistaken.


This criticism is difficult to resolve, and it is a sore point for the Buddhist side. Śāntarakṣita's main strategy is as follows. First of all, what the Buddha grasps in meditation are the real, specific characteristics, not the unreal, general characteristic. Then the question remains as to why it is traditionally held that the Buddha grasps the general aspect (*sāmānya*) of existing dharmas such as impermanence. In response, Śāntarakṣita says that the specific characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*) is called "general" (*sāmānya*) because it is the cause of fanciful thoughts (*utprekṣā*). In other words, since people mistakenly make false superimpositions upon the specific characteristics, such that they think they are endowed with a self (*sātmaka*) and non-momentary (*akṣaṇika*), they are called "general." In other words, the specific characteristic is called "general" only because it is the cause of the false idea of universals. It does not mean that the Buddha sees a non-existent general characteristic in his meditation. With the above strategy in mind, Śāntarakṣita first completely overturns the criticism from SY with the following clever repartee:

3631. [Śāntarakṣita:] The one who cognizes everything in an indivisible nature cognizes only the specific characteristics of all existents.³³

As can be seen from the statement about perceiving *only* the unique characteristics (*svarūpāṇy eva*), here Śāntarakṣita explicitly indicates that what the Buddha perceives in meditation is not the general characteristic, but only the specific characteristics. He then offers a hermeneutic excuse for general aspects such as impermanence.

3632. The specific characteristic, which is excluded from the things endowed with a self, non-momentary, etc., is here called “general,” because it is always the cause of fanciful thoughts.

As is clear from Dharmakīrti’s theory of *apoha*, the specific characteristic has two kinds of exclusion: «The exclusion from others of the same category» (*sajātīyavyāvṛtti*), and «the exclusion from others of different categories» (*vijātīyavyāvṛtti*). The former is the real content of the general characteristic. People mistakenly have notions of real universals but that is just a fanciful thought that misunderstands this former type of exclusion.³⁴



As Dharmakīrti explicates, “exclusion” (*vyāvṛtti*) and “the excluded” (*vyāvṛtta*) refer to the same thing, merely the intentions of the speakers are different. Thus, the specific characteristic that is the cause of the false notion of universals is traditionally called “general” (*sāmānya*). Therefore, the Buddha’s perception of the “impermanence” that uniformly grasps all existing dharmas does not perceive a general characteristic, but specific characteristics.

3633. And the cognition that grasps it (i.e., a general aspect such as “impermanence”), that arises by virtue of meditation practice, and that is manifested for the best yoga practitioners, targets [only] the specific characteristic.

Needless to say, what the Buddha grasps cannot be a real universal, as other schools claim.

3634. The mind of a yogi never grasps the universal postulated by other schools, which cannot be determined to be x or non- x , etc.

The universal assumed by other schools does not, in fact, exist. Therefore, it does not obey the law of excluded middle that applies to a reality: “Either it is x or not x .” Thus, the Buddha in meditation does not grasp the universal that other schools claim exists. Therefore, SY’s criticism is misguided. Assuming that the Buddha grasps a single (universal) aspect (*ekākāra*), SY present the following options in the *pūrvapakṣa*.

3252ab. [SY:] The cognition that has a single aspect can be either correct or incorrect.

SY then go on to examine each case in detail.

3252cd. [SY:] If it is correct, then it is refuted by empirical facts; [also,] everything would be one.

3253. And then for you, there would be no [difference between] students and the omniscient [teacher], [between] good and bad, [or between] the statements of either. For their [individual] natures are not determined, though they are different [from each other].

If the Buddha’s perception of the general aspect were correct, then it would be refuted by the actual perception of various mutually different realities. In other words, this claim is refuted by our perception (*pratyakṣabādhā*). Also, since things would be identical under the general aspect, necessary distinctions such as teacher and disciple,³⁵ good and evil, etc. would be lost, because the unique characteristic of each individual would not be grasped by him. How in the world could he teach? On the other hand, if his percep-

tion is wrong, then troubling consequences await him.

3254. [SY:] If, on the other hand, his cognition of a single [aspect] was incorrect, then the omniscient being would be mistaken. In that case, his words are not to be trusted, as the sentences of madmen and others are [not to be trusted].

Then the fundamental Buddhist assertion, “The Buddhist scriptures are correct, because they were composed by the omniscient Buddha,” would no longer be valid.

It is already clear that the above criticism by SY is completely off the mark. For, in the first place, it is not a general aspect that the Buddha grasps. The perception of the Buddha, the supreme yogic practitioner, is non-conceptual and non-erroneous. Indeed, if he grasped universals, as SY say, then his perception would conceptual and mistaken.

3635. [Śāntarakṣita:] The *manas*-based [perceptual cognition]³⁶ of the highest yoga practitioner is non-conceptual and non-erroneous. And if it grasped the [universal], it would be riddled with conceptuality and error.

The perception of the yogic practitioner (here referred to as *manas*-based cognition) satisfies Dharmakīrti’s definition of perception as “devoid of conceptuality and non-erroneous.” Therefore, if the Buddha’s perception grasped a general characteristic (or a universal, as other schools hold,) rather than a specific characteristic, then it would be identical to conceptual cognition and erroneous.

3636. [Conceptual:] Also, the universal that cannot be determined [to be either *x* or non-*x*] has already been explained [in the Apoha chapter] as nothing but conceptual cognition.³⁷

[Error:] That universal, which always accompanies [all substrata of the same category], has already been explained [in the Sāmānya chapter] as lacking an essence [and therefore non-existent]. [In other words, the cognition of it is erroneous.]

As Kamalaśīla notes, it has already been explained in the Apoha chapter that non-existent universals, which cannot be determined to be either x or non- x , are forms of conceptual cognition and therefore essentially identical with it. It has also been explained in the chapter on universals that universals such as cowhood, which always accompanies all cows, have no essence and are nonexistent.

3.7. According to importance

What SY intended by the phrase “according to importance” (*yathāpradhānam*) is the distinction between *sarvajña* and *dharmajña* that Kumārila was concerned with. In other words, is one called omniscient because one cognizes everything, even the things that are not important to human beings, or is one called omniscient because one cognizes the things that are religiously important—in this case, the past, the present, and future causal relations involved in actions?

3255. [SY:] If you say that a person who cognizes an action along with its cause and effect by a supermundane cognition arising from samādhi is accepted as omniscient,

3256. then there is no such [omniscient] person, because there are no [evidential] *pramāṇas* for his existence, whether perception, inference, or verbal testimony, either his own or that of others.³⁸

If the latter is the case, then Kumārila has already argued that there is no perception, inference, or verbal testimony to prove that there is such a person who knows the imperceptible dharma. To this criticism from SY, Śāntarakṣita again responds with a witty repartee.

3637. [Śāntarakṣita:] A person who cognizes action along with cause and effect by means of a supermundane cognition arising from samādhi is called an omniscient person.

3638. Already before, by inference, it has been proved that he exists. Since that

pramāṇa that proves his existence exists, such a person exists.

In response to Kumāṛila's criticism that there is a limit to the improvement of human abilities, in the context of arguing that abilities can be improved indefinitely, Śāntarakṣita concludes the argument as follows: "And therefore, it should be understood that it is possible for all dharmas to appear simultaneously and clearly in a single cognition."³⁹ He sums up his argument that all [existing] dharmas can be manifested in the perception of the Buddha who has practiced repeatedly, as follows: "All dharmas are clearly manifested in one cognition at the extreme point of improvement in practice, because they are real, because they exist, etc., like a beloved woman."⁴⁰

The reason karma is mentioned here rather than the Four Noble Truths is that the focus is on the imperceptible objects. According to SY, there is no *pramāṇa* that proves the existence of a person who knows the imperceptible objects. According to Śāntarakṣita, on the other hand, the existence of such a person is proven by inference.

3.8. Due to capability

The fact that the discussion of capability is placed at the end of these five topics, and the degree to which the present discussion has evolved, suggests that it was historically the latest discussion for Śāntarakṣita in the dispute with Mīmāṃsakas. For Kumāṛila, it is obvious that the omniscient being (*sarvajña*) is the one who is cognizing everything (*sarvaṃ jñāti*), and that the one who *can* potentially cognize everything was not considered at all. Nowhere in Kumāṛila's criticism is there any indication that the issue of capability (in contrast with its activation) was taken into account.

Within Buddhism, however, the discussion of omniscience as an aspect of capability can be found even long before Kumāṛila. A passage in the *Milinda-pañhā* mentions that the cognition of the Buddha as omniscient does not always occur continuously but is dependent on attention (*āvajjanapaṭibaddha*).⁴¹ As Kawasaki 1992: 83-84 and McClintock 2010: 31-32 point out, Vasubandhu distinguishes between the two modes of omniscience, i.e., *saṃmukhībhāva* and *sāmarthyā*.⁴² Thus, here again, we can see a transition in which detailed internal Buddhist issues, which were not the subject of dispute

at the time of Kumāṛila, came to be taken up in the debate with Mīmāṃsā.

There is a statement by Śāntarakṣita that suggests that the issue of capability is closely connected with the problem of simultaneity and sequence. In TS 3627-28 Śāntarakṣita mentions capability (*śakti*) when accepting the view that the Buddha can cognize whatever he wants, whether cognition is simultaneously or sequentially. Furthermore, the first part of the capability theory under discussion (TS 3257) also refers to order, i.e., whether simultaneous or sequential. Based on the stages of theoretical development, the following distinction and non-distinction can be assumed. The Buddhist position of *svecchāsarvajña* (§2.2) as presented in passing in the discussion of order, can be considered to be the same as the capability theory (§5).

	Buddhist view
§1	He cognizes everything <i>simultaneously</i> .
§2.3	He cognizes everything <i>successively</i> .
§2.2 = §5	He <i>can</i> cognize everything in one way or another.

The strongest position on the Buddhist side is that the Buddha perceives everything in a moment. This is an uncompromising, main position (cf. TS 3448). In contrast, there are some concessions in the view that accepts the sequence theory based on the description of 16 minds in the Buddhist scriptures. Finally, the capability theory seems to have made a significant concession. But why is this concession necessary?

This view seems to take into account the criticism from Kumāṛila. He pointed out that Buddhists cannot claim that the Buddha knew everything when the Buddhist sūtras do not explain everything (TS 3146, 3239). Śāntarakṣita addresses this issue in two different places.

	TS <i>pūrvapakṣa</i>	TS <i>uttarapakṣa</i>
A. <i>anibaddhatvam</i>	3146	3321-23
B. <i>ekadeśajñāḥ</i>	3239	3592-95

Material A is provided in the context of addressing the various problems with “all-knowing,” and Material B is given in the context of discussing the problems with the ordinary (i.e., not supernatural) form of oral teaching.⁴³ It is the former, Material A, that concerns our present interest.

The discussion between Kumāṛila and Śāntarakṣita in Material A can be summarized as follows. Kumāṛila says (in the BṬ quoted as TS 3146): If Buddhists claimed that the Buddha knew even what he did not actually state in his own texts, then all poets would be omniscient just because they composed their own poems.⁴⁴ Here, Kumāṛila points out the gap between the amount actually spoken and the infinite amount that the omniscient Buddha should know. Briefly, this problem can be termed as “not composed/spoken/authored” (*anibaddhatva*).

Śāntarakṣita’s response to this can be summarized as follows. First, the Buddha clearly taught selflessness (*nairātmya*) for those who are to be guided. This selflessness is the one and only gateway to auspicious nirvāṇa, and it is feared by those who hold false views of the self.⁴⁵ This selflessness, which transmigrating beings have not yet practiced, when cognized, destroys all evils and, for those who have practiced it, brings such virtues as supernatural powers (*ṛddhyādi*).⁴⁶ If the poets cognized this supreme truth, they could be regarded as omniscient, knowing the main human purpose.⁴⁷ Here Śāntarakṣita asserts that if one knows the primary human goal (liberation, and the means to that goal, selflessness), then one can be considered omniscient. These are the arguments of the two parties in Material A.

Considering the relevant passages throughout the work, we can reconstruct Śāntarakṣita’s intention as follows. Śāntarakṣita’s compromised position was that the Buddha knew everything about important things, i.e., the matters concerning heaven and liberation (cf. TS 3527-28)—and that this could be deduced from his teachings (TS 3312-13). But due to the knowledge of emptiness that removes the two kinds of obstacles (TS 3627d), he is able to cognize everything⁴⁸ including supersensible things (such as karmic retribution) and even unimportant things such as the number of hairs on a person’s head, although it is useless for him to know the latter and he probably does not actually cognize it. But one can say that he has the potential to cognize it. In this way,

indirectly it is inferred that he is also capable of cognizing everything if he wants to (cf. TS 3308, 3409-12).⁴⁹ Also, the existence of the practice (*sādhana*) shows the *possibility* of omniscience (cf. TS 3420-22),⁵⁰ though not the definite existence of an omniscient person. In this way, the capability theory functions as the last bastion of concession on the part of Buddhism.

Kumārila	Śāntarakṣita
If you claim that the Buddha knew even what he did not actually stated in his own texts, then all poets would be omniscient. (≈He taught only a little, not everything.)	Yes, but he taught everything important, i.e., <i>dharma-nairātmya</i> .
	I. Primary proof of omniscience: So he knew everything important.
It is also theoretically impossible for humans to acquire the ability to know everything.	Due to the wisdom of emptiness, he was capable to cognize everything, including supersensible objects and even unimportant things. It is also theoretically possible to find a way to acquire this ability.
How can you say that he cognized everything?	II. Indirect proof of omniscience: Therefore, he was able to cognize everything as he wished, including imperceptible or unimportant objects, and regardless of order, whether simultaneously or successively.

SY considers the case where the Buddhist side stands on this most compromised theory of omniscience, i.e., the capability theory, and rejects the possibility as follows.

3257. [SY:] How can we infer [his cognition of everything], whether simultaneously or sequentially, without its result?⁵¹ Nor does he have the capacity [to cognize everything]. If [you say that he is] capable [of cognizing everything, although there is no evidence for his omniscience], then everything would be [capable].

As already explained, the following chain of causal relationships is assumed here.



As for this verse, at least, it seems that Śāntarakṣita has summarized SY's criticism and rearranged it to get at what he wanted to say. This is because the criticism is fairly faithful to the Buddhist point of view. From this criticism we can already anticipate his response, which runs as follows:

3639. [Śāntarakṣita:] His cognition [that perceives everything], whether simultaneously or sequentially, [is inferred] from the result revealed [i.e., from his teaching], and he also has the capability [to cognize everything], inasmuch as he carries out the teaching.

We have already explained the logic of Śāntarakṣita's answer: from the result, i.e., his teachings, the Buddha's cognition of all things and his capability are inferred. And the question of capability leads to the question of how to cultivate it, namely, the issue of means (*sādhana*, *upāya*) or repeated practice (*abhyāsa*, *bhāvanā*). SY point out that omniscience is impossible because there is no method of practice that is the root cause of this causal chain, as follows:

3258. [SY:] And all individuals have the potential to cognize everything. However, they do not have the means [to attain omniscience], so they never cognize everything.

If it were only potential, we could say that all people have the potential for omniscience, but since there is no means to realize it, omniscience is impossible. In response, Śāntarakṣita shows that the Buddha's omniscience can actually be inferred on the basis of the Buddha's valid teaching qualified by various adjectives, as follows:

3640. [Śāntarakṣita:] He has this spotless teaching of the well-meditated selflessness of [all existing] dharmas.⁵² This has been proven in the entirety of this work, [the TS].

3641. There is a [wonderful] knowledge there that is unworthy of a transmigrating [miserable people, who cannot attain it independently]. It is beyond the reach of Viṣṇu and other [gods]. And the sages very much worship it devotionally with their heads [down].

3642. It destroys all enemies of evil. It is the cause of the attainment of various kinds of prosperity and the cause of the attainment of nirvāṇa.

The content of his teaching, the selflessness of all dharmas (*dharma-nairātmya*), is what he has meditated upon fully. In other words, his teachings are based on his direct experience of selflessness in meditation. The word “spotless” probably refers to the validity of the scripture. The teaching of selflessness, i.e., dependent origination, is proven as valid in the entirety of the TS, as also implied by Śāntarakṣita in the very beginning of the TS, i.e., TS 1-6. The Buddha’s teaching is of course not contradicted by other means of valid cognition. It conveys unique, new, useful information that cannot be known by ordinary people or by Viṣṇu and other gods. Thus, his teaching fully meets the definition of means of valid cognition.

SY flatly deny the Buddhist claim that there was an omniscient being who, through practice, is unique and completely different from others, on the grounds that there is no evidence for this.

3259. [SY:] There is no evidential *pramāṇa* that there was a certain superior, omniscient person out there who had unique means and was different from everyone else.

Śāntarakṣita, again using word play, rejects SY’s criticism outright as follows:

3643. [Śāntarakṣita:] There is an evidential *pramāṇa* for this [claim] that there was

a certain superior, omniscient lord who had unique means and was different from everyone else.

The reason why a person who realizes selflessness is free from mental defilements and becomes omniscient is explained in detail by Kamalaśīla in his commentary on TS 3337. In TS 3339-41, Śāntarakṣita explicitly states that omniscience is limited to the Buddha and not to Kapila and other teachers.

It should be noted here that the “all” in question is limited only to the important matters preached in the Buddha’s teaching. Moreover, his omniscience is identified (in TS 3640a) as the cognition of selflessness, which is effective in repelling ignorance. Śāntarakṣita’s argument is that since the Buddha taught about selflessness, his cognition of selflessness and his ability to know selflessness are inferred. On the surface, that seems to be the end of the discussion of ability. But this alone cannot be the reason for Śāntarakṣita to specifically assert an ability apart from the Buddha’s actual cognition, for it is obvious that if one has a cognition of x , one has the ability to know x . Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the reason to introduce the ability theory is to make room for the demonstration of omniscience in the sense that one does not actually know everything, including unimportant things, but is potentially capable of knowing them. In other words, what Śāntarakṣita really intends here is that it is possible to prove that the Buddha had the ability to know unimportant matters if he wanted to, even if he did not actually cognize them.⁵³ The proof of omniscience in this sense is called by Kamalaśīla (in TSP ad 3308) a consequential/secondary proof (*prāsaṅgikam sādhanam*) because it is derived from the primary proof (*mukhyam sādhanam*), which proves omniscience in everything important, i.e., how to attain heaven and liberation. Indeed, that the ability theory is relevant to this secondary proof of omniscience is suggested by the discussion in §2.2 (which corresponds to §5). There, Śāntarakṣita concludes that the Buddha has the capacity for omniscience because he has abandoned the two kinds of obstacles.

3.9. Concluding remarks on the five perspectives

After rejecting all five options and asserting that omniscience is impossible in any case,

the opponents then connect this discussion to the argument for the invalidity of scripture, as follows:

3260. [Mīmāṃsakas:] Thus, since no one can be omniscient, a man-made statement is not the cause of understanding the dharma.

As for this verse, it is better to see it as a verse that concludes the entire *pūrvapakṣa*, that of both Kumārila and SY together, rather than as a conclusion of only the criticism from SY.⁵⁴ Therefore, this is probably a verse composed by Śāntarakṣita himself.

For Mīmāṃsakas, the discussion began with a comparison between the Buddhist scriptures and the Vedas. The starting point of the debate was to the denial of the Buddhist claim that “the Buddhist scriptures are valid concerning dharmas, because they were composed by the omniscient Buddha.” Here the Mīmāṃsakas return to that starting point. Similarly, Śāntarakṣita, again with word play, completely turns the opponents’ argument on its head.

3644. [Śāntarakṣita:] And thus, since only a particular person can be omniscient, a man-made statement is the cause of understanding the dharma.⁵⁵

It is reasonable to assume that the argument for the validity of scripture based on omniscience is only in response to the Mīmāṃsakas’ criticism and not the view of the Buddhists themselves. Otherwise, as many scholars have worried,⁵⁶ there would be interdependence between scriptural validity and omniscience. As we have already seen, it is the basic view of Dharmakīrti and Śāntarakṣita regarding the proof of omniscience that the Buddha’s omniscience can be deduced on the basis of his flawless teaching. The validity of the teaching itself is not based on the nature of the teacher, but on the perfection of the content of the teaching itself, e.g., it must be not inconsistent with other means of valid cognition.⁵⁷

3.10. A comment on a minute point

As for the question of how to cognize everything, it is possible to set up another question as to whether it is through a cognition *without* a cognitive image (*nirākāra*) or through a cognition *with* a cognitive image (*sākāra*). Such a minor discussion, however, is futile in a discussion with Mīmāṃsakas. Therefore, at the end of this section, Śāntarakṣita notes that there is no need to do so in this regard, as follows:

3645. But considerations such as whether or not it is accompanied by an image are useless with respect to the omniscient being [under discussion here], because just as your cognition of a particular object [functions in a particular way], the supreme [cognition of the omniscient being will function] in the same way.

As Kamalaśīla notes, it is pointless for a Buddhist, a theorist of consciousness-only who does not accept external reality, to argue with a Mīmāṃsaka who assumes external reality about such subtle theoretical differences within Buddhism.⁵⁸ This is because the Buddhists are arguing for omniscience, tentatively acknowledging the existence of external objects, in accordance with the view of the opponents. There is no need for them to develop a detailed discussion here based on a position of consciousness-only. Śāntarakṣita replies, a little impatiently and contemptuously, “we should just assume the same as you.” The way Śāntarakṣita answers, “By the same method as you,” is reminiscent of Śubhagupta’s method of criticism.⁵⁹ In other words, the argument is that if you adopt the theory of formless cognition, for example, then in a similar way we can explain the Buddha’s cognition.

From Kumāṛila to SY, the debate with Mīmāṃsā on omniscience came to cover the very fine points that had been debated within Buddhism. But Śāntarakṣita’s final note is that there is no need to go into so much detail here about the existence or absence of images in the cognition of the omniscient Buddha.⁶⁰

4. The outline of the discussions between SY and Śāntarakṣita

The following table summarizes the argumentative exchange between SY and

Śāntarakṣita.

	Sāmaṭa-Yajñaṭa (TS 3248-59)	Śāntarakṣita (TS 3621-43)
1	[Simultaneously?]	[Simultaneously]
1.1	[Not by a single cognition:] It has not been experienced that contradictory things are cognized simultaneously by a single cognition. (3248abc)	[By a single cognition:] It has been experienced that contradictory things are cognized simultaneously by a single cognition. (3621-25)
1.2	[Not by many cognitions:] Nor has it been experienced that one simultaneously has many cognitions that grasp contradictory things. (3248d)	[We agree:] (Not applicable) (implied in 3626a: <i>ekajñāna</i>)
2	[Sequentially?]	[Three alternative views]
2.1	It is impossible to cognize the infinite number of things of the three times one by one sequentially, even after hundreds of years. (3249)	[We agree. Not sequentially but simultaneously:] Not applicable. We are proving an omniscient being who cognizes everything simultaneously by one cognition. (3626)
2.2		[Both are possible:] He can cognize whatever he wants to cognize, simultaneously or sequentially, as he wishes, because he has destroyed the two kinds of obstacles. (3627-28)
2.3		[Only sequentially:] In the view of sequential cognitions, it doesn't take much time, because the omniscient one cognizes everything that needs to be known, i.e., the four truths, with sixteen cognitions. (3629-30)
3	[Generally?]	[“Generally”=Individually]
3.1	[Not individually:] A person who cognizes everything generally in terms of a single nature does not cognize the specific characteristic of all things. (3250)	[Individually:] A person who cognizes everything generally in terms of a single nature does cognize the specific characteristic of all things. (3631)

	Sāmaṭa-Yajñata (TS 3248-59)	Śāntarakṣita (TS 3621-43)
3.2	[Useless:] Such an omniscient person who cognizes the general characteristic is useless. (3251ab)	[Not applicable:] It is not the case that the omniscient being grasps non-existent universals posited by other schools. (3634)
3.3	[The specific characteristic is not grasped:] The specific characteristic is not cognized by a cognition of the general characteristic. (3251cd)	[The specific characteristic is grasped:] Since the specific characteristic, excluded from the heterogeneous ones, is the cause of fancy, it is here called “general.” (3632) The cognition of generality that arises from practice and manifests in the yogic practitioner targets the specific characteristics. (3633)
3.4	[The cognition of the general characteristic:] The cognition of the general characteristic can be either true or false: (3252ab)	[The cognition of the universal:] If the cognition of the yogic practitioner, which is supposed to be non-conceptual and non-erroneous, grasped a non-existent universal, it would be conceptual and erroneous; but it is not. (3635) It has already been explained that the universals, which the other schools posit as always accompanying, are nothing but conceptual cognition and are non-existent externally. (3636)
3.4.1	[Undesirable consequence of the cognition of the general characteristic:] If true, it contradicts the facts. It also makes everything indistinguishable. (3252cd-53)	
3.4.2	[Falsity of the cognition of the general characteristic:] If false, the omniscient one is deluded; so his word cannot be trusted. (3254)	
4	[According to importance?] Since there is no evidential <i>pramāṇa</i> (perception, inference, verbal testimony) for the existence of an omniscient being who cognizes important matters (actions together with their cause and effect) through transcendental meditative cognition, there is no such being. (3255-56)	[According to importance:] Since there is an evidential inference for the existence of an omniscient being who cognizes important matters (actions together with their cause and effect) through transcendental meditative cognition, there is such a being. (3637-38)

	Sāmaṭa-Yajñaṭa (TS 3248-59)	Śāntarakṣita (TS 3621-43)
5	[Potentially?]	[Potentially]
5.1	One's potential to cognize everything, either simultaneously or sequentially, could be inferred from a particular result, but there is no such result. (3257ab)	One's potential to cognize everything, either simultaneously or sequentially, is inferred from a result revealed, [i.e., from his teachings]. (3639ab)
5.2	Therefore, he has no capability to cognize everything. (3257c)	Therefore, he has the capability to cognize everything. (3639c)
5.3	If you insisted that something is capable of doing something when it is not producing a result, then everything would be capable. (3257d)	As long as there is his teaching as a result, his capability can be inferred. (3639d)
5.4	We acknowledge that all people have the potential to cognize everything, but they will never cognize everything because they lack the means to do so. (3258)	[He is omniscient, because] his teaching is valid. It teaches a well-meditated selflessness of dharmas, it is not refuted by any means of valid cognition, it cannot be accessed by any other person or deity, it is respected by the sages, it destroys all suffering, and it brings prosperity and liberation. (3640-42)
5.5	There is no evidential <i>pramāṇa</i> that there is a certain superior omniscient being who is different from all human beings through a unique method of practice. (3259)	There is an evidential <i>pramāṇa</i> that there is a certain superior omniscient being who is different from all human beings through a unique method of practice. (3643)

5. Concluding remarks

Some of the key points from above are reiterated below.

1. There is a close correspondence between the criticism from Sāmaṭa and Yajñaṭa and the response by Śāntarakṣita. By tracing the exact correspondences between the two, the framework of their discussions becomes clearer.⁶¹
2. The five perspectives that SY discuss represent a stage in the development of the post-Kumārila debate, and while some of them overlap with Kumārila's arguments, they

are all more in line with Buddhist theories. Thus, the controversy with Mīmāṃsā is drawing further into the details of the Buddhist theories.

3. These verses attributed to SY by Kamalaśīla are possibly not original, but rather Śāntarakṣita's reworking of their arguments, selected and/or summarized as appropriate.
4. The five perspectives of omniscience can be organized into the following four options in terms of content. That is, it is simultaneous or sequential, general or individual, only of important or also of nonimportant things, and potential or activated. All four issues have long been discussed within Buddhism and each has its own history, although differences in degree and perspective must be considered.
5. Regarding these four possible options, the strongest non-compromising theory on the Buddhist side (for Śāntarakṣita) is that the Buddha simultaneously perceives everything (important), individually (§1.1).⁶²
6. On the question of order (§2), Śāntarakṣita presents three positions: §2.1. one that does not accept sequentiality and insists on simultaneity; §2.2. one that accepts both; §2.3. and one that admits only sequentiality.
7. The theory on the sixteen cognitions (§2.3) can be evaluated as a more concessive theory on the Buddhist side (at least for Śāntarakṣita). The Buddha cognized everything that is important individually and sequentially. This view goes back to the traditional theory of the *Sarvāstivādins*.
8. According to Śāntarakṣita, the Buddha's insight into impermanence and so forth, such as "everything is impermanent," refers only to individual objects, not to nonexistent universals. The criticism from SY regarding *sāmānya* (or *ekasvabhāva*) is based on the Buddhist theory of the opposition between *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. In Kumāriḷa's BṬ, this argument has its origin in the criticism of *saṃkṣepasarvajña*.
9. Dharmakīrti's point that the Buddha knows only all that is important (the Four Noble Truths) finds a corresponding discussion in Kumāriḷa's BṬ in the somewhat unsystematic discussion of what "all" means; in SY, this debate is organized in terms of whether or not it is important (*pradhāna*). (But the important matter addressed there in TS 3637 is the causality of imperceptible karma.)

10. Śāntarakṣita's description of the theory of potency has in mind Dharmakīrti's description of the Buddha's four epithets. Śāntarakṣita distinguishes between the two aspects with regard to omniscience, depending on whether it is potential or activated. This theory of potency was not an issue at the time of Kumāṛila, but it had a long history within Buddhism, before Kumāṛila. Here, too, we can see that detailed discussions within Buddhism have surfaced in the debate with Mīmāṃsā.
11. In keeping with Dharmakīrti's system, Śāntarakṣita responds as follows: The Buddha's omniscience in all important matters, i.e., *dharma-nairātmya*, is inferred from his valid teachings; omniscience is possible because there exists a method of practice that achieves omniscience.
12. Directly from the Buddha's teaching, it is inferred that the Buddha knew everything important, i.e., *dharma-nairātmya*. This is the primary, direct proof. Indirectly, from his knowledge of *dharma-nairātmya* that removes two kinds of obstacles, it is inferred that he had the capacity to know everything, including unimportant objects. This is the secondary, indirect proof. The theory of potentiality was introduced, presumably, to defend the latter type of indirect proof of omniscience.
13. The method of criticism in TS 3256, which refers to perception, inference, and verbal testimony, strongly suggests that SY rely on the ŚV, which refers to these three, rather than on the BṬ, which refers to the five *pramāṇas*.
14. The solution of *svecchāsarvajña* that Śāntarakṣita presents in his response (§2.2) to the criticism of the sequence theory is, in effect, the same as the capability theory (§5). This is strongly suggested by the presence of the common phrase *yugapat paripātyā vā* in TS 3628a and 3639a. This view agrees in part with Dhammapāla's description (Jaini 1974: 85) that "the Buddha, whether he wishes to know the objects all together, or separately, all at once or one by one, knows them all as he wishes." (But Śāntarakṣita does not allow the position of "all together" (*ekajjhaṃ*), i.e., knowing everything generally through a single nature.)
15. Śāntarakṣita considers the Buddha's yogic cognition of everything in this context to be a cognition based on *manas*.
16. The important thing (*pradhāna*) that the omniscient Buddha knows is, broadly

speaking, the way to attain heaven and liberation (TS 3527, 3642). In some contexts, imperceptible karmic causality is taken up as the object of this wisdom (TS 3637), which obviously contributes to the attainment of heaven (for lay Buddhists), and in other contexts, selflessness is taken up as the object of this wisdom (TS 3640), which contributes to the attainment of liberation.

17. Like Kumārila, what SY consider to be a Buddhist claim is that “the Buddhist scriptures are valid regarding the dharma, because it was authored by the omniscient Buddha.” This, however, differs from the view of Śāntarakṣita and Dharmakīrti, who seek to guarantee the validity of the Buddhist scriptures by scrutinizing their contents, not the quality of their author.

¹ For the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*, see Kataoka 2011: II 27-60. McClintock, however, has a different view on this section. McClintock 2010: 155: “As is common in other portions of this work, the *pūrvapakṣa* includes also a number of objections to the Mīmāṃsaka arguments, some of which may represent Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla’s positions, while others probably represent the views of other contemporary champions of *sarvajñatva*.”

² TSP ad 3246cd.

³ McClintock 2010: 155, 225, and 310, n. 689 translate TS 3247, 3250, and 3260 respectively.

⁴ McClintock 2010: 309-10 translates TS 3640 and 3643-44.

⁵ McClintock 2010: 156 explains the background to this fact as follows: “It is precisely because the chapter represents only a provisional perspective, argued mainly at the Sautrāntika level of analysis, that the authors feel free to offer a variety of solutions to the conundrums raised by Sāmaṇa and Yajñata.”

⁶ *sa kṣīṇair āsravaiḥ*] conjecture ; *sakṣaṇair hyādibhiḥ* GOS, BB, Pātan ms. (Jaisalmer ms. is not available for this part.) The conjectured reading is still uncertain. Based on the Tibetan translation (*zag pa zad pa la sogs rnam kyī*), *ādi* should be added to the word *āsrava*, but it does not easily fit the meter.

⁷ TS 3245ab: *evam sarvajñatā puṃsām svātantryeṇa nirāspadā*./

⁸ For Śāntarakṣita’s usage of *nirāspada*, see, for example, TS 384cd (*iti nityavikalpo ’smin kriyamāṇo nirāspadah*/) and TS 1190 (*bhedābhedādayaḥ sarve vastusatpariṇiṣṭhitāḥ/ niḥsvabhāvaś ca śabdārthas tasmād ete nirāspadāḥ*/).

⁹ Cf. McClintock 2010: 155: “Is the omniscient person asserted to know all things simultaneously, successively, through a single nature, in terms of the most important [things], or due to the capacity [to know all things]?”

¹⁰ See Otake 2001: 45(635). Hamano 1984 identifies Nāgasena as the author of the **Kāyatrayāvatāramukha*, placing its date around 500 AD. According to the correspondence table given by Hamano 1985: 713, however, this argument (kk. 21-25) is missing in the *Suvarṇaprabhāsottamasūtra*,

which otherwise closely corresponds to the *Kāyatrayāvātāramukha*. Thus, the possibility of a later insertion is conceivable.

¹¹ A passage from Dhammapāla's *Paramattha-mañjūsā* is translated by Jaini 1974: 84 as follows: "A question may be raised here: Does this knowledge, when it operates, cognise all objects at once, (simultaneously), or in succession? (*sakiṃ eva ... udāhu kameṇa?*)."

¹² There are references in Vasumitra's *Samayabhedoparacanacakra* (異部宗輪論) to the fact that different schools have different opinions as to whether the *abhisamaya* of the *caturāryasatyas* are simultaneous (Taisho 2031, vol. 49, p. 16, c, l. 28: 四聖諦一時現觀) or sequential (Taisho 2031, vol. 49, p. 16, b, l. 2: 四聖諦漸現觀). See also the *Abhidharma-Mahāvibhāṣa* (Taisho 1545, vol. 27, p. 533, a, ll. 25-27). These certainly form part of the background to this discussion. For the *abhisamaya* of the *caturāryasatyas*, see Mori 1995: 619-627. Cf. also AKBh ad 6.27ab, which refers to scholars of other schools (*nikāyāntarīyāḥ*) who hold the view of a single *abhisamaya* (*ekābhisamaya*). For other relevant sources, see also McClintock 2010: 32-34.

¹³ The following rough chronology is assumed as a working hypothesis. (Cf. Kataoka 2011: II 21, 112; The date of Dhammapāla is uncertain; it is between the 6th-11th centuries.)

400		Vasubandhu
500		Nāgasena
600	Kumārila	Dharmakīrti
		Devendrabuddhi
	Mañḍanamiśra	Śākyabuddhi
700	Sāmaṭa, Yajñaṭa	
	Umbeka	Śāntarakṣita
750		Kamalaśīla

¹⁴ Dhammapāla discusses a similar issue in his *Paramattha-mañjūsā*. A relevant passage is translated by Jaini 1974: 84 as follows: "If it simultaneously comprehends all 'compounded' (*saṃkhata*) objects (divided by distinctions of past, future, present, external, internal, etc.) as well as all 'uncompounded' (*asaṃkhata*) and 'nominal' (*sammuti*) dharmas, like a person looking from a distance at a painting of mixed colours, there will be no cognition of them individually. If that happens, then there would be a deficiency in the knowledge of the Lord; he would be seeing these things as if they were not fully seen. This is comparable to the vision of a yogin, who when he perceives all objects only from the *anātmā* point of view, thinking *sabbe dhammā anattā*, sees only this aspect and nothing else."

¹⁵ Here, the position of cognizing everything individually, which is considered to be the main position in the Buddhist theory, is not explicitly stated but is implicitly assumed.

¹⁶ Cf. NV ad 1.1.4 (39,17-20): *anityādiśabdaviśayatvāc ca na sarvathāhvācyam. anityaṃ pratyakṣaṃ duḥkhaṃ śūnyaṃ anātmakaṃ ca pratyakṣam. eṣāṃ cet śabdānāṃ viśayatām upayāti, katham avācyam. atha nopaiti, na sarvaṃ saṃskṛtam anityam ity etat tathāgatenākhyātavyam*. "And since it is the object of the word "impermanent," etc., it is not at all inexpressible [in language]. Perception is impermanent;

and perception is suffering, empty, and selfless. If [perception is] the object of these words, how can it not be expressed [in language]? Or, conversely, if it is not [expressed in language], then the Tathāgata should not have taught this: all conditioned things are impermanent.”

17 See also Lin 2018 for relevant Chinese sources.

18 See Endo 2002: 61-67 for the expansion of the content of “all” (*sabba*) in the Pali tradition.

19 The two perspectives (*mithyā* and *mudhā*) that Kumāṛila presents in TS 3135 are explained by Kamalaśīla with the words *asaṃbhāvanīya* and *niṣphala*, respectively. Kumāṛila himself uses the word *arhati* in TS 3136 and *anartha* in TS 3137.

20 This dichotomy of the two possibilities of omniscience, potential and activated, finds a parallel in TS 3365, which discusses non-omniscience. Kamalaśīla contrasts the difference with *śaktatā* (potentiality) and *saṃmukhībhāva* (being in operation). Dhammapāla makes a similar distinction in his *Paramattha-mañjūsā*, where he uses the terms *samattha* and *sabba-dhammābodbhanato*. See Jaini 1974: 84.

21 Cf. Kataoka 2011: II 44, 329.

22 See McClintock 2010: 157-158 for *anuloma* and *pratiloma*.

23 Dharmakīrti (PV II 138cd) interprets *śāsana* in the *śāstr* mentioned by Dignāga as the cause of teaching, i.e., repeated practice. In other words, the person referred to by Dignāga as “the teacher” is replaced by “the practitioner” according to Dharmakīrti’s interpretation.

24 Cf. McClintock 2010: 152, n. 376: “The notion that these figures may represent fictional opponents developed in a Buddhist monastic setting to foster debate was suggested to me by John Dunne. That the figures are meant to be counted rhetorically as Mīmāṃsakas is evident both from a statement in one of the verses (TS 3260) and from Kamalaśīla’s commentary.”

25 Regarding the question of whether omniscience is simultaneous or sequential, Nāgasena, the author of the **Kāyatrāyāvatāramukha*, offers his own view that it is simultaneous. See Otake 2001: 45(635) and 2003: 198(1082). See also Jaini 1974: 82 (as well as Kawasaki 1992: 66 and McClintock 2010: 28) for a passage in the *Majjhima-nikāya* that refers to the omniscient being “who at one and the same time can know all” (*sakid eva sabbañ ñassati*).

26 Kumāṛila did refer to impurity, observing that if the Buddha perceived everything directly, then even impure tastes would be perceived by him; but he was not addressing it as a matter of contradiction.

27 Cf. Dhammapāla’s *Paramattha-mañjūsā* translated by Jaini 1974: 84: “But if, on the other hand, it is maintained that he perceives all objects in individual succession (*kamena sabbasmiṃ visaye ñāṇaṃ pavattati*), that too is not correct. The knowables divided by genus, nature, place and time, etc., are infinite; hence there is no possibility of knowing them all one by one.”

28 Cf. a translation by McClintock 2010: 142: “An omniscient being is established to be one for whom the entire sphere of objects of knowledge is pervaded by a single moment of cognition.”

29 Cf. Dhammapāla’s *Paramattha-mañjūsā* translated by Jaini 1974: 85: “the Buddha, whether he wishes to know the objects all together, or separately, all at once or one by one, knows them all as he wishes. Therefore he is called *sammā-sambuddha*.”

30 Cf. AK 6.27ab: *iti soḍaśacitto ’yaṃ satyābhisamayāḥ*.

31 For the sake of accuracy, Kamalaśīla notes that the length of time of one *lava* is equivalent to 720

kṣaṇas.

32 See also a translation by McClintock 2010: 225: “One who understands everything in terms of a nondifferent nature does not know the individual nature (*svalakṣaṇa*) of all things.”

33 See also a translation by McClintock 2010: 226: “One who understands everything in terms of a nondifferent nature understands precisely the individual natures (*svarūpa*) of all things.”

34 McClintock's interpretation differs from mine. McClintock 2010: 230, n. 543: “Although the authors are not explicit on this point, it seems clear that the particular in this instance is not, for example, the external cause of a perceptual image but rather that image itself. We can safely make this claim because it is that image that is the direct cause of the cognition of sameness (*samotprekṣa* or *abhinnākārapratyaya*) to which the authors refer in this passage. Thus, as Kamalaśīla explains, although that mental image is a particular, it can be called a universal insofar as it serves as a cause for that cognition of sameness.”

35 In asserting his final position of the ultimate oneness of consciousness-only, Prajñākaragupta admits that the distinction between self and other cannot be established. See Inami 2011: 191-192.

36 In another passage, Śāntarakṣita also considers omniscience cultivated by repeated practice of meditation to be a cognition based on *manas*. TS 3380: *samastavastusaṃbaddhatattvābhyāsabalodgatam/ sārvañāṃ mānaṣaṃ jñānaṃ mānaṃ ekaṃ prakalpyate//*.

37 Kamalaśīla interprets *yat* as *yasmāt*, but this is impossible because of the existence of *ca*. I interpret it as a construction of *yat ... tat*. The original meaning of Śāntarakṣita is probably “And *yat* A *tat* B.” But Kamalaśīla seems to have reinterpreted it as “*yasmāt* A and B,” separating the first and second halves. Kamalaśīla's interpretation is more in line with the context. However, there is a discrepancy with the position of *ca*.

38 Interestingly, the three *pramāṇas* listed here are in line with the ŚV; the BT, on the other hand, considers five, adding *upamāna* and *arthāpatti*. It might be that SY had the ŚV, not the BT, in mind.

39 TS 3444: *sambhavaṭṭ ekavijñāne sakṛt spaṣṭāvabhāsanam/ sarveṣāṃ api dharmāṇāṃ ataś caivaṃ pratīyatām//*.

40 TS 3446: *bhāvanotkarṣaṇīṣṭhaikabuddhispaṣṭaprakāśanāḥ/ vastusattvādihetubhyaḥ sarvadharmāḥ priyādivat//*.

41 See Jaini 1974: 83, Kawasaki 1992: 67, and McClintock 2010: 32, n. 86.

42 See AKBh 467,15-17: *naiva ca vayaṃ sarvatra jñānaṣaṃmukhībhāvād buddhaṃ sarvañāṃ ācakṣmahe, kiṃ tarhi sāmāthyāt. yā hy asau buddhākhyā saṃtatis tasyā idam asti sāmāthyam yad ābhogamātreṇāvīparītaṃ jñānam utpadyate yatreṣāṃ*. McClintock 2010: 32, n. 86 translates: “And we do not proclaim that the Buddha is omniscient due to having direct awareness in relation to all [things at all times]; rather we do so due to [the Buddha's] capacity [for awareness of all things]. For that mental continuum is called ‘awakened’ (*buddha*) which has the capacity for a nonerroneous awareness to arise spontaneously in relation to anything that is desired.” *Ābhogamātreṇa*, which McClintock translates as “spontaneously,” should rather mean “simply by directing one's attention to the object in question,” as she explains in the main text on p. 31.

43 Material B is discussed in detail in a separate paper (Kataoka forthcoming).

44 TS 3146: *svagrantheṣv anibaddho 'pi vijñāto 'rtho yadīṣyate/ sarvajñāḥ kavayaḥ sarve syuḥ*

svakāvyanibandhanāt//.

45 TS 3321: *advitīyaṃ śivadvāraṃ kudrṣṣīnāṃ bhayaṃkaram/ vineyebhyo hitāyoktaṃ nairātmyaṃ tena tu sphuṭam//.*

46 TS 3322: *saṃsāryanucitaṃ jñātaṃ sarvānarthanivartakam/ tadabhyāsādiyuktānāṃ guṇaratnākaraṃ param//.* (The text has been corrected in accordance with the edition prepared by Sato 2021.)

47 TS 3323: *īdrk ca paramaṃ tattvaṃ jānanti kavayo yadi/ pradhānapuruṣārthajñān sarvajñān ko na manyate//.*

48 One becomes omniscient when obstacles are removed. Dhammapāla, for example, equates *anāvaraṇa-ñāṇa* with *sabbaññuta-ñāṇa* in his *Paramattha-mañjūsā*. See Jaini 1974: 84 and McClintock 2010: 125, n. 325.

49 TS 3308: *svargāpavargasamprāptihetuṇo 'stīti gamyate/ sāṅgān na kevalaṃ, kiṃ tu sarvajño 'pi praṭīyate//.* “Not only is it understood directly that there is one who knows how to attain heaven and liberation, but the omniscient being is also understood [indirectly].” (Cf. McClintock 2010: 329, n. 725.) TSP ad 3308: *mukhyaṃ hi tāvat svargamokṣasamprāpakahetuṇatvasādhanam bhagavato 'smābhiḥ kriyate. yat punar aśeṣārthaparijñātrivasādhanam asya, tat prāsaṅgikam. anyatrāpi bhagavato jñānapravṛtter bādhakapramāṇābhāvāt sāṅgād aśeṣārthaparijñānāt sarvajño bhavan na kenacid bādhyata iti.* “First of all, the main (primary/direct) argument we are making is that the Buddha is the one who knows how to attain heaven and liberation. On the other hand, the argument that he is the one who completely knows all objects is consequential (secondary/indirect). For since there is no means of valid cognition that denies that the Buddha’s cognition works for other things as well, even if he is omniscient because he knows all objects directly, he is not denied by any [means of valid cognition].” Cf. A translation by McClintock 2010: 329-330. She interprets *tatprāsaṅgikam* as a compound and translates it as “a consequence of that [earlier demonstration] (*tatprāsaṅgikam*).” However, this *tat* is a pronoun related to *yat*. She also translates *na kenacid bādhyate* as “no one can refute”, interpreting what *kenacid* refers to as a person (**janena*), but Kamalaśīla’s usage of *bādhyate* suggests that *pramāṇena* is more likely.

50 See also McClintock 2010: 158: “Devendrabuddhi, the first commentator on Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇavārttika*, describes the progressive (*anuloma*) argument as establishing that it is “not absolutely impossible” (*śhin tu mi srid pa = atyantābhava*) for the Buddha to be trustworthy.”

51 This interpretation differs from that of Kamalaśīla. Kamalaśīla says that since there is no result, i.e., since there is no cognizing everything either simultaneously or sequentially, the capability of omniscience cannot be inferred. But this interpretation is not in harmony with Śāntarakṣita’s answer in TS 3639, because in TS 3639, Śāntarakṣita says that cognition is inferred from the result, which he considers to be nothing but the teaching. In Kamalaśīla’s interpretation, the contents of TS 3257ab would overlap with those of 3257c. Kamalaśīla cannot explain the role of *api* in TS 3257c. Kamalaśīla did not comment on TS 3639, saying that it is “self-evident” (*subodham*). It may be that he did not realize his mistake. Or he may have skipped the note to TS 3639 because he realized the discrepancy at that point.

52 McClintock 2010: 309 interprets the compound (*svabhyastadharmanairātmyā*) as follows: “whose stainless teaching is this well-cultivated (*svabhyasta*) selflessness of dharmas”. This compound, how-

ever, should be interpreted as a *bahuvrīhi*, i.e., *svabhyastam dharmanairātmyam yasyām deśanāyām* (or *yasyā deśanāyāḥ*) and not a *karmadhāraya*, which is grammatically impossible.

⁵³ Of course, Śāntarakṣita believed that the Buddha knew everything, including unimportant things. It is only at the level of proof in the dispute with Mīmāṃsakas that Śāntarakṣita is trying to say that even if the Buddha was not actually cognizing unimportant things, it can at least be proven that he was capable of doing so.

⁵⁴ Kamalaśīla also sees it as a verse that concludes the entire *pūrvapakṣa*, when commenting on TS 3260. At TSP 1024,20 he writes: *ittham ityādinā sarvajñasiddhipūrvapakṣa upasamhriyate*.

⁵⁵ McClintock 2010: 308-310 criticizes Richard Hayes' view on this verse.

⁵⁶ See McClintock 2010: 311, n. 691 for previous studies related to this issue.

⁵⁷ Cf. McClintock 2010: 311-315, where she explains “the Linear Approach” in contrast to “the Circular Approach.”

⁵⁸ TSP ad TS 3645 (1130,15-17): *yeyam asmābhir vijñānavādashitair nirākāracintā prāḡ akāri, sā sāmprataṃ bāhyārthābhiniṣṭhān bhavato mīmāṃsakān prati bahirartham abhyupetya sarvajñe pratipādyamāne bhavatām bahirarthavādinām kathamapi nopayujyata eva kartum*. McClintock 2010: 340-341: “Previously we, conforming to (*sthita*) the Vijñānavāda, reflected on [cognitions] without images. In the present context, when we—having accepted external objects [provisionally]—are demonstrating omniscience to you Mīmāṃsakas, who are addicted to external objects, it would not at all be useful to do that [analysis from the Vijñānavāda perspective again] for you externalists (*bahirarthavādin*).”

⁵⁹ TS 2040 (Saccone 2018: 200): *yathā hi bhavatām jñānaṃ nirākāraṃ ca tattvataḥ/ veti cābhūtam ākāraṃ bhūtam arthaṃ tathaiva cet//*. Saccone 2018: 296: “If [Śubhagupta objects,] “As, indeed, in your opinion, cognition is devoid of images in reality, and [yet still] brings an unreal image to awareness, similarly [it will also bring] a real object [to awareness].” (BASK 101)”

⁶⁰ In his commentary to TS 3626, Kamalaśīla introduces a detailed internal Buddhist debate over *nirākāra* and *sākāra* regarding omniscience.

⁶¹ McClintock 2010: 230 (and n. 544), for example, has interpreted TS 3637, which immediately follows TS 3636, as a continuous discussion. However, TS 3636 and TS 3637 are discussions referring to different topics (§3, §4) and should not be interpreted consecutively since there is a significant disconnect between them. Furthermore, the correspondence of TS 3257 with Śāntarakṣita's answer, TS 3639, reveals that Kamalaśīla's interpretation is inadequate. See the footnote to the translation of TS 3257.

⁶² The following is a table of each theory with respect to the four options. (Y: Yes; N: No)

	Simultaneously	Individually	Unimportant	Activated
§1.1=§2.1	Y	Y	(N)	Y
§2.3	N	Y	N	Y
§3	?	Y	(N)	Y
§4	?	Y	N	Y
§5(=§2.2)	Y/N	Y	N	Y
§5'=§2.2	Y/N	Y	Y	N

With regard to the theory of potentiality two types of omniscience can be distinguished: omniscience about important matters, which is proven directly (§5), and omniscience about everything, including unimportant things, which is proven indirectly (§5'). Śāntarakṣita's descriptions in §5 clearly have only the former in mind. It does not, however, deny the latter case, in which the Buddha is capable of cognizing unimportant, useless things, but does not actually cognize them. The description in §2.2 can be more closely aligned with §5'.

Abbreviations and Bibliography

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- AK(Bh) *Abhidharma Kośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu*. Ed. P. Pradhan. Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1967.
- TS(P) *Tattvasaṃgraha(pañjikā)*.
- BB *Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita with the Commentary Pañjikā of Shri Kamalashīla*. Ed. Dvārikadāsa Śāstrī. 2 vols. Varanasi: Baudha Bharati, 1981, 1982. (Second edition) [Corrections not otherwise noted are based on the edition by Sato 2021.]
- GOS *Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita, with the commentary of Kamalaśīla*. Ed. Embar Krishnamacharya. 2 vols. Baroda: Oriental Institute (Gaekwad's Oriental Series 30-31), 1926.
- Taisho The SAT Daizōkyō Text Database, 2018. (SAT 2018).
- NV *Nyāyabhāṣyavārttika of Bhāradvāja Uddyotakara*. Ed. Anantalal Thakur. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1997.
- BT *Brhaddikā* (quoted in TS)
- PV II *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*. See Vetter 1990.
- VV *Vidhivivekaḥ of Maṇḍanamiśra with Commentary; Nyāyakaṇikā, of Vācaspatimiśra, and Supercommentaries, Juṣadhvaṅkaraṇī and Svaditāṅkaraṇī, of Parameśvaraḥ, Critical and Annotated Edition: the Pūrvapakṣaḥ*. Ed. Elliot M. Stern. 3 parts. Dissertation submitted to the University of Pennsylvania, 1988. (A revised version consisting of the *pūrvapakṣa* and the *uttarapakṣa* is being prepared by Stern. I thank him for allowing me to refer to the manuscript prior to publication.)

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