Why Is You Don’t Know That Different from You Don’t Know It? 
Reanalyzing Anaphoric Expressions from an Intersubjective View

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0. Introduction

This paper offers an analysis of the use of it and that from the perspective of intersubjective interaction between the dialogue participants, namely, the speaker and the hearer. The paper examines the usage of the two anaphoric expressions, especially when they refer to clausal antecedents, events or propositions. Specifically, I analyze how the choice of the expressions is related to intersubjective interaction of the two dialogue participants.

It and that are often considered as belonging to different grammatical categories, that is, it is a pronoun and that is a demonstrative. However, in many cases these two anaphoric expressions are interchangeable; the same antecedent can be referred to either by it or that without significant difference in meaning as in (1) below.

(1) Tom knew that Joanne wanted to sell the car, and it/that bothered him.

(Kamio and Thomas 1999: 290)

On the other hand, there are many other cases where it and that are not interchangeable. In (2a), that is the only option in the question. In (2b), both it and that can be used to refer to the same antecedent, yet there would be a subtle but significant pragmatic difference between the two sentences. Furthermore, with the same negative sentence, you don’t know, only that is allowed in (2c) while it is obligatory in (2d).

(2) a. Vivian: You know your foot’s as big as your arm from your elbow to
your wrist? Did you know that/*it?  
(Pretty Woman)
b. You're an excellent doctor. You know it/that.  
(City of Angels)
c. Kit: You definitely like him. Well, he’s not a bum. He’s a rich, classy guy.
  
Vivian: Who’s gonna break my heart, right?
Kit: No, no. Come on. You don’t know that/*it.  
(Pretty Woman)
d. Loraine: Shut your filthy mouth. I’m not that kind of girl.
  
Biff: Well, maybe you are and you just don’t know it/*that yet.  
(Back to the Future)

(Although the underlined word was not actually used in the movie listed, it is possible in this context.)

As is seen in (2), the distribution of it and that with the cognitive verb know is quite distinctive and significant. This seems to be related to the fact that in each case of (2), it is the cognition of the dialogue participants that is inquired about, negated or referred to by each speaker. Verhagen argues that in order to understand linguistic phenomena it is essential to consider the ability of human beings to engage in “deep cognitive coordination with others (2005: 4)”. That is to say, intersubjective interaction between the speaker and the hearer should be taken into account when linguistic expressions are analyzed. Incorporating this view, this paper analyses the use of these two referring expressions in English.

Regarding the choice of expressions, this paper claims that there are two aspects that are to be reflected on. First, the speaker chooses an expression based on what he/she assumes to be in the hearer’s mind. Second, the speaker adjusts his/her way of viewing the situation, accordingly his/her presenting of it, so as to match the way that he/she wants the hearer to take the utterance. Put differently, the speaker anticipates how the hearer will accept his/her utterance, which will effect the expressions used.

In section 1, earlier studies are reviewed and the problems are analyzed. In section 2, Langacker’s model of the control cycle is introduced and examined to see if the model explicates the problems raised in section 1. In section 3, based on Verhagen’s theory, the hypotheses of this paper are proposed, and in section 4, it is shown how the hypotheses can account for the anomalies of the previous theories. In section 5, cases of Japanese sentence-final particle, yo and ne, are
briefly considered.

1. Previous Studies and their Problems

1.1 The Givenness Hierarchy

Gundel et al. (1993) presuppose a hierarchy in the speaker’s cognitive state, and they explain that the referring expressions are determined based on the status of the referent’s location in the hierarchy.

[The Givenness Hierarchy]

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In the case of *it* and *that*, if the referent is in the state of being “activated” through visual, audio sense or linguistic codes, *that* will be used. When the referent reaches the “in focus” state in the hearer’s cognitive status, *it* will be used. Based on this assumption, Gundel et al. account for the use of *it* and *that* in (3) as follows.

(3)

a. Sears delivered new siding to my neighbors with the bull mastiff.
   #It’s/That’s the same dog that bit Mary Ben last summer.

b. My neighbor’s bull mastiff bit a girl on a bike. It’s/That’s the same dog that bit Mary Ben last summer. (Gundel et al. 1993: 280)

In (3a) the referent the bull mastiff is at the stage of being “activated” because the hearer has only perceived the referent by linguistic code; thus the referent has not yet reached the state of being “in focus.” Therefore, only *that* is possible here. On the other hand, in (3b), my neighbor’s bull mastiff is the topic of the discourse, being at the center of the hearer’s attention. Since the referent is at the stage of being “in focus,” *it* is possible. Furthermore, the cognitive state of being “activated” is included in the state of being “in focus,” that is, when the referent is in focus it has necessarily experienced the process of being “activated.” Consequently, *that* is also possible in (3b).

While the givenness hierarchy seems to account for a number of phenomena as in (3), it is unlikely to explain adequately the varied uses of *it* and
that in examples in (2) brought up in the introduction. In (2d), for example, only it is possible as a referring expression. This usage contradicts Gundel et al.’s claim that the condition which allows it will include the one which allows that because each cognitive state entails all lower cognitive states. If their claim is correct, that should be also possible in (2d), which is not the case.

1.2 Prior Knowledge

Kamio and Tomas (1999) explain the use of it and that in terms of the speaker’s “prior knowledge.” If an antecedent proposition is prior knowledge to the speaker, it will be used. That, on the other hand, will be used if the proposition is still being processed in the speaker’s mind. Based on this assumption, they explain the difference in the usage of the two expressions as follows.

(4)  A: Overnight parking on the street is prohibited in Brooklyn.
    B1: That’s absurd!
    B2: It’s absurd!

In (4) above a speaker who is familiar with the traffic rule in Brooklyn would use it as B2, whereas B1, who hears about the rule for the first time, would use that. Kamio and Thomas explain that B2 uses it because the traffic rule is prior knowledge to her, while B1 uses that because the rule, still being processed in her mind, has not yet reached her long-term memory.

Their theory seems plausible in (4), where only the speaker’s knowledge matters. However, when the addressee’s knowledge comes into question, the theory loses its cogency. Examples abound. In (2a), while the proposition your foot’s as big as your arm from your elbow to your wrist is obviously prior knowledge to the speaker, that is the only possibility. This contradicts what the theory predicts. Furthermore, in (2b), with that, the speaker is trying to help his girlfriend recognize her superior ability as a doctor. With it, on the other hand, the speaker assumes that the hearer already possesses a fair degree of confidence, which he tries to let her know. This pragmatic difference cannot be accounted for in terms of the speaker’s prior knowledge.

In this section, previous studies were examined and their problems were pointed out. In the following section, Langacker’s model of the control cycle is introduced and examined as to whether it gives an explanation of those problems.
2. Langacker’s Control Cycle and the Two Layers of Conceptualization

In this section, Langacker’s model of the control cycle is introduced in order to examine if it can unravel some of the anomalies pointed out in the previous sections.

With the verb *know*, which is one of the factive predicates, where truth of complements is generally presupposed and therefore even when the main clauses are negated the complements are not (Kiparsky and Kiparsky 1970). Langacker argues that this specific feature of factivity will be accounted for by presupposing two layers of conceptualization: one layer, subjectively construed, the other layer, objectively construed. In the former layer, it is the speaker who conceptualizes the whole situation and presents it (2002: 203). In the latter, the conceptualizer is the sentence subject, who plays the role of the subject of conceptualization in the objective layer, as well as the object of conceptualization of the speaker. This is illustrated in Fig. 1.

![Diagram of Langacker's Control Cycle](image)

Langacker (2002, 2009), bringing this idea of the two layers of conceptualization into his model of control cycle, sheds some light on factivity of the verb *know*.

(5) a. Eric believes that beer prevents cancer.
   b. Eric *knows* that beer prevents cancer. (Langacker 2002: 203)

In (5a), which is illustrated in Fig. 2 (a), the sentence subject Eric (C₁) accepts as real the proposition *beer prevents cancer* (P₁). This is depicted by the line between C₁ and P₁ in the objective layer. At the same time, in the subjective layer,
the speaker (C₀) holds the proposition (P₀) that Eric entertains this belief. Since the speaker and his belief stay off-stage, they remain implicit. Only the proposition P₀ is overtly expressed.

In (5b), illustrated in Fig. 2 (b), where the factive verb know is used, unlike in the case of the verb believe, there are two lines connected to the speaker C₀. The first line is connected from the speaker to the proposition P₀, that is, Eric holds the proposition P₁. The second line is connected from the speaker directly to P₁, that is, beer prevents cancer. This second line indicates that the proposition P₁ is “independently accessible to the speaker and accepted as being valid (Langacker 2002: 204).” Thus, in the case of the verb know, if the main clauses are negated the complements are not because the speaker holds the proposition as valid. In this way, the specific feature of factivity is explicated.

Fig. 2

(Langacker 2002: 204)

Now, let us see one of the examples in the introduction. Sentence (6) is a case where the cognition of the sentence subject is negated.

(6) Loraine: Shut your filthy mouth. I’m not that kind of girl.
Biff: Well, maybe you are and you just don’t know it/*that yet.

(= (2d))

In you don’t know it in (6), the sentence subject, you, doesn’t know the proposition, while it is implied that the speaker knows the proposition. This will be illustrated in the model as follows. First, in the objective layer, the cognition of the proposition, P₁, by the sentence subject, C₁, is negated, which is in bold line,
indicating it is profiled. Next, in the subjective layer, the cognition by the speaker is illustrated by the two lines: one connects $C_0$ to $P_0$, the other $C_0$ directly to $P_1$. The former line illustrates that the speaker holds the proposition that the sentence subject, *you*, does not hold the proposition as real. The latter line illustrates that the speaker himself holds the proposition $P_1$ *maybe you are* as valid. This accounts for the implication that the speaker knows the proposition in spite of the fact that the sentence is negated.

On the other hand, as for (7), its semantic value cannot be fully captivated by Langacker’s model of the control cycle.

(7) Kit: You definitely like him. Well, he’s not a bum. He’s a rich, classy guy.

Vivian: Who’s gonna break my heart, right?

Kit: No, no. Come on. You don’t know *that/*it. (= (2c))

In *you don’t know that* above, there is an implication that neither the hearer nor the speaker knows the proposition *who’s gonna break my* (Vivian’s) *heart*. Put differently, in (7), unlike in (6), not only the sentence subject’s cognition is negated but also the speaker’s cognition is negated. This could mean that the direct line between $C_0$ and $P_1$ in Fig. 2 (b) has disappeared. In other words, in the case of *you don’t know that*, the conceptualization in the subjective layer is also negated. The model of the control cycle does not give any account of this matter.

3. Verhagen’s Theory and the Hypotheses of this Paper

In this section, Verhagen’s theory of intersubjectivity is introduced, based on which the hypotheses of this paper are proposed.

When human beings learn about the world, they “learn about the world ‘through’ others, and not only via their personal interaction with the environment (Verhagen 2005: 3).” Thus, in regard to the analysis of linguistic phenomena, Verhagen, emphasizing the importance of humans’ ability to take into account other minds in relation to an object of conceptualization and to engage in deep cognitive coordination with others, maintains as follows:

For a range of linguistic phenomena which are arguably quite
Accordingly, in his construal configuration, he proposes two conceptualizers as the “ground,¹” namely the speaker and the hearer, who take part in conceptualizing the situation. The speaker assumes the hearer’s viewpoint, based on which he/she invites the hearer to jointly attend to an object of conceptualization in some specific way and coordinate conceptualization. In this way, the participants of a discourse update the common ground between the two and increase the amount of their common knowledge. This is illustrated in Fig. 3.

Fig. 3 The Construal Configuration and its Basic Elements
(Verhagen 2005, 2007)

In Fig. 3, the ground consists of conceptualizer 1, the speaker, and conceptualizer 2, the hearer. The vertical line between the two conceptualizers and the object of conceptualization indicates “joint attention,” and the horizontal line between the two conceptualizers represents “coordination relation.”

Based on the construal configuration elaborated by Verhagen, the hypotheses of this paper are proposed as follows. The construal configurations for *it* and *that* are depicted as in Fig. 4. The bold lines indicate the parts profiled; that is, the elements where focus of attention is put.

**The Hypotheses:**

*It:* When *it* is used, the speaker presents the object of conceptualization at the objective level. Thus the elements at Level O are profiled.

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¹While Langacker defines the “ground” as an ensemble of communicative events (1987: 126; 1990: 9), he basically presupposes a single “viewer” in his “viewing arrangement.”
That: When *that* is used, the speaker (conceptualizer 1) invites the hearer (conceptualizer 2) to jointly attend to the object of conceptualization and coordinates his/her conceptualization at the subjective level. Thus the elements at Level O, the vertical line, and the right half of the horizontal line at Level S are profiled.

\[ \text{Fig. 4} \quad \text{Construal Configurations for *It* and *That*} \]

In this section, the hypotheses of this paper were proposed based on Verhagen’s theory of intersubjectivity. In the next section, it will be shown how the hypotheses elucidate the cases brought up in the introduction.

### 4. Explanation Based on the Hypotheses

In this section, it is demonstrated how the hypotheses of this paper explicate the cases brought up in the introduction.

First, in 4.1, the cases are analyzed, where the speaker’s assumption about the hearer’s mind or perspective determines the expressions. Then in 4.2, an example is shown, where the speaker chooses expressions in the way that he/she wants the hearer to view the situation.

#### 4.1 Choice Based on the Speaker’s Assumption about the Hearer’s Mind

The first example is a case where only *that* is acceptable as a referring expression. The hypotheses of this paper will give explanation of this example.

(8) Vivian: Did you ever notice how Callahan never asks Warner… to bring him his coffee? He’s asked me at least ten times.

Elle: Men are helpless. You know *that/*it. \text{ (*Legally Blonde*)}
Here, by the utterance *you know that*, the speaker is not describing an event that the sentence subject/the on-stage conceptualizer (*you*), knows something about. Instead, the utterance should be taken as an instruction, from the speaker to the addressee, to recognize the proposition she put forward. The speaker, Elle, thinks that the real reason for Professor Callahan’s never asking the male student for coffee is that Warner cannot do things. However, the hearer, Vivian, doesn’t seem to realize it and complains about his asking her for coffee many times. Thus, by the utterance *you know that* the conceptualizer 1 is inviting the conceptualizer 2 to jointly attend to the object of conceptualization, that is, the proposition *men are helpless*, and coordinating her conceptualization, which results in updating the common ground between the two conceptualizers. Consequently, not only the proposition at the objective level, but also the joint attention and the coordination relation between conceptualizers 1 and 2 at the subjective level are profiled as depicted in Fig. 5, which matches with the configuration of conceptualization of *that* in our hypotheses. This is why *that* is used in (8).

Fig. 5

\[ you know that \]

On the other hand, *it* is not acceptable here. According to the hypotheses, when *it* is used, the event “*you know*” is presented at Level O: that is, “Vivian’s knowing the proposition” is presented as an objective event. This will contradict the purpose of Elle’s utterance, where she aims to bring Vivian to view the situation in the same way as she does. As a consequence, *it* is not possible.

The next example, in contrast, is a case where joint attention is assumed by the speaker; accordingly it is a case where the coordination relation at the subjective level is not profiled.

(9) Jordan: Maggie, you’re an excellent doctor. You know *it*. \( (= (2b)) \)

Seeing Maggie, who has lost her confidence as a doctor, Jordan is saying that she is an excellent doctor as well as that she herself knows about her excellent ability
as a doctor. Put differently, in (9), the speaker is describing two events: one, the event that sentence subject is an excellent doctor; the other, the event that the sentence subject knows that she is an excellent doctor. Thus, the utterance you know it is a description of the event that on-stage conceptualizer, you, knows something. Consequently, neither inviting conceptualizer 2 to the joint attention nor the coordination relation of the two is profiled, which is illustrated in Fig. 6. This fits the configuration of it in our hypotheses. For this reason, it is chosen.2

![Fig. 6](image)

Next, the following is a case in which the hearer’s cognition is questioned, making only that acceptable to refer to the antecedent proposition3.

(10) Vivian: You know your foot’s as big as your arm from your elbow to your wrist? Did you know that/*it? (=2a)

What is inquired about in a question such as in (10)? As Verhagen argues in regard to the case of do you think that…?, it is the hearer’s cognition itself that is questioned (2005: 120). Thus, the proposition your foot’s as big as your arm from your elbow to your wrist at the objective level, joint attention towards the proposition, and the hearer’s perspective or understanding at the subjective level are put into profile as is shown in Fig.74. Thus, only that is acceptable.

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2That is also possible in (9), although with a slight but significant pragmatic difference. With that, the speaker, assuming the hearer doesn’t recognize her ability as a good doctor, is instructing the hearer to realize her own excellent ability as a doctor.

3 When a noun phrase is referred to, it is possible. Such cases are not considered in this paper.

4Verhagen points out that this is a way of probing the hearer’s mind (2007: 120).
As the final example in this section, I will examine a case where the hearer’s cognition is negated at the subjective level.

(11) Kit: You definitely like him. Well, he’s not a bum. He’s a rich, classy guy.
Vivian: Who’s gonna break my heart, right?
Kit: No, no. Come on. You don’t know that/*it. (= (2c))

In (11), Vivian is afraid that she might end up being deserted by the man. Seeing this, Kit is trying to persuade her not to be too pessimistic. This is not a case where the speaker is describing the sentence subject’s ignorance of something. Instead, the speaker is trying to adjust the hearer’s way of understanding the situation to the view that the speaker holds towards the situation.

Verhagen, discussing the semantic value of sentential negation\(^5\), argues that what is profiled in sentential negation is two opposite viewpoints held by the conceptualizers, as well as the coordination relation where the view of conceptualizer 2 is to be rejected and replaced by that of conceptualizer 1 (2007: 67-68). This argument is applicable to the present analysis of the utterance you don’t know.

In the utterance you don’t know that in (11), two opposite views (conceptualizations), entertained by the two conceptualizers, are involved. Conceptualizer 2, Vivian, has the conceptualization “I know the proposition (being deserted by the man).” Seeing this, conceptualizer 1, inviting conceptualizer 2 to jointly attend to the conceptualization “you don’t know the proposition (being deserted by the man),” rejects her present conceptualization.

\(^5\)Verhagen analyzes the semantic difference between Mary is not happy and Mary is unhappy (2007: 67-68).
and consequently builds a new ground for common knowledge. Thus, two perspectives of the two conceptualizers are profiled, as well as the coordination relation of the two.\(^6\) All the elements of the configuration are profiled, which is illustrated as in Fig. 8. This includes the configuration of *that* in the hypotheses, consequently *that* is used.

![Fig. 8](image)

\(O: \text{object of conceptualization} \)

\(S: \text{subject of conceptualization} \)

**4.2 Taking Account of How the Hearer will Receive the Utterance**

Up to this point, it has been shown that the choice of the anaphoric expressions depends on the speaker’s assumption about the hearer’s mind/perspective. When joint attention is presupposed, the speaker chooses *it*; when joint attention is not presupposed the speaker chooses *that*. However, there are cases where the speaker considers how the hearer would receive the utterance, which affects the choice of expressions. One such case is (12) below.

(12) Loraine: Shut your filthy mouth. I’m not that kind of girl.
Biff: Well, maybe you are and you just don’t know *it/*\textit{that} yet.

\((= (2d))\)

Here, the speaker, Biff, assumes that the hearer, Loraine, does not share the proposition *maybe you* (Loraine) *are* (that kind of girl) with him; hence joint attention is not presupposed by the speaker. Nevertheless, *it* is chosen to refer to the proposition.

Honda (2006),\(^7\) emphasizing the significance of “semantics of presentation,” argues that when the speaker presents the situation to the hearer, he/she takes into account how the hearer would receive the utterance, which effects the way the speaker views the situation and presents it to the addressee.

\(\text{---A horizontal line between the conceptualizers represents the process of coordinating cognition.}\)

\(\text{---Honda analyzes the example of Japanese postpositional particle }\textit{tari} \text{ (2006: 8-10).}\)
Put differently, how the speaker views the situation is not decided solely in relation to the situation itself, but in relation to the way he wants the hearer to view the situation.

In (12) the proposition is not jointly attended by the hearer, yet the speaker deliberately views the proposition as jointly attended by the hearer, which he presents to the hearer. By being presented as common knowledge with the hearer, the proposition would sound as if it were a hard, inescapable fact. Now the speaker presents the proposition not just as his personal judgment but as an objective reality shared by others. In a sense, the choice of it here is a rhetorical strategy to make the statement more plausible and convincing.

In this section explanations were given, based on the hypotheses of this paper, to the anomalous cases brought up in the introduction.

5. Japanese Sentence-Final Particle Yo and Ne

In the previous sections, regarding English anaphoric expressions it and that, the choice of the expressions was discussed in relation to intersubjective interaction between the speaker and the hearer. This perspective can be applied to the choice of expressions in other languages. In this section, the case of Japanese sentence-final particles, yo and ne, is briefly reexamined in the light of intersubjective interaction between the two dialogue participants. It will be shown that a more inclusive explanation, which covers a wider range of varied usage of yo and ne, can be given to the issue.

When engaging in communication, the speaker attempts to establish joint attention with the hearer and to build up common knowledge between the two. In this section, the sentence-final particles, yo and ne, are both regarded as a means of establishing joint attention between the two interlocutors. The two particles, however, differ from each other in respect to how joint attention is established. Based on this idea, the following hypotheses are proposed:

**The Hypotheses:**

*Yo*: When yo is used, the speaker invites the hearer to jointly attend to the object of conceptualization and coordinate his/her conceptualization.

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8Honda suggests, in one of his notes, that yo is used when the speaker invites the
Thus, the elements at Level O, the vertical line, and the right half of the subjective layer are profiled.

Ne: When *ne* is used, the speaker shows that he/she views the situation in the same way as the hearer. Thus the elements at Level O, the vertical line, and the left half of the subjective layer are profiled.

![Diagram](image)

**Fig. 9** Configuration of Conceptualization for *Yo* and *Ne*

In 5.1 and 5.2, it will be shown that the hypotheses explain the use of *yo* and *ne*.

**5.1 Yo and Ne as Two Different Means of Establishing Joint Attention**

First, let us look at cases where the choice is made based on the speaker’s assumption about the hearer’s perspective.

(13) Kokono pasuta oishii desu *yo*

“This restaurant serves good pasta.”

In (13), the speaker assumes either that the hearer has no idea about the meals at the restaurant, or that the hearer has a different point of view from the speaker. In either case, in order to have common knowledge with the hearer, the speaker invites him/her to jointly attend to the proposition *this restaurant serves good pasta*, coordinating the hearer’s conceptualization. Thus, the object of conceptualization, the joint attendance, and the coordination relation (the right half of the horizontal line at the subjective level) are profiled, which fits the configuration of *yo* in our hypotheses. This is why *yo* is used in (13).

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*hearer to joint attention; *ne* is used when the speaker follows the hearer (2006: 11).*
Example (14), on the other hand, is a case, for instance, where the speaker is eating with the hearer, who also seems to be enjoying the food. The speaker assumes that the hearer shares the same view. In this case, by letting the hearer know that the speaker has the same view towards the proposition, the speaker establishes joint attention with the hearer. Thus, the object of conceptualization and conceptualization of conceptualizer 1, that is, the vertical line and the left half of the configuration at the subjective level, are profiled. The right half of the horizontal line at the subjective level is not profiled since conceptualizer 2 need not coordinate his/her conceptualization. This configuration fits the configuration of *ne*, and therefore *ne* is chosen.

### 5.2 An Utterance with *Ne* Sounds Softer or Stronger?

In this final section, let us examine cases where the speaker presupposes how the hearer will receive the utterance, which affects the speaker’s way of viewing the situation and presenting it to the hearer. The first example is a case where the utterance sounds softer with *ne*.

(15) A: Asuno tennki wa dou deshou
    “What will the weather be like tomorrow?”
B: Asumo ame deshou *ne*
    “It will rain again.”
C: Asumo ame deshou
    “It will rain again.”
    (Ikeda 1995: 103)

In the case above, B’s utterance with *ne* sounds softer and gentler than C’s utterance without it. The hearer would feel closer to speaker B, resulting in intimacy between the two (Ikeda 1995: 103).

Example (15) is not a case where the speaker assumes that the hearer has the same outlook as his/hers. Nevertheless, the speaker adds the sentence-final particle *ne*. According to the hypotheses, when *ne* is used, the speaker presents that he/she views the situation in the same way as the hearer. Thus, by adding *ne*
at the end of the sentence, the speaker sounds as if he/she viewed the situation in
the same way as the hearer; as if the speaker was taking the view in accordance
with the hearer. This would be effective in establishing good rapport, which is
why the speaker chooses ne.

Adding ne, however, does not always make the utterance sound either softer
or harmonious. Depending on the context, statements with ne can make the
speaker sound determined and unyielding as in example (16) below.

(16) A: Jubun ja naidesu ka
   “Isn’t that enough?”
   B: Watashi toshite wa mitome rare masenn ne
   “I cannot accept it.”
   (Kato 2001: 33)

Here, B’s proposition I cannot accept it is not shared by the hearer A.
Nonetheless, the sentence-final ne is put at the end of B’s utterance, which makes
the statement a strong assertion. Here, by adding ne, the speaker sounds as if
he/she viewed the situation in accordance with the hearer, which results in the
implication that the speaker is adopting an external point of view. That is, the
judgment is not made solely by him/herself, but made in accordance with
someone with the authority to make a judgment. As a result, the statement sounds
unchallengeable, and as a result, the speaker sounds decisive and unyielding.

Ne could make utterances either softer or stronger depending on the context
in which they are used. However, as was shown, in either case ne has the same
construal configuration; that is, the speaker shows/indicates that he/she views the
situation in the same way as the hearer. Thus the elements at Level O, the vertical
line and the left half of the subjective layer, are profiled.

6. Conclusion

In this paper I proposed a new analysis of the use of English referring
expressions, it and that. The analysis was done from the perspective of
intersubjective interaction between the dialogue participants: that is, the speaker’s
taking account of others’ minds as well as joint attention and coordination relation
between the two interlocutors. Two points were emphasized: first, the speaker
chooses expressions based on his/her assumption about the hearer’s
perspective/mind; second, the speaker adjusts his way of viewing the situation so that the hearer will take the utterance in the way that the speaker desires. In communicating with others, the speaker not only exchanges information with others, but also regulates and assesses the other’s perspective in order to build up common ground. This paper attempted to shed light on this aspect of language use, exemplifying the choice of anaphoric expressions in English.

References


Works Cited


照応表現を「間主観性」の観点から考える
you don’t know that はなぜ you don’t know it と違うのか？

中島 千春
（福岡女学院大学短期大学部）

英語の指示表現 it と that の使い分けについて、間主観性の観点から考察する。
it/that が命題や出来事を指示し、認識動詞 know 共起する場合、主語と文タイプ
によって特徴的な分布が観察される (Nakashima 2005)。これを談話における指示対
象の地位 (Gundel et al. 1993)や、話し手の知識 (Kamio & Thomas 1999)といった従
来の理論から説明することはできない。また Langacker (2002)は認識動詞と命題、
概念化者の関係について、二つの層 (objective layer と subjective layer)を提案する
が、そこでは概念化に関わるのではなく基本に一人の認知主体（話し手）とされるた
め、十分な説明を与えることはできない。

Verhagen (2005, 2007)は、話し手と聞き手の間主観的なインタラクションもまた
概念化の形成に関わると考え、発話とは相手の観点を読み、相手に対象への共同
注視を促し、二人の間の概念化の調整を行うことであると論じる。更には、話し
手が聞き手の受け取り方を「先読み」するということがあるが、本多 (2006) は、
話し手が聞き手の捉え方に合うように自身の捉え方を調整するのだと主張する。
本稿は、この二つの観点から英語の照応表現 it/that の使い分けについて捉え直す
ことで、これまでの理論では十分に説明できなかった用例の説明を試みる。